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CONTENTS

	PAGE
ADDRESS BY H. E. THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF IN INDIA, AN—	7
ADOWA By Major B. R. Mullaly.	379
BOX, THE— By F. T.	401
CAMBRAI, 1917 By Captain F. Mackenzie.	404
CHINA TO-DAY AND TO-MORROW By "Hsueh Sheng."	23
"CONTACT!" By "X. L. O."	229
DARDANELLES CAMPAIGN, THE— By Major H. C. Westmorland, D.S.O.	418
DEBT By "M. Stone."	410
DUCK SHOOTING IN INDIA By Colonel E. J. Ross, O.B.E., M.C.	435
EDITORIAL	1, 149, 259, 374
EDUCATION FOR ALL By a P. S. C., C. O.	351
EMPIRE OR..... By Colonel F. Dickins.	91
FOR WANT OF A NAIL By Major T. H. E. Woods.	200
FOREIGN LEGION, THE— By Captain J. A. Codrington.	319
FOREIGN TUNES AS REGIMENTAL MARCHES By J. Paine.	484
FOREST WARS By Captain R. C. Howman.	287
GENTLEMAN CADETS OF THE INDIAN ARMY TO-DAY AND YESTERDAY By C. A. Swainson.	240

INDIA—THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL	
HORIZON	328
By Captain C. B. Birdwood.	
INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION	185
By Major-General H. Rowan-Robinson, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.	
INFANTRY—THICK OR THIN	51
By "Hoplite."	
INTERNATIONAL SAAR FORCE, 1934-35, THE—	158
By Lt.-Col. A. G. Kenchington, M.C.	
KENYA AND UGANDA	176
By Major A. B. Gibson.	
LAPLAND AND KARELIA, EXPERIENCES IN—	423
By Brig.-General F. G. Marsh, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
LETTERS TO THE EDITOR	131, 244, 368, 493
LIGHT INFANTRY AND MOUNTAIN WARFARE	
TRAINING, A FEW THOUGHTS ON—	86
By Captain F. D. S. Fripp.	
LIGHT TANKS WITH THE ARMY IN INDIA, THE	
EMPLOYMENT OF—	122
By Major H. G. V. Roberts, M.C.	
LYAUTEY, MOROCCO, AND THE N. W. F. P.	267
By "Spingirai."	
LYAUTEY, MOROCCO AND THE N. W. F. P. (A REPLY)	455
By "Shiggadar."	
MAN-DAY PROBLEMS	207
By Captain H. G. L. Brain.	
MARTIAL AND NON-MARTIAL RACES	16
By Major-General E. C. Alexander, C.B., C.I.E., D.S.O.	
MESOPOTAMIAN CAMPAIGN, THE FIRST BATTLE OF	
JABAL HAMRIN, MARCH 25th, 1917—	356
By "Scorpio."	
MILITARY NOTES	137
PERSIAN INTERLUDE, A—	471
By Major F. T. Birdwood.	
PROMOTION IN THE WAR BLOCK	282
By Captain G. Creffield, M.B.E.	
RAILWAY BATTALION OF THE AUXILIARY FORCE	
(INDIA), THE TRAINING OF A—	195
By Lieut. D. M. Hambly.	
REMOUNTS, A SUGGESTED METHOD, BASED ON THE	
LICHTWARK PROCEDURE, OF HANDLING—	459
By Major S. H. Persse.	
REVIEWS	147, 253, 371, 499
ROYAL EMPIRE SOCIETY, THE—	58
By Major H. G. Tranchell.	

SATURDAY TO FRIDAY—AN AIR JOURNEY, Part II ..				
By "Mouse."				
SEDGEMOOR
By Major S. R. Macdonald.				
SEDGEMOOR: ANOTHER VERSION
By "Hazara."				
SKIING IN AUSTRIA—A POSTSCRIPT
TIGER SHOOTING, THE TACTICS OF—				..
By Colonel E. J. Ross, O.B.E., M.C.				
TROUT FISHING IN AUSTRIA
By "Newt."				
UNNECESSARY CORRESPONDENCE, THE REDUCTION				
OF—
UNUSUAL JOURNEY HOME FROM INDIA, AN—				..
By Captain E. W. H. Clarke.				
"V. B."				
By "Phoenix."
WADHGAON
By D. Kincaid.				
WORDS
By "Mouse."				
WRONG SPIRIT IN ARMY SPORT, THE—				..
By "Nike."				

41

111

345

135
67

106


232
212

191

309

228

313



Vice-Admiral Sir HUMPHREY T. WALWYN, K.C.S.I., C.B., D.S.O., R.N.,
Flag Officer Commanding Royal Indian Navy.

FOR REFERENCE

Not to be taken out

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EDITORIAL.

Army Instruction (India), No. 82 of 1934, giving the proposals accepted by the Secretary of State for India in Council for dealing with the War Block has cleared the air. **The War Block.** After months of anxiety and inevitable wild speculation among officers commissioned between 4th August, 1914, and 31st December, 1920, the worst is now known. On the whole the terms offered are better than were expected, and it is obvious that Army Headquarters approached this painful duty with a deep sense of the unavoidable hardship it would cause and a desire to soften the blow with as generous compensation as possible.

The main block of 400 officers to be retired compulsorily over a period of six years beginning on 9th September, 1935, deserves our first notice. Officers so selected will be placed on a special unemployed list where they will remain until they attain the age of 50 or complete 28 years' service. They will then be admitted to pension. While unemployed they will draw pay at a special yearly rate of £400. To this will be added, as applicable, £60 marriage allowance, £40 for one child, and £25 each for a second and third child. On admission to pension they will be entitled to the gross pension, up to a maximum of £640, which they would ordinarily have earned if on the active list.

The selection of these officers is being carried out in a very fair and thorough manner. A board of Indian Army Officers, presided over by Major-General A. W. H. Moens, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., has toured

all the principal military stations in India and Burma and collected information at first-hand to supplement the Special Confidential Reports submitted through the usual channels. This ensures that the necessarily diverse idiosyncrasies of individual reporting officers are reduced to a common denominator, and makes it as certain as human ingenuity can devise that the same standard of reporting will prevail. After this exhaustive examination we can hardly imagine that any officer, realising the grim necessity of this axing, will be likely to have any legitimate "grouse" if he is unfortunate enough to be selected to go on unemployed pay.

The other proposals put forward to relieve this congestion are twofold :

(i) The tenure of command of all lieutenant-colonels appointed from 1st January, 1935, to the command of regiments of cavalry or battalions of infantry or to equivalent appointments will be limited to three years. This is probably a necessary curtailment of tenure, but we hope it will not become a permanent fixture. A promising officer—one that will become a leader and commander of troops in the real sense—needs four years at least commanding his own unit for him to develop his qualities of leadership and to make his mark. Lieutenant-Colonel Snooks commanding his battalion for three years in Cannanore or St. Thomas' Mount may think he stands less chance of recognition than Lieutenant-Colonel Fooks in the Peshawar Brigade, or at Razmak.

(ii) Officers for whom commands or equivalent appointments cannot be found when they complete 26 years' service and attain the rank of lieutenant-colonel will be granted leave up to one year and retired on a minimum pension of £700 a year. This cuts across certain old Indian Army traditions but, from any business point of view, is impeccable. There seems to be some doubt as to the exact meaning of the expression "cannot be found" and some officers imagine that, if they have not obtained command at 26 years' service, they will necessarily be retired. We understand that this is not the intention and that it would not be altogether incorrect to substitute the word "foreseen" for "found." The Selection Board works from twelve to fifteen months in advance and if, at one of its half-yearly meetings, no command or equivalent appointment can be "found" for an officer of 26 years' service, it is presumed that he will be retired : but, if a com-

mand vacancy could be foreseen when the officer would have, say, 26½ or 26¾ years' service, he would certainly be considered for this command, if in all respects fit and thoroughly efficient. On the other hand, if there were several candidates for one vacancy, all about the same date, it would presumably be a case of "survival of the fittest."

It would be folly at such a time as this to ignore the serious issues raised by the apparent collapse of the Naval discussions in London between Japan, America and Great Britain; this failure to reach an agreement is a significant reminder that Japan is not satisfied with her present situation either from the security or from the economic point of view. Fourteen short years ago the Washington Conference met in an atmosphere of democracy and internationalism; if the 1935 Naval Conference ever takes place the atmosphere will be one of intense nationalism and a suspicion of democratic government as hitherto understood. The stumbling block is Japan, and we might well try and study the Japanese viewpoint.

In Japan there are two political schools, one the liberal and moderate school which negotiated the Washington Treaty, and the other the militarist school which at present seems very powerful. The military party consider that Japan can solve the problem of feeding her people and achieving her destiny as a Great Power by developing the raw materials of the Asiatic mainland, manufacturing them in her own factories and selling the products back to the mainland in a privileged market. After the Industrial Revolution in England the same problem arose and, *mutatis mutandis*, was solved in very much the same manner. The occupation of Korea and Manchuria has definitely committed Japan to a continental policy and, although she is running grave risks *vis-a-vis* a recovering China and a suspicious Russia, she is evidently prepared to accept them.

In this expansionist policy Japan is thwarted by the terms of the Washington Treaties, which established the principle that the problems of the Far East should be dealt with according to certain basic principles and by the signatories to the Nine-Power Treaty *acting in concert*. The Treaties were based on two simple ideas:—

(a) They assured equal naval security to the United States, the British Empire and Japan by the adoption of the 5:5:3 naval ratio, and by an agreement on the part of each of the Naval Powers that they would not further fortify certain islands,

notably Hong Kong belonging to Great Britain, the Philippines (particularly the naval base project at Cavite) the Aleutian Islands and Guam belonging to the U. S. A., and the Kuriles, the Pescadores, Formosa and the mandated Caroline and Marshall islands belonging to Japan. From press reports we gather that already Japan is making secret preparations in some of these islands.

(b) The Nine-Power Treaty established the principle of China's integrity and the "open door" as regards trade.

The military party in Japan appear to think they cannot carry out their continental policy without tearing up portions of the Washington Treaties, and at present it is not unlikely that the Treaties will be denounced this year. This would place both England and America in a difficult position, and so far as England is concerned, may force us to spend vast sums on the Navy because we cannot afford to leave our great interests in the Far East at the mercy of anyone. It must be remembered that, once the Treaties are denounced, there is nothing to prevent Japan from fortifying the Kurile Islands, Formosa and the mandated islands, which stand across the seaway between the Philippines and Hawaii. No one, least of all us British, would wish to deny the Japanese a fair field in China on the assumption that their intentions do not cover a plan to destroy our trade interests there and in the Pacific.

The problem for America is not dissimilar, although from the point of view of security and trade her risks are smaller. America, preoccupied with her own internal affairs, is a different country from that of 1922 when her statesmen interested themselves wholeheartedly in the world problems of peace. There is a growing American opinion that it is better to face the facts of Japanese power and cut the losses in the Far East. The fruition of this "Middle West" doctrine, despite its plausible attraction, would be war in which the U. S. A. would inevitably be embroiled; for America's international trade, particularly in the Pacific, has such great ramifications that it would be impossible to sever them without provoking a crisis in her political life.

A solution for this grave problem is difficult to find. If the Japanese peoples could be made to understand that the present policy of the militarist party is akin to the Junker policy in Germany in 1914; if the military party could be made to understand that they cannot go

on antagonising the world all of the time without risk of reprisals; if the statesmen of England and America and Japan would co-operate on the basis of joint policy and common liability; then, perhaps, "the cloud no bigger than a man's hand arising over the Pacific which might come to overshadow the whole sky" (General Smuts in a speech on 12th November 1934), might be dispelled.

Between Japan and England there are traditional ties of friendship, and, even in her continental adventures, a large section of British public opinion was pro-Japanese and unfavourable to the findings of the Lytton Commission; surely with this in the background we can come to an agreement which will be a vital factor for peace in the Far East.

We suppose that we ought to comment editorially on the Report of the Joint Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform; but we can hardly suppose that any of our readers are interested now in this threadbare subject. Yet, its acceptance by the British Parliament will change—eventually—all our lives and our schemes of living in India. Despite the present political excitement we can safely state that nobody can say when an All-India Federation will be inaugurated, but we can, perhaps, prophesy that within eighteen months Provincial Autonomy will be granted.

The Federation, however, is the main thing. The members of the Committee—like their predecessors of the Simon Commission and the Round Table Conferences—came up against huge bunkers, which even the wildest drive of an extreme Labour or Congress disciple could not escape or evade; the Princes, the Communal Award, legitimate British interests and the impossible demands of the Indian Congress. These were the stumbling blocks which produced the present lengthy Report with all its safeguards.

The majority of Indian politicians have rejected the Report because of these safeguards; a majority, and an unexpectedly large one, of the Houses of Commons and Lords has accepted the Report because of these same safeguards. And yet we cannot help feeling that if the Report is adopted for India with the goodwill of both these British and Indian politicians who have got to work it there is in it all the opportunity and all the hope for an amicable *modus vivendi*. That there will ever be cordial relations between the extreme

politicians of both sides—except in case of war—we doubt. *Swaraj* is the dominant and winning slogan in this country; in the Report even Dominion Status has not been mentioned.

The Committee has accepted the main proposals of the White Paper—All-India Federation with responsibility at the Centre (except in Foreign Affairs, Defence and Ecclesiastic matters) and Provincial Autonomy. The Governor-General and Provincial Governors are given wider powers of veto than at present in cases of vital emergency; but it is unlikely that these will be used unless under deliberate provocation by recalcitrant extremists.

The scheme provides for eleven Governors' provinces, excluding Burma which is to be separated, but adding Sind and Orissa. In all these provinces there will be elected Legislative Assemblies, the major party of which will provide the Ministers. The electorate for these Assemblies will consist of about ten per cent. of the population. We foresee in certain provinces (without mentioning the Centre) a conglomeration of parties which will, in comparison, make the French Chamber of Deputies look a coherent whole.

Although the Report has received in India the whole-hearted disapproval of its vocal politicians we think this adverse criticism can be taken with a grain of salt. They know, as well and probably better than we do, what it means and what power is being transferred. In the provincial sphere—which is, after all, the main concern of the Indian lawyer, merchant, artisan and peasant—Indians will have a full measure of self-government. In all internal matters the Provincial Governments will be free from the control and superintendence of the Central Government. The direct rule of the Indian Civil Servant will cease. Whether this will be a good thing or a bad thing time will show, and we must therefore eschew comment.

At the Centre the principle of responsibility is conceded. The Centre, however, is still a nebulous constellation of converging heavenly bodies and, until they take more shape, we must view them as an astronomical phenomenon, similar, we would suggest, to Halley's Comet which threatened our world for a time but, in the end, missed it.

ADDRESS BY HIS EXCELLENCY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF AT THE STAFF COLLEGE, QUETTA, ON THE 8TH OCTOBER, 1934.

(Published by Special Permission.)

This is probably the last time I shall be able to visit the Staff College here before I finally finish my active military career next year. What I say to you to-day may be my military testament to Quetta.

You men are just starting on the upward military ladder, and some of you are certain to exercise great influence on the future efficiency for war of the Army, during your careers.

An indifferent regimental officer is an encumbrance, but a narrow-minded staff officer is a danger to commanders and troops alike.

I am not happy about the present officer, either in the British Service or in the Indian Army. I do not think that, as a class, they have improved in general education, or military instinct and leadership, since the War. One might well imagine that those, at any rate, who had been through the tremendous experiences of the Great War would have emerged with an increased military instinct.

I may be wrong, but I do not think I am, when I say that, if anything, the contrary is the case.

Let me state my case.

First, as to what I may call the civilian side of the soldier's mind.

We soldiers are looked down upon, by the liberal professions and others, as being of rather inferior intelligence. That, I am perfectly certain, is not the case. There are just as many acute brains in the Army as there are in any other profession, but they are not sufficiently used to keep them up to concert pitch.

Undoubtedly this is partly due to our environment, which we cannot well alter in this country. Small stations in which we meet the same people day after day. One hot weather after another, and the great spaces of India, which prevent us from moving about and coming into contact with alert brains and men distinguished in other walks of life, result in "brain slackness" in all but the most gifted personalities.

Moreover, this "crabbing" by civilians has, to some extent, caused us soldiers to retire rather smugly into our purely military shells, and to ignore the trend of thought and events in the civilian world around us. I am almost inclined to say that this encourages a supercilious narrowness of outlook in every direction, and not the least in a military one.

No matter how much some of us endeavour to encourage independence of thought and the polishing of wits, it is, especially in India, not easy to devise means to keep up the pressure.

In every other trade—politics, business, law, and even to some extent in our sister services, the Navy and the Air Force—men are always, as it were, on active service. In the services they are contending against nature and the elements, and in the civil professions striving for place and success against others; for, if they do not do so, in the services they may meet disaster, and in other professions they fall behind in the race.

With us, we may read as much as we like, we may theorize as much as we like, and we may discuss as much as we like; but we are not, day in and day out, and year in and year out, on active service, as are the other professions.

Of necessity, we are always pretending; our exercises on paper, on the ground, and with troops, are pretence, and it is impossible that it should be otherwise. We cannot have a bullet in every tenth rifle.

Small wonder, then, that only a very few retain their enthusiasm, especially when, in peace time, at any rate in regimental life, the mediocre brain and the lazy man go slowly up the ladder at much the same speed as their more brilliant and persevering brothers.

We cannot well alter the basic facts underlying this state of affairs, but I do suggest that improvement is possible, great improvement; and the driving force must come from men like yourselves, who have taken the trouble to improve your education and your military knowledge, to acquire the habit of work and study, and, what is perhaps more important, to improve what gifts you have of imparting knowledge to others and for the clear exposition of a case.

I am horrified, as I travel up and down India, at the number of officers I find, senior and junior alike, who have allowed themselves

to sink into a state of complete brain slackness. Their narrow interests are bounded by the morning parade, the game they happen to play, and purely local and unimportant matters.

I have found men all over India who evidently scarcely read the papers, and are quite unaware of the larger aspects of what is going on in India around them, and still less of the stupendous events outside this country that are now in process of forming an entirely new world.

A study of the papers sent in by officers sitting for their promotion examinations and even for the Staff College, makes one glad that the results are not published to the world with critical comments by the examiners. Many officers to-day cannot even express themselves clearly in the simplest language, let alone with any style or distinction.

Men like you can do a tremendous lot, when you pass back into your units, to encourage your brother officers, by suggestion and discussion, to keep their minds active towards events and ideas of world importance in politics, economics, and sociology, instead of only towards polo and tennis tournaments, sport, or the next morning's parade.

So much for one aspect of my case. I pass to the attitude of mind of the average British Officer towards military matters.

You may think it curious, but I am convinced I am right when I say that, taking one thing with another, the British nation, though perhaps the toughest fighters, when they have their backs to the wall, are the most unmilitary-minded people in the world.

For geographical reasons, we have always been navally-minded. It has been forced on us, and it looks as if we are becoming air-minded for the same reasons ; but neither of these Services can by themselves hold our Empire. Army matters hardly interest the public at all, as they do in France or Germany, and the war of trenches convinced the amateur expert, at least to his own satisfaction, that there were no mysteries and no trade secrets in the military art.

War, and particularly successful war, is much more an affair of imagination than many people think, but few officers of the Army allow much play to their imagination. It would almost seem that it is a crime to do so, or to be one inch outside " sealed pattern " and regulations. The longer I remain in the Service, the more wooden

and the more regulation-bound do I find the average British Officer to be. Everyone has heard the British Non-Commissioned Officer, when asked why he did not do something or other, reply that there was "nothink laid down about it." I cannot but think that his officer's attitude of mind is often not very different.

I admit that our system of examinations may have something to do with this. A man's future depends on the result of those examinations, and it is not easy to devise questions that demand the exercise of imagination rather than a meticulous knowledge of the regulations, to answer successfully.

Our manuals of war are purposely general and not particular in their scope ; they must be used as foundations, and not assumed to constitute a complete edifice of military thought. They are intended to stimulate thought and imagination. Many British officers appear to think that they are designed to obviate the necessity of thinking at all on their part.

Again, this may be partly the fault of the regulations themselves, for no one can say they are written in a way which stimulates thought or imagination. I wonder what the results would be were I to commission you officers here to re-write those regulations in an arresting and provocative manner, which would cause them to be read with eagerness by the average regimental officer, and promote heated and healthy discussion, and unexpected and unusual tactics on manœuvres ? Books on sport or business are eagerly read, but our books on war, in which we may be engaged at any moment, are seldom attractive even to us professionals.

There obviously must be regulations when you are dealing with great masses of men ; there obviously must be, and are, principles of war—war has always been with us, and has taught us many things that we cannot disregard without at least risking failure.

You cannot read war history without coming across many instances of failure, and even disaster, owing to the neglect of some or other of the so-called principles of war ; but, on the contrary, you cannot read history without coming across many great victories and successes, which, when you analyse them, have apparently been gained by disregarding so-called principles altogether, or, as I like to call it, by taking legitimate risks.

Please do not imagine that I am asking you to leave here, and go on to staff employment and eventual command, with the fixed purpose of ignoring principles and rules. I do, however, suggest to you that there are no games in the world—and war is the greatest of all games—in which to take risks is not one of the secrets of success; but I will qualify that by saying that every risk you take must be legitimate and have good reasons behind it.

If you adopt base-line play in a tennis tournament, and never risk coming to the net for fear of a “passing shot,” you may get a reputation for fine stroke play, but you will not often win.

This contention demands proof.

The battle of Tannenburg was converted from a retreat of the Russian Army into a disaster by partial ignoring of orders on the part of General von Francois, and by his taking great risks, with his command and his own career. With 25 Battalions, he strung himself out over a length of 50 kilometres, and in two days, in spite of a further order to advance north-eastward, he established a single thin line of posts between the Russian masses struggling to escape from the forests and whatever hostile troops might be set in motion against him from the direction of Warsaw. The Russians had no idea that anyone could be so audacious as to have nothing behind this thin line, and their rout became a disaster. Even a single battalion of von Francois’ Corps captured as many as 17,000 prisoners, and out of a total of 92,000 unwounded and 30,000 wounded prisoners, 61,000 was the share of his Corps. Obviously, anyone who had proposed to do this on peace manœuvres, or in a promotion examination, would have incurred the gravest risks. Pray do not think that I am suggesting to you that you should cultivate the practice of disobedience of orders. If you do so, you take your fate in your hands. But he took *legitimate* risks. He availed himself of the privilege, which even our regulations allow, of the man on the spot knowing more than the commander who issued the original order. He realised the mentality of a beaten army, and knew that it is legitimate, nay imperative, to take risks against a beaten enemy that you would not presume for a moment to take against a still unshaken foe.

Winston Churchill, in his masterly account of the eastern campaign, describes von Francois’ action as “that rare alternation of prudence and audacity which is the characteristic of true soldierly genius.”

Another example. A year or two ago, I was told by the Director of Training that General Ironside, on manœuvres, was advancing towards his enemy on a three-brigade front, with no reserve !! I asked for particulars, and was told that he was endeavouring to crush a detachment of the enemy before they joined their main body, and that he had the initiative and superiority of numbers, but that time was against him. On this, I asked an obviously horrified audience what use, then, was there in a reserve and that surely speed and an early crushing blow were obvious necessities, and every man out of the front line on such an occasion was a man wasted.

When Lord Allenby attacked Beersheba and Gaza, I myself was in command of four Divisions turning the enemy left flank by attacking Beersheba, with the Cavalry still further round the outer flank. General Bulfin was making a demonstration against the entrenched position on the coast at Gaza, and acting as a pivot for the great wheel. Between us there was a gap of many miles, with only a few scattered Cavalry in observation in it. The pandits were horrified : "Not a man in reserve except local reserves ! Horrible ! Impossible !"

Why should there be ? We again had the initiative, we outnumbered the enemy, we had mounted troops in large numbers, which he had not, speed was essential and we intended to hit excessively hard with every man we could put into the front line, and when this is done, the defending commander must be a transcendent genius if he grasps what is being done before it is too late. Lord Allenby took a perfectly legitimate risk, and won his battle.

There are geniuses in all walks of life, men outside the ordinary class. Few of us can aspire to that, but I do maintain that we can, and should, cultivate boldness and the legitimate taking of risks ; and, above all, the attitude of mind which leads up to this.

None of you have commanded yet. I have, and I can tell you that, when you are thinking out your plans for battle, whether deliberately or in an emergency, if you are any good at all, a still small voice tells you that in one course lies safety and mediocrity, and in the other risk, but almost certain surprise and more brilliant possibilities.

If that still small voice comes to you as a surprise, unless you are a genius, you will almost certainly adopt the safe course, or at

least you will follow the advice "IN MEDIO TUTISSIMUS IBIS ;" but if you have cultivated the habit of looking at every military problem, except purely protective duties, from the point of view of weighing the pros and cons of a bold policy, you will instinctively lean towards a bolder course, and the reasons for and against it will flash into your mind, just as the appreciation of a situation, from long practice, comes into your mind in logical sequence, and you will not be taken by surprise.

Now, before you command, you will be staff officers helping a commander, the servants of the troops. You may have the luck to be under a commander of imagination, and you will recognise it at once. It is altogether a different feeling from being under a commander who is determined to take no risks, and, above all, is determined not to be accused of departing by so much as an inch from the so-called rules of war.

If you are under a man of imagination, he will probably have thought out two or three plans—ordinary, bold, and very bold and he will work out the general idea of them, and pass them to his Chief of Staff and ask him to consult very secretly with his head administrative officer, in order to tell him whether they think they can implement all or any of his three ideas, in food, water, ammunition, disposal of wounded, reinforcements, movement, and so on.

It will not be your business to discourage the bold idea. It will be your business to make sure that no factors whatever are concealed from your commander which might jeopardise his plan; and, "contrariwise," if he is cautious, it is your duty to hold back nothing that might encourage him to adopt a bolder plan.

It is not your business to make the plan. It is not your business to decide on the plan. It is your business to supply all the information—facts, details, etc.—that will help your commander to decide finally.

In the end, it is he who has to decide. If he is built naturally for war, he will like the responsibility. If he is not, the sooner we get rid of him the better. But he is immensely helped in his difficult task by the way in which the facts are put to him by a skilled staff.

However gloomy these facts are, a big commander will and does override them on occasions.

I instance Lord Roberts on his march over the Peiwar Kotal to Kabul. He had two Brigades, but camel transport for only one, and he had to move one Brigade and send his camels back to bring up the other one. He had just done this when the hills around him were seen to be a mass of hostile tribesmen and standards. He knew the psychology of the hill warrior better than most men. Ninety men out of a hundred would have remained where they were until the second Brigade came up. "Bobs" went straight at them, and by his very boldness dispersed them and broke his way through to Kabul. I wonder how many officers would do that in a promotion examination?

Lord Allenby made every arrangement he could for supplying his troops in his final battle, as far as Nazareth. He then turned to General Campbell, his Q. M. G., and said: "I intend that the Cavalry shall go further, through Damascus, and if necessary to Aleppo. Can you manage that?" The Q. M. G. replied: "Quite impossible, Sir." Lord Allenby finished the conference by saying: "Then they will go there"—and they did go there. The risk was legitimate. Indeed, it was essential, if the Turkish armies were to be broken up, that the pursuit should be to the last gasp of man and horse.

I wonder if you think I am asking you to take foolish risks. I am not. I am asking you to cultivate the habit of mind that faces risks boldly, but with full knowledge of the consequences—not bald-headed.

You will find I am right in saying that, in the British Army, there are but few men who are prepared to take even a legitimate risk in war. Do not, I beg of you, be content to go with the crowd. Shake yourselves free from the ruck, and the further you get, encourage the more, freedom of thought and imagination by every means in your power.

We, as English soldiers, have been brought up on the necessity of being dressed by the centre, and to regard with suspicion the man who is five yards out of dressing, even in battle. May I remind you of Marshal Saxe's opinion, in his *Memoirs on the Art of War*, of the average commander of his day (1757):

"Custom and prejudice, confirmed by ignorance, are the usual foundation of the so-called science of war."

Or Napoleon in 1813:

“ Si l'art de la guerre n'était autre chose que l'art de rien compromettre la gloire deviendrait la proie des esprits médiocres.”

Both apply still, especially to the British.

All that I have said really boils down to an appeal to you, instructors and students alike, to encourage, by every means in your power, independence of thought, imagination, initiative, avoidance of the obvious, the ordinary, the commonplace.

We are constantly told that one of the chief aims of a commander in war should be surprise. If he is one of those whose minds have been trained to regard regulations as their god and any departure from them almost irreligious, we can hardly expect him to conceive plans which will be other than commonplace, and easily guessed at and countered by his enemy.

I am rather afraid that quite a number of the average Staff College students aim at being a correct, methodical, “sealed pattern” staff officer, ground out to pattern by the Quetta and Camberley mill. Am I altogether wrong in thinking that, to many Englishmen, to be independent in thought, to have imagination, to go outside the obvious, to be different to others, is to be almost un-English, or even that more frightful crime “not sound?”

How many great commanders have been orthodox and commonplace? Did Napoleon never take big risks? Did not Nelson possess a blind eye? Must we always attack at dawn with one quarter of our force in reserve? Must we always be fully concentrated, and never risk some measure of dispersion for a big object? Must we always have 100 per cent. of our forces, ammunition, and supplies, on the field before we dare attack, even if we have the two great factors of success in war, initiative and time, on our side?

Do you wish to remain always labelled, as I have so often heard men labelled on the Selection Board, “A reliable staff officer, but no independence of thought; not likely to command?”

Think it over, and remember that, in war, above all other arts, the commonplace will never succeed.

MARTIAL AND NON-MARTIAL RACES.

The following essay was awarded the second place in the Gold Medal Prize Competition of 1934 :—

Subject—

“It is often said that Indians are by nature divided into what might be called martial and non-martial races. This is a mere myth.....” Examine this quotation and state your conclusions.

By Major General E. C. Alexander, C.B., C.I.E., D.S.O.

Myth? A fable, a legend, a fabulous narrative founded on a remote event; a falsehood.—Chambers: *Twentieth Century Dictionary*.

From the earliest legendary times until the middle of our nineteenth century the history of “India” is a tale of successive sovereignties founded on, and buttressed by, victory on the battlefield. Conquest directly implies the higher fighting value of the conqueror. It is a legitimate assumption that the conqueror has always used every physical and moral means to maintain this superiority. Such methods include obviously the disarming of the mass of the conquered, and the restriction of recruitment, in at least the *élite* of the conqueror’s forces, to men of his own following. The more the conquest represented the culmination of a successful racial invasion, the more complete and enduring would be the measures taken and the more definite and final their result—the division of the population into a martial race and a non-martial race.

In that sense, a division into martial and non-martial races has been for many millions of its people for centuries in India, no fable but a practical fact of life. Legend, if any existed, lay in the traditional prowess of the ancestors of the conquered.

“India” has experienced racial invasion and partial repopulation by at least three species of the *genus* man. The polity of one of them, the Indo-Aryan, further reserved the roles, at least, of King and Captain within its own tribes to a hereditary Guild—The Rajput. There were, however, in addition, many invasions, conquests and re-conquests on scales of varying magnitude, by subdivision of these races. It must therefore follow that in many instances the conquered and the conqueror have been of the same racial stock. In these

circumstances particularly it may be legitimately agreed that the separation of the population into martial and non-martial sections was artificial rather than natural. While, however, the ethnological affinities of the conquerors have been as varied as the scope of their conquests, the direction of their advance has been curiously constant. From the days of the fabled Hanuman to the very real Ahmad Shah, the conqueror's advance has been consistently southward. Eddies and backwashes there have been, produced by dynastic struggles or family feud, but in the nine centuries that have elapsed since Mahmud of Ghazni crossed the Suleimans, twice only has the current of conquest set definitely northward,—once with the expansion of Mahratta power in the eighteenth century, and again with the rise to hegemony of British India in the nineteenth.

The first might be claimed as the achievement of clever politicians, rather than warriors ; it was certainly materially assisted by the internecine strife of the southern Muslim sultanates and the striving after universal lordship of the Delhi Moghuls. This movement, though reinforced by all the Hindu chivalry of Central India, met its Marathon at Panipat. It is, however, interesting to note that his genealogical tree on view to-day at Satara, gives Sivaji descent from the royal Rajput house of Udaipur, while legend ascribes it to the Chitpavan Brahmin, an unique oversea, and even Nordic, origin.

The steel frame of British-Indian power indubitably had its origin and source of replacement in a land lying twenty degrees north of Cabul.

Throughout the centuries numbers, learning, wealth, in short, the material means to military power, have lain rather with the conquered Southerner than the conquering Northlander. It would appear, therefore, that there must have existed some very powerful, and constant, factor to account for this consistent supremacy of the latter. I suggest that this factor has been climate ; that the climate of the Indian Peninsula has in the past so devitalized its successive conquerors that they have become within comparatively short periods of time unable to stand up against a new wave of northern energy.

The Muslim historian who wrote, " He who holds Cabul holds the keys of Delhi " was right, and he was right not because there was any mystical strategical importance in Cabul City, but because the ruler of the tracts west of the Indus controlled the connections to the most convenient reservoirs of " new blood."

The conclusions suggested are :—The existence in India for centuries of conquerors and conquered and thereby of martial and non-martial sections of its population is no falsehood but a historical fact. That the former have been consistently found from among those peoples who have been least exposed to the deleterious climate of the Indian Peninsula, is a proposition supported, not only by fabulous narrative founded on remote events, but by the facts of comparatively recent history ; since climate is a natural agency, it would be reasonable to say that this division has in fact been drawn by nature. These are conclusions based primarily on the general history of the two thousand years preceding the advent of the British to India ; it will therefore be of interest to see how far they are consonant with the details of our experience during the century and a half since the general direction of the march of victorious armies was switched from south by east to north by west.

At the beginning of this century officers of the Madras Army still talked of the glorious deeds of "The Coast Army," of which they claimed that their men were the legitimate heirs, and they pointed to the more recent records of the Queen's Own Sappers and Miners, and of such corps as the battalions of Madras Pioneers, as conclusive proof that they were worthy heirs. To a reader of the accounts of our campaigns in Southern and Eastern India, it seems evident that a large proportion of the forces, hostile or friendly, engaged, were of comparatively low fighting value,—the result of the battles usually turning on the result of an engagement between certain small contingents of Europeans, or of Native Troops trained and led by Europeans.

A point of interest to the matter under review is the extent to which the native personnel of these trained contingents was indigenous to the theatres of war. Now, war may be said to have had in India, in the eighteenth century, practically the status of a staple industry. Labour is still in India, very considerably migratory ; it would therefore have been unnatural if the war industry had not produced its own quota of migratory labour ; personnel which moved naturally to areas where employment was brisk or wages attractive. The proposition advanced is that there was a considerable body of such labour and that given the necessary condition of good wages, there was ethnologically little difference in the pick of material available at Vellore, or Lahore, Poona or Patna, to a recruiter. Moreover, since for centuries the line

of movement for victorious armies had been southward, it would have been most natural for the flow of this labour movement to have been generally in the same direction ; and consequently quite possible for the personnel of a contingent recruited in Southern India to have consisted partially, or even wholly, of individuals belonging ethnographically more properly to areas far to the northward.

In support of the possibly novel, but certainly possible proposition that this actually did occur in the case of corps recruited on the Carnatic Coast, the following facts are cited : In the archives of the 5th Madras Infantry there existed in A.D. 1900, a fairly complete nominal roll of the battalion in about the year 1780. The names therein were characteristic of ethnological affinities north of the Nerbudda, rather than south of the Godavery ; certainly there was in it no equivalent of the large number of distinctively Telegu and Tamil names on the roll of 1900 A.D. In the records of the 6th Madras Infantry was a letter of about the same period, from an officer, telling that his battalion had recently taken to enlisting "Cawns," as well as "Moors" and expressing satisfaction therewith. Now, to this day the Muslim fisher-folk of the Ceylon coast are known as Moormen. "Cawn" is an obvious, and somewhat phonetically superior, equivalent for our modern Khan ; an inference is that to the eighteenth century Madras recruiter "Moor" was a Muslim with some known local geographical affinity ; "Cawn," the more recent and obvious migrant from an unknown northern home. I have known a "Deccani Mussulman" recruit for a Madras Infantry Battalion differing physically little from others of his batch, not merely claim to be a "Pathan" but able to substantiate intelligently that his great-grandfather was a Tarawali from Hazara ; also, a "Hindustani Mussulman" sowar of the 26th (*née* Madras) Light Cavalry, physically so true to type as to be recognisable as an Afidi among the sand-hills of Arabia. The latter knew no Pushtu but did know that his family had settled at Fateghur about 1750 A.D., the location of the ancestral village in Sowaki. He said that his family still sometimes got a wife therefrom.

Whatever personnel formed the dough or the leaven in our first drilled contingents, it is certain that as these expanded into armies the demand for men from further north was constant.

In the early years of the nineteenth century we raised many "Subsidiary Forces" and "Special Corps." The majority of these

drew at least a proportion of their personnel from outside the political spheres for which they were specially formed. I know of no instance in which any tangible proportion of this outside element was drawn from areas to the southward of the political sphere. By 1850 the Hyderabad and Gwalior contingents were competing with the regular Bengal Army for the peasantry of Oudh and Rohilkhand, the most northern areas then accessible to our recruiters. The regular Bombay Army drew recruits from far north of the Presidency boundary long before it ceased to be a separate administrative organization.

Our "Sepoy" Armies helped to carry the flag from the Indian Ocean to the Himalayas and the Helmand, during a century of military achievement of which any soldiery might be proud. In the latter half of that century they enjoyed all the advantages accruing to the agents of the predominant military power in India, but a comparison of the campaigns of that period in the Punjab and Nepaul with those in the Carnatic and Deccan, in the first half, indicates very clearly that the further north those armies went, the harder was the fighting, the smaller the margin for any errors in organisation or leading. The hastily raised Punjabi corps appear to have dealt effectively enough in 1857-58 with the rebel regiments of the Bengal Regular Army and their sympathizers in the countryside.

The record of the Queen's Own Sappers and Miners needs no advertisement. An old officer thereof told me some years back that service in it was hereditary to the point of "*gosam*," verging on the status of a sub-caste for matrimonial purposes!

I knew, early in the century, at any rate one Madras Infantry Regiment whose peace field exercise ability was at least equal to, while its interior economy, parade ground and athletic efficiency was considerably in advance of that of the bulk of its northern contemporaries. I know of a Madras Infantry Battalion in the Great War which, under the inspiration of a commandant who firmly believed it was his duty and fate to die in Armageddon, successfully crossed bayonets with the Turk. The Mahratta earned high renown amid the dust and heat, the cold and the mud of the fighting before Kut, but to-day the Mahratta peoples have difficulty in finding sufficient recruits of an adequate physical standard to fill the requirements of the five battalions of the 5th Mahratta Light Infantry.

The great discovery, or re-discovery, of the War, 1914—18, was the "Garhwali," a folk from our furthest northern hills, who confirmed in Irak and on the North West Frontier, a reputation won in France. The war also showed that fifty years of pax Britannica had not, as some feared, emasculated the Dogra and that for all his quiet manner he was still a first-class fighting gentleman. The blue ribbon for the highest ratio of casualties to men of military age is the guerdon of the Khattak, in his hills on the edge of our north-western administrative border. Since it may be, and indeed has been, argued that the great preponderance of northern-bred men in our Army in 1914 renders any data drawn from "The War," entirely inconclusive in regard to the matter under consideration, it may be serviceable to draw some from an entirely different source. Our own history, if no other, should teach us that the qualities required for the civilian adventurer are very similar to those required of the soldier; that the nation which produces many of the former will at need produce the latter. Lately, much has been written of the pressure of the population on the land in Eastern and Southern India and the consequent need of increasing the opportunities of employment for these peoples. In such circumstances it would appear that a virile population would at least fill all existing local opportunities for employment and avidly seize on all new ones. It would be fair to assume that failure thus to maintain themselves in their own land against "foreigners" was indicative of an inferiority in stamina or energy. It is a matter of common knowledge that the Pathan pseudo pedlar stalks the Deccan and Carnatic, drawing a handsome profit on his transactions. In 1931 two-thirds of the labour on the Western India Turf Club race courses was Garhwali; durwans, car-park superintendents and so forth in Bombay and Madras are 90 *per cent.* North Indian; Bombay Dock labour is recruited largely from both sides of the "Durand Line." The civilian manager of a Dairy Farm in the far south told me in 1932 that he could not run on less than 40 *per cent.* of "North Indian men" since they alone gave an economic return for good wages given; his northern men were in fact Punjabi Jats. Men from the Salt Range have for many years "fired" the ships of the P. and O. and City Lines. A few years ago "India" started a navy. Here, indeed, one would imagine was an opportunity for the descendants of the famed Angria and Janjira corsairs, or indeed for any of the teeming population of two thousand miles of coast line, seeking honourable,

lucrative and, incidentally, martial employment; to-day, even the "Sick Bay" personnel of the Indian Navy is recruited from the Attock District.

The over-worked pleas of "a lower standard of living" will not avail; the material wants of the northerner are, if anything, greater than those of his indigenous southern competitor. The significance of his success could only be diminished by showing that there was an equivalent rank and file infiltration in the opposite direction. The fact is that while the King's armies have for ninety years paved the way to the armed exploitation of the Indian Peninsula, the forays still continue in a different guise.

The experiences of the last two centuries generally confirm the deduction drawn from the general history of the previous twenty, that where Northerner and Southerner compete on no more than equal terms, the Northerner wins. Since the Northerner and Southerner have been and are themselves of varied race, tribe and creed, the simplest explanation of the former's success is the superior vitality conferred on him by the land of his "infant birth" and nurture.

The final conclusions propounded are then :

The past in other lands besides India has shown that those who know their business can make technically competent soldiers out of any material, with a modicum of physical efficiency. That it is possible to maintain a martial spirit under adverse conditions, possible, even, to create it—given time and other favourable circumstances. History shows equally conclusively, however, that the greater the physical vitality of the raw material and the stronger its initial consciousness of a fighting tradition, the easier the work of making and the smaller the risk of failure under the stress of war. If, therefore, the framers of the Report meant merely that there were no simple anthropological formulae by which we could determine the material in India from which alone soldiers could be made, they were right. If, on the other hand, they intended to lay down as a principle that all the male population within the bounds of the Indian Empire is equally good raw material for potential soldiery they were wrong. They were wrong because Nature working through climate confers a higher physical vitality on a proportion of that population, and that superimposed on this the action of man, and particularly the Hindu caste system, has resulted in large elements of that population having been divorced for many generations from any fighting tradition.

“ CHINA TO-DAY AND TO-MORROW.”

By “ HSUEH SHENG.”

The tragedy of China is being enacted in an arena so remote from the centres of white civilization, that, despite its importance to the whole world, it appears to excite less interest than a budget speech in England, the kidnapping of a film star's baby in America or the controversy on the subject of “ body-line ” bowling in Australia. Yet momentous events are taking place ; events calculated to shatter in an instant this apathetic indifference if only their full import were more generally realized.

China, impoverished to the verge of bankruptcy, her shrinking frame wasted by internal disease and the ill-usage of foreign persecutors lies stretched once more upon the rack, her tortured limbs almost wrenched asunder. Her friends—the signatories of the Kellogg Pact and the Nine-Power Treaty—who have guaranteed her against dismemberment, are content to watch the struggle. They do not applaud, it is true, but neither do they rush to release the harassed sufferer and apply palliatives to her aching flesh. In place of restoratives they offer platitudes ; for medicines and ointments they substitute sermons. But, slowly and inexorably, the rack continues to do its work, until stretched and broken beyond all human endurance the frail body can stand no more. Will those friends who have written and preached so much of their love of fairplay and their horror of war, stand by and watch this crime consummated ? Or will they, before it is too late, realize that the sufferer is powerless to effect her own release, and that if her life is to be preserved, sympathy must be translated into action ?

China is potentially one of the richest countries in the world. Her vast resources, as yet scarcely tapped, include not only every commodity necessary to feed and clothe her four hundred million souls, but are also believed to embrace all the products necessary to the existence of a civilized manufacturing state. Yet this promising country, whose people are unrivalled in their capacity for patient toil and skilful handicraft, stands dangerously close to bankruptcy whilst the spectre of famine lurks constantly in one or other of her stricken provinces. Banditry is rife in many quarters. Piracy infests the China seas. Communism flourishes in the Kiangsi area in flagrant opposition to the National Government in Nanking, whilst

in the North, Manchuria and Jehol have already been swallowed up by Japan, and further inroads appear to be threatened.

The situation is deplorable, chaotic. It has become so involved that few people find it worth the trouble to attempt to unravel the tangled strands of fact and fiction, truth and propaganda. When once the realities are grasped, however, the problems which emerge, and the dangers which threaten the West due to China's weakness will be found to provide a study of intriguing interest. Their consideration will serve to set the stage for a survey of some of the more obvious possibilities of the future. An effort will be made to draw a picture of conditions as they exist in China to-day, to outline the dangers which appear to threaten, and to suggest a solution which it is believed would avert them.

A consideration of China's government or lack of government is a necessary first step in getting down to realities.

Since the revolution which overthrew the Manchu Ch'ing dynasty in 1911, numerous military leaders have sprung up and struggled with each other to seize the supreme power; but this has proved so elusive that no personality has yet arisen strong enough to grasp and wield it. It was not until 1928, after a series of mushroom governments had sprung up and withered again, that the armies of Chiang Kai Shek thrust Northwards and, seizing Peking, forced the dissolution of the Northern Government established there, and inaugurated the National Government. The seat of government was transplanted to Nanking, which was proclaimed as the new capital of the now "unified" China.

Chiang represented the Southern section of the Kuomintang—"the People's Party," created by the revolutionary leader Sun Yat Sen, whose disciple Chiang had been—and he triumphed over the North because he had succeeded in collecting around him a more efficient army than his rivals. Immediately upon his success he proudly announced the unification of China, and secured the recognition of the Powers for the new National Government.

China thus became unified, in name if not in fact, and since that date the National Government has continued to enjoy the blessing of the Powers and has been assumed to speak with the voice of all China.

Numerous attempts have been made to upset this government, and the years which have passed since its inauguration have been marked by a series of revolts. Independent revolutionary govern-

ments have been set up in the North, in Canton, and most recently in Fukien, but each in turn has been crushed by Chiang's army, and no single "war-lord" or coalition has yet succeeded in ousting him.

The generalissimo, meanwhile, has concentrated on the improvement and modernization of his army, leaving the administration of government to the politician elements of the Kuomintang party. Aided by a German mission of some sixty officers, he has succeeded in producing a force of two infantry and one cavalry divisions, well equipped and armed, and trained on foreign lines. This he has further supplemented with a steadily increasing air force, the machines and advisers for which have latterly been supplied mainly by the United States. Owing to the inexperience of its leaders and officers and the fact that its German advisers do not hold executive commands, it is doubtful whether this small force could make much showing against troops of a modern Western army, but it is certainly vastly superior to any other force in China. It is virtually Chiang's bodyguard, and the *corps élite* of his much larger army composed of many indifferent Chinese divisions scattered over the limited area which his government really controls.

In this army of General Chiang Kai Shek lies the secret of the National Government's continuity in power. But for it the Kuomintang could hardly have seized and could never have held the reins of government for so long, or retained its capital *in situ* at Nanking. It follows that Chiang, whatever his title for the time being may be, as the man with the gun, is the real head of the party, and little short of dictator in the affairs of its government. If he should resign he would no doubt take his bodyguard of picked troops with him. The Kuomintang would be little inclined to see these under the banner of a political opponent, hence, despite bitter disagreements, he stays and he continues to call the tune.

Within the Party there are, beyond doubt, many earnest and patriotic reformers, and several who can add to these attributes ability and farsightedness; but owing to internal dissensions, corruption, place-hunting, inexperience and other defects of the new administration it has so far failed to improve materially the lot of the people, to deal effectively with the bandit situation, or to achieve the disbandment of the hordes of soldiery all over the country, owing allegiance to regional generals and preying upon the countryside. It has failed to stamp out the Communist menace in Kiangsi and Fukien, despite

repeated attempts and protracted operations, and though it has triumphed over local revolts, it has never succeeded in imposing any real authority or in collecting revenues from any area outside the limited zone—Kiangsu, Chekiang, Fukien, Hupei, Honan and Anhui provinces—actually garrisoned by units of Chiang Kai Shek's army. Other regions are controlled by various generals, each of whom holds his territory as the *nominal* representative of the National Government and each of whom has his own personal army—also *nominally* the troops of the National Government with which he garrisons and holds his territory, and which he supports by taxation of the people. These regional commanders are the men who, from time to time, have led their armies against those of Chiang. The National Government has no real authority in the areas they control, and in fact has nothing more than a somewhat dubious suzerainty. It is thus clear that the government at Nanking has no genuine title to speak for all China, but in that it is the one serious attempt to form a united government which has shown any promise of success since the revolution, the Powers have given it their support and encouragement.

Having originated in Canton, the Kuomintang party is by no means popular in the North, where the feeling has never been very enthusiastically republican. The North has little liking for Canton and its works. Its stolid inhabitants are far more conservative than the somewhat mercurial Southerners, and resent among other things the removal of the capital from Peking. Hence the National Government is anything but popular in North China. In Canton itself the National Government rules only in name. The Cantonese can never forget that Sun Yat Sen and the Kuomintang party sprung from Canton: *ergo* Canton should be the capital and not Nanking. Moreover, at the head of affairs there should assuredly be a Cantonese, and not this upstart Chiang Kai Shek, who is a native of Chekiang. Resentment against the National Government has actually been so acute in Canton that from the summer of 1931 until recently, the Cantonese section of the Kuomintang was in open revolt against Nanking and went to the length of declaring an independent government with its capital at Canton. Under the stress of the situation created by the Japanese aggression, the two warring factions of the Kuomintang have composed their differences for the time being. The union of Canton and Nanking, however, lacks depth and offers slight hope of permanence.

It will be appreciated from the foregoing that the Republic of China is hardly a term which should be taken too seriously, in that there is no one authority which can be said to be in complete control of the whole country. The National Government is the most plausible attempt at a central administration up-to-date, but, though Nanking has nominal authority throughout China proper, it has been seen that she cannot enforce her orders beyond the territory occupied by Chiang's army. Unless, therefore, she can so purge and reorganize her government as to ameliorate the condition of the people and compel the disbandment of the rival armies, she can hardly hope to retain her position indefinitely. Manchuria is lost already. Large portions of Kiangsi and Fukien and parts of Hunan and neighbouring provinces have been merged into the "Soviet Republic of China." There would appear to be every indication that this gradual process of disintegration is likely to continue, unless the National Government can rapidly stabilize its position, or other Powers interested in the welfare of China should deem it advisable to intervene, and lend a helping hand towards the placing of her government on a sound basis.

It should not be inferred that the writer has any desire to criticize adversely either the patriotic fervour or the benevolent intentions of the members of the National Government. On the contrary he is full of admiration for the progress they have been able to make against great odds, and he readily acknowledges the stupendous nature of their task. He is in sympathy with their aims, and desires with them to see China really unified and on the high road to improved conditions for her toiling masses. But he must concern himself with fact, unobscured by sentiment, and he is forced to admit, with any impartial observer, that up-to-date the real progress made towards genuine unification is scarcely encouraging. A hopeful sign for the future, however, may be seen in the fact that quite recently some prominent members of the Kuomintang party have freely admitted their errors and failures, and have shown that they clearly recognize the importance of creating better living conditions for the people and of extending the means of communication and transport.

Having arrived at an estimate of the position at present occupied by China's National Government, the second reality which it is proposed to examine is the existence or otherwise of a Red menace in China. The Japanese Press affects to take this matter very seriously and suggests that the present Government of China will never be strong

enough to make an end of the peril, and that there is danger of the whole country becoming sovietized. This is one of the excuses advanced for their aggression in Manchuria and Jehol, where it is urged that they dare not risk their vital interests being submerged by Bolshevism.

As far as the Kuomintang is concerned, this party may be assumed to be definitely anti-Red. It will be recalled that, in 1924, Sun Yat Sen called in the help of Soviet Russia and obtained the services of Borodin and his mission to assist him in the overthrow of the Northern war-lords. When the Russian intention to obtain control of the organs of government was realized, however, there was immediately a complete revulsion of feeling against Borodin. The members of his mission were driven out piecemeal and many of them were butchered. The Kuomintang thereupon washed its hands of Bolshevism, and has subsequently shown no inclination to revoke this decision or to encourage Red ideas.

The seed once sown, however, has not been completely eradicated and there are still large portions of Kiangsi, Hunan, Fukien and Ssuch'uan provinces, where a form of Chinese communism flourishes, and these areas have not shown any very noticeable tendency to decrease in size despite Chiang Kai Shek's frequent efforts at suppression. In other mountainous regions, notably in Southern Honan and in Hupei there are also small organized bodies of communistic bandits, who have enforced a form of communism upon the areas in which they operate. The sovietized areas are occupied by hordes of communist-bandit troops, organized on a military system and armed with rifles. Most of their weapons and ammunition have been obtained from the Chinese armies, frequently by the simple expedient of offering a definite price for their surrender. Funds are alleged to be supplied by the Third International, and there are believed to be a few Russian agents and advisers, though the bulk of the work is undoubtedly carried out by Chinese. The normal procedure by which sovietization is accomplished consists first in the forcible occupation of an area by the Red army, immediately after which propagandist agents proceed to distribute leaflets, plaster the area with appropriate slogans, address mass meetings of "workers," and generally agitate to enlist the sympathies of the poorer elements of the population. This propaganda is ably assisted by the confiscation of the property of the wealthier classes and its redistribution amongst the peasantry; by reducing the price of food and rates of taxes; by looting banks, public offices and the

property of any unfortunate foreigners who may have been indiscreet enough to remain in the area. A few wealthy citizens and a Christian or so are in all probability executed as a punishment for their past misdeeds of possession and a proof of the turning of the tables. These executions too serve as a salutary warning to all that the Communists are not the type of people to stand any nonsense. The levelling process having been completed, the sovietization of the area is proceeded with by the organization of trade unions and local soviets and the institution of collective farming. According to many reports the troops of the Red armies are not allowed to batten upon the populations, and are said to be regularly rationed and paid, so that, quite possibly, the conditions of life for the poorest class may be slightly better than they were prior to the arrival of the Communists in the area.

Chiang Kai Shek has found it impossible to eradicate Communism so far for a variety of reasons. Firstly, the Communists operate in difficult country and employ guerilla tactics against the Government troops sent to suppress them. Secondly, his lack of funds is so acute that he has been unable to pay regularly the large numbers of soldiers he maintains under arms. As a result these troops have frequently proved unreliable when employed in the Communist areas, the bribes offered by the Reds have proved too tempting, and there have been wholesale desertions to the ranks of the Communists. For this reason too he has hesitated to commit his best troops and risk their loss, fearing defeat at the hands of his political opponents should his fighting forces become greatly depleted. Thirdly, he has been so constantly diverted by the necessity to suppress revolts in other parts of China which threatened the existence of his government, by the floods, and by the Japanese action in Manchuria and Shanghai, that he has been unable to give the Reds his undivided attention for any length of time, and they have consequently profited by his periods of inactivity to enlarge their sphere of influence. His ability to clear up the situation now, without external assistance, is very much open to question, but the problem would be simplified if the recent *rapprochement* between Nanking and Canton were sufficiently sincere to permit of the Canton armies combining with the Nationalist troops against the Reds.

It is true that a very large force of Government troops is at present engaged in the anti-Red campaign and that a serious attempt

at blockading the Reds is being pushed forward with apparent determination. Success, however, will not be achieved by military operations alone, even if the issue of these could be foretold with certainty. It will wait upon the improvement of communications in the affected areas, the provision of roads and yet more roads; and if it is to be permanent, it will demand improved conditions for the people and vastly better relations between the Government troops and the peasantry than have existed in the past. Funds, which are lamentably short, will be the paramount necessity, not merely for road building, but equally to ensure that the troops are regularly rationed and paid, and thus deprived of all excuse for oppressing the inhabitants. There are indications that Chiang Kai Shek has realised the importance of the factors necessary for permanent success, and that he is making serious efforts not only to improve communications, but to promote a better understanding between the military and civil elements of the population. His task is no light one, however, and though it cannot be described as impossible it must be admitted that progress up to date has been too slow to encourage optimism.

There is thus a definite "Red Peril" in China to-day.

At present, however, there appears small likelihood of the movement gathering sufficient momentum to drive out the National Government. And even in the unlikely event of its being able to do so, it appears more than probable that the resulting government would rapidly be purged of all Russian influence. History has a way of repeating itself, and should the leaders of the Chinese Communist movement be successful in seizing the supreme power, they might be expected to be true to type and to throw over all Soviet influences immediately they had achieved the object for which foreign aid and money were utilized. The story of Borodin might well be repeated, and it is somewhat suprising that the Russians do not appear to have realized this. The innate conservatism of the population, and particularly of the Northerners is another factor which argues very strongly against the sovietization of the whole of China. The whole social instinct of the masses is directly in opposition to the principles of Communism. The centre of Chinese life is the family and the main desire in life of each Chinese family is to enrich itself at the expense of other families, and in due course to pass on the benefits to posterity. The division of property may appeal to the very poor in China as anywhere else, but the communal ownership of the property

after it has been divided is not calculated to appeal to a nation of individualists.

The third step towards an appreciation of the realities of the situation in China to-day is naturally an examination of conditions in "Manchukuo" as the Japanese have named the new state they have created from the territories of Manchuria and Jehol. The latest move has been the enthronement of P'u Yi as Emperor of the state. P'u Yi only 22 years ago, as a mere child, was the last of the Manchu Emperors to sit on the throne of China. He remains to-day the rightful occupant of the Dragon Throne.

The Japanese have declared that they have no intention of re-establishing the Ch'ing dynasty in China or of extending the domains of Manchukuo south of the Great Wall: but they can hardly expect the rest of the world to remain sufficiently credulous to take such an announcement seriously, it is certainly not taken seriously in China, where the supporters of the revolution regard this latest manoeuvre of Japan with considerable concern.

The facts that the provinces from the Yellow River northwards to the Great Wall have little liking for the rule of the Southerners composing the bulk of the Kuomintang party, that the removal of the capital from Peking is bitterly resented, and that the Northerners have never been very enthusiastically republican have already been mentioned. There are also distinct elements of the population and a large section of the merchant class who were in favour of the resumption of the monarchy in 1915, when Yuan Shih Kai, then President of the Republic, was urged to found a new dynasty and proclaim himself Emperor. The date of his coronation was actually fixed for February 9th, 1916. A rebellion which broke out in the South, however, forced the abandonment of this scheme, and Chang Hsün's attempt in the following year to restore the Manchus fared no better. It failed, not because of lack of monarchist sentiment in the North, but because of non-co-operation amongst the Chinese Leaders. Chang Hsün's army was defeated by Tuan Ch'i Jui, the commander of the Tientsin garrison, who is believed to have opposed him more from personal jealousy than from being out of sympathy with his object of re-usitating the Ch'ing dynasty in the person of Hsüan T'ung (now known as P'u Yi).

These two attempts ended in failure not because the Manchu dynasty lacked friends or because there was any genuine love for the

chaotic maladministration which had followed its overthrow, but rather because of the lack of cohesion amongst the various leaders and the feelings of jealousy and mistrust which existed between them. The failures have discouraged further attempts until the Japanese coup of 1931, but it may safely be assumed that there are fully as many to-day who would welcome the return of the monarchy as there were, in 1916 and 1917; particularly now that the heir to the throne is no longer a child, but an enlightened and thoughtful student of world affairs. The many descendants of the old Manchu court and army in North China still retain a feeling of loyalty for the Imperial house and scorn the misgovernment which has succeeded it. The bulk of the people may be assumed to take little interest in the form of government and to be mainly concerned with the struggle for existence. They would look favourably upon any administration which offered to improve their lot. They are tired of the never-ending civil wars, the depredations and exactions of the rabble soldiery, the unchecked lawlessness of bandits and the general grinding poverty of their lot—they sigh for the good old times before "democracy" came to China. Many of those who have enough education to think things out for themselves must realize that there was more democracy under the Manchu Emperors than ever there has been since their fall.

Such being the case, it would appear that, Japan's assurances notwithstanding, there may be many contingencies more remote than the return of Hsian T'ung to his ancestral home in Peking, and the resumption of his rule over at least a portion of his former territory in China proper. Such a return could conceivably be "permitted" by Japan "in recognition of the urgent desire of the people," and though it would presumably be strenuously resisted by the Kuomintang, it might well find favour with the leaders and people in North China, particularly if, in the meantime, Manchukuo had made such progress as to compare very favourably with the state of affairs south of the Wall. A factor against the possibility here considered is the deep hatred of the Chinese for the Japanese, which would render unpopular any form of government in China which was capable of being construed as the puppet of Japan. The Chinese, however, are notoriously willing to wait long for revenge. They might, therefore, see in the return of the monarchy an opportunity to make use of the assistance of Japan for their own purposes for the time being, whilst

a sure hope of turning in due course to rend and swallow up the aggressor might well lurk at the back of their minds. Their own history, moreover, has taught them that China, through the ages, has never failed ultimately to devour her conquerors by a steady and persistent process of peaceful penetration. Why should she not repeat once more this historic achievement? Some such dream of ultimately getting even with the Japanese might conceivably prove a sufficiently powerful motive to induce Chinese leaders in the Northern provinces to support the restoration of the monarchy.

Thus, then, might the realities of the situation as it stands to-day be briefly summarized. The Nanking Government does not really rule China, but only the portion occupied by her own army; she has so far failed to reduce banditry or to compel the disbandment of the hordes of regional troops all over the country. The incapacity which she has shown up to the present tends to suggest that it will be a very long time before either she herself, or some other government which may succeed her, will be able to perfect an administration capable of governing efficiently the whole of China and removing the ills from which her people are suffering. The area affected by Communism is found to be too well consolidated to admit of very much hope of its being reconquered by the National Government without external assistance. At the same time it appears probable that the further spread of the Red virus may be arrested, and it is extremely unlikely that the whole of China would "go Red." In the North, Manchuria and Jehol have become foreign territory, and there appears no present hope of effecting their return. Japanese aggression has stopped for the time being, but few in China are deceived by the pacific assertions of Japan. It is believed that she will neglect no excuse for a further advance, and it is thought in many quarters that she will probably stage the second act of her Far Eastern drama with less abruptness than the first, carefully disposing the settings so that the absorption of Northern China into the new state will be made to appear as the natural result of the craving of the inhabitants for a stable government and relief from the burdens of crushing taxation and extreme poverty.

The actualities of the situation and the trend of events having been briefly considered, an attempt may be hazarded to survey some of the possibilities of the future. There are, however, many factors to contend with, so many uncertainties and so few certainties, that it

will be impossible to reach a definite conclusion as to the impending developments in the Far East during the next decade or so ; nevertheless it is possible to imagine several situations which might arise and to derive from their consideration an interesting study.

One of the possibilities of which a great deal has been heard in the Press is that of a war between Japan and the Soviet, in the course of which both these economic competitors for the world's markets will exhaust their strength fighting each other, whilst the great Powers applaud and supply armaments and stores to both belligerents. Such a war is no doubt visualized as giving the Western nations a breathing space, in that the approaching economic threat of cheap mass production by Japan, or Russia, or both, would be postponed until these two nations had recovered from their war exhaustion. It might even lead to the overthrow of Bolshevism and the re-establishment of the capitalistic regime. It is frequently referred to almost as a certainty. Japan's high-handed action in the Chinese Eastern Railway dispute, and Russia's defensive preparations towards the Manchukuo frontier are regarded as pointers. Friction undoubtedly exists, but is the situation really so strained as to admit of no other solution but war ? If it really should come about, which of the two combatants would prove the stronger ? And what of China in the meanwhile ?

The Russians are no doubt much annoyed. They would probably like few things better than a successful war. But their strength is still untried and they have fresh memories of their last disastrous encounter with militant Japan. It is suggested, therefore, that they will put up with a great deal more before they will resort to the extreme measure of war ; that they will, in fact, only go to war if absolutely forced to do so, and that they will try to avoid taking the field alone against so formidable an opponent. The doubling of the Siberian Railway and the cantoning of a force of all arms in the vicinity of the Manchukuo frontier can scarcely be construed as a certain indication of hostile intent on the part of Russia ; rather would these measures appear as natural precautions of defence rendered imperative by the dangerous aggressiveness recently shown by Japan. What, save the gratitude of China and the great capitalistic Powers, could Russia hope to gain by fighting Japan, even if she were sure of the result ? And in the light of her own bitter experience she can scarcely feel supremely confident of turning the tables on her former victor.

And what could Japan expect to gain by forcing a war upon Russia? A slice of Siberian territory? But why fight for territory when she can take it, unopposed, from China? The death of Soviet hopes in China? But, surely it would be illogical to fight Russia in such a cause; there would be more sense in attacking the Chinese Reds in the Kiangsi-Fukien area. The gratitude of the Western nations? It can hardly be imagined that Japan, usually so wide awake to her own interests, has failed to appreciate how the wastage of a war between herself and Russia would suit the book of her economic competitors. It is indeed difficult to imagine that Japan could hope for any gains of sufficient importance to justify the expense and the risk of embarking on a war with Russia; particularly, too, at a time when she has incurred the enmity of China, the anger of America, the disapproval and mistrust of the League of Nations, and indeed of the whole world. The more one tries to put oneself in Japan's place, the more does one become convinced that for her to fight Russia would be little short of suicidal.

If, however, this now not-quite-so-certain war should come about, dare one hazard a guess as to the ultimate victor? So little is known of Russia that it is difficult to estimate how much of her supposed strength in the air and on land is real, and how much imaginary; but it is at least obvious that her troops would be forced to depend upon a long unwieldy line of communication, consisting only of one long double line of railway, and ill-furnished with lateral communications. The Japanese, on the contrary, would benefit by the network of railways with which Manchukuo has been provided, and would thus possess the double advantage of interior lines and a short compact rear area. Russia, of course, has far greater resources of man power; but this advantage could scarcely be expected to prove irresistible if matched against the superior organisation of a numerically inferior foe, whose state of preparedness was such that he could strike decisive blows before the cumbersome machinery of Russia had been properly set in motion. It is impossible to be positive of the outcome, nor is it at all certain that the war could end without other interested Powers becoming involved, but, as far as it is possible to judge, Japan would appear to have the better prospect of success.

And what of China? Her leaders realize her weakness. If she were wise she would remain neutral and avoid providing Japan with any excuse for further aggression. The temptation to join in, how-

ever, particularly if Japan should fail to make rapid progress in Siberia, might prove irresistible, urged as it would doubtless be by the misguided enthusiasm of the youth of China, clamorous for revenge. But whether China joined in or stayed out, the result, if Japan were victorious, would probably be much the same in the long run. To wit, either by peaceful or forceful means the Japanese strangle hold would probably be tightened, and another large slice of China would add its quota to the might of Nippon and bear testimony to the new Monroe Doctrine of the Far East.

Should Russia and Japan decline to be goaded into the folly of fighting each other, should Russia continue to content herself with defensive preparations, and Japan succeed in keeping her militaristic party under restraint, what then might be expected to happen in Manchukuo and China?

Under Japanese tutelage the Manchurian State would probably be considerably developed, banditry would in all probability be stamped out, conditions for the poorer classes rendered more tolerable, taxation reduced, hygiene and sanitation improved, and the standard of living slightly raised from its present very low level. It is not suggested that the Japanese will necessarily develop Manchuria any more rapidly than would have been the case if the Chinese administration had remained, but it is possible that the development may be more rapid than in China proper. Japan may be expected to make great efforts to this end. Any improvement in conditions North of the Great Wall will rapidly become known in the territory to its South. Unless, therefore, the National Government can so reorganize itself as to produce South of the Wall a state of affairs which compares not too unfavourably with that to its North, it would seem that any sentiment which already exists favourable to the restoration of the Emperor would receive stimulus, and that, cunningly aided by Japan, this feeling might become more and more eloquent, until the transfer of the seat of Government from Ch'angch'ur to Peking, and the extension of the territory of Manchukuo right down to the Yellow River, if not to the Yangtse, would be made to appear as the natural consequences of the desire of the people of China.

This surely seems to be the way in which events are shaping themselves, and appears, too, to be the manner in which Japan desires they should proceed. The only situations which suggest themselves as likely to alter this trend of events are either the establishment of

a stable and effective administration in China, or armed intervention by other powers. The latter appears so highly improbable in the present state of world affairs as to exclude it from discussion in this article. But the advent of an effective government in China appears under certain conditions, to be well within the bounds of possibility. This may seem to contradict the suggestion made earlier that the National Government has shown few indications of its capacity to deal with the stupendous task in front of it. It is still thought that, acting alone and without outside guidance, financial aid and administrative assistance, there is little hope that the Kuomintang party could succeed in transforming itself with sufficient speed to stave off the Japanese menace. But if such help could be administered with the full approval of Chinese Leaders, and could be so given as to avoid all suggestion of foreign intervention or aggression, it is believed that rapid strides could be made.

The thought of China at one with Japan, with the resources of both countries organized to compete with the West must be a very disturbing one to the economists and the governments of the European Powers and America. Such a domination of China by Japan is a state of affairs which it may be safely assumed they would wish to avert, and which, indeed, they might be expected to go to some lengths to avoid. Short of armed intervention against Japan, how else can they hope to thwart the Japanese plans to continue and complete the conquest of China, except by giving to the National Government in China such practical help and support as will enable it to become a real government, capable of ruling efficiently a reorganized and unified country? If such a government could be brought into being, there could never be any danger of the success of a movement for the restoration of the monarchy at the price of bondage to the Japanese, and it would be increasingly difficult for Japan to secure control over territory South of the Wall without recourse to aggressive action. Any such resumption of warlike measures would, it is thought, no longer be tolerated by the Powers, and might conceivably be successfully resisted by a reorganized China.

That the interested Powers should combine and take a practical part in the reincarnation of the Chinese Empire as a republic has been constantly urged by that able student of Far Eastern affairs, Mr. J. O. P. Bland, who, in his book, "*China, The Pity of It*" (Heinemann), has developed the idea in some detail and outlined a

scheme, which if it could be inaugurated with the approval of the Chinese Leaders should have every prospect of success. This is how he puts it, and the pages of his whole book burn with the ardour of his conviction :—

"Therefore, if there be anything of vitality in the ideals which the Anglo-Saxon race professes, anything dynamic in the political faith of the League of Nations, the world's collective conscience must face the realities and urgency of the problem and set itself to solve it by regarding the Chinese people as a "ward of civilization." In other words, there must be an end to the fetish of non-interference and the friendly powers must devise and impose measures, during a period of tutelage, first for the restoration of law and order, and thereafter of the nation's commerce and credit. What China needs, above all else, is ten years of uninterrupted peace and security, and this she cannot possibly have, except with material assistance from without. The civilized Powers owe it to the unfortunate Chinese people to abandon the formula of non-interference and to recognize the truth that the doctrine of self-determination is inapplicable in the case of a people which is manifestly incapable of self-government."

Mr. Bland urges benevolent intervention by the Powers, preferably with the consent of Nanking, but, if necessary, without it. His views are so sound and so forcibly expressed that it is difficult not to agree with him; yet it would appear very doubtful whether there could be any hope of agreement between the Powers as to combined operations with a view to intervention in China, short of a critical situation arising which left them no other course for the protection of their own nationals and interests. Without such crisis, however, benevolent intervention for the benefit of the Chinese people might yet be achieved through the joint action of the United States and Great Britain, even if other powers could not be prevailed upon to participate. It might even be possible to inaugurate the scheme with the full approval of the Chinese Leaders, if they could be successfully convinced of the disinterestedness and non-aggressiveness of the Powers. Guarantees of the unimpaired sovereignty of China and of protection against aggression during the period of tutelage would naturally be required.


The announcement in the Spring of 1934 by the Japanese Foreign Office, which was given considerable prominence in the Press under

some such heading as "Japan's 'Hands Off China' Warning," would seem to indicate that Japan herself is not unaware of the danger of foreign intervention in China, and that she would do her utmost to resist it. Her uncompromising attitude towards the question of naval quotas and her lavish expenditure on her army and air force are further indications of her determination to place herself, as speedily as possible, in the position to carry out her expansion policy on the mainland of Asia in the teeth of foreign opposition. That she would resist outside interference in Chinese politics as strenuously as she dared is certain. Her resistance might, indeed, be expected to be active if intervention were attempted by any single Power, but, in the present state of her national armament, it is scarcely believable that even she would be capable of the folly of attempting to fight single-handed against a coalition of Great Powers.

The Chinese National Government, after its recent bitter experience at the hands of Japan, must have fully realized its impotence, and the complete hopelessness of attempting to oppose the advance of the Japanese army without outside aid. The failure of its attempts to suppress Communism in Kiangsi and Fukien must have convinced the leaders of the extreme difficulty of bringing this area under control, whilst the series of rebellions and attempts to establish opposition governments must have brought home to them the fact that the "Republic of China" is still an empty boast and the "National Government" a meaningless title. Those leaders of the Kuomintang party who have the interests of their country at heart must surely realize their failure, their complete inability to stand alone any longer against Japan, and that they are now faced with two alternatives: to come to an agreement with Japan and to accept her aid, with all the bondage to a hated foe which this would connote, or to seek other assistance to put their house in order and enable their country to preserve its independence.

If, as they surely must, the governments of the Powers interested in China's future fully realize the extent of the Japanese menace, the importance in their own interests of backing up the National Government in China and of affording every possible assistance to enable it to resist the overtures or the attacks of Japan must be apparent. The thought of a Japan, paramount in China, with the vast resources of this rich territory—more a continent than a country—organized to compete for world markets, conjures up visions

of an economic crisis in the West which would completely upset present standards of living and possibly spell the reversal of our whole social system. It is a thought which cannot be tolerated in Europe and America. Clearly, something must be done to stay the ominous trend of events in the Far East and stave off a crisis which threatens the very existence of our civilization. How is it to be achieved?



SATURDAY TO FRIDAY—AN AIR JOURNEY—(contd.).

PART II.

By "MOUSE."

In the first part of this epic or comic flight to the East,* I described the journey as far as Alexandria. The beautiful "Scipio" had just shaken the waters of Alexandria from off her shining floats and we were heading to Cairo in the mysterious south. I was fed up. Having looked forward to smoking a cigarette for close upon eight hours, and then baulked of my vicious desire by the exigencies of the petrol service and a delaying head wind, I was childishly upset.

"I think the Air Service is the greatest invention since horses in the world, don't you?" emitted the Great Man in a gentle roar.

"No," I said, feebly but firmly, "I don't."

"No?" he enquired in a horrified squeak which awakened all my lady friends who were prostrate.

"No." (From me, lying exhausted with hushed eyelids and every simulation of approaching demise).

The Great Man rose in his seat, put two thumbs in his waistcoat armpits, cleared his throat in a manner which put the back-firing of the engines to shame, and declared: "By gad, sir!" [This is the first time I ever heard this Edwardian expression employed seriously. All the electorate (*i.e.*, ship's company) sat up]. "When I was in the Air Force in the Great War," he said, "and commanded No.—— Squadron, I learned them that England's only hope lay in the Air." ("Hear, hear" from a nice looking passenger whom I had not met). "That squadron was one of the most famous of all; I had in my command two V.Cs., seven D.S.Os., and I can't remember all the other decorations. One of the finest air squadrons in the War, Sir!" he finished, looking at the Peach impressively.

"No.——. Sir?" inquired the nice unknown young man, excitedly. "I was with you in Amiens in '18, then. We hadn't any V. C. then, Sir, but we did have old Rolly Poley who got that D.S.O. north of Arras. Do you remember, Sir? That was a good show. Old Rolly often tells me things about you, Sir. You must be General Tooty-kins?"

* Published in the Oct. No., 1934, of the Journal of the U.S.I.

There was a horrified and embarrassed silence. The Great Man hummed and gargled and said that he did not mean number such a squadron but that he meant number so a squadron, and that so far as he was aware he had never had the pleasure of the nice young man's acquaintance. Snob, we all snorted to ourselves, and snored to Cairo.

(Moral : Never believe any casual War reminiscences. They are all built on the unsubstantial structure of emotional memories ; and now have produced as their Cenotaph a Prime Minister's Bar Memories.)

Egypt lay all around us like blue-black ink, the engines droned on and on, and we moved far more steadily than any train. But I was hungry, thirsty and smokeless. At 10-10 p.m. (Sphinx time) we approached Cairo. The city lay below us like some vast jeweller's shop—with all her diamonds and brilliants and iridescent trinkets laid out in patterned rows. The "Scipio" had all her lights burning and I must have imagined seeing our shadow—perfectly luminous brushing the lights below as we swooped down, effortlessly, in a spiral curve to land gently on the bosom of the Nile between two bridges. I forgot all my trivial, personal and possibly childish troubles in the joy of an achievement. We, in fact, had arrived in the glamorous land of Pharaohs, Sphinxes, Mummies and Pyramids.

Instead of any fun, however, I had to clamber unsteadily up a gangway into another customs house and suffer the embarrassment of further rubber-stamping by Egyptian officials.

Eventually we were all unbottled at the Hotel Continental (excellent so far as I had time to see it). I asked the Peach to share my humble table and we sat down on the terrace overlooking the street to eat our dinner at 10-45 p.m. Victorias, taxis, and all those Egyptian chaps with nightshirts and post cards wandered below us, their noises echoing uneasily through the sleeping town. We were hungry and thirsty. The Peach ordered the whole menu and I demanded the whole cellar. The food was first-class, my whisky and soda was better than any champagne, and we were both looking forward to a bath and some sleep.

Along came a waiter with a neatly printed card issued to passengers by the Imperial Airways with all the cold-blooded efficiency which stamps modern so-called staff work. "Your luggage," it said, "will

be collected at 1 a.m." The Peach grabbed my drink and drank it. "You will be called at 1-15 a.m." continued the death sentence. I have never felt so much the lack of a Mummy, but the waiter said they were all shut up in the museums. The Peach reacted marvellously (my whisky possibly), and whispered urgently a tip about our onward journey. "But you must be quick!" she said.

So I rushed to my room, shaved, bathed and changed, sped to the bar for some iced beer, and greeted all my fellow passengers at 1-15 a.m., on the steps of the bus as if I was a Viceregal A. D. C. doing it for love. I sat in front. We were transported through uninhabited, brilliantly lit streets to the Aerodrome at Heliopolis, where we were herded into yet another Customs office. The Great Man, when he found that the other important Government officials were absent and asleep, did his indignant stuff. I—this was naughty—took advantage of the uproar, slipped through a bath-room door, ran across the Aerodrome to the dimly-shaped Hannibal and effected a burglarious entrance. An outraged steward confronted me. He was shocked. I pleaded with him in the darkness. I told him that I was escorting an invalid lady, that I believed two seats were available in the fore-cabin, that my father had been Prime Minister of England, that my aunt was Mae West, that I was engaged to Sir Eric Geddes' niece, that I was a Squadron Leader in the R. A. F., and that the lady must have peace and quietness. He didn't believe, I believe, one word, but was good enough to allow me to put a cigarette case on one seat and my hat on another. (Incidentally, he refused to accept my furtively offered tip and made me feel rather ashamed. However, all is fair in love and air.) I got back to the Customs Shed in time. A Customs official and I examined my pyjamas and shaving brush with mutual horror. I grabbed the Peach by the arm and raced her to the Hannibal. We rushed aboard, tore selfishly into the fore-cabin, and she—you will hardly believe it—plopped down on my Black Homburg hat (not yet paid for), and said: "Well, you're not such a funny fool as you look!" Later I forgave her the wanton ruin of a good hat when I discovered the extra comfort she had won for us by knowing the ropes.

Owing to the extra amount of fuel required on the long hops between Cairo and Karachi it appears that the live freight in the fore-parts of the aeroplanes has to be decreased. This entails that less passengers can be carried, and that the bulk of their weight must

be in the aft-cabin. Only two passengers, therefore, are allowed in the fore-cabin, and, naturally, this cloister is reserved for distinguished passengers. I could hardly go to sleep with laughing. In fact, just after the Great Man rumbled for'ard and glared at me with my feet upspread on the table before me, my head on cushions, and facially an appearance of innocent repose, I cried myself to sleep. (The Peach asked him to put out the light. He didn't.)

* * * * *

Five minutes later (it seemed) the steward was shaking me. "Have we crashed?" I asked tentatively. "No, Sir", he replied, "Landed. Gaza. Breakfast."

Tuesday.—I crawled out feeling and looking like one of those what-nots one meets under an upturned slate. A hearty Imperial Airways official, looking like Lord Beatty, greeted me and the dawn with an ill-judged smile of welcome. "Breakfast is ready," he said, and taking the Peach (almost as comatose as the author), by the arm escorted her with a sickening flourish to the restaurant. I stumbled through sand in the rear, and wondered dazedly why we had fought three hard battles in the war for this incredible sand-dune.

In the restaurant the proprieties were being (thank heaven) observed. The ladies were each eating an enormous breakfast at one table; and the gentlemen were eyeing each other sourly at another. I joined the men and sensed immediately an atmosphere of loathing. I was too sleepy to care and ordered an egg, a bacon, an Eno and an aspirin. The Great Man swallowed a pint of coffee, put his thumbs in his armpits, beamed at two colleagues, and with very elaborate emphasis said: "Ha! Here is our gay Lothario!" A sycophantic titter greeted the gibe. "And how is His Excellency this morning?" he inquired. They all roared with laughter, and looked at me as if I was an illegitimate baby or the author thereof. I couldn't think of anything to say and said nothing. The Great Man continued in this strain for a bit when suddenly the Air pilot cut in with a remark: "Well, anyway, His Excellency bagged the best seat—why didn't you?" The Great Man, for the first and only time since London, said nought, and "His Excellency" ordered another good egg.

The great "Hannibal" lifted us from this childish scene at 7 a. m., and it was interesting to see from the air the imprints in the sand of the war trenches, machine gun emplacements and so on which, quite likely, are now obliterated from the view of the pedestrian. We

ew on eastwards and uneasy atmospherics became more apparent. The Dead Sea I noticed was, quite rightly, dead. Before long I wished to be dead also. A sand storm was billowing below. Through one twitching eye I saw the starboard wing of the aeroplane describe a badly-drawn circle; through the other eye I saw a nauseatingly blue sky merge without reason into a ground *motif*. In between I felt Hannibal rolling up and down the Alps on his elephants.

The Peach was sleeping like a little child. I belled the steward. He produced a card-board box. "Kiss me, Hardy," I said, lying back. "Don't mention it, Sir," the kind fellow answered, "Have another." I did. Twice. What a morning.

Down below I could dimly see a telegraph wire wasting its time over miles and miles of desert. Incidentally the same line demarcates a significant line of air petrol stations on the direct journey from West to East, but I was barely interested. We landed at a Petrol Station, called H. 4, for supplies, a desolate station with a very nice manager and assistants in charge. They could offer Hannibal 48 gallons, a meagre gin and bitters, as their main store had been emptied by aeroplanes from Saigon and Java that same morning. It sounds rather fantastic that this obscure spot in an almost uninhabited eastern desert should have been sucked dry within a few hours by the machines of three western countries. I was worrying out in my own small mind the peculiar significance of this incident when the Great Man grabbed my arm savagely. "I told you, didn't I?" he said, "that what we need is guts. Why the hell should a British aeroplane find all its petrol pinched by these something awful other fellows?" I didn't know the answer again. Mad-dening.

We spent an hour and a half imbibing this small cocktail (48 gallons) and then flew on to the next Petrol Dump, H. 5. The Peach slept. I had two more card-board boxes and hoped secretly that we would crash and be killed instantly. At H. 5.—I must pay a fleeting tribute to all those kind people who succour air passengers when they land so fortuitously at their god-forsaken homes—we got our fill of petrol and I went for a long wholesome walk.

The sand storm continued and the Hannibal and I fought our sickening way through it as far as Rutbah Wells, that oasis in the desert. I joined the Great Man and his boy friends at their table. "His Excellency has been sick," he said. Stung at last I managed to

say: "If you don't shut up His Excellency will be sick again," and I think I looked it. An enormous lunch, soup, tinned salmon, curry, cold mutton, tinned pears, cheese, a bottle of beer and everything else offered. What one needs, travelling by air, I think, is guts. I paid three shillings at Rutbah Wells for a bottle of iced beer; it was worth ten.

In the glare of sand and sun we took off at 2-50 p.m. (Iraq time) I slept. When I awoke the air was thin and cold and the Hannibal was cruising on a most even keel. I looked down and saw nothing but a swirling, amorphous mass of golden sand-storm very busy four thousand feet underneath. We were flying at 10,000 feet in a purified and calm atmosphere.

At 5-30 p.m., the pilot switched off his engines and we volplaned, or rather revolplaned, down to the murk of sand, spun through it and landed with deadly accuracy on the Baghdad Aerodrome. A beautiful bit of navigation.

Formalities were quickly expedited and the passengers were transported smartly to the Maude Hotel. It looks like a "Hindu Hostel for Travellers" from the front, but has a magnificent terrace at the back on the bank of the Tigris. On this terrace the Great Man and I shared dinner. It was a good dinner but the conversation was more enjoyable. He was in a humble spirit, and said that perhaps as I had been in India recently and he had not been there since before the War it might be possible that I could tell him something of its modern spirit; what will you drink, my good fellow? "Champagne," I replied, "please." He didn't bat an eyelid and ordered a bottle, and after the first glass I began to like him.

He was an honest Die-hard and was so genuinely saturated with 1890 ideas about India that he had no room left in his head to accommodate the events of subsequent history. I explained to him that I, too, basically, was a Die-hard and that it was a dangerous experiment to transfer benevolent British rule to mobocracy, but that we, the British, had to stick to our promises, that the War had caused fundamental changes in our political outlook, that the rising tide of democratic impulse was a significant growth in our constitutional political genius, that it is no use kicking against the prigs—thank you, I wouldn't mind another glass.

And the great turgid Tigris swept past us greyly and without emotion. The Great Man then told me things about England's most

famous politicians which I can't write here. "Mark my words!" he ordered me. "The White Paper will never get through Parliament."

Wednesday.—I got to bed at 10-30 and was called at 2-15 a.m. I stumbled on board and slept until Basra, although I have a faint memory of gloomy, oily marshes lying below. At Basra we had a poor breakfast—perhaps I wasn't in a breakfast mood?—and left at 6 a.m. for Koweit. It leaves no mark on my memory except we did not know if one pronounced it "Quite", or "Quaite."

Thence to Bahrein where the aerodrome is an expanse of nothing in a similar situation, and where I met an Indian Muslim Customs official who waxed lyrical about a brother officer of mine and procured me a mother-of-pearl shell for eight annas.

We got to Sharjah in the evening, having flown for several hours down the Persian Gulf over the sea, a quaint admission of Persian territorial rights, but—as I looked at our landing wheels and the deep blue sea below—hardly a tribute to so-called Oriental hospitality. Sharjah is a "Beau Geste" fortress, standing solidly on a palm-dotted peninsula. Barbed wire surrounds it, towers for enfilade fire are at its corners, and the battlements were, until recently, loop-holed with loop-holes whose loops looped *outwards*. Otherwise, if it had a garrison, it could withstand a minor siege. It possesses a pet gazelle, the most friendly little deer I have ever met.

The homeward-bound Imperial Airways machine arrived shortly after us and dinner was a swopping house of experiences. I shared a bedroom with a Mr.———who was making a reconnaissance for the London-Melbourne flight. He was most interesting and made no bones about his belief that his machine would win. He showed me his maps—four long strips with a red compass bearing streaked across each; London—Baghdad; Baghdad—Allahabad; Allahabad—Singapore (1,500 miles over water); Singapore—Port Darwin; Port Darwin—Melbourne. He said that the official estimate of the time was 72 hours but that his machine would walk it in 54. I was so air-minded by this time that I believed every word. The poor chap failed to get off the ground at Mildenhall and I lost two pounds.

Thursday.—In an extraordinary pearl-coloured mist we left Sharjah next morning for Gwadar at 5-15 a.m. This is, I understand, the longest hop made by Imperial Airways on any of their routes. Flying at 2,500 feet nothing was to be seen except a pale golden and

enlarged sun trying to penetrate the soft fog. Later we got glimpses of the jagged coast with its fantastic rock formations. At 10-2 a.m.—450 miles distance—we arrived at Gwadar, the first Indian outpost. What a thrill! (impersonally).

Gwadar consists of a petrol godown and a Ladies and Gentlemen, a mean city untouched by Lutyens. After some welcome tea we embarked again, the Peach remarking that there was nothing like tea after all (thank Heavens), and we set sail for Karachi. We had an excellent lunch *en route*—the air meals are really good and served most efficiently—and we wandered through the afternoon along the edge of desolation, called Baluchistan, until almost without warning we were precipitated upon Karachi at 3 p.m.

Drigh Road, Karachi, will eventually be one of the greatest air junctions in the Empire. As such, it will require better facilities for passengers. We were driven by car from the aerodrome to a dâk bungalow a mile or so away and looked after with the greatest courtesy. We were driven back and had to stand kicking our heels about until the mail was sorted and our kit transferred to the India liner—a monoplane of the Atlanta Class. Obviously, a Waiting Room with all conveniences in the Aerodrome itself is required; by this time one is getting tired of being polite to fellow passengers and herded with them everywhere. Even the Peach could hardly bear to look at me, and I had to pass her the sugar and ask for more milk in my tea.

I wandered into the Postal Sorting Shed and watched the end of this epic Air Mail journey—mail posted last Saturday in London arriving in India on Thursday. What a triumph of modern inventions! What a meeting of West and East!

There seated on the ground with his legs tucked under him in the manner of the agile East sat a little Babu. Before him lay a litter of air-mail stamped letters, heaped in heaps and scattered in piles. He had a bit of string fastened to his big toe and with the help of his teeth and hands was bundling those letters into bundles destined for all the great cities of the Orient. An urchin kept adding fuel to the pile murmuring "Shimla-wala." That Imperial Airways use such gigantic transports as Heracles, Scipio and Hannibal to transport Imperial mails to India where they are sorted by a small Babu's big toe struck me as a Big Thought with which to comfort the Great Man. But he had gone, and I would like to meet him again,

The journey from Karachi to Jodhpur that evening was uneventful. Most of our fellow-passengers had departed and the Peach and I felt flat; returning to India always has a deflating effect. The hotel at Jodhpur is easily the best I have met in India, but the heat in June is not conducive to happy slumber.

Friday.—I was glad to be called at 4 a.m. and to leave the aerodrome for the cooler heights at 5 a.m. At 7-30 a.m. I delivered the Peach to her perspiring husband at the Safdar Jung Aerodrome, New Delhi,—pleasure over, duty done, battle won—and retired to Maiden's Hotel. My bearer woke me the same evening at 6-30 p.m. and I still felt short of sleep.

One does not like to criticise or praise such efficient hosts as the air and ground staff of Imperial Airways. They are amazingly thorough and efficient. Dubious as I am of all this air business, I never suffered a technical qualm during the whole flight and always found the ground officials so full of staff work efficiency that they made me shudder. I met four pilots personally and I could not help being struck by their modest air, their quiet sense of their own unimportance, and their shattering efficiency. They all talked very little; I was disappointed at that, as I always thought air chaps talked too much.

Saturday's Washing.—Some of the people who read this article may say that it is all very well to travel by air for people who can afford it; but what of us poor devils who can barely afford a tourist passage by steamer?

The answer, of course, is that the tourist passenger cannot afford the present air rates. I couldn't either if Windsor Lad hadn't won. But I have found a comparison of rates between a first-class sea passage plus P. & O. Special across France, and an Imperial Airways in the "*Journal of the Aero Club of India.*"

The figures strike me as being moderate for the sea journey, but do not include the extra expense incurred by the air passenger's kit sent by sea. They are as follows:—

BY SEA.

	<i>Single.</i>			<i>Return.</i>		
	£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.
1st Class "A" and Special	..	105	18 6	192	2 0	
1st Class "B" and Special	..	99	18 6	182	2 0	
1st Class "C" and Special	..	93	8 6	172	2 0	

(The above includes rail journey from Delhi, tips and expenses both on the steamer and train across France.)

BY AIR.

From Delhi to Victoria Station, London.

			<i>Single.</i>			<i>Return.</i>		
			£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.
Government officials and Army officers			95	8	0	171	14	0
For unofficals	106	0	0	190	16	0

Recent developments in the Air Service, which include the facilities to fly to Marseilles and the doubling of the weekly service, give hope that the passage rates will be decreased and thereby make the air journey more popular. But, in conclusion, I would add that the journey needs to be made more comfortable. To sit in a chair for hours on end and on one's own end gave me the holy thought that it was not a divinity of the Air Service who "shaped our ends." If the passenger has to be in an aeroplane for fourteen or sixteen hours of the day and denied more than four hours in a bed she and he ought to be given long seats in which complete relaxation would be possible. However, the Peach and the French air cushion saved my life.

INFANTRY—THICK OR THIN.

BY "HOPLITE."

The problems of the proper organisation and functions of infantry are matters of frequent discussion and speculation by military minds to-day.

One writer in a recent article in this journal,* entitled "The Fallacy of the Line," hopes to improve the chances of success of infantry in the attack by reintroducing the old column formation. This author bases his arguments on the result of two battles of the Great War: the second battle of Ypres and the battle of Loos to prove that, as regards formations in the attack, the German column method was more successful and more economical in casualties than the British linear method.

True, it has been said that Nature's great book is written in mathematical language, but it is doubtful whether battles can be won by applied geometrics.

Besides the factor of formation, there are other important factors in both these battles which may have contributed very largely to the results of each.

The figures for casualties in the second battle of Ypres when the Germans attacked were:—

Killed, wounded and missing—

		British.	German.
Officers	..	2,150	860
Other ranks	..	57,125	34,673

The British and French were on the defensive and the French casualties are not included. The Germans although employed in an unsuccessful attack were giving approximately three casualties to one received. The outstanding facts are that the Germans had a great preponderance of artillery, especially the heavy types, and they employed gas which was in the nature of a surprise weapon. The British counter-attacks, when launched, were unsupported by adequate artillery fire and hence were costly. It appeared to be an operation in which rifles on the British side were pitted against artillery and gas; and for the latter the wind at the time was especially favourable.

* July, 1933.

As regards the battle of Loos in which the British attacked and the Germans were on the defensive, the figures for casualties were as follows :—

Killed, wounded and missing—

		British.	German.
Officers	..	2,013	441
Other ranks	..	48,367	19,935

In the initial attack the British employed about 50,000 men on a front of eight miles: this, on the face of it, can hardly be considered a linear movement, nor, it is maintained, can formations be entirely responsible for the disproportionate number of casualties on both sides as compared with those for the battle of Ypres. To consider one item alone, which strikes the eye,—the heavy proportion of losses among officers. Officers are not affected by linear or column formations. The same fact is noticeable in the figures for Ypres.

No; the story seems to be similar to that of the second battle of Ypres. There was a shortage of artillery, especially heavy guns, and of ammunition, on the British side. The Germans were favoured by having good artillery observation, whereas the British had not. The Germans used on the whole more wire to protect their positions than the British did, and evacuated the forward zones during the bombardment which we learnt afterwards to do. The British did make use of gas on this occasion, but the wind was unfavourable for its employment. It would appear that both engagements were an example of the triumph of matter, and the bigger the weight of it used the better. It cannot seriously be disputed that the main obstacles to an attack, with the exception of barbed wire, are machine guns and automatics whether an attack be in linear or column formation. It has been an accepted principle and is easily demonstrated that extended lines are less vulnerable to machine-gun fire than columns. It was firstly, the breech-loading rifle; secondly, the machine gun that compelled the infantry to adopt the line formation. Latterly, machine-gun fire has tended to become more and more oblique, so that it is a moot question whether lines should not be perpendicular, *i.e.*, in single file, rather than parallel to the front: in other words in relation to the front they would be in the nature of column formations. But with infiltration methods, there will be no real front in minor tactics. Hence no standard formation can be prescribed.

These conditions are relatively the same whether the defence be organised on a static, semi-static, or encounter basis. For an attack to be successful, apart from attaining the element of surprise, the most essential factor is the accurate and sustained fire of artillery. Armoured fighting vehicles will in a measure be able to perform certain of the functions of artillery, but they in turn require their allotment of artillery, thereby making less available for the infantry. It should and will be possible to employ less infantry as the number of armoured fighting vehicles increases, but this does not mean the extinction of infantry ; and it is as well to try and to clarify our ideas on this controversy.

The infantry will always have scope as being the most readily concealed and ubiquitous fire unit in the land forces. The armoured sages will dispute this, and quote in support of their argument the fact that on sea the old wooden fighting ship has been driven off by the ironclad. But on reflection it must be evident that this does not end the naval part of the simile. Coastal motor boats and torpedo boats still exist alongside the battleship and cruiser, and are as vulnerable to them as infantry are to armoured fighting vehicles. This result has evolved on an element like the sea which practically offers equal facility of movement to both classes of ships ; unlike conditions on land where the armoured fighting vehicles are faced with various obstacles. Besides, the land battle does not necessarily close down at night as the naval battle is forced to do. It is to be expected in future that night operations will be resorted to more often. By this means it is hoped to place the fire power of the defence at a disadvantage and give the attack a better chance. Infantry are and will be the paramount arm for this sort of work. It must, however, be borne in mind that, even with well-trained troops, night operations will tend to be hazardous affairs. They cannot normally be undertaken by very large forces, nor is it likely that the defence will allow the attack to turn the scales against it without devising a means of restoring the balance.

The defence can reduce the odds against them by an adequate system of patrolling, by the employment of flares in the area, and by reconnaissance with armoured fighting vehicles. (A night attack has to avoid the closer parts of the country, the defence has no need to hide its presence ; no weapon is going to range with any degree of accuracy at night on a moving armoured fighting vehicle even if it carried a small

searchlight, and the armoured fighting vehicle will be moving over ground which can be previously reconnoitred.) There seems no reason why armoured fighting vehicles should not be an answer to night attacks.

Furthermore, the defence machine-guns fitted with spotlights throwing a beam up to three or four hundred yards should be able to make fairly accurate shooting. These lights are not going to afford much of a range mark and they would be defiladed from the front. The advantages the attack hopes to gain from darkness are not going to be so predominant, and the situation from the attacking infantry point of view will be much the same as by day, with the added difficulty of co-operation and inter-communication. There does not appear to be a solution to the infantry problem on these lines. The subject still centres round the problem of increasing and making fire power more effective,—fire power primarily in the form of guns and armoured fighting vehicles. It is with this end in view that the activities of infantry must be developed. The use of smoke is not touched on in this article. For one reason, it is in an experimental stage. Secondly, it is considered that owing to the variability of meteorological conditions, smoke will be too uncertain a quantity to form the basis of a fire plan.

There appear to be four chief ways of increasing fire power :—

- (i) By the rapid and accurate indication of targets.
- (ii) By the provision of ample ammunition and the means of getting it forward in small armoured track vehicles.
- (iii) By an increase in the number of guns and mortars.
- (iv) By developing the mobility of artillery in the form of armoured protection and track vehicles. (This is gradually being done.)

It is not proposed to dwell much on the last three means, they are more or less self-evident, and do not so intimately concern the infantry problems under discussion.

The provision of ample ammunition is a corollary of the present mechanical and industrial age. Its distribution in action should be the work of special units working in zones with their own cross-country vehicles.

The increase of tractor-drawn and propelled guns should reduce the general cost of maintenance of the artillery and enable an increase

in the number of guns to be made. Further, it would seem advisable for the machine gun company or the support company to go the whole hog and have a mortar for every machine-gun : the former for use in the attack and the latter in defence. For rapid consolidation, the new Vickers-Berthier machine-gun should fulfil all requirements.

It is the first means which it is proposed to examine in some detail. The rapid and accurate indication of targets is a task in which the infantry can give more assistance than they do at present. The methods of doing this must be more widely taught and practised. *Vide* Infantry Training, Vol. II, Sec. 5. (7), "subordinate infantry commanders must therefore do everything in their power to keep the artillery and machine-gun commanders supporting them continuously informed of the position of their forward troops, and to indicate to them where and when fire is required."

Sufficient attention is still not paid to this vital factor of information, and to exploiting ways of distributing it, with the means available at present. Information and inter-communication are essential in all forms of warfare, and no great progress seems to have been made in this respect since the war. The wider use of wireless telegraphy will be a means of speeding up communication, but enlarging the scope of information to be sought, and the collecting of it, still require much attention. The subject of infantry doing more F. O. O. work is dismissed lightly with the reply that this savours too much of static warfare. By what Black Magic on the day is the present inadequate artillery fire going to be directed on to the essential areas, when it is not only areas on the front of attack, but especially on the flanks of it, which will have to be neutralised. Guns or armoured fighting vehicles are the tools with which to do it, helped no doubt by the new mortars, but the mortars will be dependent on receiving good information the same as the other arms.

The first stages of any attack will usually be a fight for information. The infantry will have considerable scope for manœuvre, but the attack must be backed by sufficient numbers in order to make the defence disclose its fire plan. It is not reasonable to assume or hope that the attacker's first fire plan is normally going to dislocate the enemy's. In the light of the information gained in the first stages, the attack's fire plan will have to be readjusted. The quicker and more accurately this can be done, the more effective will be the results.

The infantry must be imbued with the stalking instinct, be able to recognise good view-points, and the ways of "getting there." The infantry cannot rely on F. O. O.'s or intelligence sections, nor on a widespread use of wireless. The former may be knocked out, the latter jammed by counter-wireless devices. The only method of communication for the infantry seems to be visual signalling. On a modern battlefield semaphore is archaic, but there seems no reason why the Morse code should not be used. Once learnt, it is not so quickly forgotten as semaphore. A man using Morse only employs one flag and can lie on his back behind cover while sending it. Every non-commissioned officer in a company should know it. For indicating targets and the fall of shot the horizontal clock code method is the simplest and most practical. Even an approximate indication of certain targets will be a help. The question of observing the shot is a harder one, especially, taking into consideration the shells, smoke and dust, which will confuse observation. Indication of targets can be practised on field exercises. Certain objects or localities in the defence will be given numbers starting from right to left, which are easily recognisable by both infantry and artillery. A target can be quickly pointed out with reference to anyone of them. The observer only requires a piece of paper with a description of reference and their numbers written on it, a pencil, and an ordinary pocket compass for setting the North point. It is a system which can be checked without necessarily the attendance of gunners, by raising flags or dust at distances and directions from reference points known to the instructor. (See Appx.)

These functions of information collecting should be a primary duty of the infantry. A second important function is the partial demoralisation of the enemy by their own fire, either as a preparatory measure to a main attack, or in exploitation. This is only a return to the original Light Infantry tactics of a century or so ago. It means the working forward of small parties of infantry to demoralise and destroy by fire part of the defence fire plan. A bold use of automatics will be a feature of this fighting.

Such infantry must be as physically fit as possible; good marksmen, of indomitable will, and must be trained to realise instinctively the use of ground. Some assistance from ground will be necessary for these tactics. They cannot be introduced in an attack over terrain like the plains of Mesopotamia. Normally, practice for these tactics can be found in situations such as are visualised in advanced guard

actions, or the initial fight for information ; in exploitation after the crust of a defence system has been broken ; and, lastly, against a second class enemy, or when surprise has been affected and the defence has not been organised. They imply the manœuvring of the infantry under fire power probably provided only from battalion resources. For this work the infantry will require to be in small packets. In conjunction with these duties, infantry will be required for night work, to hold ground seized by the armoured fighting vehicles, in mass attacks supported by preponderating fire power, and as local protection to observers and to the other arms. For most of these duties column formations will be the most suitable.

Finally, to employ an allegory, the infantry both in attack and defence are like the mortar which binds the bricks of a wall ; they are instrumental in binding the military fabric together. What is required to be done is to increase the size of the bricks and decrease the layers of mortar ; in fact keep the infantry thin and employ more material, so that it shall be the destruction of material in the land battle just as in the naval battle which shall decide the issue.

APPENDIX.

By the use of Roman figure such messages can be made very brief, as these figures obviate the use of the numerical sign. Thus with sender as reference point, a hostile V. G. could be described : —

Vic. I (VI) DCC EN M. G.

[From my position 700 yds. six oc'l enemy M. G.] The half hour direction can be denoted by adding an O, e.g., VIO. 630.

These messages can be translated into map references if necessary at Coy. or Bn. H. Qs.

THE ROYAL EMPIRE SOCIETY.

A Study of its Early Years.

BY MAJOR H. G. TRANCHELL, I.A.

There has recently appeared a book called "The Royal Empire Society—formerly The Royal Colonial Institute—Formative years," which deserves the careful attention of all those interested in the growth of the Imperial Idea. The author is Miss Aveline Folsom, Ph.D., and it is published by George Allen and Unwin Ltd., at sh. 10/6. Miss Folsom, who graduated at Colombia University and is now a Professor of History in the United States, spent much time in research both at the British Museum, and at the Headquarters of the Royal Empire Society itself, where she was able not only to study one of the best existing libraries on Colonial matters, and to see the very archives of the Society, but also to meet personally people intimately connected with the Society from its earliest days. The result is a very interesting book indeed. The authoress has not only given an excellent résumé of the Colonial situation as it was in the decade 1860-70, but she has also traced out the growth of the influence of the Society and has written an entertaining account of the papers read, and of the general activities undertaken, between 1868, the year the Society was founded, and 1882, the year in which it received a Royal Charter, and thus became fully established in the life of the nation.

In these days the British Empire is brought to one's notice in so many ways, that is difficult to realize that only seventy years ago the greatest ignorance about the Empire prevailed in England, and that educated opinion in that country confidently expected the dissolution of the Empire within the next few years. It is so much the fashion, these days, to take everything for granted, that it is overlooked that what is now generally accepted as being in the nature of things, was not always so.

On the contrary, seventy years ago the British Empire was far from being accepted as a part of the natural order of things. Even the expression, "The British Empire," was scarcely ever used, the customary phrase being "England and her Colonies." The decade 1860-70 was, indeed, one of the most critical periods in the history of the Empire since the loss of the American Colonies eighty years

earlier. The unpopularity of the Colonies in England at that time was remarkable, and they were regarded as expensive and dangerous burdens. Their gradual dropping off from the Mother Country was looked on not only as inevitable, but even as desirable.

Various factors had contributed to bring about this state of affairs, but broadly speaking, they may be grouped under two heads. First and foremost, there was the change in British economic theory, consequent upon the growing industrialisation of the country; and, secondly, there was the action of the Colonies themselves, often quite justifiable in itself, but usually completely misunderstood in England. Furthermore, this spirit of estrangement between England and her Colonies grew the more easily because of the profound ignorance about, and utter lack of interest in, the Colonies that then existed in England.

Up till 1822 England had completely controlled the commerce of her Colonies by means of tariffs and Navigation Acts, which had been in operation since the middle of XVII century. But the gradual growth of the Free Trade doctrines preached by Adam Smith and others early in the XVIII century, and the desire of the manufacturers to find markets for their goods, led to a series of fiscal changes in England, which entirely altered the economic life of the Colonies.

The first important changes took place in 1822, when noteworthy reductions of the import duties into England were made, and this was followed in 1825 by a further departure from established custom, when it became possible for ships of foreign countries to carry to the British Colonies the produce of the country of registration, and to load colonial produce destined for any country outside the British Empire. The carrying trade between the various parts of the British Empire was still confined to British shipping.

The end of the Napoleonic wars ushered in the decline of agricultural England. The manufacturing classes increasingly demanded cheap raw materials for their factories, cheap food for their labour, and enlarged foreign markets. The potato famine in Ireland in 1845 gave added strength to those who opposed the agriculturists. The result was the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846, when the import duties on grain, sugar, and on many other commodities were abolished.

While the abolition of these duties spelt increased prosperity for the English manufacturers, it spread consternation and havoc in Canada, and in the West Indies, threatening each with ruin. Thanks

to the Corn Laws the Canadian grain trade with England had been particularly flourishing. Not only was actual Canadian produce exported, but large quantities of grain from the adjoining American States were shipped to England through Canada. The repeal of the Corn Laws ruined this Canadian carrying trade, which was diverted to New York, and seriously injured Canada's actual export trade.

In the West Indies the disaster was worse. The sugar planters had not fully recovered from the effects of the emancipation of the slaves, but so long as they had received protection in the English market, they were able to keep their heads above water. The coming of Free Trade exposed them to the competition both of those foreign plantations where slavery was still in force, and of the Beet-sugar Industry.

In 1846 an Enabling Act had given the legislatures of British North America and of Mauritius a considerable degree of fiscal autonomy and English statesmen had confidently expected that those Colonies would follow their lead and adopt Free Trade. It was a great shock to them when those Colonies proceeded to protect their own interests by erecting tariff barriers, even against the Mother Country.

The decade 1860-70 opened with a feeling of great irritation in England over a Canadian Tariff Act, which was purely protective in purpose. So great was the feeling, that the Sheffield manufacturers had even gone as far as to demand that Parliament should disallow the Act. Canada's example was followed during the next ten years by Australia and other Colonies. This infuriated the disciples of Free Trade and brought upon the Colonies considerable, and one must admit unmerited, odium.

Two allied schools of thought thundered against the Colonies, the Manchester School and the Separatist School. The former, led by such brilliant men as John Bright and Richard Cobden, looked on the Colonies as useless burdens, useless because they were not free markets for British goods, burdens because the major cost of their defence fell upon the Mother Country. The Separatist School, led by Mr. Goldwin Smith, Regius Professor of Modern History at Oxford, held that the greatness of England lay "not in her Empire but in herself," that her "strength and wealth" could be materially increased by "resigning useless dependencies." Professor Goldwin Smith outlined his theories in a series of letters to the "Daily News."

"Not apparent power, but most apparent weakness, is the true name for territories scattered over the globe, known to yield neither revenue nor military force to the possessors, and for the moral feebleness which besets all dependencies, unprovided with any effective means of self-defence."

In addition to all this there was the tremendous influence of Mr. Gladstone, who held the Greek theory of Colonial polity. For him the ideal to be aimed at was that of "perfect freedom and perfect self-government. That the Colonies should be united to the Mother Country by sentiment alone, and that there should be no coercion to secure Colonies, nor coercion to retain them." Mr. Gladstone was, further, of the opinion that those Colonies, which had achieved a considerable measure of constitutional freedom, should be responsible for their own internal defence. He had, in consequence, gradually withdrawn all the garrisons of regular British troops from Canada, Australia and New Zealand. This action had caused considerable annoyance to the Colonies concerned, and in the case of New Zealand, had been carried out in spite of the vigorous protests of the local government, which was then engaged in armed conflict with the Maoris over disputes connected with the acquisition of land by the English settlers. Also, in pursuance of Mr. Gladstone's policy of not adding to existing Colonial commitments, the Ionian Islands had been ceded to Greece in 1864, and the Government had declined to make certain extensions of British territory recommended by the Governor of Cape Colony.

Such public opinion in England, as was at all interested in Colonial matters, looked on the federation of the North American Colonies into the Dominion of Canada in 1867, and on the growing tendency of the Australian Colonies to reach out towards some form of federation, with the greatest suspicion. In each case it was considered that federation was merely a prelude to independence. At that time it was generally accepted that Canada would gravitate to the United States, and that the Australian Federation would soon proclaim its own independence, and many influential men considered that the height of wise statesmanship would be so to arrange things that when the parting came, it should be with the best of good feelings on both sides. So strong was this feeling, we read, that somewhere about the year 1867 a Bill was actually drafted to permit the Colonies to secede as and when they pleased.

Thus, towards the end of the decade, we see on the one hand the vast mass of the people in England completely apathetic towards the Empire and on the other, educated opinion almost entirely swayed by the active disintegrationists and the pessimists of the Manchester and Separatist Schools. It was into this deep gloom that there stepped, in June 1868, a few gallant souls, who believed in the strength of Imperial Unity, and who felt that the time had come when a concerted effort should be made to dispel the clouds of ignorance and prejudice, and to awaken people to the true value of the Empire. As a first fruit of their efforts was born the Colonial Society, which later became the Colonial Institute, and in 1882 the Royal Colonial Institute, a designation it held until 1928, when it became the Royal Empire Society.

Who, then, were the stalwarts who dared challenge the all-pervading pessimism and brave the very Manchester School itself? They were only a handful, of whom the acknowledged leaders were Mr. A. R. Roche and Lord Bury. Mr. Roche had been a resident in Canada for some years and had taken a keen interest in the development of the North-West Territories, and had successfully worked for their inclusion in the Dominion of Canada. Lord Bury had had considerable administrative experience and had been Civil Secretary to Lord Elgin, and to Sir Edmund Head, in Canada. He had been a deep student of Colonial affairs and had, in 1865, published a work entitled "*Exodus of the Western Nations*," wherein he looked upon the ultimate separation of England and British America as inevitable. His conversion from pessimism was very remarkable, and so complete that he became the first President of the Society.

In June 1868 this small group of enthusiasts met in London and decided that the time had come to form a Colonial Society, which would uphold the value of the Empire and be a focal point, in England, of the interests of the Colonies. When it came to sending out invitations to the preliminary deliberations, it was soon discovered, Miss Folsom tells us, that no means existed of ascertaining what Colonials were in London. The preliminary meeting was held on 26th June 1868, and was attended by a number of people in important positions. Lord Bury was the Chairman, and, in concluding the discussion, presented certain resolutions, the tenor of which was, (a) that it was expedient to form a Colonial Society, which should bear to all matters of Colonial interest a position analagous to that occupied by the Royal

Society with regard to Science ; (b) that as soon as funds permitted, there should be opened a lecture hall, a library and reading room, and a museum of science, industry and commerce ; (c) that there should be opportunities for reading papers and holding discussions on Colonial subjects generally, and for carrying out investigations in connection with the Colonies ; (d) that the Society should be entirely non-political. These resolutions were adopted and a Provisional Committee was formed to draw up the necessary rules of the Society and to form a Council. In August the rules were adopted and Viscount Bury was elected President of the Society, Mr. Roche being elected Honorary Secretary.

In the Spring of 1869 the Society was launched by an Inaugural Dinner, which was attended by a brilliant Company, including The Prime Minister (Mr. Gladstone), the United States Minister (The Honourable Reverdy Johnson) and the Secretary of State for the Colonies (Earl Granville). As the Society was non-political, members of all parties were able to meet amicably at that dinner. Many felicitous speeches were made welcoming the foundation of such a Society. There was only one jarring note, the United States Minister permitted himself in his speech to refer openly to "certain British Dominions finding themselves in the process of time under the flag of the United States."

After reading Miss Folsom's two chapters "The Founding and Inauguration" and "Organization and Personnel", one cannot but feel that the genius of Mr. Roche launched the Society at the very moment when England was, subconsciously, ready for a reaction against Separatist Doctrines. That this was the case is shown conclusively by the success of the Society, by the remarkably rapid spread of its influence and by the achievements standing to its credit, all within the short space of fifteen years.

In 1872 Mr. Roche was succeeded as Honorary Secretary by Dr. C. W. Eddy, a man of wide culture and of indomitable energy, and one who had travelled much. He had studied at Oxford and at King's College, London, and had been awarded a Ratcliffe Travelling Fellowship by Oxford University, which he had made use of for visits to Australia, Tasmania, Canada and certain parts of Europe. Unfortunately he died suddenly in 1874. His successor was a remarkable man, a Mr. Frederick Young, who did sterling work until 1886, when he handed over his duties to a paid secretary. But that was not the

end of Mr. Young's services to the Society, he continued to take the greatest interest in its work until he died at the ripe age of 99. He was honoured with the K.C.M.G. in 1888. When he handed over his duties as Honorary Secretary in 1886 many papers printed eulogies of him. Miss Folsom quotes the Sheffield "Daily Telegraph" as saying "No single man has done so much as Mr. Young to promote the present good feeling between the Mother Country and the Colonies, and to strengthen the ties which unite the various sections of the Queen's dominions in one great Empire."

In 1871 the Duke of Manchester succeeded Lord Bury as President of the Society, a position he held for seven years. He worked indefatigably for the Society, or Institute as it had become. In 1869 the Queen had granted permission for the Society to call itself the Royal Colonial Society, but as the initials R. C. S. tended to confuse it with the Royal College of Surgeons, which was the older established body of the two, the name was changed in 1870 to the Royal Colonial Institute.

As well as having such exceptionally able men as President and Honorary Secretary, the Institute was fortunate in obtaining on its Council the services of some of the most distinguished men of the time. This resulted in a rapid growth in influence, so that, within a few years, the Institute had, by carefully eschewing all matters of party politics, achieved a position of high importance in the State. It became a recognised thing for deputations from the Institute to wait upon the Secretary of State for the Colonies in order to put forward some special point of view. The general activities of the Institute attracted increasing attention in the Press. In 1878 the Prince of Wales became President of the Institute, while the creation of the new post of Chairman of the Council made it possible for the Duke of Manchester to continue as Presiding Officer.

The economic survey of the Constituent parts of the Empire is now so complete, that it is hard to realize that in 1868, when the Colonial Society was founded, scarcely anything was known in England about the Colonies. Consequently one of the first occupations of the newly-formed Society was the collection and dissemination of information about the Colonies. This was done partly by the reading of papers and partly by the foundation of a library, wherein were collected Blue Books issued by Colonial Governments and other publications and books of interest. The Colonial Institute was particularly fortunate

in having as its first Librarian Major Boosé, a man of untiring energy and of unerring "flair" for any books, pamphlets or articles of interest bearing upon Colonial subjects. Thanks to the splendid foundation that Major Boosé laid, the Royal Empire Society has now one of the finest libraries on Colonial matters in the world.

But papers of a purely informatory nature would soon have become tedious, and so the Institute also devoted itself to the putting forward of Colonial opinion by the reading of papers, great care always being taken to avoid anything that might be constructed as of the nature of party politics. Miss Folsom deals with these papers in three separate chapters headed "Colonial Information," "Current Topics" and "Imperial Relations." These chapters, specially the two latter ones, are particularly interesting in the way they take us back to problems that were considered important sixty years ago. In those early days Canada loomed large in the "Current Topics" section. Canada had only recently been created a Dominion and had to face many problems, a glance at which may not be without interest for students of present day problems in India. Outstanding were the questions of the purchase of the Western Territory of Canada from the Hudson Bay Company in 1869, of the Red River revolt in 1870 and of the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway. The question of the fiscal relationship between Canada and the United States was also the subject of considerable discussion at that time. On the other side of the globe the problems of the Fiji Islands of the Polynesian Labour question, and of the occupation of New Guinea received much attention. The Australian Colonies were particularly anxious that no foreign power should be allowed to occupy the Island of New Guinea, and for years pressed the Home Government to annex the whole island. Actually, no action was taken for some years, until spurred on by the German menace, the British Government occupied the south eastern portion of the island. Considerable attention was also paid to the question of emigration to the Colonies.

The Institute had not long been established before the question of Imperial Relations came before it and it was the object of much discussion throughout all the years under review. As the Institute was always strictly non-party in all these matters, there sprang from its loins other movements of a definitely political tinge of which the most important was the Imperial Federation League. The nature of the relations between the Mother Country and the Dominions and

Colonies is a matter of extraordinary complexity ; and is in a constantly fluidic condition. As the Empire has grown up from being a mere collection of "Colonies dependent on a Mother Country" into being a "group of sister nations" held to the Mother Country by a common loyalty to the throne, and by sentiments of affection, it is only natural that the relations between Great Britain and them have also changed. But what is the best form that this relationship should assume during any given period ? That problem was much discussed during the early years of the Institute.

The Separatist tendencies of the Manchester School had few supporters in the Colonies, consequently the papers read mostly tended to the theory that an Imperial Federation was the ideal to strive for. The Institute itself stood strongly for Imperial Unity, and its motto was "United Empire," which later (in 1910) became the name of the monthly publication. Naturally it was not possible for the Institute to solve so delicate a problem as that of Imperial Relations, but the fact that the papers and discussions were kept above party politics and gave expression to the views of the most important people of the time, was not without weight in England and caused the Institute to retain the friendship of the Press and to gain an increasing amount of space for the reporting of its papers and for the discussion of Imperial affairs.

Lord French used to say that the study of the history of the past is one of the most important helps to the facing of the problems of the present. These are times when the Empire is beset with the two major problems of the New Constitution for India, and of the best means of Imperial organization, and Miss Folsom's book is of value because it suggests useful lines of research and draws attention to a Society, which besides presenting the advantages of a club, has been for over sixty years attracting to itself a brilliant company of Fellows, and devoting an immense amount of time and study to those very problems upon the successful solution of which depends the future of the Empire.

THE TACTICS OF TIGER SHOOTING.

BY COLONEL E. J. ROSS, O.B.E., M.C.

In the July 1934 issue of this Journal was published, probably owing to the absence of the permanent Editor on leave, an article of mine which dealt on general lines with shooting in India. I have now been asked to deal more especially with the subject of tiger shooting, and to try to give some idea of the tactics employed.

This is not a very easy thing to do in a short article, for tactics vary with the characteristics of the individual man and the individual tiger, as well as with the local topography.

The first thing you have to do, if you are to be successful in tiger shooting, is to be able to put yourself in the place of a tiger and to think like a tiger; until you can achieve that you are not likely to meet with much success. While one can lay down general rules and general lines for this sort of shooting, one must remember that tigers vary quite a lot in their habits, and, because one tiger acts in a particular way one day, it does not follow that another tiger will do the same thing on another day. This much is, however, certain: a particular tiger nearly always has his own particular habits; he will generally kill in the same way and behave in the same way, and once you have discovered his individual habits you have generally gone a long way forward in the direction of getting him.

There is not room here to give a long dissertation on the habits of tiger, but I will try and outline a few general and salient points which may help people when the time comes.

Firstly, about the tiger himself: of all animals in the jungle the tiger has got the best sight and the best hearing, but he is definitely deficient in the powers of scent. This question of scent is rather a controversial one, and a good many people disagree with this. My own experience, however, is that although he may possess a fairly good nose, he has a very indifferent one compared with the normal animals—deer and so on—which one comes across in the jungle. It is safe, I think, to say that whereas deer, goats, and sheep think through their noses, a tiger thinks, like human beings, through his eyes and his ears which are, however, much more efficient.

A tiger is by nature, and when well-fed, rather lazy and fond of comfort. He particularly dislikes a strong sun and a glare. Although, therefore, he will travel, and even rest, in fairly open ground in the early morning and evening, he will invariably pass the heat of the day in really thick shade. Normally speaking, except when hunting, a tiger is not very cunning or alert. Once he has been disturbed, however, his whole nature changes. He becomes one of the most cunning animals in the jungle.

One of the first principles, then, in tiger shooting is never to run the risk of disturbing a tiger until you are pretty certain that you are going to get him. If you get a kill in a doubtful place, therefore, either for beating or for sitting up, leave it alone and do not chance your arm. Tie up again for him and let him kill again. It is much better to let your tiger kill two or three baits and then get him, than to take a doubtful chance with your first kill and put your tiger off altogether. If you once disturb him off the kill he will run cunning. He may go on killing your baits and making himself a perfect nuisance to you, but he will dodge you every time. It is never worth while economising over baits. I can never understand the mentality of a person who will spend hundreds of rupees on his journey and his *bandobust*, but who will skimp the number of baits and the number of kills on which his sport really depends.

While in general, as I say, a disturbed tiger is a lost tiger, I do not mean to say that there are not exceptions. Occasionally one meets a complete fool. Somebody once said that 90 *per cent.* of human beings are fools; in the case of tiger you can reverse this, I think, and say that 90 *per cent.* are clever and 10 *per cent.* are fools. It is good business, therefore, to treat every tiger as a clever one until you have proved the contrary.

Tigers when hungry are restless and wander over large areas. They are comparatively rare in any jungle, and the first thing you have to do, therefore, is to localise them. Until you have done this, you may wander through the jungle for weeks and months and never come across one, at least so that you can get a shot. There are, however, some lucky people who seem to meet them whenever they go out. But do not imagine that you are going to be one of the lucky ones! To localise your tiger you must get him to kill; if once you succeed in this he will stay in the same area, at least for three or four days.

There are two normal methods of shooting tiger—one is by beating, and the other by sitting up over a kill. Each has its own technique, and if you are going to be successful with either you must start from the beginning with the particular method in view. Do not start merely tying up in the hopes of getting a kill somewhere, and of then making up your mind whether you are going to beat or to sit up. To be successful at either method, you must start from the very beginning with that method in view. The success of each depends on a different state of conditions.

A tiger in the heat of the day must always lie up in shady cover, and nearly always in or very near water. He will stay by his kill throughout the day if conditions are suitable, but, if he cannot drag his kill into suitable lying-up ground, he will leave it for at least two or three hours in the middle of the day and lie up by the nearest water.

The art of sitting up depends on getting into position without disturbing the tiger, while he is away from his kill. The art of beating depends on finding the tiger at home, on or near his kill, and beating him away from it. In sitting up, locating the tiger does not matter very much so long as you make sure that he is some distance away when you are putting up your *machan*, and that you have a general idea of the direction from which he will come. If you are going to beat, however, you must locate your tiger accurately. It follows, therefore, that, in tying up to sit up, you tie up in some place where the tiger cannot drag his kill into cover suitable for lying up, and, in tying up for a beat, you place your bait so that the tiger will drag it into lying-up cover and will stay near it through the heat of the day.

I propose now to deal separately with the question of sitting up and beating. Sitting up is really the poor man's method, and it is also the method which has to be employed in jungles where beaters are unobtainable. There is a great deal of rubbish written to the effect that sitting up is a form of poaching requiring no skill. As a matter of fact, to be successful, it requires just as much woodcraft and as much knowledge as beating. It is not, as some people suppose, merely a question of getting a kill in any old place and sitting up over it in any old tree. The reason, I think, why many people regard it with disfavour is that they do not understand it and, therefore, they sit up time and again and nothing happens. Beating is, of course, more certain, and, given a reasonable amount of knowledge of the ground, success is easier. On the other hand, to the naturalist and to the

person who really enjoys seeing the undisturbed life of the jungle, sitting up is the more attractive, as, apart from the chance of your tiger, you will see all the inmates of the jungle at their ease and undisturbed. When the tiger himself comes, you see him behaving in his natural way in his natural state, and not worried and hustled by a crowd of beaters.

It is a mistake to suppose that tigers, in general, only come out on their kills at night. My own experience is that, provided the right conditions have been selected and adequate precautions taken, tiger will normally come out to feed quite early in the afternoon. The normal habit of the tiger when he has killed is to stay on his kill until he is driven off it by the heat or the glare. He will generally stay fairly near it till the heat drives him off to look for deep shade and water. He will lie up there for three or four hours in the heat of the day and will generally begin coming down to his kill again as soon as the sun gets off the patch of jungle in which it is located. What you have to do in sitting up is to take advantage of this habit. Get all your business in the neighbourhood of the kill completed while the tiger is away and while he cannot hear the noise which you must inevitably make in rigging up and getting into a *machan*.

Whatever you do, never allow yourself, or anybody else, to follow up a drag or go anywhere near the kill in the morning. Even if the tiger is not actually on the kill, he will be somewhere quite near it, and he will certainly hear you. Although he will hear you, you will not hear him. He will slink away very quietly and as likely as not you will not even know he was there. Time and again, however, you will hear a cheetal or a khakur barking a couple of hundred yards away in the jungle. You will think it is barking at you; as a matter of fact what is worrying it is not you, but the sight or the smell of the tiger which you have disturbed. Although he may come back to his kill after he has been disturbed like this, he will do so terribly cautiously and generally after dark. When disturbed in this way a tiger develops a most annoying habit of coming down within a hundred yards or so of his kill quite early in the evening but of remaining quiet, listening and watching, for an hour or so before he actually comes out. I have once or twice been able to see this myself, and it is amazing to see how, for an hour on end, he will remain alert and listening for the slightest sound. It is almost impossible for the keenest man in the world to remain absolutely motionless for an hour

on end, and the slightest sound while the tiger is near will mean that your chance has gone.

If it is possible, therefore, go round your baits yourself in the early morning and make sure that, if there is a kill, there is no disturbance whatever in the neighbourhood. If you cannot go round them yourself, send a reliable man with the coolie who looks after your baits. Give him the strictest possible orders that, if there is a kill, he is to come straight home without making a sound. It is exactly on this point that the average *shikari* fails. He likes to show his great knowledge by coming back with specious tales of the size of the tiger and of where it has left the kill. If your *shikari* can tell you where the kill is, you can tell him that he has almost certainly spoilt any chance of getting your tiger. The moment you have a kill, therefore, come straight home and make all your preparations to go out, put up your *machan*, and get into position during the heat of the day while the tiger is away.

It is as well to allow an extra hour or two for delays and for the difficulty in following up the drag. You should, however, make certain in the hot weather of being in position all ready in your *machan* by three o'clock at latest. When you come out, the first thing to do is to locate the kill. Bring out your *machan* and necessary gear and the men to tie it up, but leave them for the time being at the place where your bait was killed. Then go on yourself very quietly with only one man and follow up the drag. This is not quite as easy as it sounds; a big tiger will often carry a small buffalo so that the track is very difficult to follow, especially when the ground is dry or rocky. He may drag as far as three-quarters of a mile, or even more, but, in any case, you must expect it to take an hour to find your kill and to select the tree for your *machan*. Having made this reconnaissance and decided exactly on the position of your *machan*, send back for your men, and in the meantime sit very quietly in some spot where you can get a view round about the kill. There is always just the chance that a tiger may be lying somewhere near and he may, when he hears your man go back, come out to have a look at the kill.

Some authorities recommend, when tying up with the intention of sitting up, using a rope which the tiger cannot break, so that he cannot drag the kill away. I am strongly opposed to this. It may work all right with a very inexperienced tiger; once, however, a tiger

knows the game, anything like this will make him suspicious and less likely to return by daylight. My experience is that it is much better to let your tiger drag into some quiet place, and take the chance of being able to find a suitable tree for your *machan* than to risk rousing the suspicions of a beast which is already quite cunning enough.

If you are sitting up over a live bait, by all means use a strong rope. Remember, however, that it must be a very strong one. It takes something like a four inch hawser to prevent a heavy tiger dragging his kill!

There are several points to be thought of in selecting a place for your *machan*. You have to consider two things. The first is the question of being able to sit up without making a noise. You must select a tree which will not shake or sway every time you make the slightest move; therefore, select a good, solid tree at some distance from the kill, rather than a fragile tree which may be nearer from the point of view of shooting, but which will shake every time you move and especially at the critical moment when you put your rifle up to fire. A tiger approaching a kill, depends more on his ears than his eyes—even the rustle of one or two dried leaves is quite enough to put him on the alert. Remember that his attention is concentrated towards the kill; try, therefore, to arrange your *machan* so that it is out of the line of his direct approach to the kill. The mistake which every *shikari* makes is to put the *machan* too much on top of the kill so that the tiger either walks straight under or straight towards it. Try and tuck it away to one side so that the tiger will pass you well to one side when he is coming to the kill. It is much better to have a steady shot at a tiger fifty or sixty yards away in broad daylight, than to have a doubtful one at fifteen yards rise in the dark or straight under your tree.

A tiger, when he is hunting at night, nearly always moves either by a road, a path or a dry *nullah* bed where he can move quietly and not make a noise. The best place to tie up is generally either at a point where a track meets a road, or where a road crosses another, for this sort of place will give you a double chance. A very favourable place is where a road crosses a long *nullah* leading down from the hills. You often find that these *nullahs* have water in them right up at the top, but that the lower end is dry for perhaps a mile or so. The bottom end of one of these is the best possible place to tie up. The tiger which kills there will drag up into the *nullah* but must leave the

kill to go to water at the top of the *nullah* and to lie up for the day. You can, therefore, slip in and get your *machan* up, knowing that the tiger is almost certainly lying up right away at the top of your *nullah*. You will also, which is a great advantage, have at least a general idea of the direction from which he will return. Remember, however, that this is a general direction only. A tiger will not necessarily, in fact will hardly ever, come right down the bed of the *nullah* to a kill; he will nearly always approach it from some slightly higher ground from one side or the other. A little experience will soon give you a pretty shrewd idea of the route by which he is most likely to come, and it must be your business to try to locate your *machan* so that it will be off the direct route and so that, from it, you will be able to cover his advance for the last thirty or forty yards up to the kill.

I have tried, in the attached diagrams, to give some idea of what I mean. Diagram I is of a kill which has been dragged up into a *nullah* of this nature. "B" shows the place where your *shikari* will generally want to put up your *machan*, that is to say, right on top of the kill and so that the tiger will walk straight up to it as he comes to the hill; this is the worst possible place. I have tried to show the sort of place you should select, and have marked it "A." You will see that this is tucked away right off the line of the kill, so that there is very little chance of his seeing you; but at the same time so that it gives you a fair broadside shot as he approached the kill. In this connection, it is well to remember that, if possible, you should never wait for a tiger to come to the kill before taking your shot; try to take him, if you can, well before he gets to the kill, for once he gets there you never know quite what will happen. He may suddenly suspect something at the last moment and shy off, or he may, as I have actually seen happen, suddenly pick up the kill and go off with it before you get your rifle off. There is only one rule, and that is to take the first certain shot that offers.

I have added two more diagrams (II and III) which are, I think, self-explanatory and follow similar principles. Each of these are of actual kills, and in each case the tiger was shot. In each case "B" is what appeared at first sight the most obvious place to put the *machan* and "A" is the place where it was finally located. You will see that in each case the *machan* was so located that it was hardly possible for the tiger to come underneath it, and that in each case the tiger was shot well before it reached the kill.

A trick I have played two or three times on a tiger which refuses to co-operate by coming to his kill before dark, is to sit up, not over or near the kill, but right away from it on his road down. Most tigers, even though they will come out to the kill by daylight, will generally come down to the neighbourhood of it quite early in the afternoon. In certain types of country a tiger may go a mile or so away to lie up. Although he will vary his route in the immediate neighbourhood of the kill, he will often use the same route for the initial part of his move.

If you see signs of this it is worth while letting him kill two or three times in the same place, then sit up early in the afternoon at some selected point on his route. A tiger on the move like this is much less alert than he is near the kill, and it is a very pretty way of getting a cunning tiger. It requires, however, very good local knowledge, and very skilful reconnaissance.

Now about the actual *machan* and the paraphernalia you want. The ordinary small-sized *machan*, although it is light and handy, is a perfect abomination for sitting up quietly. It is quite impossible for an ordinary human being to sit up in one of these for two or three hours without moving. It is essential, if you are going to keep from moving, that you should be completely comfortable. Anything—a lump or a wooden bar which you can just feel when you first sit up—will cause you absolute agony when you have been sitting on it for an hour or so. In my experience the only way really to sit up well, is to have a *machan* arranged so that you can lie full length and make yourself completely comfortable. In fact one in which you can lie up, rather than sit up. You are, moreover, less conspicuous when lying down. The ordinary village *charpoy*, if long enough, does very well indeed. You want to have on it either a camp mattress or a well-padded *rezai*, and I strongly advise two good fat cushions. Equipped like this, you can lie full length on your face with a couple of pillows under your chest, your rifle tucked in under your right arm, and you can keep quite still for hours on end. There is no reason at all why you should not read a book, and you can smoke quite safely provided you do not make a noise lighting your pipe.

Everything you have with you in the *machan* must be arranged so that you can get at it with the minimum amount of movement and, of course, everything must be of some neutral colour. The ordinary

topee with its hard outline is most conspicuous in a *machan* ; I strongly advice you to camouflage it by sewing on wide black stripes on to the khaki so as to break the outline.

Remember that, from the lying position, you cannot shoot to the right, and only with difficulty straight to your front. You must arrange the *machan*, therefore, so that the kill is well to your left. It is better, in fact, to have the kill on what the sailors call your " port beam " rather than broadside on or on your " port bow." This is a point which is often missed. I have many times seen people put themselves into a *machan* so that they cannot shoot at the tiger at all when he appears.

If you are going to sit up, as you should, from three o'clock till dark, in the hot weather, you will want lots of water and something to eat. See that the cover of your water-bottle is thoroughly soaked before you get into your *machan* so that it will keep cool, and hang it so that you can drink with the least possible movement. Your food must be something that you can eat without making a noise ; do not have it in a tin or wrapped in paper. Sandwiches wrapped up in a khaki handkerchief will do very well, but to my mind the most convenient form of food is the cold sausage.

Whatever you do, never take a man in the *machan* with you ; even if he does not cough at a critical moment, which he probably will, he is certain to cramp your style, and doubling the number of people in a *machan* means double the amount of movement and double the amount of noise. If you really want to get your tiger, leave your girl friend at home. If you select a firm tree, however, there is no reason why you should not be able to eat and drink when you want without giving the show away. As a rule, too, in a jungle where there is lots of game, you will have warning when your tiger is getting near. You will hear cheetal, khakur, sambhur or monkeys making a noise when the tiger begins to move, and as soon as you hear that, you must be absolutely still and absolutely on the alert. Generally, too, a tiger does not come very quietly to the kill ; if he is quite undisturbed you will very often hear his footsteps on dry leaves, and once you have heard a tiger coming down like this, you can never mistake his footsteps for anything else.

I personally do not like the idea, which many people suggest, of having men sitting up two or three hundred yards away ; if there is

a main road or open ground, say, five or six hundred yards away, I generally have some men there so that I can call them up by whistle if I want them. One has to be very careful about this, however, especially if one fires at a tiger and is not quite certain whether he is dead or not. If your men are reasonably well trained you can generally get them up to you without any risk. If, however, they are simple, untrained coolies who really do not understand what you say and what you are at, it is much better for you to get out of your *machan* and go to them, rather than get them to come up to you. Always, therefore, have a rope in your *machan* so that you can lower your rifle if you want to get down, and also have a really powerful whistle with which you can make yourself heard. Whatever you do, warn your men that they are on no account to come near you after you have fired a shot until you have definitely called them up.

Do not forget that a dead tiger is very often not so dead as he looks. Even, therefore, if you think he is quite dead make certain that your men approach you from the other side of the *machan* while you keep the tiger covered in case he comes to life again.

It is nearly always getting towards evening and the light is generally beginning to go about the time you fire your shot. If you knock him down, therefore, and he shows any sign at all of movement, do not hesitate to give him another shot or two, it may save you a lot of trouble later on in case he moves. A few extra bullet holes in the skin make practically no difference, provided you stitch them up while the skin is still wet. So do not be deterred from making certain he is dead by the risk of spoiling his skin. The only shot that is likely to do much damage to the skin is a shot in the face or one which breaks up his skull.

Before I go on to the question of beating, there are one or two situations in which beating and sitting up overlap. It is often worth while, if there are two of you shooting together, and where the ground is suitable, for one gun to go very quietly on to a point where he can cover the possible line of retreat of a tiger, while the other follows the drag and makes the necessary arrangements for putting up the *machan*. The sort of place where this can be done is where a tiger has dragged into one of the flats at the side of a *nullah* bed. A very common formation in the lower hills is a sandy *nullah* which winds about through thickly covered flats with hills on either side. If the tiger drags into one of these flats, one gun may go quietly on to the point

where the nullah curves back under the hills again. If the tiger is disturbed by the other gun off his kill, he will very often move away along the bottom of the hill. If the forward man goes very quietly on up the nullah and gets into a tree where that flat ends, he will often stand a chance of getting a shot. This should, however, only be attempted where the ground permits of his getting quietly into position without any disturbance of the jungle. It is, however, a very pleasant trick if it can be brought off. (See Diagram IV.)

Another trick which is well worth carrying out, when sitting up in the evening has been unsuccessful, is to stalk the kill very carefully in the early morning. A tiger which is hungry and has been kept off his kill in the evening will very often come back late at night and may feed till fairly late the following morning. By that time you will know the ground, and may be able to overlook the kill from a convenient ridge. A fellow I was out with two years ago was driven off his *machan* in the evening by a violent storm of wind and rain. The following morning, as the jungle was wet and he could move quietly, I sent him out to stalk the kill. Actually he got two tigers, or rather curiously enough, two tigresses which had evidently been quarrelling as to who was to have the kill!

Now to turn to the question of beating. The first point, as I have already said, is to locate your tiger as closely as possible without running the risk of disturbing him. In general, a short beat is much better than a long beat. The tiger has less chance of breaking out on the side or of stopping before he gets to the guns and of having to be put up again. Six hundred yards is about as long as a normal beat should be, but, of course, at times it may have to be longer still. Some of the most successful beats I have seen, however, have been quite short, and if the cover is really good it may be possible to run a beat of 100 yards or so. The difficulty, of course, with a short beat, is getting the guns and stops into position without disturbing the tiger.

The first principle in beating is, of course, to drive the tiger in the direction he naturally wants to go. When tying up for a beat one tries to get one's tiger to lie up in a fairly isolated bit of jungle of a size which is manageable with the available strength. When disturbed in a cover like this, he will naturally move towards the main forest or towards the hills, provided there is suitable heavy jungle there. It

follows, then, that your beat will be laid out towards the main heavy forest or hills. I do not, however, mean to say by this that you must try and force the tiger up a steep hill, but what I do mean to say is that you must try and move him along the natural lead to the main hills.

I have never noticed any difference between beating up wind or beating down wind ; I do not believe that a tiger coming out on a beat takes much notice of human scent. Naturally, if there is a wind blowing down from the guns into the beat, noise will carry better so that one has to be more careful about getting into position quietly.

The ideal is for him to come straight to the gun without being forced or turned by stops. This, however, is sometimes not possible ; it may be necessary to force him to some extent off his natural line if it is not possible to cover this with the guns, but those sort of beats are rarely satisfactory, and in my experience generally result in an unsatisfactory galloping shot. What one wants to aim at is to move the tiger rather than to drive him, so that he will come forward quietly and unsuspectingly to the guns.

Once you have decided on the general line on which you are to beat your tiger, the next thing is to consider the detailed location of the guns. A tiger, when he kills, nearly always drags into the thickest cover available, and generally in the direction he will finally go. Generally, therefore, one should beat away from the kill, and it is certainly undesirable to try and drive a tiger straight back over the place where he has killed.

A tiger in a beat moves on a different line to what he does when hunting at night. At night, for instance, he will generally move by the bed of a nullah ; during a beat, although he will follow the general line of a nullah, he will nearly always keep along thick cover on one bank or the other. He will not go round the bend in a nullah, but will generally cut across it, and the same applies to small hills and the like. If a low ridge runs through the beat he will very often follow it so as to get a view on either side. A common form of beat is up towards the fork of a nullah. In this case he will very often cross the nullah near the fork and follow the ridge between the two branches. If a bank running parallel to the beat is included in the beat, he will often follow the top of a bank, and if not, will keep along through heavy cover at the base of it.

Diagram V is of a beat carried out successfully in a situation of this nature. The kill took place where a nullah coming down from the main hills crossed a little used forest track ; between the track and the hills is very dense cover with some moist ground in the middle of it ; above this is a thickly wooded bank, with a flat and fairly open sal forest between it and the main hills. I have twice beaten this successfully, and each time the tiger, after lying up in heavy cover below the bank, has climbed the bank and come along through thick bushes on top of it—each time coming to gun "A." In the reverse of this beat, however, (which I have also carried out successfully from the opposite direction), although the ground is very similar and the same bank continues right through it, the tiger has on both occasions come along the bottom of the bank to gun "B." On each occasion, however, he has followed close to the bank and has never come out more than twenty yards from it.

When beating up into a large nullah, or towards the mouth of it, the best place for the guns is commanding the spurs up to the top of the bank on either side of the nullah. Here again, your tiger, as a rule, will follow the general direction of the nullah, but he will hardly ever, when disturbed, enter the mouth of a narrow nullah (Diagram VI).

When your beat consists of a flat on one side of a winding nullah, a tiger may do one of two things : he may either cross the nullah, where the flat narrows, into the corresponding flat on the other side, or he may, as he very often does, cut across the ridge and go straight on into the next flat on the same bank of the nullah. Again, he will hardly ever follow the bed of a nullah.

These notes, and the diagrams I attach, may assist to some extent. Remember, however, that they illustrate only very general rules and it is a matter requiring great experience and skill to be able to tell at a glance in a new jungle the exact line that a tiger is most likely to take. Some people have this faculty to an extraordinary degree, and, by some form of second sight, are able to pick out in a strange jungle the natural line by which the tiger will move.

Remember that to carry out a successful beat you have got to bring the tiger at a walk, if possible, through the frontage of seventy or eighty yards covered by the guns. You may have several hundred square miles of jungle behind you into any part of which the tiger may

want to go. If, therefore, you are to be successful, you must have the means for keeping the tiger to the correct route ; this you can only do by the use of skilfully located stops, and stops are, in nearly every beat, more important than the actual beaters themselves. In many beats, for instance, you will find that you need two or three times as many stops as beaters, and on the successful laying out of the stops all your success will depend. The principles of beating are exactly the same whether you use men or elephants in the actual beat line. I am not talking of those sort of shoots where fifty or sixty elephants can be obtained, but of the normal affair where one, two or three elephants can be begged, borrowed or stolen. In this case you use the elephants instead of beaters, and such men as are available you use as stops.

One often hears a lot of argument as to whether stops are to be silent or are to make a noise. There is no hard and fast rule for this. If a tiger is coming straight to the guns, the less noise that is made the better, for the less noise there is the more likely will he be to come on slowly and steadily. Therefore, where a flank is sufficiently open for stops to see the tiger on the move it is better for them to remain silent and only make a noise if he is showing signs of taking the wrong line. On the other hand, where the jungle is very thick, it is generally better for the stops on that flank to start tapping as soon as the beat starts. This will generally turn the tiger right away from that flank, but if he once gets quite close to the stops and then is turned by a sudden noise, he is likely to become unmanageable and may break back or gallop right through the line of stops.

In Diagrams V and VI, you will see that I have marked the stops to the right of the guns, who are in comparatively open ground, as silent stops, and the stops who are covering heavy jungle, as noisy stops. When I say "noisy," I do not mean that they must make much noise ; all that is required is a very gentle tapping of a branch, for this is quite sufficient to turn any tiger or to warn him off the flank. In any case stops near the guns must be silent. One thing they must not do is to make a noise when the tiger is coming straight forward. There is a great art in knowing the exact moment to turn the tiger. If this is done too soon it will turn him right back into the beat line, and that is the mistake which most stops make.

The ideal to aim at in any beat is to get the tiger quietly on the move in the right direction and well ahead of the beaters. Once he

has been put on the move like this, he will move steadily on and not require hustling from behind. It is a good thing, therefore, to start a beat, especially if the cover is thick and the beat a fairly long one, with a lot of noise and, perhaps, a shot or two. After that the more silently the beat comes forward the better. This wakes the tiger up and prevents him sitting tight until the beaters get quite close to him. If he is put up suddenly by the beaters when they are right on top of him, he will lose his head and start galloping about, and may break out anywhere.

People are apt to regard a beat as a show carried out by a howling mob of some scores of beaters. This is very far from being the case. The most successful and the pleasantest beats from every point of view are those carried out by a very few men. There is one particular one which I have carried out several times successfully with only about half-a-dozen men; of these three were used as stops and the rest did not even extend through the jungle, but simply walked up the nullah bed talking. I have included a diagram of this as Diagram No. VIII.

The small beats carried out with one or two elephants can be run on exactly similar lines. The whole thing is to get the tiger on the move quietly in the right direction, and not to let him realise that it is a beat at all.

It never does to put your guns on ground which is too open; a tiger, when he has been disturbed, will always shy off open ground, and if you force him across it he will generally come at a gallop. It is much easier to kill a tiger when he is moving quietly through fairly thick cover than to kill him galloping in the open. Therefore select a place for your guns, not so that the ground is absolutely clear in all directions, but so that they will get a steady shot in reasonably thick cover.

When you are shooting in a beat remember that, although you are up a tree, your beaters are on the ground. The greatest crime you can commit is to send a wounded tiger back into the beat. In general, therefore, you should never fire at a tiger until he is through, or practically through, the line of guns. If you take a shot in front it must be an absolutely certain shot, and you must be completely certain that you are going to kill him dead. Once a tiger is broadside on to you, coming through the line of guns, even if you wound him, he

will normally gallop straight on, on his original line. It is a good thing to have a reliable man available in a tree seventy or eighty yards behind you. It is the business of this man to see exactly what happens to a tiger after you have fired at him. Even if you hit a tiger clean through the heart, he will nearly always gallop on for forty or fifty yards, and if the jungle behind you is tolerably thick, an observer up a tree will save you an immense amount of trouble and possibly some danger after the beat is over.

There are often more than one tiger in a beat, so when one tiger has come through and been fired at, there is no need to stop the beat unless he is in front of the guns. You should, therefore, give very careful instructions to your beaters to continue coming forward irrespective of whether a shot has been fired or not, but the most careful arrangements must be made for an alarm signal in case a wounded animal is between the guns and the beaters. Where the jungle is very thick and the tiger is not likely to come far ahead of the beaters, it is probably best to reverse these instructions and to arrange with the beaters that they are to stop and climb trees when a shot is fired, and are not to advance until you signal them to do so by whistle. I have noticed that in very wet weather and when the jungle is thick, that a tiger will often hang back and come along quite close ahead of the beaters. In this case it is particularly necessary to let him through the guns before you fire at him.

The last tiger I shot was one killed in September while the monsoon was still on, at the special request of the local civil officers, as it had been doing a lot of damage close to a main road. We were three guns, and the beaters were actually up to the line of guns on my left and not more than thirty yards away from me. The jungle was terribly wet and heavy and the tigress, as she was in this case, suddenly appeared slinking along not more than twenty yards ahead of the beaters. She looked utterly disgusted and bored with the wet and discomfort, and was obviously very reluctant to move at all. The jungle was very thick, but I managed to get her with rather a lucky shot as she jumped the track on which my *machan* was located.

One of the great difficulties in arranging a beat is to get your *machans* up and to make your reconnaissance without running the risk of disturbing your tiger. If time permits, it is much better to make your arrangements in advance, *i.e.*, do a complete reconnaissance of the cover you intend to beat, select the position for your stops and

actually put up your *machans* before you get a kill. Then, having done all that, tie up so that the tiger will drag into the beat.

It is a good thing, if you are going to be fifteen days, or so, in a jungle, to spend the first three or four days laying out and preparing two or three beats a day, and when each is ready to start tying up baits for it.

There are two other ways of shooting tiger available to the ordinary officer on leave. The first of these, and one of the most effective, is *ghooming* on a single elephant, but this can only be applied where the jungle is suitable. The method adopted is this : Instead of sending men to look at the baits in the morning, the sportsman himself goes out and visits them. If there is a kill, he works his elephant very quietly up the drag, and if the tiger is not found on the kill, he works very quietly through all the likely spots in the neighbourhood. This is a very deadly method in the early autumn when the jungle is undisturbed and the mornings are cool, and can be applied successfully all through the cold weather. It is only likely to be successful, however, in grass or in forest such as sal where there is a grass undergrowth, for in other types of jungle the elephant makes so much noise that it disturbs the tiger. If you are practising this method, therefore, the moment you find that the drag is leading you into bamboo jungle, or where there are a lot of dry branches about, it is much better to chuck it up and go home. If you persist in unsuitable ground, it only means that you will spoil your chance of getting your tiger in some other way.

In this form of shooting, it is absolutely necessary that you should have a complete understanding with your *mahawat*. He must, in the first place, really understand that complete quietness is essential to success. He must on no account talk to his elephant, for the sound of a human voice will put the tiger clean away. He must direct his elephant entirely by pressure, and he must on no account beat it over the head with his *ankus* if it does the wrong thing. The ideal is to give the impression of a wild elephant wandering about in the jungle. Further, you will be perched up on a pad a bit higher than he is, and you must have an arrangement by which he will stop the elephant at a touch from you and will turn it automatically in the right direction.

A *mahawat*, unless he is very well trained, forgets that it is impossible to shoot to the right, and difficult to shoot even straight

ahead off a pad elephant. The moment a tiger is sighted, therefore, he must automatically turn the elephant so that the tiger is slightly to your left and keep it absolutely steady for the three or four seconds required for your shot.

If it can be carried out successfully, this is a very pretty method of getting a tiger, and has the advantage of not requiring large numbers of men and complicated apparatus.


The last method is that of stalking your tiger and shooting him on foot. This is the method adopted by the hero in the story books, but it is not one which is likely to be successful often in practice. A tiger is much too quick of hearing to allow a clumsy animal like a man with a rifle to get up to him unless conditions are very suitable. Where you know the ground well, however, and where your baits are suitably located, it is often worth while going round yourself on foot and stalking them with great care on the off-chance of a tiger being on a kill. As a rule, however, he will drag into thick stuff before daylight and the most you are likely to see of your tiger is a flick of his tail as he disappears into cover.

Where there are isolated pools in a sandy nullah, it is, however, sometimes possible to stalk a tiger when he is lying up in water in the middle of the day. If you want to try this, you must previously make a very careful reconnaissance so that you cannot only approach your pool from the most favourable direction, but so that you know the exact spot where the tiger is most likely to lie. You want to tie up a hundred yards or so from your pool, and, if there is a kill, to come out in the heat of the day and stalk the water carefully. It is unsound under these conditions to fire at a tiger when he is lying down. If you do, you are much more likely to wound him than to kill him. If, therefore, you get up to a sleeping tiger, get yourself absolutely ready then waken him up with a slight noise—say the snapping of a twig. If he is wakened up like this, he will generally stand long enough to give you an easy shot, but if you disturb him too violently he will bound straight off without your being able to get a reasonable shot at him at all.

A great deal of rubbish has been written about the danger of shooting tiger on foot, and of it being the only sporting method, and so on. It is, of course, a very fine sport if it can be brought off, but

↑
Main hills etc.

FLAT
HEAVY COVER. ♀



HIGH HILL
Precipitous.





DIAGRAM I.
SITTING UP.



KILL DRAGGED INTO
MOUTH OF NULLAH

POSITION OF BAIT..... X

DRAG..... ————

KILL..... X

PROBABLE LINE OF TIGERS RETURN..... ————

WRONG PLACE FOR MACHAN..... ⊕ B.

RIGHT PLACE FOR MACHAN..... ⊕ A.


ZONE OF FIRE..... ————

TIGER SHOT AT..... ⊕

RANGE 40 Yds.

DIAGRAM II.

SITTING UP.



- BAIT KILLED AT..... *
- DRAG..... - - - - -
- POSITION OF KILL..... X
- PROBABLE LINE OF TIGERS RETURN..... ←
- WRONG PLACE FOR MACHAN..... ○ B.
- RIGHT PLACE FOR MACHAN..... ○ A.
- TIGER SHOT AT..... ⊗
- RANGE 50 Yds.

DIAGRAM III.
SITTING UP.





DIAGRAM IV.

FOLLOWING UP A DRAG IN SUITABLE
GROUND WITH 2 GUNS.




BAIT KILLED AT. ----- X
 DRAG. ----- ->
 KILL. ----- X
 PROBABLE LINE OF TIGER, IF DISTURBED. ----- ->
 NO. 1. GUN FOLLOWS UP DRAG. ----- O
 NO. 2. GUN GOES ROUND BY NULLAH. -----
 FOLLOWING BLACK LINE, & GETS INTO
 A TREE AT. ----- A O

(N.B.) THIS SHOULD NOT BE ATTEMPTED UNLESS NO. 2. GUN
 CAN GET INTO POSITION WITHOUT ANY DISTURBANCE
 OF JUNGLE.

DIAGRAM V.


BEAT INCLUDING A THICKLY WOODED BANK.

HIGH HILLS.



KILL.....X
 DRAG.....
 ROUTE OF TIGER IN BEAT.....
 SHOT BY "A" GUN.....⊕
 STOPS.....○
 STOP ON RIGHT OF GUNS.....SILENT.
 " ON LEFT OF GUNS.....NOISY.
 AS FORMER ARE IN OPEN & LATTER
 IN THICK COVER BELOW THEM.
 BEAT LINE.....XXXX
 TIGER WAS NOT SEEN BY STOPS.

DIAGRAM VI.
(BEATING TO THE MOUTH OF A NULLAH.)




TWO TIGER IN THIS BEAT.
EACH CAME TO LOW RIDGE LEADING UP SIDE
OF EXIT OF NULLAH FROM HIGH GROUND.
NEITHER SEEN BY STOPS.

BEATERS ----- XXXX
GUNS. ----- ⊕
STOPS. ----- ○
KILL. ----- X
DRAG. ----- →
LINE TAKEN BY TIGER. ----- →

STOPS ON LEFT OF GUNS ARE IN THICK COVER.
& START TAPPING AS SOON AS BEAT STARTS.
STOPS ON RIGHT OF GUNS ARE MORE IN
THE OPEN & REMAIN SILENT.

THICK COVER.


DIAGRAM VII.



BEAT. ALONG LOW RIDGES & LOW GROUND BETWEEN GRASS TAPPAR & SAL FOREST RIDGES NOT MORE THAN 50 FT HIGH & SLOPES GENTLE. BEATEN TWICE.

1ST TIME SINGLE TIGER FOLLOWED BLACK LINE.
 2ND TIME 3 TIGER FOLLOWED RED LINE.
 A OCCUPIED BY STOP INSTEAD OF GUN.

DIAGRAM VIII.



BEAT CARRIED OUT WITH 7 MEN.

KILL AT JUNCTION OF TWO NULLAHS.

C. C. HOLDING COVER INTO WHICH TIGER DRAGGED.

S.S.S.S. STOPS.


A. GUN.

X X X B. 3 MEN WALKING UP NULLAH TALKING &
BREAKING AN OCCASIONAL BRANCH.

NULLAH HAS OCCASIONAL POOLS OF WATER IN IT.

SLOPES OF HILLS FAIRLY OPEN SAL FORESTS.

FLATS BY NULLAH GREEN JUNGLE FAIRLY THICK WITH
GOOD SHADE.



the chief objection is that except where the country is unusually suitable, it is about a thousand to one against your ever getting a shot.

So far as my experience goes, there is practically no more danger in shooting a tiger on foot than in any other method. A tiger will hardly ever charge immediately on being fired at, even when wounded. He will, nearly always, whether wounded or not, blunder straight on along the line he is facing when the shot is fired.

Obviously you do not want to take uncertain shots either on foot or anywhere else, and, of course, no one but a fool will fire at a tiger which is likely to blunder straight into him or which is straight uphill and likely to fall on top of him whether killed or wounded.

The danger in a tiger shoot, of course, starts some time after the first shot, when you are following up the wounded beast. Whether your original shot has been fired on foot, off a *machan* or off an elephant, a wounded tiger is equally dangerous. I have specifically said "off an elephant" because, in my experience, except for the one fact that you can see better, it is more dangerous following up a wounded tiger on a half-trained elephant than on one's flat feet, and the majority of elephants which we soldiers can borrow are definitely half-trained or worse.

I trust these notes will be of use to people embarking on this fascinating sport for the first time, and may even possibly interest those who have considerable experience of it.

The main points which I would emphasise again are: Firstly, begin from the very beginning with a clear idea of the method you intend to use in each particular case—that is to say, from the very start, tie up and make your arrangements definitely either for sitting up or for beating. Secondly, never take an unnecessary risk of disturbing a tiger until you are pretty certain that you are going to get him.

A FEW THOUGHTS ON LIGHT INFANTRY AND MOUNTAIN WARFARE TRAINING.

BY CAPTAIN F. D. S. FRIPP, 2ND PUNJAB REGIMENT.

It has been a recognized fact since the Great War, that in normal open country infantry are powerless to advance against machine-guns without the close co-operation of tanks and artillery. In fact the tanks supported by artillery were becoming the chief arm, while the infantry were assuming the more humble rôle of mopping up and holding. It is unlikely however that in India the infantry will be displaced from being the chief arm, owing to the limited artillery fire power available, the paucity of A. F. V.'s and the terrain over which possible operations may take place.

In order therefore for infantry to advance against machine-guns without adequate fire and A. F. V. support, the present and rather inflexible linear tactics must be changed to some other form to avoid overwhelming casualties.

Whatever form of tactics or formations are evolved, it is still manifestly impossible for infantry to advance against machine-guns across bare open ground, but infantry can and must be able to deal with machine guns where the country affords opportunities for covered approaches, such as hilly and mountainous country, scrub, jungle, woods, villages and crops.

To counteract the impression that infantry are powerless against machine-guns, and to create an antidote against this infernal machine, the Commander-in-Chief's directive on "Infiltration" and Light Infantry tactics has been issued. Infiltration is not a new horror inflicted on the infantry. It is but an old and well tried form of tactics which has been used by all successful armies in the past and is as old as the hills. The enemy's defensive position is penetrated, not by direct bludgeon work, but by indirect approach and by employing every means of cover available and exploiting any opening made. This in fact is "stalking" tactics, and for troops to be successful at this, they must possess first class weapon skill, mobility and flexibility. This is, however, impossible without self-reliance and initiative on the part of all junior leaders, and to enable them to carry out their rôle, units and sub-units must be given more latitude, which implies larger frontages.

We have only just begun to realise out here in India that our post-war training has not altogether been on the right lines. Training has been modelled on F. S. R., Vol. II, and Infantry Training, Vol. II which are unfortunately heavily impregnated with Great War doctrine. We have now to readjust our thoughts and eradicate the Great War complexes caused by trenches, barbed wire and machine guns.

The potential enemy armies with which the Indian Army may have to deal will undoubtedly possess machine-guns, and the tribesmen have in their possession modern rifles and ammunition. We must therefore train our infantry to deal with the machine-gun and to infiltrate through the enemy's defences. To this end the sepoy must become a master of flexible penetration and an elusive but determined stalker.

It is generally recognized that the average sepoy, whatever his caste or creed, is really only capable of mastering one thing at a time and is inclined to lose his initiative when commanded by British officers through leaving all the thinking to the latter. The tendency in the past has been to instruct the sepoy in various kinds of warfare by classification into various watertight compartments. The general result is that he has become a jack of all trades and a master of none. This has been specially noticeable when an Indian battalion has been transferred from the frontier to a down country station. On arrival it has been immediately immersed in all the technicalities of training for civilized warfare and in a very short time has forgotten what it had learnt on the frontier.

In peace time, the normal duties of the Indian Army are small frontier wars and internal security ; the latter including the rounding up of Moplahs, Burmese rebels and Terrorists and such like. There is one common factor applicable to either the frontier tribesman, rebel or terrorist and that is elusiveness. Unhampered with impedimenta, their mobility is assured and consequently they are very rarely pinned to a position. What finer trainers could be found to teach the Indian Army the old but new tactics of flexibility ?

It is maintained that if the qualifications of weapon skill, flexibility and mobility are applied to mountain warfare, the training therein acquired will be equally applicable to any other operation against an Asiatic enemy or rebel. Accordingly, to allow the sepoy to become a master of a trade, he should, I think, be trained in mountain warfare to the Ninth degree as modified or altered to suit the new tactics.

Mountain warfare does not necessarily imply skirmishing on a khud side ; there are many flat places on the Frontier including villages, crops, scrub, copses and nullahs. In the writer's limited experience, the most dangerous ground is that which is flat, covered in scrub and interlaced with nullahs ; ideal country for elusiveness and infiltration. Similar ground can be found in the vicinity of most garrison stations and there should be no difficulty in allotting suitable training areas.

Mountain warfare, however, has first to be purged of its Great War complex. The general tendency is to restrict all movement to a narrow corridor flanked by piquets and to employ the use of too much barbed wire. It is admitted that a secure line of communication is vital and that the protection of permanent camps and piquets demands wire, but the sum total is that the initiative is left largely in the hands of the enemy and that our troops feel naked and exposed when they leave the security of their barbed wire enclosures and the comparative safety of the corridor.

The opportunities offered for a stand up fight by the tribesmen are comparatively rare, and therefore unless the troops can engage the enemy at their own method of warfare, the latter are enabled to choose their own time and place to inflict losses. To change the rôle of the tethered goat, the troops must be trained to be as equally elusive and to stalk the tribesman instead of being stalked.

A camp having been established in tribal territory, we must be able to roam the country side whenever and wherever we choose and to put the fear of God into those tribesmen who object.

In regard to this, a quotation from Callwell's *TIRAH*, 1897, describing the small unit of Gurkha Scouts, is interesting :—

“All were especially selected for their activity and fleetness of foot, and they had been trained on the steepest hillsides. They were all good marksmen and had been taught self-reliance. At night they often went out barefooted and in disguise carrying arms. Although called Scouts, they were in reality much more than Scouts and could surpass the tribesmen at their own tactics.”

What finer training could be obtained anywhere else ? and when war comes either on the frontiers of India or outside against an Asiatic army, the Indian Army thus trained should be more than a match for the enemy. Given the ground and essential cover, it will be

comparatively easy to stalk and obliterate the machine-gun and to penetrate the enemy's defence.

To enable these light infantry tactics to succeed, clothing and footgear must be suitable. At present the infantryman is weighed down with a various assortment of articles that he may require. Give him the bare essentials to carry and train him to lie hard and to fight and stalk even harder.

The worse features of the man's clothing at present are the shorts and footgear. Taking the latter article first; one cannot expect a man to move nimbly, swiftly and silently in a heavy pair of hobnailed boots. Look at a Punjabi youth playing "Kaudi Kaudi"; see him leap into the air like a young goat; watch the spring and tension of his muscles. Then put him into a pair of ammunition boots and see how comparatively immobile he becomes. To allow his legs and feet full scope he must be given suitable footgear. The most suitable of course for hill warfare and arid regions are *chaplis*, and for serious stalking and patrolling, grass *chaplis* are better still, as those who have used them on shikar well know.

These are cheap and, being a local product in the north of India, there should not be any difficulty in supply. The argument against *chaplis* is that they are not a general utility footgear.

Regarding shorts; these are useful garments and comfortable but provide no protection against cold or mosquitos. The ever-present transport problem will not allow of the carriage of a second pair of neither garments and therefore some kind of general utility garment is indicated. For Indian troops some form of baggy pyjama or very loose knickerbocker giving full freedom to the knees and legs and yet providing necessary protection against mosquitos and cold appears desirable. For winter these could be made of a light woollen material or serge. The present pattern of trouser or knickerbocker is too tight and the drill material too heavy and thick.

The *puttee* also comes in for criticism. These constrict the calf muscles, are hot and uncomfortable and when wet are beastly. A short ankle *puttee* to guard against thorns and a thick woollen stocking or hose top into which the *pyjamas* can be tucked would provide a practicable and comfortable ensemble. Not perhaps smart, but serviceable.

Bearing in mind the type and efficiency of the probable enemy of the Indian Army and the limited fire power available for support, the infantry must not and cannot wait for elaborate fire plans of machine-guns and artillery, but must fight their way forward on their own by infiltration and light infantry tactics. This definitely requires a new form of training. The best training that can be carried out in peace time and employed with little difference in mountain warfare is by "Fighting Patrols." The conduct of a fighting patrol demands self-confidence and initiative on the part of the commander and weapon skill, stalking ability and initiative of a high order by all ranks.

The general picture one has in mind is that from a camp or camps established in tribal territory, fighting patrols varying from a platoon to a company or more, depending on the task in hand, are sent out at frequent intervals to roam the hillsides and broken ground under dispersed control, elusive, lightly equipped, suitably clothed and with no transport tail, stalking the tribesman and domineering the countryside.

It is suggested that a man so trained in peace and on the frontier could easily adapt himself to any other kind of warfare and that, given the ground, he could stalk and deal with enemy machine-guns with comparative ease. There is no reason why our infantry should not be able to emulate the Gurkha Scouts of 1897 and become first class troops at infiltration. It is considered, however, that to unlearn the barbed wire tactics of the Great War and the linear formations which have become a second nature to the average sepoy and his immediate commanders, time must be given. At least two complete training seasons might be devoted to nothing more ambitious than company training.

Based on a simple doctrine of training of the shikar instinct and applied to fighting patrols in mountain warfare, a high standard of light infantry tactics should easily be reached.

EMPIRE OR

BY COLONEL F. DICKINS.

Within the last few years there has sprung up a town called Becontree, in Essex. It is the result of the efforts of the L. C. C. to construct an ideal city for the working classes; it is well laid out, neat and clean; the small standardized houses are good, and each is surrounded by its own garden. With its population of 120,000 it should surely be held up as a model of what such a city should be. And yet—and yet—there is something wanting. Somehow, for all its technical perfection and large area, it conveys an impression of smallness, of a dearth of large ideas and purposes, of a want of balance; something indefinable is missing. And the reason is—that it is entirely composed of working-class dwellings. The well-to-do, the middle class, the professional classes, have not been catered for. Consequently, everything is pitched in a minor key, as it were, and there is no invitation for further progress. The houses, the shops, are small and somewhat mean; the streets are dull and monotonous. And they have no escape. It is a town in which spacious ideas and ideals will never flourish.

Recently this township has achieved the honour of having had a general survey made of it, which has been published in book form. And this is the lesson which a reviewer in *The Times Literary Supplement* has garnered from it:—

“Let housing committees and all responsible citizens learn the lesson from Becontree that technical planning is sterile without social imagination.”

A similar lesson might well be taken to heart by that gallant, zealous band of thinkers who wish to see some plan, some definite form, designed for the queer, loosely-knit collection of countries and contingents which some call the British Empire, and others the British Commonwealth of Nations. Imperial Conferences, Imperial Defence Committee and Colleges, Ottawa Pacts, and Economic Conferences are called into being, and, after all the talk and the squabbling have died away, the several component parts of the British Empire do not appear to be one whit more closely connected than they were before. Professors, journalists, politicians, Mr. Robert Stokes, Major-General

J. F. C. Fuller, and others, write irreproachable books and articles, lay down attractive principles, and produce carefully thought-out designs for a constitution and for institutions which should weld the scattered bits into one homogeneous whole.

But, however, scientific their approach, however logical their argument, there is just one thing which not one of them seems to bother about, and it is just that "social imagination" which has, by its absence, nullified the technical perfection of Becontree.

Is there not a real danger that no Imperial Plan, however scientific, however technically correct, will really meet the needs of the situation, and will fulfil the purpose for which it is designed,—namely, the assurance of the permanent unity of the Empire—unless it is framed in accordance with "social imagination"? In short, before the brain begins to plan, is it not essential that the purpose of the plan should appeal to the heart? To achieve Empire unity, is it not necessary to win over the Empire's heart before its brain can be expected to function in the required direction?

Fifty years ago, one Sir John Seeley created a small sensation by the publication of his book—"The Expansion of England." He was one of the pioneers to explore the problem—"Is the Empire worth conserving?" and its corollary—"Can it be conserved?" His reply in both cases is a very decided—"Yes." But he makes a curious exception in the case of India, regarding which much troubled continent he remarks: "It may be fairly questioned whether our possession of India does, or ever can, increase our power or our security, while there is no doubt it vastly increases our dangers and responsibilities." That is a subject about which a certain amount of controversy may be noticed to-day; a subject, indeed, which has become so obscured by gas-cloud and ink-deluge that it is becoming a little bit difficult to distinguish what the real point at issue is.

But as regards the rest of the Empire he has no doubts or reservations at all. He denies vigorously that, because the Empire is enormous and widely scattered, any inherent necessity for dissolution is thereby involved, and points out that no real parallel exists between it and previous Empires whose decay is writ in the sad pages of history. It is true that the English had already lost one Empire—but so unnecessarily. Had there been displayed on either side a sufficiency of "social imagination," that first Empire would never

have been lost. The appeal to the heart would have conserved what the appeal to a half-baked brain lost.

For this is all that social imagination really means—the recognition of a common humanity—the realization that men are just men, and not dummy figures to be regimented like pawns on a chess-board; that they are swayed by emotion as well as by reason, by sentiment as well as by selfishness, and that, in the long run, they cannot be persuaded against their will; that the various classes and estates have their own appointed functions to fulfil, their own useful place in the world's affairs; that nations will remain nations, and that races will continue to produce races in spite of all the declarations of quacks and cranks and intriguers to the contrary; and that it is sheer lunacy to shut one's eyes to the fact that mankind is, after all, only just a tiny proportion of that "fortuitous concourse of atoms," which, according to old Lucretius, *is* the world.

It is really humiliating to consider that, according to Mr. Van Loo, the whole population of the world could be packed into a square box with sides only half a mile long!

Presumably everybody is acquainted with Sir John Seeley's sentence: "We seem, as it were, to have conquered and peopled half the world in a fit of absence of mind." What would be still more remarkable would be the loss of half the world, due to a continued state, not much of absence of mind, as of careless and ignorant indifference as to the significance and result of such a loss.

Since Sir John Seeley's day there has been a steady tendency for the business of Empire to become more and more complicated, for conflicting interests to stand out more prominently against the background, until the problem has become so difficult that no statesman seems to know quite where to begin—and still less where to end. Consequently all efforts towards consolidation and understanding have been somewhat isolated and uncorrelated; there is no consistent melody, only a series of staccato notes. A good deal of lip-service is paid to the sanctity of Imperial unity; but the appeal is generally made in narrow terms to interest, to fear, to self-conservation.

Sir John Seeley puts the solution into a very simple form—and leaves it there. "If the colonies are not, in the old phrase, possessions of England, then they must be part of England.
When we have accustomed ourselves to contemplate the whole Empire

together, and call it England, we shall see that here, too, is a United States. Here, too, a great homogeneous people, one in blood, language, religion, and laws, but dispersed over a boundless space. We shall see that, though it is bound together by strong moral ties, it has little that can be called a constitution, no system that seems capable of resisting a severe shock."

That is the problem—the Dominions and England to be one and indistinguishable, and yet each component part to preserve its individuality and its independence. If the Empire is to be permanent and indissoluble, then it must be homogeneous at least in spirit and in purpose. No matter what constitution may be baked and boiled and katalysed and synthetized in the political laboratory, it will not be a successful experiment unless some strong flux of the most tenacious nature is employed that will ensure the cohesion of all the constituent parts of the finished product.

The trouble is that the Empire is not a homogeneous whole, much less so than it was in Sir John's day. And it is just this very lack of homogeneity which will nullify any purely academic constitution or elaborately designed institutions. To fabricate any sort of constitution or institution before any sort of homogeneity has developed is wasted labour. So long as all the constituent parts are the playgrounds for party politics, and so long as successive governments can repudiate the policy of previous governments, what can the Empire be but a congeries of separate, independent entities?

Sir John says—"Here, too, is a great homogeneous people, one in blood, languages, religions, and laws." But that is just what the Empire is not, and never can be! It is, therefore, a vain thing to attempt to frame a constitution as if homogeneity existed. Yet, unless there is some form of homogeneity, what good does there appear to be in attempting to frame a constitution? There must be a "something" that all the constituent parts have in common—some strong flux to bind them together as a cohesive and balanced whole. It is fairly obvious that what is required is something rather less evanescent than merely common interests and mutual fears. When we try to discover common interests, we seem to discover a preponderance of conflicting interests, attempts to satisfy which seem to lead rather to common dissatisfaction. When we try the appeal to common dangers and fears, we are apt to discover that

more attention is paid to the immediate and selfish necessities of the moment.

Yet, when the Great War shattered the complacency of the world, we found that he had no need to make any appeal at all. In their thousands, the people of the Dominions obeyed some irresistible urge and gave all they could without counting the cost. It is easy to sneer and to state with airy superiority that self-interest lay at the bottom of their action. It did not. Self-interest was not in the heart of one single soldier who came over the seas, and their dead have earned some better memorial than a slander which only discredits the fatuous few who are mean enough to utter it.

There is a similar school which sneers at any attempt to idealize the reasons which brought England herself into the War. They do a poor service to the 3,000,000 volunteers who obeyed the same irresistible urge in our own Islands, before conscription was resorted to, in order to balance the conscription, that has always obtained on the continent.

It is not a question of the policy of a government; goodness knows *that* may be swayed by any fitful breeze. It is a question of what is in the heart of a people, and it is to the heart of a people that the ultimate appeal must always be made.

If, then, the appeal to the heart proved the strongest bond in the face of danger, it is surely not illogical to argue that the appeal to the heart will prove the strongest bond at all times, and that we may find that the magic flux we are seeking, the homogeneity which is not to be found in a physical form, or a religious form, or a legal form, or in any tangible form at all, will be found in a higher form which cannot be expressed in any easy words, but which can be felt with intensity—a form at once indescribable and inarticulate, but nevertheless indestructible. But it can no more be expected to take root and flourish without any attempt at cultivation than can a fallow field be expected to produce a rich crop spontaneously.

Here is a good opportunity for the hard-baked industrialist or financier, for the strong, silent, ruthless soldier, for the crafty, cynical, ambitious politician,—all those disagreeable people we meet with frequently in novels, occasionally in biographies, and sometimes in real life—to be faithful to type, and to apply the guillotine, for the argument is really beneath their notice.

It is just possible, though, that the argument is above their notice ; it is away and beyond their power of understanding and imagination. For they can conceive of nothing useful except elaborate, cut and dried plans, framed in exact accord with all the approved principles of strategy, economics and politics.

And yet—just as the technical perfection of Becontree is nullified by its complete lack of social imagination, so may all the technically perfect plans of Empire conservation be ruined by this very same lack of the gift of social imagination. And when one comes to think of it, it is a little bit difficult to recognize what *are* the approved principles of strategy, economics and politics. If one thing is certain in this changing world, it is that all the old principles are hopelessly discredited, and that there is universal disagreement as to what the new principles should be.

To cut the cackle, let us now assume, if we may, that the only homogeneity achievable in the Empire is that which almost amounts to a spiritual homogeneity—spiritual, not in a religious sense, but in the sense that it is something removed from mere empirical laws that are supposed to govern human motives ; ideals held in common and a purpose reached out for in union. If we can find some such brotherhood beneath the sun, then indeed, we will be justified in framing our constitution and our institutions.

If not

Why should it be difficult to build up this common Imperial outlook and intention ? Perhaps a few cold facts will bring the difficulty home. If we take Canada, according to an article in the August number of the FORTNIGHTLY, we find the following complications. "French Canada has one of the highest birth-rates among the white people of the world the population of English speaking Canada is stationary." (The proportion of British, French, and "others" is—5—3—2.) Then "there are 1,300,000 Canadians in the U. S. A." A pretty big proportions out of a population of 10,000,000. Of the European population other than British—"54.32 per cent. are on the western fields ; 34.7 per cent. of the British only." And of this foreign element, the queerest of the lot prove to make the most stable, contented, and successful farmers—the only farmers who can face the grim and hard reality of life in the far west—namely, that stubborn Russian sect, the DOUKHOBORS. They, and

the Scandinavians, seem fated to form the population of the western prairies. Finally, here are some disquieting statistics:—"The whole country is being Americanized; one-half of the stocks and bonds are in American hands; 75 per cent. of the vast wood-pulp industry is in the hands of Americans; the total value of American capital invested in Canada amounts to £800,000,000."

These are hard and stubborn facts. What is to be done about it? As time goes on, as the ties of sentiment and race grow less and less with every generation, what can we throw into the scales to balance narrow self-interest and the expediency of the moment?

It is hardly necessary to mention the racial antagonism in South Africa. A great fight is being staged to bridge it over—a fight, remember—and one of which the final result cannot be foreseen, because the real designs of the protagonists are by no means apparent.

In Australia—how much of Ireland has flowed into Australia? So far from seeing any great encouragement for Empire unity in Australia, we actually see signs of Australian dis-unity; the openly expressed desire of West Australia and of the riverine portions of New South Wales to break away from the Dominion.

In New Zealand, there does appear to exist stability and homogeneity, and, curiously enough, that is the one Dominion which was originally colonized on a definite, purposeful plan, due to that queer character, Gibbon Wakefield, who also achieved the unusual distinction of being twice arraigned for, and convicted of, abducting eligible young ladies!

No amount of tinkering with quotas and tariffs seems to help the situation. Whatever we do to improve dairying in England must re-act unfavourably on Australia and New Zealand. In Canada and Australia the determined efforts to establish industrial activities must affect our English industries. The acreage under wheat this year in England is 42 per cent. more than it was last year; hardly pleasant for Canada. Canada is shipping large quantities of motor-cars to Australia—hardly pleasant hearing for our motor industry. The South African Government has heavily subsidized an Italian shipping line—a shrewd blow to our crippled mercantile fleet.

Not one of the Dominions is in the least bit anxious for any scheme of British emigration on a large scale. "Charity begins at home" is their motto. Moreover, even supposing we were able to

inaugurate a successful scheme of emigration (and so far all attempts have failed), what are the new inhabitants going to do when they get there? Grow more corn when more is already produced than the world can buy? Produce more beef and more wool before the additional potential markets have been ascertained? Help in founding more industries when half the industries of the world are well-nigh bankrupt?

One begins to wonder whether Sir John was quite justified in saying that there is no inherent reason why the Empire should disintegrate. It would appear that, with the appearance of the Statute of Westminster, all the seeds of disintegration have been sown, and that no one can tell when the crop of weeds is going to materialize. Good, easy gentlemen assure us that the more complete the independence of the Dominions, the more remote is the likelihood of their breaking away from the Empire. That, surely, can only be true if there is some bond stronger than their independence.

After all, this fissiparous tendency is rather a natural one, considering that until quite recently, as history goes, nothing whatever has been done to avert such a development. Indeed, the desirability of any such action has hardly been considered. There was Wakefield, who advocated a definite plan of colonisation; there was Lord Durham, who gave us a united Canada; there was that Empire spell-binder, Lord Beaconsfield, who, as Ben Disraeli, remarked that the colonies were millstones round our neck; there was the voice of one crying in the wilderness in the early days of this century, one Joe Chamberlain, the converted Radical, who was rejected by the mugwumps of his own party and was despised by those Empire wreckers, the intelligentsia of that Liberal Party which did more during its nine years of tyranny to destroy the "green and pleasant island," perhaps, than any other Government of modern days. There was the voice of old Sir John Seeley 50 years ago, and there are the voices of two or three striving to make themselves heard to-day.

Among the latter, Mr. Robert Stokes and Major-General J. F. C. Fuller have each produced a book with practical suggestions. The latter, with good commonsense, stresses the senselessness of this bleat for independence by peoples incapable of maintaining their independence against aggression—a bleat that reverberates round and round the old world that is itself completely dependent on the laws of physics and chemistry and Professor Einstein—some, indeed,

say on the laws of God. But the desire for independence is not dependent on common-sense, on stodgy facts of history, geography, economics or anything else. The clamour for independence is generally due either to a heart-felt national pride, or to an artificial national ambition manufactured by idealists or self-seekers.

But few pause to consider to what lengths independence can be stretched—where it must end. When the Hyde Park tub-thumper or the perfervid patriot shriek about independence, what do they actually mean? Independence of common sanity—common weal—common folly—common greed—common decency?

What is meant by this magic word, this hot gospel of independence and self-determination, which, reduced to its ultimate ratio, must lead to the independence of the individual? We see now, before us, the tragic result of the cult of the individual in the mess in which the U. S. A. finds itself, in the collapse of all preconceived tenets of economics, finance, and industry. To free themselves from this mess into which their independence has carried them, the people of the U. S. A. now have to submit to a very drastic code of public behaviour in which there is no room for individual independence at all.

The cult of the individual does not seem to have produced any happier results than has the cult of mass-production or the cult of socialism. The reaction to this dismal record of universal failure is to be seen in the surrender to a modern form of dictatorship, at first ruthless, subsequent benevolent—so long as you do what you are told. And why? Because the appeal is a sentimental one rather than a scientific one. Because dictators, with a shrewd knowledge of human nature, appeal to the individual, not as an individual, but as a unit of the national mass. In other words, they apply *their* version of the doctrine of social imagination. Their methods are uniform in that they are designed to give each member of a state a sense of his responsibilities towards the state.

Thus the point to be noted is not so much their method or their ultimate purpose, as their discovery that by appealing to sentiment, and not to intellect, they can force a sense of mutual interdependence on to the people of nation. The people are brought to see that they must pull together or starve together; that there is really no room for divergent motives, for different ideals, for uncorrelated effort—in a state. The nation must work as one—like a nest of ants,

We tried it once in England, nearly 300 years ago, and nothing is more unlikely that we will ever try such dangerous medicine again.

To quote old Sir John again—and for the last time—“ When we have accustomed ourselves to contemplate the whole Empire together, and call it England ” It was difficult to do so in his day, and now the difficulties would seem to be even greater. How many of the inhabitants of England ever give one single thought to the Dominions! What, exactly, is conveyed by the word “ Australia ” to the *average* Englishman? Well, it’s a patch on the map, somewhat larger than Rutlandshire, perhaps, but hardly more important. And what is England to the *average* Australian? A little island, vaguely situated in the north of Europe, where the fogs are cold in winter, but warmer in summer. And what does the farmer in Saskatchewan think of the farmer in Cornwall, and what does either of them think of the problem of direct *versus* indirect rule in our “ coloured ” colonies? Who can name straight off the third most populous dependency in our Empire?

It is sheer lunacy to expect that any average man can possibly master, or even take an interest in all the literally incalculable problems that are involved in a great and scattered Empire.

Now, all that the would-be Empire reformers are able to suggest is some form of economic, strategic and political alliance between England and the Dominions—an alliance which surely would be at the mercy of any Government of the day, which might be blown to pieces by the breath of any demagogue, at the mercy of a specious catchword. Alliances and treaties within the Empire merely stress the independence of its constituent parts. If the Empire is to be *one*, there can be no room for alliances and codes. They cannot serve to bring the parts closer together than an alliance with a foreign country. Can any one maintain that our alliances with France and Japan did, in the long run, bring our people into more intimate sympathy with the peoples of those countries? They did *not* break down national barriers and racial antipathies. They have never stopped economic rivalry and industrial throat-cutting. An alliance is but an expedient only, and serves its purpose for a day, and then is filed away for the dust to collect.

We may work out as many meticulous and high falutin’ schemes of Empire reciprocation as we like—but that won’t help us to “ call

it England." Indeed, the unholy squabbings that seem fated to attend any conference have an effect the exact contrary to that for which the conference was summoned. Was it not a Canadian premier, who, many years ago, airily pronounced that he could not see why Canada should bother about contributing to the upkeep of the British navy, when she could always have the navy of the U. S. A. to fall back upon !

The other side of the picture is displayed in Australia's and New Zealand's very real alarm when, at one time, we seemed to be deliberately proposing to send our navy to join the German fleet at the bottom of Scapa Flow. It certainly looked as if we were prepared to throw them to the wolves !

Both these historical instances show exactly to what a dangerous pitch the old policy of *laissez faire* can be developed. This clamour for independence on the part of the Dominions is not the result of any tyranny or oppression on the part of England. On the contrary, it is the result of the complete indifference—one may almost say, of the contemptuous indifference—of the English people, and of a parochial outlook on the part of the peoples of the Dominions.

If these pitiful attitudes are to be altered, something more than ministerial or bureaucratic alchemy is required. There must be an appeal that goes home to the heart of the people, over the heads of all the little tin gods.

We rather pride ourselves on lack of sentiment in England ; at any rate, whatever we may feel, we would rather die than give expression to our feelings. It is quite true that most of us are quite incapable of expressing ourselves. Still, apart from that, we don't like doing it, and when some fellow *does* get up and let himself go, we are rather apt to regard him with suspicion and disfavour. That's all very right and proper, but perhaps we rather over-do it. It is difficult to imagine any British General appealing to his men as "*mes enfants*," but, against that, one seems to remember an appeal by Earl Haig—something about having "*our backs to the wall*" came into it. The appeal succeeded. Under similar circumstances, a similar appeal would always meet with response.

Sentiment ? No such thing in England ? Why, it does not require a very extensive journey through the fields and villages and little towns of England to discover that the stolid inhabitants and

workers have a sentimental attachment for their own particular little niche that is as deeply felt as it is inarticulate. A mile or two on either side of a tortured main road in Sussex you will still find the real England—hemmed in, attacked, bewildered by noise, vulgarity and shallow flippancy, but still persisting.

For, in spite of all the hideous desecration of the lovely country that the Industrial Revolution has left in its ruthless tracks, in spite of unspeakable vulgarisation by means of pink-roofed bungaloid eruptions, of the cancerous attacks of ribbon development, in spite of all the discordant sights and noises, in spite of the cult of what is ugly, unhealthy, obscene, in art, literature, and drama—in spite of all this men *do* still dig in the fields of England, and her kindly earth still *does* produce its fruits.

The moderns have not yet succeeded in killing the spirit that is England—the sense of unity. Indeed, in the far country something very like a feudal spirit still persists—astoundingly so. It is not so much a racial instinct—that developed very late in England. It is not so much patriotism, which hardly existed at all before Tudor days, and which is now condemned by the Intelligentsia as an unspeakable word—as a consciousness of mutual interdependence between the land and the dweller on the land, and between the individual dwellers of the land, rich or poor. An interdependence due, not so much to personal interest, as to a finer feeling of the continuity and stability that *is* a country, that makes a nation. That this spirit still exists in spite of the sneers and jeers and arguments and figures of the self-complacent Intelligentsia, with their well-paid, well-advertised propaganda, is just a proof of its depth, its persistence, its sincerity, its radical truth.

But, if neglected and passed by, it cannot endure for ever.

It is just because no effort has ever been made, in the whole history of our Colonial Empire, to inspire this feeling of unity, this necessity for continuity and stability, as between England and her Colonies, that the problems of Empire unity have reached the pitch of complexity where we find them to-day. Conflicting interests have been allowed to expand; ties of sentiment and race have been allowed to slacken; the gospel of self-determination has been preached vociferously as if there were some peculiar sanctity in the word.

And all the time it might have been so easy to concentrate on working out a scheme of mutual interdependence, on the basis of

equality, of oneness. But the Victorian industrialists and free-traders were far too busily employed in building up their own private fortunes, in exploiting the whole world. It was a paying game—while it lasted.

The whole root matter of the trouble is this word—independence. What the Dominions mean, presumably, is independence of British Parliamentary control. They have got that now, and they are welcome to it. If they are satisfied with what they have substituted, well and good. It is their business. As a matter of fact, they do *not* appear to be particularly satisfied with it.

They cannot have it both ways, though. They cannot be members of an Empire, and at the same time be independent of some central guiding principle or ideal or purpose or pattern, that can shape their policies and destinies as one entity. They cannot have progress here, and reaction there. There *must* be some common starting-point and some common goal. One can hardly visualize the north of England following protection, and the south clinging to Free Trade. But that would be no greater lunacy than to imagine that an Empire can be maintained whose several parts are all pulling in different directions. If they are to remain members of a living Empire, then Canada and Australia must consider the extent of their independence, not only in their relations with England, but in their relations with each other. And both of them must balance, vis-a-vis South Africa, their several and mutual dependence on, against their several and mutual independence of, South Africa.

It seems a little bit odd to imagine that you can have the closest alliance coupled with the greatest independence.

We have, then, several individualistic co-partners in association, who are quite desirous of working together in amity, but who are not *quite* sure what the objects of the association are or ought to be, who are more than a little bit suspicious as to how the profits (if any) are going to be allocated, while not one of them has the slightest intention of recognizing the chairmanship of any other partner.

But, all the time, did they but know it, there has been available for them the strongest form of national cement known—the strange and indefinable magic of the Crown—not necessarily of the sovereign in his person, but all that the Crown stands for, that wonderful cohesive element in our own constitution which has preserved our being as a

nation through so much adversity, so much folly, so much careless disregard of the lessons of the past, of the dangers of the future. Here we have, as developed in England, a central, idealized, and permanent focus, undisturbed by political intrigues, unruffled by the fall of governments—a focus from which guidance can be gathered and directed without any fear of that patronage and dictatorship which seem to infuriate so many otherwise harmless inhabitants of England and her Dominions. The Crown of England stands like a lighthouse against which the winds and the waves do most furiously and impotently rage.

If the various peoples of the British Empire can once get it into their heads that the Crown is but a symbol, not of tyranny, but of permanence and unity, and that its value and its power lies, not so much with its accidental wearer, as in its symbolical character, standing for stability, continuity, fidelity and justice, then perhaps it might be possible to frame the ideal constitution and build up the ideal institutions on and by which alone can a real Empire be founded and maintained.

But first the symbol and its significance must be worn in the hearts of the people.

When the society bore remarked to a witty individual that "Familiarity breeds contempt," instantly there came back the comment—"But you can't breed anything without a little familiarity, can you?" And so, if one is to have an ideal Empire, surely it is necessary to have some idealistic purpose in accordance with which its constitution must be designed, its development planned, and its actions directed. And surely, in idealism, there is no room for envy and petty selfishness and short-sighted greed and false ambition—no—and no room for any detestable snobbishness and assumption of superiority, of which our race is by no means always guiltless, not only towards the inhabitants of other (and so less-favoured) climes, but towards individuals of its own race, less favourably endowed by Providence, by opportunity—and by conceit. The unity must be real, not merely as between all constituent parts of the Empire, but as between the individual inhabitants of each part.

The preceding paragraphs do not pretend even to sketch the outline of a working plan. They are merely intended to offer the germ of an idea, to suggest a possible starting point, and to warn

against the folly of putting the cart before the horse ; to remind those who would attempt to concoct plans and institutions and alliances in the political laboratory, no matter of what technical perfection, that they will be wasting their time and ours, unless they leaven their technicality with the spirit of "social imagination." Human actions spring from human hearts, and the motives that sway humanity are not to be fabricated in any scientific, philosophic, bureaucratic or political laboratory whatever.

NOTE.—When half-way through this article, the author was gratified by reading in the *Army Quarterly* for July a review of Major-General Fuller's book, "Empire Unity and Defence." The reviewer ends up by quoting a remark once made by the Empress Catherine the Great :—"You work on paper, which puts up with anything and presents no obstacles. I, a poor Empress, have to work with human nature for my material, and that is a much more ticklish job."

Further, the following extract from Mr. Gerald Heard's "These Hurrying Years"—read long after the article was completed—perhaps crystallizes what I have endeavoured to expound. The quotation refers to Chamberlain's dream of Empire :—

"The Empire must become more than an emotional racial confederation ; it must become a reciprocating engine. It should give England food, and England should give it machines and all manufactures. It looked as concrete as cement. but it was only a dream—a dream of German mechanical thoroughness quite alien to actual organic life and the way peoples and constitutions do in fact grow."

TROUT FISHING IN AUSTRIA.

By "NEWT."

A fishing trip in Austria is still perhaps sufficiently uncommon a variation to the course of an ordinary home leave, to make its details of interest to officers serving in India. The author and a friend visited the country during July 1933 when, owing to the drought, fishing prospects in most parts of England were distinctly depressing. Austria, however, had undergone rather a wet summer; and the two streams fished were, if anything too high. Discoloured water interfered with sport on several occasions. Neither member of the Expedition was an expert fisherman and neither had had a very wide experience previously.

The duration of the trip was a month, including the journey both ways. The name of the village adopted as a headquarters was Windischgarsten in Upper Austria. It is reached by way of Dover—Calais—Paris—Basle—Buchs—Innsbruck—Salzburg. A second class return fare cost £17-10-0, but this could be reduced by travelling third class from Innsbruck, to about £15. Third class in Austria is quite clean, although not very comfortable as it consists merely of bare wooden seats. However, from Innsbruck to Windischgarsten is only a day's journey, so a little discomfort is endurable. It is probably better to get one's tickets through the Continental Travel Bureau, Victoria Station, rather than through an agent, as one saves the extra charges.

To enjoy the trip a smattering of German is advisable. In larger towns like Innsbruck and even Salzburg some English is understood, but in the country neither French nor English will get one far. However, a very little German combined with a few inventive gestures will meet most necessities and all the inhabitants are friendly and helpful.

Roughly speaking, there are two main classes of accommodation to be found in the country, the pension and the pub. In the larger towns there are, of course, modern hotels which are clean, comfortable and not over-expensive, but these do not affect the fisherman. The pension is generally run by a family who take paying guests, either foreigners or townsfolk from Vienna on holiday. An inclusive charge is made

for board and lodging. The Pension Sonnhof at Windischgarsten charged £3 a week, drinks being extra ; also baths which cost 6d. a time to pay for heating the water by means of a sort of geyser. Wine, red or white, cost $1/3$ for half a litre (about the equivalent of a small bottle in a London Restaurant) and beer 3d. a pint. We economised a good deal on baths.

The accommodation was very clean and comfortable and the food excellent. Herr Schartler, the owner of this pension, is a most courteous and considerate host, who did everything he could to make one comfortable and took a personal interest in one's success with the fishing.

The other form of accommodation is the gasthans or Austrian pub. The accommodation is rough, but feasible. One pays so much for a bed and has one's food in the beer-garden. The whole probably costs rather less than £2 a week. All the above calculations are worked out on an exchange of 30 Austrian shillings to the pound.

There is a great drawback to trout fishing in Austria. All the fish one catches are the property of the Government and it is compulsory to take out a gillie. All fish caught must be kept alive if over the $10\frac{1}{2}$ inch limit. This is done by putting them in a small, portable barrel which the gillie carries. At the end of the day they are taken back to the village and kept in a large tank until such time as the housewives feel inclined to buy some fish for dinner. Of course one is permitted to buy one's own fish if one wants to do so and they even allow one a 10 per cent. rebate for having caught it.

It is distinctly trying at first, to see the day's bag being removed in this way and one is deprived of the pleasure of holding post-mortems on the local trout's diet. We used to contrive to weigh our fish by putting them in a landing net, weighing the whole ; and then subtracting the weight of the net. All fish under $10\frac{1}{2}$ inches had to be returned, but I am not sure whether the limit is the same in all parts of Austria.

We shared one gillie between us and his pay was 5 schillings, *i.e.*, $3/3$ a day. In addition we provided him with a sandwich luncheon and his train fare when we took the train to get to the further end of our beat. We always went third class and the return fare was about nine pence each. Gillie's fees vary all over the country and probably on a second trip one would be able to arrange for a cheaper one.

However, the head gillie at Windischgarsten was worth his pay, because he knew the stream like the back of his own hand. He always knew where fish were likely to lie; and, more important still, he knew what beats would be affected by a rise or fall of the stream. This saved us much valuable time which was important when our total stay only amounted to four weeks. In addition the head gillie was a genial and amusing fellow, who could beguile the luncheon hour with stories of his war experiences or of previous visitors and their foibles. He seemed to have friends throughout the locality and occasionally, when we were soaking wet, would take us to some farm house where we would be regaled with hot tea and schnapps. Other gillies who occasionally deputised for him knew very little about the locality or fishing, and were in reality merely porters for any fish we caught.

A license for a month's fishing cost eighty schillings, *i.e.*, about £2 10s. In our case this covered stretches of two streams, the Dambach from Windischgarsten to where it joined the Teichl, and the latter river to where it was joined by the Steyr; in all, this amounted to about eight miles of fishable water (both banks). The type of fishing varied considerably throughout. The Dambach actually flowed through Windischgarsten and from the inhabitants' back gardens one could get into fish as stout as anywhere on the other beats. In fact it was from one of these gardens that I hooked and lost what both of us agreed to be the monster of the tour.

This, however, merely filled in the evenings. For the day we went further afield, sometimes on foot and sometimes by train. Below Windischgarsten the Dambach runs for about $\frac{3}{4}$ mile through hay-fields, a stream about ten to fifteen yards wide, to where it joins the larger Teichl. The latter varies between twenty and thirty yards in width and is edged with willow and hazel thickets. Lower down it flows through a magnificent pine-clad gorge. It is a gravel-bottomed stream, rocky in places with a series of fine pools, in which on a sunny day one can see scores of fish basking.

All the tackle one requires for one's trip should be bought in England and taken with one. No duty is charged, provided rods, etc. can be certified as not new. Tackle is only obtainable in the larger towns in Austria and even then it is merely an inferior English article with 80 per cent. added to the price.

A 9-foot rod with 30 yards of tapered line to match was found quite adequate to meet all requirements. Casts should be tapered to 3 × gut and should be 7—8' in length.

We fished with the sunken fly exclusively and this is usual throughout Austria, I believe. Our gillie told us an occasional visitor had tried out dry flies, but only one had met with much success. A list of flies is given below :—

(a) We took fish regularly with the following :—

March Brown, Wickham's Fancy, Green Well's Glory,
Red Palmer, Water Hen, Olive Gnat, Butcher.

(b) We had occasional success with : Mallard and Claret, Red Spinner, Water Cricket, Hardy's Favourite, White Moth, March Brown Red.

(c) The following were recommended to us, but we did not catch much on any of them :—

Mole fly, Whirling Blue, Stone fly, Red Tag, Alder Invieta, Alexandra.

The above should be tied on size 3 or 4 hooks, in teams of two or three on a cast. There is a May fly season in Austria, but we were too late for it.

In the Dambach and Teichl wading is absolutely essential. We did not use waders, but wore shorts and stockings and found this a most comfortable kit, and not too cold for wading. In May and early June, when the snow water is coming down, it might not be possible to do this.

Spinning is practised a good deal by Austrian fishermen and our gillie told us that it was the best way to get big fish. We only used this method when the water was too thick for a fly. Some $\frac{1}{2}$ " fly-spoons are an asset therefore.

An account of the costs to each member of the party is given as an appendix. Our bag to two rods in four weeks was as follows :—

Sizeable fish—211 ; average weight—9·4 ozs. ;

Larger fish—1 lb ; returned 308 undersize ! fish.

In four weeks, rain prevented us fishing a good deal, and we only had fifteen full days on the river.

From the above it will be seen that one's bag is not likely to be startling either in numbers, or individual size of fish. The charm of the fishing lies in the fact that, on Dambach and Teichl at all events, the fish are doing something all day ; and one is in most delightful surroundings.

As to the time of year to select for one's trip, May and June are, I believe, excellent for fishing, but one is apt to be held up by snow water right into the middle of the latter month.

In July one does not get snow water, although we were hindered by excessive rain. Later on in September one gets grayling fishing in some streams which is reported to be excellent. But of this I speak mere hearsay.

The national dress is shorts; and one can, therefore, be comfortably dressed without being stared at. The people are most friendly and as to Nazis, bombs and outrages, we saw nothing of them. As in India they are probably the privilege of the vocal minority.

APPENDIX.

Expenses for one person. Exchange rate 30 Austrian schillings to the pound.

	£	s.	d.
Return fare 2nd class London-Windischgarsten ..	18	0	0
Board, lodging at pension for four weeks @ £4 a week including drinks, tips and baths ..	16	0	0
Licence for fishing	2	10	0
Cost of $\frac{1}{2}$ share of gillie's pay, etc.	3	10	0
Extra tackle bought for trip	3	0	0
Extras (including food on train journey both ways, a night's stay in Innsbruck, developing of films, books, etc.)	10	0	0
Total ..	53	0	0

SEDGEMOOR.

THE LAST BATTLE FOUGHT ON ENGLISH SOIL.

BY MAJOR S. R. MACDONALD, 1ST K. G. O. GURKHA
RIFLES.

The battle of Sedgemoor, fought on the sixth of July 1685 dealt the death-blow to the cause of James, Duke of Monmouth. It was fought less than four weeks after the standard of revolt had been set up at the small port of Lyme in Dorsetshire, where Monmouth and a few followers had landed from the Dutch vessel, the *Helderenberg*, in which they had set sail from Amsterdam for the purpose of raising England and of driving James the Second from the throne.

Before describing the battle in more detail, and the other small passages of arms that made up the tale of the Western Insurrection, it is necessary to give a brief account of the events, political and military, that ascended in a climax to the total rout of the insurgents by the royalist forces in that dreary morass which formerly environed Bridgewater.

The Duke of Monmouth, a natural son of Charles the Second by an early mistress, the beautiful Lucy Walters, was born at Rotterdam in 1649. Shortly after the Restoration he had been brought over to England, and on his marriage at the early age of seventeen with the daughter and heiress of the Earl of Buccleuch was publicly acknowledged by his father. His alliance with this noble Scottish house was made the occasion for creating him Duke of Monmouth, Duke of Orkney, and a knight of the Garter.

In addition to these high honours he was given a command in the Life Guards, and was installed as Chancellor of the University of Cambridge. But despite these proofs of his father's esteem and affection, and of his being acknowledged as Charles' natural son, his claims to kindred were regarded by a vast majority of people in England as entirely supposititious. His beautiful but fickle mother was known to have had many lovers even after she came under Charles' protection, and it was generally supposed that Monmouth's true father was Robert, brother of the ill-fated Algernon Sidney. From his mother he appears to have inherited his handsome features, his charm of manner and sweetness of temper, as also a shallowness of mind and a fatal want of resolution.

His marriage was not a happy one, and in his early manhood he gained, according to Pepys, a reputation for debauchery and riotous living. But though a libertine he was strangely popular with the Puritan party, who for the sake of his Protestantism overlooked his scandalous conduct, putting it down to headstrong youth and the evil influences of a licentious court. Soon, however, more honourable employments gave him the chance of reinstating himself in the public esteem and of restoring his somewhat blemished character.

Monmouth had already, in 1665, taken a creditable part in the action off Lowestoft—a sanguinary and hard-fought affair in which the Duke of York, afterwards James the Second, distinguished himself as a naval commander. During the Dutch war he was sent, with the command of six thousand English troops, to the assistance of Louis the Fourteenth of France, and he is said to have, notwithstanding his inexperience and lack of generalship, proved himself a good soldier. Again, when England was at war with France in 1676 Monmouth commanded the English contingent which had been sent to help the Dutch, and at the battle of Saint Denis distinguished himself by his personal courage.

At this time England was imbued in pandemic form with the virus of anti-popery. The depositions of the infamous Doctor Oates and Captain Bedloe concerning the so-called Popish Plot had rent the country from top to bottom, and it was at this conjuncture of affairs that Monmouth became politically important. The Whig party of which the all-powerful Earl of Shaftesbury was the head was clamouring for a bill to be passed in Parliament to exclude the Duke of York from the succession. Efforts had already been made by the Exclusionists to secure the Protestant succession in favour of Monmouth. Charles had been urged to legitimize him by declaring that he was his lawful son born in wedlock, that he had married Lucy Walters. But to all their importunities the King had remained adamant in his refusal to rob his brother of his birthright. Shaftesbury and his party now made it their business, by playing on the fears and suspicions of the populace, already driven to the point of frenzy by the stories of Oates and Bedloe, to accustom the people to look upon the "Protestant duke," as Monmouth was now commonly called, as the natural protector of their church. For this purpose Monmouth, during James' enforced absence from England, was sent on a prolonged tour of the Western counties, which had since the days of Cromwell

remained fanatically loyal to the reformed religion. Throughout his progress in the West he was rapturously welcomed by the people on whom his affable manners and charm of person made such an impression as was to last for long after his death. It was probably on this tour that the thought of future armed rebellion first entered his head. Certain it is that Shaftesbury's scheming brain had already conceived such a plan, and but for the frustration of the Rye House Plot, which had for its object the waylaying and assassination of the king and his brother, his intrigues against the rightful succession might have prospered. This nefarious plot against the king's life and person resulted however in a complete change in the public opinion. The leaders of the Whig party were arrested, several of them were executed, and Monmouth was only able to reconcile himself to the king by betraying his colleagues. The exclusionist party was now completely crushed, and Monmouth, sick at heart perhaps over his own cowardly behaviour, fled to Holland. In that country he lived in comparative obscurity with his mistress, the Lady Wentworth, a woman of high rank and ample fortune, until the king's death.

It was not fated, however, that he should spend the remainder of his life thus peacefully. Many of the Whigs who had been implicated in the Rye House Plot had found an asylum in the Low Countries, and had there employed the period of their exile in forming schemes of rebellion in the island kingdom. These and other outlaws, of whom the most notable were the Duke of Argyll, Lord Grey, Wade, Ferguson, and Fletcher of Saltoun, determined to make a simultaneous descent on England and Scotland for the purpose of raising the respective country sides. Argyll was chosen to lead the northern enterprise, for it was confidently assumed that the highland clans would flock to the standard of the greatest noble of Scotland. For the southern landing Monmouth was chosen, and to this end he was approached by the conspirators. Though desirous of living peaceably in retirement with his wealthy mistress, he at length allowed himself to be persuaded against his better judgment. It is said that, weakwilled and vacillating as his nature was, he would have withstood their urgent solicitations had not Lady Wentworth added her own entreaties to make him quit a retirement which she herself had made so delightful. She urged him to go, for she wished to see him a king. Monmouth at length gave way and acquiesced in all they had planned for a landing in England. Ambitious hopes which he had thought were long

extinguished revived in him, and his irresolute mind now favoured a scheme that before had terrified it. He remembered his triumphal progress through the Western counties, how he had been acclaimed tumultuously by the populace, and how he had always borne the good will of the army. He believed, and encouraging messages from the conspirators' agents in England confirmed his belief, that he had but to show himself in the country when whole regiments would come over to him, the city of London would declare in his behalf, and the counties would eagerly rise in arms and gather round him.

Preparations were now put in hand for the two expeditions. Several Dutch ships were commissioned, and were loaded with arms and stores. The exiles had been promised the necessary funds for equipping the two expeditions, and from London in particular was expected a large sum of money. But these promises of help did not materialize, and for his own small armament Monmouth was constrained to sell his own and Lady Wentworth's jewels.

At last after many delays all was ready. Argyll sailed for Scotland and, following many vicissitudes of fortune, landed on the western coast at Campbelltown. From here the fiery cross was sent forth to summon the clans to a gathering. The resulting muster was not as large as had been expected, but some two thousand clansmen obeyed the summons. The chieftains however who were either well affected to the government or were afraid of risking life and property in the venture held back. Argyll must have seen from the first that his cause was hopeless.

Monmouth set sail for England two weeks later. He seems to have thought it advisable to allow the rebellion in the northern kingdom to break out before he landed in the south. All the available troops in England would be marched against Argyll's gathering, and his own landing would thus have far more chance of success. His voyage was long owing to bad weather and contrary winds, but his ship, the *Helderenberg*, escorted by two smaller vessels, having managed to escape an English squadron cruising off the Dutch coast, made her way into the Channel. At length, on the morning of the eleventh of June, his small armament arrived off Lyme.

The inhabitants of the small town, on the three foreign-built ships being sighted, lined the cliffs with no little uneasiness, which was not dispelled when they perceived boats putting off and making towards the shore. They were seen to be full of armed men.

The boats were beached and about a hundred well-appointed soldiers sprang out. One of the first to land was Monmouth, who was accompanied by Lord Grey, Fletcher, Ferguson and Wade. When the Duke was recognised the townsmen's apprehensive fears gave way to unbounded delight. They pressed down to the beach and acclaimed him with joy. Monmouth and his party moved off to the town, where his ensign was set up in the market-place and a declaration read to the assembled population. In this declaration were set forth the objects of his armed descent on English soil. It had been drawn up by Ferguson, a fanatical theologian and inveterate schemer who having been deeply implicated in the Rye House Plot had had to fly the country with a price on his head. Written in language so strong as to approach scurrility, the Declaration, among other charges, accused James of having ordered the burning of London, and of having poisoned his brother Charles to obtain the crown.

This masterpiece of invective ended by declaring James an usurper, a traitor, and a mortal enemy to the liberties of the people, and adjured all right-thinking men to throw off their allegiance to him. Monmouth, in a further manifesto, stated that he would be able to prove beyond dispute that he had been born in lawful wedlock, and had therefore a just claim to the throne, but that he would for the present waive his pretensions of that nature and leave the settlement of all questions of future government to the findings of parliament. The effect of this declaration on the common people was such as within a few hours after his landing no fewer than fifteen hundred men had enlisted in the Duke's cause. The local gentry held aloof, but the yeomen, the tradesmen, the artisans, flocked to his standard in crowds.

But while recruits were being enrolled at Lyme, the local militia was being mustered at Bridport to oppose the insurgents. News came to Monmouth that the Dorsetshire and the Somersetshire contingents had arrived in that town, and were preparing to march on Lyme. He determined to attack the militia forces forthwith, and Grey with about a hundred mounted men and Wade in command of four hundred foot marched on Bridport. Despite the disparity in numbers, the insurgents, who made up in spirit what they lacked in training, drove back the militia; but the latter having given some ground made a stand, and in the end routed the men of Lyme.

In this small action Grey and his horsemen did not acquit themselves very creditably, for as soon as the militia began to stand up to them they fled from the field as fast as their horses could gallop. Wade, however, was able to steady his men and to draw them off in good order. A few days later Monmouth at the head of his undisciplined but enthusiastic men entered Axminster.

News of his landing and of the growing insurrection had now spread far and wide. While recruits came pouring in from all sides, the Lords Lieutenant of the neighbouring counties were calling out the militia, and couriers were speeding fast to London with the tidings from the west. James greatly perturbed at the intelligence instantly assembled the Privy Council, in which it was decided that extraordinary measures for the safety of the realm should be immediately taken. Commissions were granted for the raising of new regiments, and a brigade of English troops that was serving in Holland was recalled. The Commons granted a large supply for the King's purposes, and without one dissentient voice brought in a bill for attainting Monmouth of high treason. A large reward was offered for him dead or alive. A state of emergency was declared in the capital, and many persons of high standing suspected of being in sympathy with Monmouth were arrested. Those regiments of the regular army that were available were placed under the command of the Earl of Feversham, who was ordered to march to the west with all possible speed. A regiment of household troops, the Blues, under John Churchill, afterwards the great Duke of Marlborough, was also ordered to join this force.

While this activity was taking place in London, affairs in the west had not stood still. The Duke of Albemarle, son of General Monk, who had distinguished himself in Cromwell's army, had mustered the Devonshire militia and marched on Axminster when he heard that the insurgents had taken possession of that town. But Monmouth's men were ready for him. As he approached the town his troops came under a heavy musketry fire from the hedges that lined the road. The militia who although numerically far superior were little better disciplined than the rebels wavered, and Albemarle fearing that his troops might cross over to the enemy should they but see the person of the popular duke, ordered the retreat to be sounded. But the militia's morale was shaken and the retreat became a rout. In their flight the fugitives cast off their arms and

equipment which the insurgents following in pursuit eagerly gathered. Had Monmouth acted with more vigour and closely pressed his disordered enemy there can be no doubt that he would have taken Exeter, the capital of the west. Such a gain would have immensely increased his prestige and might probably have brought to his side many of the dissatisfied nobility and gentry. Instead he marched to Taunton, in those days a city of great commercial importance, where he expected to find reinforcements of men and supplies. Nor was he disappointed. The city had from the Commonwealth days remained republican in spirit, and in no part of England was the hatred of papacy so intense. He was rapturously welcomed by the citizens, supplies for his growing army were generously given, and hundreds offered themselves for enlistment.

It was in Taunton that he was prevailed upon to declare himself king. Some of his officers who had noted with increasing anxiety that so far no man of substance had declared for the Duke importuned him to take this step. They argued that so soon as he should assume the regal title many of the disaffected nobles and other influential people would rally to his side. Although in Ferguson's Declaration Monmouth had explicitly stated that he would waive his pretensions to the crown until parliament should have decided in his favour, he yielded to their specious counsels.

The rebel army now set forth for Bridgewater, where it was as eagerly welcomed as at Taunton. The Duke was escorted to the market-place by the Mayor and Aldermen and there proclaimed as the rightful king. Recruits offered themselves in crowds, but owing to the scarcity of arms hundreds had to be turned away. The whole countryside was searched for scythes and other rude implements, and with these improvised weapons the new levies had to be content. The time in Bridgewater was spent hastily drilling and organising into regiments the willing but raw material. The cavalry about a thousand strong was formed into three regiments over which Grey was placed in chief command. Raw as were the men the horses were even more so. The animals, large and shaggy creatures, had been brought in from the farms and the moors, and the first business of training was to accustom them to the bridle. The infantry, roughly five thousand in number, was formed into six regiments. Only those men who had formerly served in the militia possessed any uniform.

It was now necessary that Monmouth should form some definite plan of operations. Up to this time he had merely wandered about the countryside collecting recruits. In no other part of England had there been any rising nor even a threat of one. No regular regiments had mutinied and come over to him. His assumption of the regal title had effected nothing. To his deep chagrin he found that not one man of note had decided for his cause. The royal army was approaching fast, and in all the southern and western counties the militia had been mustered. In a council of war held at Bridgewater it was determined to strike a blow at Bristol. That thriving port was known to contain a large Whig element, and it was thought that should the Duke once appear before the walls the gates would be thrown open in welcome. Its fortifications had for some time been neglected, and it was garrisoned by only one regiment of militia. The rebel army therefore set out for Bristol. It marched through Glastonbury, Wells, Shepton Mallet, to Pensford, greatly harassed throughout the advance by the royal cavalry under Churchill.

On the Gloucestershire side of Bristol the fortifications were in a much more decayed state than on the city's western side, so it was planned to make an attack from the east. To effect this however the Avon had to be crossed, and the nearest bridge was at Keynsham. The march from Bridgewater had exhausted Monmouth's ill-shod troops, so instead of pushing on with all speed to cross the river, he delayed a while at Pensford.

This halt proved fatal to his designs on Bristol. The royal army was now in the neighbourhood, a regiment of foot-guards was thrown into the city, and the bridge at Keynsham strongly held by the Gloucestershire train bands. It only remained for the rebel army to retire on Bridgewater.

At this juncture Monmouth received news of the total rout of Argyll's forces in Scotland. This blow to his hopes of a general rising in the North must have given him a grim foreboding of the hopelessness of his own undertaking.

The retrograde march of the rebels took them through Philip's Norton, closely pursued by the royal troops. Here a sharp action took place. The advanced guard of the royal army, following precipitately after the retreating rebels, allowed itself to be ambushed with the loss of a hundred men killed. This successful skirmish gave

Monmouth breathing space, and that night he quitted his position and fell back on Frome.

But the rebel army was in evil plight. Ill-equipped, tired and famished after a succession of long marches, constantly molested by the royal cavalry, and commanded by one who seemed to have lost all confidence in them and in himself, it is amazing that these raw troops should have held together so long.

But they were of sterner heart than their leader. Monmouth had now given up all hope, and craven fears for his very life began to assail him. Ignominious thoughts took possession of his mind. He planned to desert his followers and to escape to the continent. He confided his nefarious scheme to his chief officers, and some of them, in equal fear for their lives, basely counselled flight. But Grey, Wade, and others stood out against the cowardly design and implored the Duke to stay.

The rebel army on the following day fell back on Wells. It was from the roof of the cathedral in this city that the lead sheetings were torn off to make bullets. Bridgewater was entered again on the 3rd of July, and by this time Monmouth's army was little better than a rabble. It was decided to fortify the town and to make a stand, for further marching in the present state of the men was deemed impossible. The inhabitants were summoned to assist the rebels in digging trenches and in throwing up embankments. But time was short.

On the 5th of July the royal forces under Feversham came in sight, and encamped on Sedgemoor, some three miles from Bridgewater. His force consisted of about three thousand regular troops of all arms, and fifteen hundred of the Wiltshire militia. Sedgemoor was then, as its name implies, a quaggy tract of moorland intersected by many deep and wide ditches which in the wet weather became full and impassable. Feversham encamped his army in three divisions, the cavalry in the village of Weston Zoyland, the militia in the neighbourhood of Middlezoy village, and the infantry on the open moor.

When Monmouth heard of his enemy's dispositions, which, in fact, he could discover for himself from the lofty tower of the church at Bridgewater, he conceived that his only plan was to make an attack under cover of darkness. It was, therefore, decided to march that night and to surprise the main body of the royal infantry. Monmouth was to lead the foot, and Grey with his cavalry and the ammunition waggons were to follow.

A little before midnight the rebel army set out. As soon as the outskirts of the moor were reached a thick marsh fog was encountered which made the going, already difficult, slow and halting. Scouts had reported that between them and the enemy were two deep ditches, filled with water. The ammunition waggons were therefore halted on the edge of the moor.

The column after great difficulty and delay managed to cross these two ditches, but was soon unexpectedly arrested by a wider and deeper obstacle, a canal known as the Bussex Rhine, of which the guides had made no mention. On the far side and within musket shot lay the royal forces. In the resulting confusion the accidental discharge of a pistol raised the alarm. All hopes of effecting a surprise were now lost. Monmouth ordered his cavalry to beat along the bank of the Rhine to find a passage, and hastily drew up his infantry into some sort of battle formation. But the drums of the royal regiments were now beating to arms, the men were hurriedly falling in the ranks, and in Western Zoyland Churchill's troopers were feverishly mounting. Grey groping his way in the thick mist was suddenly fired upon at close quarters by a regiment lining the far bank. His untrained troopers and even less trained horses were sent flying in all directions. Such was their utter rout as it was impossible ever to hope to rally them, and their leader made off himself as fast as his horse could carry him. Some of the fugitives passed close by where the ammunition waggons had been parked. The wagoners on seeing their disordered appearance took fright, and turning round drove off at full speed towards Bridgewater.

Now indeed was the rebels' plight desperate. Dawn had broken and the sun was dispelling the mists. The royal cavalry was in their rear, Feversham's infantry had crossed the Rhine in large numbers, and the Wiltshire militia was coming up to reinforce the regular troops. The only advantages that the rebels had possessed, surprise and darkness, had both been dissipated.

But still the untrained and ill-disciplined foot stood their ground. Their ammunition had long run out, and yet they stood staunch to the murderous fusillades poured into their ranks by the royal troops. Monmouth who till now had borne himself gallantly perceived his desperate straits. His courage forsook him, and leaving his devoted troops to fend for themselves, he fled from the field of battle. Even then the deserted rebels held their ranks and beat off with their rude

weapons attack after attack. Only when Feversham's artillery after great exertions had been dragged across the marshy ground and had opened fire did these raw levies break. Leaderless, broken, and encompassed by foes, their flight became a slaughter. Those who effected their escape poured through the streets of Bridgewater, hotly pursued by Churchill's troopers. All that day the fugitives were harried, and only the approach of night gave any respite to the survivors. The proceedings on the ensuing day were even more merciless. Prisoners in hundreds, not excepting the wounded, were summarily executed, and on the roads leading out of Bridgewater long lines of gibbets exposed their grim burdens. Monmouth, after some days of wandering disguised as a peasant, was discovered hiding in a turnip field on the borders of Hampshire. He was carried to London under a strong escort and lodged in the Tower. At his urgent request he was given an audience of the King. He pleaded for his life with the utmost unmanliness, crawling to James' feet in a paroxysm of terror. But the King was inflexible in his resolve that Monmouth should die, and he was beheaded on the 15th of July. On the scaffold he is said to have comported himself with both courage and dignity.

And thus ended the last battle to be fought on English soil. But the misery and horror inseparable from internecine warfare in which the wretched vanquished is hunted down by a merciless conqueror were not ended. A more terrible vengeance than that of Colonel Kirke and his Tangier regiments who were now ranging the countryside was to be let loose on the stricken western shires. Judge Jeffreys and his Bloody Assize were yet to come. But it is not the present writer's intention to bring into the compass of the story of Sedgemoor the awful doom that was to visit the scenes of the Western Insurrection. Sufficient be it to say that even the horrors of that assize, which will be infamous as long as the history of England runs, were not enough to crush the spirit of freedom that ran so fiercely in the veins of the rustics of Dorsetshire and Somersetshire. Three years later the embers of the seemingly crushed rebellion for liberty of conscience burst forth into flame when William of Orange landed at Torbay and summoned the people of the west to his standard.

THE EMPLOYMENT OF LIGHT TANKS WITH THE ARMY IN INDIA.

BY MAJOR H. G. V. ROBERTS, M.C., ROYAL TANK CORPS.

In England after a number of years of experiment and controversy a doctrine regarding the tactical employment of Tanks, which is unlikely to be modified to any considerable extent in the near future, has become crystallized. This doctrine, however, the result of investigation in the United Kingdom, is mainly concerned with Tanks organized in a Brigade or in a Mixed Battalion, and of necessity is chiefly directed towards their employment in a war of major magnitude.

Tanks in India do not include all the types which are contained in the Home Establishment. The opponents, which may be encountered, are unlikely to be organized, armed or handled in the same manner as European troops, while the regions in which they may be required to operate possess definite peculiarities of both climate and terrain.

It is therefore natural, particularly as the Tank is a new weapon in India, that the accepted doctrine regarding the employment of this Arm should be exposed to searching examination and criticism on the ground that European methods may be found unsuited to Oriental practice.

The object of this paper is therefore to examine the problem of the employment of Tanks with the Army in India, in the endeavour to elucidate how far methods adopted in the United Kingdom are compatible with the particular circumstances prevailing in Southern Asia and to what extent, if any, modifications of such methods appear to be justifiable or necessary.

Before examining this problem there are certain factors, which vitally affect the methods of utilizing this Arm in Southern Asia, upon which stress should be laid.

One of the most important of these is dust. Its density varies in accordance with the character of the ground, the wind, and the speed of the vehicles, but when Light Tanks are moving at normal speed over typical Asiatic plains, dust is always considerable and often comparable to a smoke screen.

It is at once a safeguard and a danger. On the one hand, it so envelops the Tanks, especially when the wind is favourable, that they offer a very difficult target to hostile gunners. On the other, it greatly increases the difficulties of the Commander and of the crews. It tends to clog the mechanism of machine-guns and turrets, and to cause petrol stoppages. It hinders visual communication and in the absence* of radio telephony, the provision of which is essential to mobility, renders repeated rallying necessary for the issue of orders. Except when the cover of hills is available dust discloses tank movement by day to enemy observers. It imposes additional strain on the crews, although the extent of such strain may be easily exaggerated. But above all it so obscures the vision of the gunner, as to make accurate fire difficult, or sometimes even impossible.

Dust is one of the main problems with which a Light Tank Commander in Asia has to compete, and it may well form a decisive factor in determining the method of employment of his force.

While dust is the greatest hindrance to concealment by day, it is noise which is most likely to give warning of their approach by night.

The sound of Light Tank engines possesses a distinctive tone audible at a considerable distance, which, however, varies sometimes unaccountably, but usually in accordance with the wind and the acoustic properties of the area in which they are operating.

This sound can to some extent be blanketed by the employment of aeroplanes over the area, though the hum of their engines strikes an entirely different note, and by small arms or artillery fire. But even if steps are taken to conceal the sound of tank movement by external means, it is essential that the vehicles themselves should move as quietly as possible, if they are to avoid giving warning of their presence.

Light Tanks produce the minimum of noise when they are proceeding at a steady pace which does not necessitate changing of their gears. Acceleration of the engines which is essential when rough ground is encountered will, however, almost inevitably disclose their presence to any enemy within two miles.

This fact accentuates the desirability of choosing the best possible going, since surprise can usually only be attained by moving tanks, either by virtue of their speed, which can only be developed to its

*[This deficiency, we learn, is now being remedied.—*Ed.*]

maximum extent over suitable country, or by their approach under cover of ground or darkness, when their proximity is likely to be disclosed by the noise of their engines.

The Light Tank is a highly efficient cross country vehicle, and can usually reach its destination even over the rougher types of country, if time is not a matter of consequence. There is, however, sometimes a tendency to under-estimate the extent to which bad going impedes the movement of Light Tanks and, on the other hand, a lack of appreciation of the speed and ease with which they can cover long distances over suitable ground. Movement is slow over country intersected by numerous small *nalas* or by the small banks which form a network in irrigated areas and Tanks operating over such country offer a comparatively easy target. It is impossible to forecast with any degree of accuracy their speed over rough, hilly or mountainous country except on well defined tracks or in the beds of dry water courses.

The selection of an alternative route over good going—when such exists—even if the mileage to be covered is much greater, will usually be justified by increased accuracy of timing, and by comparative certainty of arrival at the required point at the decisive moment.

This truth becomes even more evident in the case of night marches, since Light Tanks without any illumination other than dimmed tail lights can maintain a steady speed over well marked tracks, but can only move across country very slowly and with great caution. Bright moonlight naturally facilitates cross country movement, which at night should otherwise be confined to limited distances, and then only over ground which is known to be free of obstacles, or which has already been reconnoitred.

A well trained Light Tank gunner can bring effective fire to bear on targets at short or medium ranges when moving at a speed of 20 m. p. h. if dust does not obscure his vision, and if the surface of the ground over which his Tank is travelling is even. But, in fact, such favourable conditions seldom exist and the extent to which the accuracy of fire is affected by less advantageous circumstances must largely influence a decision as to the methods of their employment.

To obtain, therefore, the maximum fire effect from Light Tanks advantage should be taken, whenever possible, of the ease with which these little vehicles may be concealed even in apparently bare and open country in order to enable them to shoot from stationary positions.

When this is not possible fire may be developed from moving Light Tanks, but in such cases the object of the movement will usually be, either to reach covered positions from which they can engage the enemy while stationary, or to close to point blank range, when in addition to the consequences of their fire the threat of shock action is likely to have an adverse effect upon their opponents' morale.

The principle of the employment of fire from stationary Light Tanks, whenever possible, is fully recognized and practised in the United Kingdom, where training is primarily directed with a view to encountering an enemy, whose anti-tank armament is likely to be greater and more skilfully handled than would be the case in the East, and where obstacles to accurate fire whilst moving, are usually less than they are in Southern Asia.

Reference has been made in the preceding paragraph to Shock Action, by which term is meant the infliction of material damage on the enemy by means of the vehicles themselves, as opposed to the casualties caused by the fire of their guns. This rôle which in the United Kingdom is normally confined to Medium Tanks, the employment of Light Tanks being limited to protective and reconnaissance duties.

The problem therefore arises as to whether in the absence of Medium Tanks, the use of Light Tanks for Shock Action is justifiable.

The fire power available in a Light Tank unit combined with the ability to reach suitable positions from which to develop it, either at medium or point blank range, is so great that far heavier casualties are likely to be inflicted by this means than by shock action, the moral effect of which is almost invariably far greater than the material.

It follows that they will be called upon to operate by fire more frequently than by shock. But when infantry or cavalry are not available, or are unable to close with the enemy, shock action by Light Tanks may be not only justifiable but necessary in order to achieve a decisive result.

Note.—The question of fire from moving Medium Tanks lies outside the scope of this paper. To prevent misconception it should be noted that Medium Tanks seldom fire from stationary positions.

Opportunities for concealment of these larger vehicles seldom occur. When stationary they present an easy target to hostile gunners. Their comparative stability renders effective fire practicable even when moving over ground so rough as to render shooting from a Light Tank impossible, while, except in Tank *versus* Tank action, their advance against the enemy culminating in shock action will almost invariably be covered by fire from Light and Close Support Tanks and possibly by the weapons of other arms.

When Light Tanks are utilized for shock action, a reserve sub-unit should, if possible, be detailed to deal by fire with the enemy as he disperses.

In deciding whether to employ Light Tanks in fire or shock action, a Commander must carefully consider whether his object will be better attained by the infliction of heavy casualties, or by the deterioration of morale likely to result from the closing of the Tanks with the enemy.

It may, therefore, be concluded that when Light Tanks are operating in Southern Asia, due weight must be given to the following considerations :—

- (a) The effect of dust which may prove a help or a hindrance to the successful achievement of the object.
- (b) The necessity, especially at night, for utilizing every available method of minimizing the noise made by these vehicles, in order that surprise may be attained.
- (c) The most favourable line of approach in order to effect surprise. This will usually be identical with the route which affords the best going irrespective of mileage.
- (d) The higher efficiency of fire from stationary than from moving Light Tanks, which will often use their mobility and immunity from small arms fire for the sole purpose of reaching positions inaccessible to other machine-guns, in order to carry out their task.
- (e) The ability of Light Tanks to operate by shock action, should the exigencies of the situation require it, whilst recognizing that the great moral effect which may thus be achieved is likely to be offset by a decrease in the material damage inflicted.

It will be convenient to group the tasks which may be allotted to Light Tanks in India under three headings, which will be termed the Close Contact rôle, the rôle of the Independent Tactical Objective, and the Strategic rôle.

The term Close Contact rôle is used to cover all those operations of Light Tanks in which their function is direct and immediate co-operation with Cavalry or Infantry. It embraces for examples the use of Tanks with Advance or Rear Guards, in the type of attack envisaged in F. S. R., Vol. II of 1929, in the counter-attack or in mountain warfare.

The task of Light Tanks employed in this rôle will normally be to act in support of cavalry or infantry, whereas in the Strategic rôle the function of other troops engaged is primarily to assist the Tanks, which in such operations must be considered as the basic arm.

The term rôle of the Independent Tactical Objective includes all tactical operations in which Light Tanks, although working in conjunction with other arms, have been given a particular objective differing from that allotted to other troops, as for example, attacks against enemy gun positions, Headquarters or Reserves.

The term Strategic rôle is applicable to occasions when Royal Tank Corps units with or without other mechanized troops are ordered to carry out a special task, with an objective remote from the enemy's main fighting forces. Such an operation will generally entail severance from the normal channels of supplies and support, will necessitate the Commander being given a free hand as to the method he may employ, and is essentially part of the strategic rather than the tactical plan.

In European warfare increase in Anti-Tank Armament and in the study of Anti-Tank tactics renders the employment of Tanks in a Close Contact rôle not only unlikely to achieve the maximum effect, but also uneconomical, since the result obtained will seldom be proportionate to the heavy casualties in Tanks and personnel which must be anticipated. Further it must be realised that with a limited number of Tanks, it will seldom be possible to create a breach in the enemy's defensive system sufficiently wide to enable unarmoured troops to pass through it without being exposed to machine-gun fire from the flanks.

But in those theatres of war in which the Army in India is likely to operate, the inferior armament, training and discipline of the enemy are factors which entirely alter the situation. Light Tanks can operate over suitable ground with little risk of loss since the possibility of anti-tank weapons being used against them is remote, the artillery fire of a second class enemy against these fast moving vehicles is likely to be innocuous, and they are impervious to rifle fire.

For these reasons the two principles governing the employment of Tanks in a Close Contact rôle, namely that they should be used in large numbers and retained for the decisive stroke, are not equally applicable, when it is decided to utilize them for tasks of this nature with the Army in India,

Care must, however, be taken that Tank resources are not frittered away, and in this connection it should be noted that casualties in the type of warfare under review are more likely to be caused by their employment over unsuitable ground than by enemy fire.

A decision regarding the number of these A. F. Vs. to be employed on any particular task will be reached, not only after consideration of the nature of the task and the character of the ground, but also after allowance for the retention of a reserve under the hand of the local Tank Commander both for protective purposes and to enable him to exploit success.

It must be realized that once Light Tanks are actually firing, the whole energies of the crew will be absorbed in carrying out their task, and it is a difficult matter for their Commander to attract their attention in order to break off the action. It is therefore highly desirable that some portion of his command should be available, both to give warning of enemy movement in other directions and to provide a means whereby immediate advantage may be taken of any fleeting opportunity of inflicting casualties which may occur in his vicinity.

It has already been pointed out that, although in exceptional cases shock action may be justified in the case of Light Tanks co-operating with other arms in a Close Contact rôle, far greater results will usually be obtained by employing them as mobile armoured machine-guns. It is, of course, true that it will often be necessary for them to break through the enemy's forward defences in order to reach the best position from which to develop their fire, but this act of breaking through is to be considered only as an essential preliminary to their fire task and not as shock action in its true sense.

Since the primary duty of Light Tanks thus employed in immediate co-operation with other troops is essentially that of mobile armoured machine guns, the principles to be observed in their employment are fundamentally identical with those applicable to the use of the machine-guns of other arms, though the methods utilized will naturally be modified by the great mobility of the Light Tank and by the high degree of protection which is afforded by its armour.

In consequence, differences in the methods of employment of Light Tanks with Cavalry or Infantry in open or in mountain warfare are differences in detail and not in principle. A competent Commander of a Tank unit or sub-unit should be able to operate successfully in

support of troops of either arm over either type of country. Similarly the Commander of a Force, to which a detachment of Tanks has been allotted, by observation of the principles governing the employment of machine-guns and after consideration of the characteristics of Light Tanks, should be able to allot to them suitable tasks, the fulfilment of which will materially simplify the achievement of his object. Although circumstances may often necessitate the employment of Light Tanks in the Close Contact rôle, decisive results will more frequently be obtained by giving them an Independent Tactical Objective, when the nature of the ground renders such a course possible.

Asiatic forces, though far less dependent on communications than European troops, are peculiarly susceptible to threats against their flanks and rear, while a further characteristic is their ability to melt away when attacked, only to reassemble ready to renew the fight at a later period.

The bold use of Light Tanks against the enemy's flanks or rear may therefore often transform a local tactical success into a decisive victory.

It will, however, seldom be advisable to employ less than a company on tasks of this nature. Opposition will often be encountered before the locality, in which the objective is situated, has been reached, local protection may be required, the area of operations will usually be of considerable extent, and a reserve to meet any unforeseen contingency will be essential. Finally the problem must be considered as to how far the Strategic rôle is practicable for Light Tanks in Asiatic countries.

A Tank Brigade organized as a permanent formation with its four battalions, its various types of tanks, its well-equipped signal organization and its transport is a very different proposition to two or more Light Tank companies operating under a Commander with an extemporized Headquarters, but the difference in organization and training between potential European and Asiatic enemies is even more apparent.

A strategic mission would usually be beyond the scope of a single Light Tank company. Although such a unit might successfully maintain itself in enemy country for three or four days, it is too small, its fighting crews only number forty-six all told—to carry out more prolonged operations of this character.

A mobile force detailed for such a task, even if living on the country or supplied from the air, would require a certain proportion of transport which at present entails the use of wheeled vehicles. These would require protection which would be most economically afforded by Armoured Cars. Wireless communication with the air would be essential. A detachment of Sappers and Miners transported on lorries might prove invaluable. Some medical provision would be necessary and one or more political representatives would probably be required.

A Battalion of Infantry in lorries and possibly a Mechanized Battery might prove valuable adjuncts, but the Light Tanks would be the primary arm in any such operation.

A force of this character, capable of moving at least 80 miles a day on roads, with its striking force of two or more Companies of Light Tanks able to operate freely across country, would prove immensely powerful in the open plains of India, in the deserts of Iraq, and in many areas in Asia. By its employment a campaign, otherwise liable to last for months, might be concluded in a week at the minimum expenditure of men, money and material.

If there is any justification for faith in mechanization for European Warfare, where every device known to science will be utilized by highly skilled opponents to counter its efforts, there can be little doubt that the employment of a Mobile Force of which Light Tanks form the basic framework in those potential Eastern theatres of war, where the country is suited for such operations, merits the most careful study.

The utility of Light Tanks and the development of their tactics with the Army in India depends not only on an accurate appreciation of their capabilities and limitations, but also upon the formulation and acceptance of a definite doctrine as to the methods of their employment.

For the formulation of a doctrine a broad and possibly even a futuristic outlook is essential. When the principles have been stabilized, details can speedily be worked out.

In this paper an attempt has been made to indicate some of the fundamental facts upon which such a doctrine may be based.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR.

SIR,

Among the many excellent things in last October's number of the *Journal of the U. S. I. of India*, I found "Shiggadar's" story about "Fateh Khan, Bunerwal," of perhaps the greatest personal interest to myself, as I took part in the raid into Buner which he describes so well, though slightly inaccurately.

The raid was ordered by Army Headquarters, and was carried out early in February, 1914, by the Nowshera Brigade, under the command of Major-General R. Bannatine-Allason (very widely and affectionately known as "B.A."), and composed of the Durham Light Infantry (under Lieut.-Colonel, now Major-General Sir C. C. Luard), the 24th (now 4/14th) Punjabis, the 46th (now 10/16th) Punjabis and the 82nd (now 5/1st) Punjabis, reinforced by a squadron of Cavalry, some 400 men of the Guides Infantry, a Mountain Battery, and a detachment of Sappers and Miners from Peshawar under Major Sanders (afterwards killed in France while in command of a Brigade). A 2nd Brigade was in support, the Brigade with which the Nowshera Brigade was about to try conclusions at the Peshawar District Manœuvres.

We marched from the manœuvre area to Mardan and, next morning, after the unpleasant night mentioned by "Shiggadar," to Rustam, with our white manœuvre bands round our headgear, exchanged blank ammunition for ball on the way, and surprised the tribesmen completely as the result of our night march to the Malandri Pass. But for this, we might have encountered a good deal of opposition, and more might have been heard of our little "war," which was made the subject of a lecture on Frontier Warfare to the "Backward Boys" at Simla in 1927,—if I remember right.

The raid certainly was an excellent "show" and a complete success, and "Shiggadar" (who is or was evidently an officer of the Guides) is right in praising the marching of those two splendid battalions, the 24th Punjabis, under S. H. Climo (later Lieut.-General Sir S. H. Climo), and the 82nd Punjabis, under Tweddell, in every way just as good a Battalion as the Guides and the 24th Punjabis,—which is saying a great deal. The 24th and 82nd, the battalions that carried out the destruction of those two trans-Border villages, ably assisted by "Sandy" and his Sappers and Miners, did even better than "Shiggadar" says: they both did over 70 miles in 60 hours, as they had to

march from Nowshera to the bivouac near Mardan on the first day : and in spite of that wretched night in camp ; a most unpleasant march next day across heavy sodden country to Rustam, and that long night march over rough and unknown country (led by my old friend, now dead, alas, Khwaja Mohammed Khan of Hamzakot), not one man fell out in either battalion, to the best of my recollection.

I remember well that night spent in the fields near Mardan, but it's a bit 'ard to have "most of the staff" accused of having "fled for shelter to the officers' bungalows in Mardan." As regards the expression, "most of the staff," "Shiggadar" should know that a Brigade Staff is not very numerous : actually there was only the Brigade-Major and the Staff Captain with two officers of the 38th Dogras attached. These four officers were certainly all in the bivouac, and our brigade commander would have been the last man to desert his troops.

I hadn't heard of the "slanging match" between "the two irate and red-faced commanding officers." As the Guides were on that day commanded most efficiently by Captain (now Brigadier) Hector Campbell, he was presumably one of the two referred to by "Shiggadar." Had the "naughty soldiers" (Shiggadar's own Guides) really "forgotten to load their rifles before starting" on their flanking movement? And, if they had remembered, would it have been necessary to "fell the enemy dead."

I'm glad to say our gallant commander B.A. is still going strong : he must be at least 77 now, but I'm certain he hasn't forgotten our little "war," nor how splendidly he was served by his troops.

Yours faithfully,
MONGOLIAN.

COURTS-MARTIAL AND CIVIL COURTS.

SIR,

The statements regarding Justices of the Peace contained in Brigadier Peet's article *Courts-Martial and Civil Courts* cannot be allowed to pass unchallenged.

I should be the last to grudge the Judge Advocate-General his satisfaction at the smooth working of military justice in India,* but

* Perhaps I may be excused a personal reminiscence for I have sat on every species of Court-Martial in India—from "Subalterns" to "General" (and that for murder). But my first District impressed itself most vividly on my memory. For when the time came for the President to be sworn, his "bearer" entered with his sword, and held the belt round his master's waist while the oath was being administered. The ceremony ended he retired, taking the sword with him.

that is no reason why he should present such a prejudiced picture of the Civil Courts at Home. To those who know the facts such a caricature will only cause amusement, but there must be many serving in India who are not familiar with country life in England, and it would be a pity if they derived a false impression from the pages of the Journal.

Brigadier Peet asks, rhetorically, "Who are these J. P.'s?" and then proceeds to reply that they are persons "frequently appointed without regard to their suitability merely as a reward for political services, often as the result of wire-pulling." He would be a bold man who would assert that political influence is entirely unknown in any walk in life. But I can safely say that such a general statement as the above is a travesty of the truth. And in view of Brigadier Peet's high opinion of the legal training of the officers of the army, it is curious that he should make such a reflection upon a class in which retired officers are so largely represented. This Bench, for instance, numbers among its members a Major of Hussars (Chairman), a Major-General of Artillery, a Colonel of the R.A.M.C. and a Lieut.-Colonel of Rifles. And this is not exceptional: the Chairmen of the two adjoining Petty Sessional Divisions are respectively an admiral and a guardsman—all resident in the district and intimately acquainted with the people and local conditions.

Turning from Petty Sessions to Quarter Sessions, Brigadier Peet stigmatises these meetings as "an unwieldy mass of J. P.'s who use the occasions as a good opportunity for showing themselves on the Bench, and meeting their contemporaries at lunch." Anything less like my experience it would be impossible to conceive. Our proceedings are presided over by an eminent K. C. who has held high judicial appointments. All appeals* are considered by a specially selected committee; and if we do adjourn for lunch at the club, I seem to remember something similar—only much more elaborate—at an establishment on the slopes of Jakko.

It would be interesting to know on what personal experience Brigadier Peet bases his attack on a body, the members of which count among them so many members of the service to which he belongs.

I enclose my card, and am, Sir,

Yours obedient servant,

"J. P."

19th November 1934.

* The £50 surety for an appeal is no longer required.

SIR,

In answer to the criticism of "J. P." I suggest that he read the "Lawbreakers" by E. Roy Calvert and Theodora Calvert, referred to in the commencement of my article, and "English Justice" by "Solicitor."

No reflection was intended or implied on the character or strivings of any J. P., but a criticism was intended as to the competence of many of them, and a comparison with a Court-Martial.

"J. P." appears to consider that the article was a reflection on members of the services, who are now J. P.'s. Surely the article stresses the fact that members of the services receive legal training throughout their careers, and a logical deduction would be, therefore, that members of the services are suitable for the appointment of J. P.

The recent legislation in England, and that under contemplation, is also an answer to "J. P.'s" criticism.

With regard to his enquiry as to my personal experience, though I have never appeared or gone before the Bench as a prospective victim, I have met many J. P.'s, have had members of my family, who are or were J. P.'s, and have discussed the position with retired Indian Judges, who are or were J. P.'s.

On one occasion, in England, one of the latter came back from a session, when there were something like 15 J. P.'s on the Bench (a number not unusual in this particular place) and described a miscarriage of justice entirely caused by a wrong exposition of the law to the Jury by the Chairman.

"J. P." is lucky in his Bench, but that does not mean that all benches are equally well composed, or books like the "Lawbreakers" and "English Justice" would not be written, nor would there be such a growing opinion in England that reform is necessary.

With regard to J. P.'s note as to the incident at a Court-Martial, I suggest he attend any Court-Martial in England, India or elsewhere, and he will find that they are conducted with a proper sense of dignity and decorum.

19th December 1934.

L. M. PEET, BRIGADIER.

SKI-ING IN AUSTRIA—A POSTSCRIPT.

Since the appearance of the above article in the quarterly issue of the *U.S.I. Journal* for July 1934, I have received the following kindly sent in reference to the article by an officer who in the past two years has spent several months ski-ing in Austria. From this it will be seen that Ober Gurgl is yet another paradise providing everything that either the expert or the novice—especially the novice—can desire, but that Vent, lying in a deep valley, is not to be recommended. The *en pension* rates vary from 9 *sch.* per day at the *gasthäuser* to a maximum of 17 *sch.* in the hotels.

Ober Gurgl (6,332) feet.

Some 16 miles nearer to Innsbruck from Landeck is Otztal station (slow train for which change from mail at Landeck or start from Innsbruck) from where a comfortable motor bus service takes one south up the beautiful Otz Valley 25 miles to the end of the motor road at Zwieselstein (comfortable hotel). From here the road branches to Ober Gurgl (6,332) and Vent (5,700).

The bus journey occupies two hours, and on to Ober Gurgl by sleigh another two hours.

Ober Gurgl is the highest village with a church in Europe. It is situated in a beautiful open valley surrounded by the glaciers and peaks of the Otztal Alps, the highest in Austria. The valley is higher than the famous Engadine of Switzerland and is considered by many to surpass it in beauty and grandeur.

It is the skier's paradise, with extensive nursery slopes, numerous tours taking the beginner to 'cols' and peaks from which he can look down on the Italian Dolomites and feel that he is on the roof of the world. For the experienced skier the terrain is the finest in Europe. Snow is certain from the middle of November until May.

There are two very good hotels, Hotel Edelweiss and Hotel Gurgl, and three or four *gasthäuser*. The Gurgl ski club has produced some of the finest international ski-runners and there is an excellent ski-school. Complete ski-ing outfit including skis and clothes can be purchased in Ober Gurgl. Ober Gurgl is cheaper than other Austrian resorts owing to its distance from the nearest railway station.

The German and Austrian Alpine Club have provided in the Otztal Alps a number of "glacier hotels." Some of these ski-huts in

addition to the usual dormitories have over thirty single rooms complete with feather beds and all conveniences. They provide excellent meals. The Karlsruhe hut, the Samoar hut, the Hochjoch Hospiz, the Similaun hut, the Brandenburg hut are some of these glacier hotels situated in gorgeous scenery from which innumerable peaks can be ascended by the skier of quite medium experience. A tour from Ober Gurgl to these glacier hotels is something to dream about and one need not park ones skis until the end of June.

Vent is a village in a deep valley surrounded by steep mountains. It is far from ideal as a ski-ing resort and is used chiefly as a halting place on the way to the "glacier hotels" beyond. There is a good hotel and several *gasthäuser*.

S. W. S. H.

MILITARY NOTES.

BELGIUM.

Admission of Reserve Officers to the Ranks of the Active Army.

A Royal Decree has just been published by which fifteen reserve officers under the age of 30 may be admitted as second-lieutenants to the ranks of the active army on condition of qualifying in French and Flemish and of passing an examination corresponding to the passing-out examination from the *Ecole Militaire*. These officers are destined for the infantry and the artillery, and are required to fill the shortage in officers in the junior ranks occasioned by the creation of the Cyclist Frontier Units, the 14th Regiment of the Line and the extra artillery which will be required for the *Chasseurs Ardennais*, and by the provision of a fifth group in the artillery regiments of active divisions; the latter will then consist in peace of two groups, each of two 4-gun batteries of 75-mm. Q. F. guns, two groups of 75-mm. long-range guns, and one group of 105-mm. howitzers.

At the same time 120 candidates are being admitted next year to the *Ecole Militaire*, instead of the usual 90. It will, however, be at least three years before these extra officers will be available for units.

BURMA.*Burma-Yunnan Frontier Dispute.*

There is little to add to the account of the dispute in this area.

Mainly owing to the weather, which is exceptionally bad even for this time of year, both sides have been inactive. It has also been suggested that an aerial survey of the area be made in order to assist any future boundary commission. These steps may persuade the Chinese to withdraw their commission of enquiry and come to some arrangement for confining their nationals to certain specified areas before the rains cease, so that the whole question can be settled in a peaceful atmosphere.

CHINA.*Peking-Mukden Railway.*

As foreshadowed the running of through trains on the Peking-Mukden Railway was resumed on 1st July. A bomb exploded on the first train to run from Peking, the coach affected being wrecked,

four Chinese killed and ten wounded. The coach was uncoupled and the journey completed without further incident.

Officers Training Regiment.

In an attempt to introduce a common standard of training throughout the armies of the various provincial governments, Chiang Kai-shek has instituted a Military Officers Training Corps. This establishment was due to open on 1st July at Lushan in Honan province. General Chiang Kai-shek himself is Colonel of the Training Corps, which will be divided into three battalions, each commanded by an Army Commander (General). The students will consist of brigade, regimental and battalion commanders and seconds-in-command, chiefs of staff of divisions and brigades, and staff officers down to the rank of major. They will be organized into three classes, each class receiving one month's training. No details have been announced as to the qualifications or method of selection of the instructors.

CZECHO-SLOVAKIA.

Extension of the Special Army Equipment Fund Grant till 1947.

The Government on 21st June succeeded in passing a Defence Bill through the Chamber which authorised the issue of the "Special Army Equipment Fund" grant of 315,000,000 crowns (£2,600,000) a year for a further 10 years, from 1937 to 1947.

This grant was originally authorized in 1926 for a period of 11 years. It is not shown in the Ministry of National Defence Budget, but in that of the Ministry of Finance. Its object is to permit the purchase of military equipment and stores, and expenditure in any one year may be adjusted in other years. This privilege is extended in the new authorization, and, in addition, from 1934 onwards expenditure in anticipation of annual instalments is also permitted.

Thus, in effect, the Ministry of National Defence is now able to borrow up to 13 years' (1935 to 1947) allotment, or a sum of 4,095,000,000 crowns (approximately £27,000,000) in respect of armaments, equipment and buildings, from the Ministry of Finance, at short notice without any further reference to Parliament.

FRANCE.

Passive Defence Measures against Air Attack.

A Bill has been submitted to Parliament relating to passive defence against air attack, seeking in general terms to deal with the juridical

and financial aspects of this problem and to define the chain of responsibility.

The Minister of the Interior assisted by a Committee of Passive Defence is responsible for the direction, co-ordination and supervision of an obligatory national organization for passive defence.

Plans will be made and their execution supervised by the following:

- (a) Ministers, who will be responsible for the protection of services and installations under their command.
- (b) Prefects, who will be responsible for their departments, and Mayors for their Communes.
- (c) Firms and undertakings who, by reason of their possible participation in national defence, of their importance, or of any special conditions affecting their production, will be dealt with by the Ministry of the Interior, who will decide how they should ensure their protection against air attack.

The Minister of the Interior will be responsible for producing measures to reduce the vulnerability of Public Services, Communes, and private undertakings, by the adaptation of municipal projects, etc., to the requirements of passive defence. Through his advice, Public Administrative Orders will be produced providing for the addition of supplementary civil establishments, composed of volunteers to departmental and municipal authorities.

In principle the cost of passive defence will be borne by those for whom it is organized, but in exceptional circumstances where such cost is very high the State will issue a grant. In the event of failure to fulfil their obligations by Departments, Communes, and other beneficiaries, the Minister of the Interior will decide by decree the minimum requirements necessary for the preparation of passive defence. These decisions will be obligatory.

In the case of non-compliance within a specified time, the necessary work may be ordered by the Prefects, and carried out at the expense of those concerned.

Periodical manœuvres are to be carried out and any person attempting to oppose them will be liable to punishment.

The extension of the law to cover the Colonies is provided for at the request of the Minister concerned.

The weakness in the legislation lies in the fact that parties who fail to fulfil their obligations may appeal against the decree enforcing them,

and thereby gain a substantial respite pending a decision on their appeal.

It should be remarked that 11,000,000 frs. was included in the 1934 Budget for the State participation in passive defence.

Wearing of Full-Dress Uniform.

An instruction has recently been issued under which the possession of full dress will be obligatory for all officers from 1st January, 1936. It is already so for officers on promotion to General's rank and for cadets on first commission to the Army.

Credits for National Defence.

After lengthy debates in both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, the additional credits demanded by the Government have now been passed.

- (a) The total allotted to the War Department has been increased by 100 million francs to 1,275 millions (£10,200,000 at par), sub-divided as follows :—

880 millions to meet over-expenditure on the fortifications already incurred (180 millions on ordnance services and 700 millions on engineer services).

103 ,, for the completion of the works on the eastern frontier.

292 ,, for construction of new fortifications on the northern frontier.

- (b) The vote for the Ministry of Marine has also been increased by 40 million francs to 865 millions divided as follows :—

595 millions for construction and filling of storage tanks for oil fuel in France and overseas.

80 ,, for coast defence (30 for works now in progress and 50 for new works).

190 ,, for the naval air force.

- (c) The vote for the Air Army remains at 980 million francs sub-divided into :—

620 millions for new material (aircraft and engines).

120 ,, for armament and equipment.

90 ,, for reserve ammunition stocks.

80 ,, for war aerodromes.

40 ,, for preparation of industrial mobilization

30 ,, for research and experiment,

Air Manœuvres.

Important anti-aircraft manœuvres are to take place at Lyons and later in Paris.

The two chief objects of these are to—

- (a) Ascertain the length of time it will take to bring the defensive organization into operation.
- (b) Try out the co-operation of the civil authorities, both urban and departmental, and the civilian population in general, as regards the length of time which elapses between the sounding of the alarm and the extinction of all lights, and to test the organization of safety and first-aid units.

Training of Army Officers as Observers.

1. A recent decree gives details of the conditions under which officers may be attached to the Air Force as observers in aeroplanes or balloons.

2. Officers may apply at any time to carry out an attachment to the Air Force.

Subject to physical fitness they carry out an initial course lasting four months, at the end of which they are required to pass a test to gain their observer's certificate.

If successful they then do a further attachment of one year, and subsequently an annual attachment of one month, with a squadron.

The preliminary four months course is divided into—

- (a) Three months at the training school at Avord.
- (b) Three weeks at the aerial gunnery and bombing school at Cazaux.
- (c) One week devoted to examinations and tests.

During their year's attachment officers must be employed in active flying with army co-operation squadrons and, if they show particular aptitude, may be allowed to continue for another year.

The possession of an observer's certificate will entitle an officer to reckon nine months increase in service in qualifying for a pension and to other benefits.

All p.s.c. officers of the General Staff after leaving the Staff College are required to carry out a two months attachment to the training school at Avord and obtain their observer's certificate, followed by voluntary attachments lasting two weeks whenever practicable.

3. Officers can also volunteer to qualify as observers in balloons. To qualify for their certificate they are required to carry out the following attachments—

- (a) An initial course of seven weeks at the *Ecole Militaire d'application de l'armée de l'air*.
- (b) A specialist's course of one month's duration with a balloon unit.
- (c) An annual course of one month.

Officers who obtain a certificate will receive similar benefits, but on a lower scale, in the matter of pensions, etc., as for the aeroplane observers.

ROUMANIA.

Introduction of pre-military training.

A law has recently been passed, to take effect from 1st November, 1934, whereby pre-military training will become compulsory in Roumania for all youths between the ages of 18 and 20 years inclusive.

The law contains 24 Articles, the most important of which are as follows :—

Article 1 defines the scope of the law as "Moral and national training to produce order and discipline. Physical training. Elementary military instruction to permit of rapid progress being made when individuals are subsequently called to the Colours."

Article 2 allows for certain exemptions or postponements due to ill-health or other reasons.

Article 3 lays down the obligatory annual training as 50—60 parades plus 4—7 days camp.

Article 4 lays down that the Minister of National Defence will direct the training, working through the General Staff, and the Inspector-General of territorial commands.

Articles 7 to 9 explain the chain of responsibility for training from the Ministry of National Defence, down to actual District or Municipal training centres.

Article 10 lays down that the instructional staff shall be—

- (a) Active officers, or ex-active officers incapacitated through service.
- (b) Reserve officers.
- (c) Other ranks from the reserve.

Article 13 lays down that the cost will be met from the Army Budget, augmented by obligatory subscriptions from districts and municipalities.

Article 15 authorizes ground belonging to the Army to be utilized for parades, etc.

Article 16 lays down that youths undergoing pre-military training will wear distinguishing badges. Instructors will, in addition, wear badges of rank.

Articles 17 and 19 deal with recording and analysing results.

Article 18 authorizes reduction in the subsequent period of service of from three to six months, and a reduction in the qualification periods for promotion to non-commissioned rank by one-half for those who have completed their pre-military training satisfactorily.

Article 20 lays down the punishments for those not showing zeal, or displaying indiscipline during their pre-military instruction. These include, amongst other punishments, the forfeiture of all leave during subsequent military service.

Article 21 lays down certain advantages which will be granted to Officer and N. C. O. instructors at pre-military training centres.

SPAIN.

Budgets.

The estimated expenditure for 1934 has now been approved by Parliament.

The difference between the estimates as approved and those originally submitted is only slight; it entails a small increase in expenditure under the War Ministry, but the total military vote still represents a decrease on the 1933 figure of nearly £1,100,000.

The full estimates are now as follows :—

NOTE.—For convenience pesetas have been converted throughout into pounds sterling at the current rate (37 pesetas to £1).

	1933.	Proposed 1934.	Voted 1934.
	£	£	£
Estimated Revenue ..	124,268,000	122,476,000	122,471,000
Expenditure ..	124,403,000	122,705,000	123,174,000
Deficit ..	135,000	238,000	703,000

The military budget is as follows :—

	£	£	£
Home ..	11,410,000	9,955,500	10,302,500
Morocco ..	4,150,000	4,031,000	4,167,000
Total ..	15,560,000	13,986,500	14,469,500

Provision has also been made in the budget for the administration of the air force in three branches (military, naval and civil) to pass to the Presidency of the Council of Ministers. The annual expenditure of this department has increased by about one million pounds, though it is impossible, as the figures are set out, to ascertain whether the whole of this increase is intended for air service expenditure.

Reorganization of the Army.

New establishments both for the Peninsula Army and for Morocco which came into force on 1st July 1934, show that certain reorganizations and reductions in personnel have taken place.

The following are the most important changes:—

(1) The Air Service will henceforth come under the Presidency of the Council of Ministers whose budget will, in future, include Air Service expenditure. Air Service personnel are in consequence no longer included in army establishments, which fact must be borne in mind in considering the reduction in personnel in the new establishments.

(2) The Peninsula Army has been reduced by approximately 550 officers and 7,000 other ranks. Animals are reduced by about 2,000. Of these figures over 500 officers and 4,147 other ranks are accounted for by the separation of the Air Service, the remaining reductions being shared amongst all arms. The new total establishment is 7,285 officers, 106,629 other ranks and 30,000 animals.

(3) The Army in Morocco has been reduced by 108 officers and 4,066 other ranks, and animals by 586. Of these figures 45 officers and 955 other ranks are accounted for by the separation of the Air Service, the remaining reductions being principally in infantry and artillery personnel.

The new establishment is 1,404 officers (of whom 64 are natives), 32,116 other ranks (of whom 8,919 are natives) and 8,934 animals.

(4) *The Foreign Legion (Tercio).*—The two "legions" of which the *Tercio* is composed will, in future, be separate administrative units. They will be known as Legion No. 1 with H. Q. at Tauima in the Eastern Circumscription, and Legion No. 2 with H. Q. at Riffien in the Western Circumscription.

Each Legion consists of H.Q. and three battalions (*banderas*) each consisting of three rifle companies and one machine-gun and close support weapon company. The latter consists of two sections of machine-guns (eight guns in all) and one close support section of one gun and two mortars.

In order to ensure uniformity in the organization, administration and training of the two legions, an inspectorate is to be formed at Ceuta, which will consist of a colonel, assisted by two officers and 64 other ranks.

The total establishment of the *Tercio* is 157 officers, 4,326 other ranks and 767 animals, but it is believed to be about 1,000 below strength at the present time.

(5) *The Automobile Service of Morocco*.—Pending the formation of a Train Corps, all M. T. units and personnel have been formed into a separate service known as the *Servicio Automovilismo de Marruecos*.

The service will be organized into H.Q. and two groups (Eastern and Western). Each group will consist of H.Q., a general transport company and a workshop company. The total establishment of the service is 27 officers and 736 other ranks.

TURKEY.

Budget Estimates for Defence Expenditure, 1934-35.

The final figures as published differ considerably from the original estimates and now read as follows :—

			1934-35.
			£T
Army	40,964,881
Air	4,583,774
Marine	3,808,818
Military factories	3,290,643
Cartographical section	603,505
Total	53,251,621

or a total of £T12,600,116 increase over the figures for 1933-34.

This still does not take into account the sum of £T8,889,372 which is included in the Public Debt Estimates for 1934-35 in order to cover Treasury Bonds issued on account of military supplies. If this is included the total Defence Budget is £T62,140,993 or 33·75 per cent. of the total national budget (as against 29 per cent. in 1933-34).

Further, this does not take into account the Gendarmerie budget of £T8,679,379, a large proportion of which could legitimately be debited against national defence since the Gendarmerie are a trained military force.

In addition to the above ordinary Budget an extraordinary sum of £T49,000,000 has been authorized to be spent on war material during, it is believed, the next seven years. Legislation has already introduced additional taxation in the current financial year to produce £T9,850,000 of the above sum.

The main heads of expenditure of this Extraordinary Vote are the purchase of warships (mostly submarines), and the construction of naval bases, new barracks and aircraft.

REVIEWS.

A SEARCHLIGHT ON THE NAVY.

BY HECTOR C. BYWATER.

(Constable) s.10/-

The whole of this book is an attempt to show the relative position of the British Navy at the present day *vis-à-vis* the navies of other first class naval powers and, although in a study of this type figures must be quoted fairly frequently, the author has presented his facts in an easily readable form in which technicalities have been carefully avoided. The resulting picture is a most depressing one and shows a position little appreciated by the majority of people in England.

The author examines very carefully the effect of modern inventions on the Navy with particular reference to the often highly exaggerated claims of the supporters of the air arm, and he shows quite clearly that the Navy still remains a vital factor in Britain's defence. From this he goes on to discuss whether the Navy is in a position to carry out the tasks which are by force of circumstances its true rôle in war. The chief of these is to guarantee the continued arrival of our essential imports, in particular food, since, on stocks held in the country we can only exist for six weeks.

The predominance and necessity for the battleship is most clearly explained and it is interesting to read his views on the so-called "pocket battleships" which Germany produced within her 10,000-ton limit, and for perhaps the first time the shortcomings of these vessels are brought out. Their effect on France and Italy however has been much in excess of their actual worth for as a counter to the German production these countries have each laid down two battleships with a tonnage of 26,500 in the case of France and 35,000 in that of Italy.

Our policy of trying to achieve mutual disarmament, by example, such as we have followed since the Washington Conference and London Pact is shown to have been a bad mistake in psychology, for whilst we were not building up to our authorized allotment no other power restricted its output and as a result we now find ourselves much behind in our war preparedness.

The only sound system of limitation would now appear to be a graduated scale of "global" tonnage linked with limits to the standard of battleship and cruiser.

The author, however, contends that at the next naval conference the Washington and London Pacts will most probably go by the board and it is most doubtful whether any system of limitation will receive the blessing of all parties.

The future thus looks as if there is to be a reversion to the pre-1914 situation of unrestricted naval building and this will only be limited by the economic conditions of the countries concerned. Whatever happens the policy of the British Navy is clear, namely, to get back to the position where it can carry out the protection of our sea routes and trade against the navy of any other power. Then, and only then, will we be able to carry the same conviction in the councils of Europe and convince them that we are not getting "soft."

H. R. S.

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EDITORIAL.

By far the most important document affecting Imperial Defence published since the Washington Treaty is the **The Defence White Paper.** White Paper, (CMD 4827), issued to Parliament on March 4th. Its main purpose is to indicate generally the policy of the British Government in Imperial Defence and to justify the present increase of £10,000,000 in the Services Estimates.

We have not space to deal in close detail with the whole twenty-eight paragraphs of the Statement, so a brief summary of its six main sub-divisions must suffice.

I. *Efforts made by His Majesty's Government to promote peace.*—That peace has been the aim of British Foreign policy since the War is proved by the following active steps taken by Great Britain to secure peace :—

- (a) Unswerving support of the League of Nations.
- (b) The Briand-Kellogg Pact.
- (c) The Quadruple Pacific and the Nine Power Treaties.
- (d) The Locarno Treaties.
- (e) Various proposals for increasing security in Eastern Europe and the Danube Basin.
- (f) Measures to bring back our late enemies into the comity of nations ; to suspend the Penalties provisions of the Treaty of Versailles ; to elect Germany as a member of the League of Nations ; to evacuate the Rhineland five years in advance of the date fixed by the Treaties ; to settle the Saar question.
- (g) The Disarmament Conference.

II. *The Risks for Peace.*—We quote the actual words of the White Paper. "During the years that all parties in this country have been seeking to carry out the policy outlined above, there has been a steady decline in the effective strength of our armaments by sea and by land. In the air we virtually disarmed ourselves in 1919, and subsequently, from time to time, postponed attainment of the minimum air strength regarded as necessary to our security in the face of air developments on the Continent. It is not that British Governments have neglected to keep themselves informed of the position. Every year the state of our armaments has been anxiously considered, and if risks have been run they have been accepted deliberately in pursuit of the aim of permanent peace We have taken risks of peace, but, as intimated by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the Debate on the Address on November 28, 1934, "disarming ourselves in advance, by ourselves, by way of an example—has not increased our negotiating power in the Disarmament discussions at Geneva."

The next paragraph admits bluntly that our example of unilateral disarmament has not contributed to general disarmament, and that we now "are approaching a point where we are not possessed of the necessary means of defending ourselves against an aggressor."

III. *Position in Summer of 1934.*—The Disarmament Conference was being buried. Germany and Japan had given notice of their withdrawal from the League. Germany, despite the Treaty of Versailles, was re-arming openly,* but to an unknown extent. All the larger Powers, except England, were adding to their armed forces. As a result of a detailed examination of the serious deficiencies that had accumulated in our Defence Forces and defences it was considered that, apart from our commitments under the Locarno Treaties, we could neither secure our sea communications nor defend our principal cities and population against air attack. In these circumstances a co-ordinated programme was drawn up for reconditioning our Defence Forces and defences.

IV. *The Navy.*—As the first line of defence for the maintenance of our essential sea communications the Navy still forms the basis of our system of Imperial Defence, but since the Washington Treaty it has been allowed to deteriorate, both in quality and quantity. The

(*On the 16th March, 1935, Herr Hitler issued a proclamation that compulsory military service is to be introduced in Germany forthwith, and that the German Peace Army will consist of 12 Corps Headquarters and 36 Divisions.—Ed.)

capital ship of the Main Fleet remains the "essential element upon which the whole structure of our naval strategy depends." Most of our capital ships are out of date and require modernisation. The safety of our trade routes and food supplies depends on cruisers, now sadly inadequate numerically to carry out their task.

The bases and fuelling stations of the Fleet, and harbours where merchant ships load and unload, require defences against seaborne and air attacks, and the home ports' defences need modernising.

V. *The Army*.—Under present conditions the defence of ports involves concerted action between the three services, but the heaviest expenditure falls on the War Office. For this reason the improvement and installation of coast defences is provided for in the Army Estimates. The balance of the increase will be utilised for a large expansion of anti-aircraft defences, to begin the provision of deficiencies for the Expeditionary (now called the Field Force,) and to provide sorely needed housing accommodation for troops.

VI. *Royal Air Force*.—The principal rôle of the Air Force is defined: "to provide (with the co-operation of ground defences) for the protection of the United Kingdom, and particularly London, against air attack." In addition the R. A. F. provides Air Forces for general defence purposes in the Middle East, India and the Far East, as well as for co-operation in Coast Defence.

The increase in the Air Estimates is justified in a few short paragraphs which give in terse and unspectacular language the dangers incurred in England by maintaining an inadequate air arm. Technical development of aircraft, particularly in speed, range and height, lay Great Britain open to air attack by continental powers, unless the importance of the integrity "of certain territories on the other side of the Channel and North Sea" are realised by Parliament and the general public. Since no air force, however powerful, could defend England from sporadic and isolated air attacks it is recognised that the only real "deterrent to an armed aggressor is the possession of adequate means of counter-attack." Therefore, the Royal Air Force must be increased. The increase will give it parity eventually with one continental air power.

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. The most striking feature of this "Statement Relating to Defence" is its modesty. That an increase of ten millions spread

among the three Services should necessitate the active support in Parliament of three National Government front-benchers shows how the forces of theoretical pacifism are attempting to undermine the inherent sanity and wisdom of the British public. The Parliamentary Debate gave the Foreign Secretary also an opportunity of speaking to a wider public than England.

No attempt was made to hide our Defence deficiencies. Mr. Baldwin gave some significant figures. As regards the Navy; when the Washington Treaty expires in 1936, we shall have a considerable amount of over-age tonnage since our policy has been one of gradual and slow replacement of War-time tonnage. On the other hand, Japanese naval personnel increased in the four years ending 1931 from 72,000 to 88,000 men, and since then the increase has been continuous, and "they have a far more modern navy than we have." In 1933 America spent 350 million dollars on her Navy; in the current year 492 millions, and next year it is proposed to spend 580 millions. Last year Italy laid down two 35,000 ton capital ships, an example followed immediately by France. The increase in tonnage and gun calibre of modern cruisers being built by other nations forces us to build similarly. The extra 3½ millions to be voted in the Navy Estimates will not go far in a building programme especially since only 2 millions of it is to be devoted this year to modernisation. The First Lord of the Admiralty, introducing the Estimates, gave further enlightenment. America, since Washington, has modernised ten of her fifteen capital ships at a cost of £16,000,000, it is anticipated that by 1937 Japan will have modernised all her ships; England, so far, has modernised one.

As regards the British Army, we are tempted to quote Mr. Garvin of *The Observer*: "What of our Army and its reserves, of Regulars and Territorials alike? Our military system has been cut to the bone. This is so notorious that we shall say nothing about it." Notorious or otherwise, some of Mr. Baldwin's and Sir John Simon's statements bear repetition. In Russia, ("where at least we might have thought in a Government of the proletariat we might have had an example set to the rest of the world."—Mr. Baldwin), the Regular Army has increased during the last four years from 600,000 to 940,000. In Japan the Army Estimates have more than doubled in the last four years. Nothing was said of the recent changes in the French system of

conscription, and at the time Herr Hitler had not disclosed his plans. The British Army makes a poor showing when compared to these figures. In 1914 the Regular and Territorial Armies consisted of 185,000 and 313,000 men, respectively; to-day the peace establishment was nominally 152,000 and 175,000.—(Sir J. Simon.)

With these striking figures to help them the Government spokesmen had no difficulty in obtaining a large majority. It is not unfortunate, perhaps, that this important debate centred more on the political aspect of our modest re-armament than on a discussion of Imperial Defence, for which the White Paper gave an expressed opportunity. But it is to us rather surprising that so much importance and weight should be attached to a slender increase, the necessity and inevitability of which has been apparent for the last eight years. We are more surprised that only £10,000,000 has been found, and we content ourselves with the reflection that at last British politicians have faced the reality of facts and realised that in the present condition of world affairs "unilateral disarmament may be magnificent, but it is not peace." They have realised both the futility of risky "gestures," and the utility of Defence Services, which alone can back their promises and strengthen their arguments for peace in Europe. For this belief, much thanks.

The gradual mechanisation of the Home Forces, recently spurred into a heavier programme, has had little or no repercussions in the Army in India, since the rôle and field of possible operations of the latter give little scope for the employment of a mechanized force; moreover the limitations imposed by an agricultural country which has few good roads and is, comparatively speaking, devoid of commercial motor industries tend to restrict mechanisation within the narrowest bounds.

In spite of this, however, there are certain directions in which it is possible to employ mechanical vehicles of a suitable type with the mobile fighting formations. These are mainly in the improvement of means of inter-communication and for evacuation of casualties in the field. The vital duty of long range reconnaissance, formerly shared in varying degree by the R. A. F. and Cavalry, lacked cohesion and the necessary co-operation by reason of poor inter-communication. The Popham panel, the dropping and lifting of messages were slow methods, patently unsuitable for two fast moving arms. The R. A. F. wireless-equipped tender could not always get to the place to the

Light Cars
with Cavalry.

moment required. So, recently, experiments have been tried with a "baby" car fitted with a two way W/T set which have showed that this type of sturdy vehicle—at, perhaps, a further stage of adolescence—will go a good way in solving this inter-communication difficulty.

In England, the Light Car Troop (three cars for H. Q. and two sections of three cars each), is now part of a cavalry regiment's establishment. This mechanised troop is used for inter-communication with reconnoitring and other detachments, and for the rapid conveyance of officers. In the recent Eastern Command manoeuvres at Gurgaon and later at the Peshawar District Exercise some light cars were tried in replacement of the motor cycles which have been used hitherto for purposes of inter-communication and, in the case of one regiment, they were used for the conveyance of officers. In the hard fought battles round Gurgaon where roads, of all types, were fairly numerous the Meerut Cavalry Brigade found that their light cars were a great improvement on existing motor-cycles and that they speeded up communications and saved horse-flesh to a considerable degree. The Risalpur Cavalry Brigade, owing to the less developed country of their operations, did not derive so great advantages from their use. In both trials, however, the light cars were considered a great success in their main subsidiary function, inter-communication.

The collection and evacuation of cavalry casualties are other matters which have received recent attention, as there is a serious hiatus between the point where the casualty occurs and the motor ambulance which is waiting further back to evacuate him to the rear. During the Eastern Command manoeuvres an experimental Cavalry Field Ambulance, consisting of light sections of Ford "A" ambulances, was tried out. These handier vehicles were able in most cases to follow behind the leading regiments, to collect their wounded and evacuate them to an A. D. S. and in due course to the heavier motor ambulances moving along the axis of advance.

We must pay tributes to the alacrity and thoroughness of Army Headquarters in the way it is already trying to get employment for the War Block officers even before the axe has fallen. After the War, as we all know, many officers adventured into the wilds of the Dominions and Colonies with little capital and even less experience, but lured by tempting baits of lucrative farming. Some of them survived. A great many of them failed. The Information Bureau of Army Headquarters, India, in

Employment for the
Unemployed.

close touch with its sister office, the War Office Employment Bureau, 80, Pall Mall, London, is now an establishment ready and anxious to give all information possible about settlement or employment in the British Dominions and Colonies. The Bureau has produced an excellent preliminary pamphlet regarding settlement in various parts of the Empire, giving authentic details of the cost of living, chances of employment, education of children and social amenities.

This pamphlet does not pretend to be exhaustive, but from the sources of *pukka* information now available it is most commendably informative and clear. In the first place a personal letter from the Commander-in-Chief to all Governors of Dominions and Colonies has produced helpful and authoritative information. No rose has been gilded, no extravagant promise offered—but it is plain that all our Colonies and Dominions are anxious to welcome the type of emigrant now to be produced by the Indian Army.

For every country in the British Empire offering climate, health, chances of employment and a fair livelihood there are the broad sources of information in this summary. But, moreover, we are asked to emphasise that if any officer, attracted by the general outline, should like more specific information regarding details of any country he has only to write to the Information Bureau at Army Headquarters and every effort will be made to supply it.

The Editor of a Journal such as this is in a queer position. He is a sort of autogiro hovering between the devil and the deep blue sea, oscillating between Scylla and Charybdis and always on the point of crashing from the frying-pan into the fire. In other words he has great fun and a multitude of interests among the controversies that rage around him.

His first duty, as we hold it, is to his subscribers who expect a Journal published quarterly which will be of value, interest and help in their careers in India. Eighty per cent. of our subscribers belong to the defence services in India, and therefore the majority of our articles deal with military or semi-military subjects. The facets of military experiences are so many, the side-lights on military history are so numerous and the idiosyncrasies of service subscribers are so varied (and at times vehement) that it is difficult at times to differentiate between articles which should be referred to the Reading Committee or condemned out of hand to their originators.

After two years in the chair it might be useful to the Journal's future if we suggested a few axioms for our contributors, culled from a most interesting and enjoyable experience :—

1. The Journal is open to all members who wish to express on paper, in a readable and fair manner, any expression of opinion regarding the services or on other subjects of general interest. Any well argued and reasoned theme is welcomed.

2. As a certain number of our members are not yet soldiers with Napoleonic ambitions, but whose subscriptions are equally welcome, we have always tried to include articles on travel, shikar as well as good tales on military history. This class of contribution is always assured of close consideration. But there are limits ; a 500-word jejune description of a jungle scene, a 6,000-word historical hash of a battle in the wars of South India with no constructive purpose are both equally regarded as unsuitable. We get too many of them. But a description with authentic details regarding *bundobust* and cost of a good shoot in the Himalayas ; a visit to some old battlefield in India showing some original research, cheap hunting in Ireland, cheap fishing in Scotland, cheap mule or horse coping in South America ; travelling in out-of-the-way places, South Iran, North Pole, South Sea Islands ; this is the type of article which can always find a place in our Journal and for which there is probably more consideration and premium paid than elsewhere.

3. The preparation of a manuscript deserves the closest study. Most editors are overworked and, although in our particular case we cannot plead this notorious misery, we are certain that the well-presented manuscript, the one typed on good paper with double space typing and a margin leaving room for editorial comments or corrections, always catches the eye.

We have accepted hundreds of articles written in so-called fair hand and single-spaced typing on flimsy paper through which our pen tore nasty red gashes. But they are a grief and burden, and because our nature is but human, when it came (after publication) to assess the worth of such articles we remembered our tribulation and advised our committee to pay less than the actual article's worth. Badly presented manuscripts cost more in "proofing," and give the Assistant Secretary nightmares. So we therefore assure our contributors that "copy well prepared is the best investment an author can make."

In this connection we might add that once an article is submitted it is only exasperating if the author follows it up with his second-thoughts and amendments. We get quite enough of that sort of thing officially as regards our regulations without bringing it into our editorial existence.

4. Finally, we would like to dispel a certain fallacy.

"The Journal of the U. S. I. of India" is not necessarily a mouth-piece of A. H. Q., India. Its Headquarters in Simla, its Council and its Executive Committee drawn from A. H. Q. may give it an Olympian, an official character, but we assure our readers that, apart from the invaluable and willing help we get from the horses' mouths, our Reading Committee are only too glad to have access to any other point of view, and to permit its publication. At the same time A. H. Q. must exercise some control over the subject matter published. For example we are glad to accept papers which give food for serious thought even if the views in them are unorthodox; but we cannot publish the article designed to excite rejoinder or to re-open controversy.

As regards this April Number. The member who wrote to us last month and said he liked the January issue but found little in it to help him to qualify for the Staff College, will be again disappointed. Except possibly for two papers there is little in it which will be of assistance to Staff College graduates. This is not altogether our fault as we have so few senior and experienced contributors. On the other hand, there are six or seven original articles on various interesting subjects which will, we hope, help to pass the tedium of the hot weather.

With this issue there is a folder from our auditors giving the year's financial statement. It will be seen that all your money is spent to the best of your advantage. Our membership continues to increase, but the War Block retirements—may we say in parenthesis that the great majority of our subscribers belong to the fatal years 1914-20?—will probably cause a sad reduction. May we appeal, therefore, to commanders of all formations to bring this Institution to the notice of their Junior officers, from unit commanders upwards?

THE INTERNATIONAL SAAR FORCE, 1934-35

By LT.-COL. A. G. KENCHINGTON, M.C., ROYAL TANK CORPS.

I.—Its Genesis, and its Task.

The Treaty of Versailles gave France the rich coal mines of the Saar Territory for 15 years. At the end of this time on the 13th January 1935, a Plebiscite was to be held in the Territory. All qualified voters were to decide whether they wished to remain under the League of Nations, to become again a part of the German Reich, or to become part of France.

The Saar contains much wealth. The plum was a juicy one and both parties had been shaking the plum tree vigorously for some years. Each party's papers accused the opposition of the most bloodthirsty preparations for violence. Each party began to organise armed forces to meet what was at first just a bogey; and of course these measures soon made the danger real. The Press has in the last hundred years killed very many. A free and irresponsible Press is more dangerous in its power than any monarch ever was: it enslaves the mind first. Perhaps it is the first Scourge of the Apocalypse. But back to the Saar.

The Nazi Party in the Saar had all Germany's resources behind it and exercised a grim relentless power, chiefly through two organisations:

(i) The "*Brownshirts*" (SA) and "*Blackshirts*" or Black Guard (SS). These were reliably believed to be about 40,000 in number in the Saar, organised in military formations. They wore uniform, Sam Brownes, and knee boots. The leaders all wore spurs but without protuberances, not (as in other armies) to tickle the carburetter, or to brighten the office, but for their real purpose, to click frequently so as to assert and maintain a superiority-complex-coefficient.

(ii) The "*Ordnungsdienst*," estimated at 9,000 men and 12,000 women (!) These provide "police" detachments and a grim, but efficient net of *Blockwarte* (Block pickets), spies allotted to each house or group of families to report on the actions, the words (and almost the thoughts) of everybody.

Early in 1934 the Governing Commission had ordered the dissolution of this party in the Saar. The "*Deutsche Front*" arose straightway from the ashes like a glittering phoenix. The coloured shirts were replaced by the white of innocence and the Sam Brownes were worn "less holster." The movement gained the attraction of forbidden fruit. Eve, or rather Gretchen, let it be known that she liked her men bold, in the glamour of uniform and rebel heroics. Obviously, as soon as possible, the "Whiteshirts" would burst again into colour all ready to "keep order" in the sinister way implied all the world over by young politicians *en massé* donning shirts of homogeneous hue.

In October 1934 France declared her readiness to send troops into the Saar in the event of armed disorder taking place. The danger of an outbreak of war was a real one.

The President of the Governing Commission, Mr. Geoffrey Knox of the British Diplomatic Service, was faced with as difficult a task as any Governor has had for a long time. The German member of the Governing Commission—a very wise old German Minister—told me he was convinced that war or peace in Europe in January 1935 hung on the solution of the Saar problem.

Some members and high officials of the Governing Commission were Frenchmen. They were accused by the German population of using their position to weight the scales against the German party by underhand means. The great majority of the officials of the Government Services were intensely patriotic Germans owing loyalty to Germany first and last. It was discovered beyond the shadow of a doubt that the Nazi Government of Germany had placed its nominees in very many of the most important positions in these Services during the years 1933-35.

The German Police ("Blue Police," roughly 800 in the whole Territory) were well-disciplined but they, too, were Germans first and policemen afterwards. The great majority were German ex-soldiers. There had also been created a *Landjägerkorps* of about 900; these contained a certain number of refugees from Nazi Germany.

The President realised in the summer of 1934 that, with bottled-up passions so strong everywhere, with organised and partially armed forces in existence ready for trouble, faced only by a weak and divided police force, the outlook for the Plebiscite was the reverse of peaceful.

He endeavoured to recruit a considerable number of foreign police officers but all the Governments approached were very chary of giving their trained police officers or of getting in any way involved. Eight neutral police officers, British, Norwegian and Czechoslovakian were recruited. These proved of the greatest value later, but they were obviously not enough to be in close control everywhere to ensure neutrality of the police.

Then, in December 1934, the British Government offered to lend the League of Nations a military contingent to join a neutral international force to ensure peace during the dangerous period of the Plebiscite. The Italian, Netherlands and Swedish Governments agreed to provide contingents to join such a force, and France and Germany expressed their agreement with this proposal, the former with obvious relief. The League of Nations decided to create an International Force for the task as suggested and requested the British Government to provide a Commander and Staff.

This, briefly, was the genesis of the International Force in the Saar, the first International Force under the League of Nations. Major-General J. E. S. Brind, until June 1933 D. C. G. S. in India, was selected as Commander. The British press generally expressed pride in the success of the British intervention and all ranks of the Force felt pride in being selected for the task.

The work of this International Force must be of general interest to all officers and is probably of especial interest to British officers from two points of view :—

(i) It is the first example of the employment by the League of Nations of what might be termed "prophylactic treatment" against a threatened outbreak of war ; and

(ii) its work may be regarded as our old friend, Duty in Aid of the Civil Power, on an international scale, with even more difficult problems than usual tacked on to it.

With this in mind I have set down a brief narrative of how the task was appreciated and carried out and a few observations which might be of use should British officers again have to take control of a force with a similar task. These notes are written only from the point of view of an observer at Headquarters International Force, not from the point of view of the British Contingent,

II.—Composition of the Force.

The contingents provided by the four nations were :—

Great Britain.

Force Commander and Headquarters Staff.

An infantry brigade headquarters (Brigadier J. H. T. Priestman, D.S.O.), one infantry brigade, less two battalions, at reduced strength and "D" squadron, 12th Royal Lancers (cavalry armoured cars) (Total 1,500). The two battalions sent were 1st East Lancashire and 1st Essex.

Force Headquarters approximated to the Headquarters of a Division so as to be prepared for any eventuality. Staff officers were selected as far as possible from those possessing language qualifications. Qualified officers were added as interpreters, liaison officers and cipher officers.

The Administrative Services were not represented by officers at Force Headquarters except for Chief Paymaster (Financial Adviser), D. J. A. G. and Movement Control Staff.

The British Contingent took no artillery, machine-guns or tanks. M. T. was provided by Great Britain both for Force Headquarters and for the British Contingent.

Italy.

Brigadier Commanding Contingent (General Visconti Prasca), with Headquarters Staff of six officers, 1st Grenadiers Regt. (less one battalion), one battalion of Carabinieri, a cavalry light tank squadron and Administrative Services with M. T. (Total 1,500).

The three Italian battalions were each 300 strong with complete war equipment.

Netherlands.

Battalion Headquarters (Commandant de Bruyne, Commanding) and two companies of the Royal Netherlands Marines ("Saarbatalion". Total strength 250, with four military lorries).

Sweden.

Battalion Headquarters (Lt.-Col. A. G. Nordenswan, Commanding) and two companies of the 1st Swedish Lifeguard Regiment, ("Saarbataljon." Total strength 250).

Swedish law did not provide for troops being sent overseas in time of peace and a special law had to be passed. The Swedish

Contingent was a composite one. The officers were selected with a special view to language qualifications and the men were selected from volunteers of the Regular Army with a number of short-service volunteers, largely of the student class.

III.—How the Force carried out its Mission.

The Commander and Staff Officers of Force Headquarters were warned between 10th and 12th December. On the 12th December the G. O. C.-in-C. received an advance copy of his instructions drawn up by the British War Office and subsequently agreed to by the League of Nations. The essence of these orders was that he was to assist the Governing Commission in maintaining law and order, should the local police forces prove unequal to the task. On 12th December a small administrative advance party under D. A. A. Q. M. G. left, and on the 13th the G. O. C. in C. with G. S. O. I went *via* Paris to Saarbrücken.

Between the 14th and the 22nd, when the contingents arrived, this small advance party of Headquarters had an extremely strenuous time. "Q's" problem was no light one. The Force Commander had a definite sum allotted for his Budget and his expenditure had to be made through the Governing Commission. Four national contingents had to be accommodated and provided with necessary facilities for living some months in the most thickly-populated area of Europe. Their requirements were varied, no barracks were available, and there was no legal provision for billeting. The contingents were moving towards the Saar and the quartering work had to be done *pari passu* with "G's" work of distributing the Force suitably to carry out its task. When the Force assembled, six languages were involved.

On the "G" side the first problem was the correct distribution of the Force over a territory the size of an English-country so as best to cover its task. The views of the Governing Commission, of the League of Nations and of the various national Governments had to be obtained throughout. The distribution once settled, the principles of action of the Force in executing its task had to be clearly promulgated. The distribution, organisation (and reliability) of the civil functionaries and the police forces had to be studied. The complicated detailed arrangements made for the Plebiscite itself had to be studied and co-ordinated with the Force's plans.

The main body of Force Headquarters arrived with the British Contingent on the 22nd and worked really strenuously until the end of December, the immediate major problems being the following :—

(a) Establishing clearly the actual legal position, rights and limitations of the Force in its Duty. The relevant law of various nations differs appreciably and International Law offered very little precedent. British Law in this respect restricts the powers of the military much more severely than that of any other nation. Instructions based on British Law were drawn up defining the principles on which the Force would act. These were found to be generally acceptable although their limitations were felt by other contingents to be unwontedly strict.

(b) The next task was to issue a "*directif*" as to the method of using the Force for carrying out the task allotted to the G. O. C.-in-C. The Territory was subdivided into four areas. The two strongest contingents were given responsibility for the thickly-populated industrial area stretching across the South of the Territory and for the rural districts lying nearest to these. The Netherlands Contingent was given one industrial town and the fairly large, but peaceful, South-Eastern sector. The Swedish Contingent was given the fairly thinly-populated North-Western sector.

Preparing the plan

The task was considered in four phases :—

Phase 1. Duty in Aid of the Civil Power during the period of tension and political excitement preceding the day of the Plebiscite.—

After intensive reconnaissance and close liaison with local Civil and Police authorities, Contingent Commanders found little difficulty in dealing with this duty in accordance with the principles laid down in the G. O. C.-in-C.'s first instructions.

Phase 2. Duty on the day of the Plebiscite.—There were to be 860 polling stations throughout the Territory. The Plebiscite Committee consisted largely of foreign legal experts. In order to ensure law and order at the Polling booths they had found it necessary to demand the distribution at polling centres of practically the whole police force. The General Staff had to dig and dig out of the many authorities concerned the necessary information as to details of the conduct of the Plebiscite and arrangements for law and order on the day. It soon became evident that some

proposals were impracticable and there had been a lack of co-ordination. Without some adjustment, not only would the maintenance of law and order until the urns were safely collected be very difficult, but it was very doubtful whether the Plebiscite plan itself would work. *De minimis non curat lex*. The legal mind deals in principles, at times ignoring practical details.

Some of the officials of the Plebiscite Commission I fear, found irksome the insistence of the rigid military mind on checking everything with figures and times. It was "a Principle" that police had to be at each polling booth to ensure law and order. The number of polling booths divided into the number of police left a surplus barely sufficient to undertake even traffic control duties. The Chief of Police was presented with an enormous "Parade State" shewing the allotment of his police for the Plebiscite. This had been drawn up by the Minister of the Interior at the request of the Plebiscite Commission, and printed. A copy was then shewn for the first time to the Chief of Police. He said angrily (first in French, then in German) "So to keep order you have left me less than nothing at all."

Then aside in his native English, "Just dam' silly!"

It was "a Principle" that every voting urn was to be collected by a lorry from the Polling Station together with the Presiding Officer and one witness from each of the opposing parties. This lorry was then to proceed through the Territory, other lorries joining it as it went, until finally converging, ever-growing columns of these lorries were to pour into the central Counting Stations at Saarbrücken. It was a "a Principle" that each lorry should be neutral-owned, neutral-driven and entirely reliable. Then the annoying military started calculating. Each urn was to be accompanied by three plus a military escort: $3 + 860 = 2580$. Each military escort was to consist of "x" men. The capacity of a lorry was to be regarded as 12 men plus the urn and escort. Therefore the number of lorries required was $220 \text{ plus } 860 \text{ times "X"}$ ——The International Force possessed some 60 lorries! 12

Moreover, the military put forth certain "Principles." Since the police available would be few it was the more essential to hold lorries in hand with local and general reserves of troops for maintaining law and order. Moreover an escort in a strange land with strange tongues could not safely be less than the smallest command of an officer ("Platoon, *Platone, Pluton* or *Gruppe!*").

There had to be much give and take. The Civil Authorities gave : they asked us to make our own plan for the collection and protection of the voting urns at the end of the Plebiscite. The military gave : they agreed to undertake what appeared to be a non-military duty in order to be able adequately to ensure peace throughout. The situation had been foreseen and the military, when the conference had reached the deadlock stage, produced a cut-and-dried plan. This was hailed with relief by the Plebiscite Commission and by the Police, and was accepted.

Thus throughout the 13th we had to be ready to put troops into action anywhere in the Territory at short notice. Thereafter, through the night, in addition to this task we found ourselves organising the collection and transport of the urns. It was rather like organising a post-office collection—or, as one irreverent correspondent put it, a sanitary-bin collection—over Lancashire by night in a time of riot.

All these negotiations and adjustments took time. It would not have helped either to decline tasks or to try to “bounce” the cautious and conscientious Plebiscite Commission before careful reconciliation of the ideal with the practicable.

It was evident that in preparation for these tasks the contingents must arrange very careful reconnaissance and liaison visits everywhere. Therefore, as soon as the elements of a general plan were fixed, a conference of the Chief Staff Officers from the various contingents was called by G. S. O. 1 at Force Headquarters on 1st January. A first draft of the general order for the task was handed out, with an intimation that the order itself would be issued on the 3rd January, but that reconnaissances should be put in hand as soon as contingents had settled their own individual plans. With four contingents of different nationalities, it was found necessary after the issue of an order to allow time for its study and then have a general conference to ensure that the contingents' plans were all consistent and were mutually adjusted. A conference of Contingent Commanders on 7th January reported all arrangements well in hand.

During this period of preparation for phase 2 the situation was complicated by the expected alarums and excursions resulting from the natural uneasiness of civil authorities when disorders are threatening. On five occasions mobile parties were moved to various situations in readiness to deal with expected outbreaks. On 6th January, after

a period of prohibition of meetings and demonstrations, the civil authorities took the very wise course of allowing both parties to hold monster final demonstrations in Saarbrücken itself. If disorder was expected to break out it was better that it should break out where police could be handily concentrated ready to control the crowds and where troops were quickly available. A good deal of apprehension was felt by the civil authorities and at one moment in the middle of the day a clash appeared imminent.

The neutral police officers in charge were admirable in their self-reliance, and never once called the waiting troops into action although their own resources were strained to the limit. When troops were sent to positions of readiness, the British method was followed; the troops, once having moved to these positions were kept out of sight. Forces known to exist but unseen are always a greater menace than what one can see and count. Thus they act as a sedative rather than as an irritant.

Phase 3.—Phase 3 of the Force's task was to be ready to support the police, if necessary, between the polling on the 13th January and the declaration of the result on the 15th January, with the added responsibility of guaranteeing the absolute security of the Counting Station during the counting. This proved to be an easy task. The population, both during and after the polling, maintained perfect order. The German Front issued very strict orders in this respect and by its own methods ensured that they were observed; the minority knew that they were secure from persecution while the International Troops were there. There was deep snow on 13th January and the trains bearing the urns rolled into Saarbrücken in a blinding snow-storm in the early hours of 14th and were delivered under strong guard.

The Counting Station was in a theatre called the Wartburg Saal. As soon as the urns started arriving another difficulty, unforeseen by the Plebiscite Commission, made itself felt at once. The counting was to be done by some hundreds of neutral polling officers, mostly Luxemburgers, Swiss and Dutch. No interested parties were to be allowed inside the Counting Hall. From the galleries above, members of the public who could obtain a permit from the Plebiscite Commission, and who were neither too proud to submit to inspection of their papers by highly suspicious British Sergeants, nor too ticklish to mind an embarrassingly thorough search for arms by neutral police, were allowed to watch the proceedings. The urns were heavy and had

to be moved into the Wartburg Saal, sorted by towns and districts, stacked, carried upstairs to the counting room. The counted papers had to be removed and guarded until they could be removed for custody to Geneva. For this no labour had been provided.

Force Headquarters were faced with an "S. O. S." appeal: the whole thing was at a standstill unless the military would come to the rescue. Force Headquarters were diffident about offending susceptibilities by putting this unusual "fatigue" on to any of the National Contingents. Being British themselves, they felt they could ask the British Contingent to come to the rescue. One of the greatest virtues of the British soldier is that mentally he has no tender corns (mentally, I mean). Moreover, the Plebiscite Commission remarked hopefully and suggestively that they had taken the view of the local population who stated they had absolute confidence that the British soldiers could be trusted to ensure the most scrupulous correctness in the matter. In fact, the local papers stated that they found the British soldiers' "solemn correctness" in collecting the urns very impressive although a little amusing.

The British Contingent agreed to provide the labour and throughout the night of the 14/15th, while the future of the Saar was being decided under the light of innumerable magnesium flashes, movietone cameras and all the stark glare of the publicity demanded by the modern world, a fatigue party of the East Lancashire Regiment, in shirt sleeves, bore the fateful urns and voting papers in and out as required, grimly cheerful and quite unimpressed by the solemnity of the occasion.

The result was declared at 0800 hours on the morning of the 15th, resulting in a 90% decision in favour of Germany. The whole town burgeoned with red Nazi flags (under the eye of the watchful *Blockwarte*!) and church bells jangled all day. The populace spent the day as a complete holiday, listening to fervid but hoarse State-provided oratory on the radio most of the day. At night the whole town was a blaze of electric lights with the Nazi Swastika everywhere in evidence. An enormous torchlight procession wound its way all round the town, jubilating with "*Sieg-Heil*!" and songs on the word of command. The thing was so obviously going to be all in good order that only a small proportion of the troops stood by as a precautionary measure.

There were, however, some unpleasant rumblings and threatenings of persecution against (and "*putsches*" by) the minority who had dwindled to a small band of wretched refugees who had already been deprived of German citizenship on fleeing to the Saar. The voting papers were duly despatched under escort on the way to Geneva on the evening of the 15th January.

Phase 4. To ensure the maintenance of law and order during the ensuing period until the Territory was handed back to Germany on the first of March. Former dispositions were taken up and in view of the good order that had prevailed during the Plebiscite very little, if any, disorder was anticipated. The Opposition press at once disappeared: the German Front press carried on, unable to stop brewing hatred and bad feeling and accusing the Governing Commission of past partiality for the minority and of now fomenting sinister schemes against the all-conquering German Front. To the Nazi any political opponent is vermin and to be ruthlessly swatted.

The minority of the anti-German element in the Police were discharged from service during the next fortnight and about 7,000 refugees made their way out of the country. There were no acts of terrorism or overt persecution; a few minor brawls, inevitable under the circumstances, were quickly stopped by the action of the police.

This was a trying period for the Force. There was a feeling of reaction. Life in the Saar was not at any time a gay business, certainly for the British soldier. The British soldier's pay in a country where prices are at gold standard, goes nowhere. There were no training facilities at all for anything beyond route marches. The improvised barracks did not lend themselves either to instruction or comfort, and football grounds available were very few and bad. The officers of all contingents put much thought into thinking out ways of busying the idle hands for which His Satanic Majesty runs his own Unemployment Bureau. The inhabitants up to now had remained rather aloof, though without overt unfriendliness. Now they became very friendly towards the troops. But the local distractions were not those to which the British soldier takes very kindly, nor were most of them too good for him.

Visits to local factories and tours to the neighbouring battlefields of 1870 were arranged. Football matches within the contingents

took place every day and all sorts of odd local teams demanded fixtures. Here be it noted that the young German of to-day is not so much a football "fan" as a football player and the State provides many grounds for him (*o si sic omnes !*)

The "Odds and Sobs," a miscellaneous team from Headquarters details, for example, played the Fire Brigade, Police teams, Tramway teams, the local milkmen and various factories and works, and after each match were presented with souvenirs (all with a strong Nazi flavour !)

There was a general feeling that, the job being over, it would be better to go home. When one works for many masters, none of whom is afore or after other, it is at times difficult to get a decision. While nobody was prepared to decide a date for departure, the Governing Commission felt that the Force should remain until as near as possible the date of handing over the Territory. The police stated that they were able to ensure the maintenance of peace and to stop persecution only so long as the Force remained.

The G. O. C.-in-C. with the concurrence of the League of Nations informed all concerned that he had prepared a plan for the gradual withdrawal of the Force between the 16th and the 27th of February. Troops were first withdrawn from the outlying peaceful areas, and retained till the end in the centre of Government at Saarbrücken, when, with a sigh of relief, Force Headquarters packed up and disappeared with the last unit of the British Contingent.

IV.—Some General Reflections.

The International Force and the Saarlanders.—Fortescue, I think it is, says somewhere that the British soldier throughout the world goes to fight enemies and leaves friends. This is often true of other armies too. The Saarlanders saw our coming through Press-distorted spectacles. They were chilly and sourly aloof by order ; but not for long. Within ten days a thaw had set in. Once they found we were unconcerned with anything except helping the police to maintain peace and good order, then they showed openly their confidence in the Force. The efforts of the mischief-makers dwindled away. The thaw towards the three "Nordic" contingents was a little quicker, not only because of racial affinity, but because the Italians themselves kept very martially aloof at first.

From another point of view the soldiers of the Force, as well as the inhabitants, probably learned much from the mutual contact.

We all read our favourite paper too uncritically and it is good at times to try to stand outside and "see ourselves as others see us." The British and Dutch soldiers noted with amazement how utterly (and apparently willingly) the Germans had already come under the discipline of the Nazi officials. I watched men, women, girls and boys, being ordered peremptorily out of their houses by party officials at 8 a.m. on a Sunday morning in blinding sleet to march eight abreast to stand for five hours on a slushy hill "demonstrating" to order. I heard a friend say, "If any official did that to my family there would be some bloodshed." We worship freedom and are rather diffident about any confession of patriotism. Yet we have to admire the German's subordination of self to discipline for the sake of country and to wonder whether we might not learn something from this, even though we hate tyranny.

Again, I saw a young Nazi, a youth of about 18 in his knee-boots and much-bedecked shirt, bursting with fervent pride with hand outstretched as a score of others with a large flag passed by. He caught an amused gleam in the eye of several Dutch and British soldiers passing, and looked a little less inflated. One hopes he wondered if being a young Siegfried was really magnificent or was it just a little ridiculous. Also the cynical way these foreign soldiers assumed as obvious that all this drilling and stuff must be preparing for another war soon, seemed to come as a surprise to some of the Germans.

The British Army in Contact with other Europeans.—The British regular officer or soldier is expected by other Europeans to conform more or less to a type. So long as he conforms, they are prepared to trust him and work with him: variants are regarded with suspicion. May I endeavour to describe what I think is an outline of their general ideas: it may be too flattering but I believe this is how they see the British Army.

The British General is dignity itself and is very charming, but must not be expected to have the mental attributes of generalship; how could he with such a tiny army? The British have never bred a General. The Senior Officer is very "*grand seigneur*" (v. Maurois "*Silences du Colonel Bramble*"). He knows splendidly how to win the devotion of his men and is "*le fair play*" personified, but he is very rigid, nay wooden, in mind, and receives new ideas but slowly

(Foreigners also will read, "The Army as I knew it!") The British general or senior officer is at times careless of the finer shades of politeness but is always strictly correct. He is to be treated with caution, not because he explodes like his Continental equivalent, but because occasional specimens use the stereotyped mask to cover very deep cunning. He is much to be envied because his career is completely uninfluenced by politics.

The junior British officer is always anxious to get out of uniform as soon as possible after duty, put on those enviable "*High Life*" suits and become a perfectly charming young man about town. For most young women abroad his scalp is regarded as the proudest trophy of the Chase. He is fit and very "*sportif*," and a welcome guest anywhere. His regiment is his God, far above politics, and he can, if led on, talk "shop" most interestingly.

The British soldier is, like their own conscript boys ("*enfants*," "*les Bleus*," "*die Jungens*," etc.). He is an attractive, if coarse, youth, to be treated as rather a joke and spoilt a bit when possible. He is simple-minded and less brainy in type than their boys, and is astonishingly ignorant of, and disinterested in, politics, "Life" and everything outside sport and his own simple pleasures. He is under-sexed: he is much more absorbed in larking with a football and with the local kiddies, than in the usual pre-occupation of continental adolescence. His old reputation (v. Kipling *passim*) of hard drinking, no longer holds. Once shyness is over, he will talk freely, understanding and making himself understood on a vocabulary of some six or eight words, plus an ever-ready smile. This I think is a true if rosy statement of the foreigner's idea of T. A.

The Superiority Complex of the British.—This has often made us hated abroad. It can be an irritant; it is at times a definite asset. Confidence gives steerage-way in sailing through troubled waters. One sees the anxiety and disadvantages of other people not cursed (or blessed) with it in such situations. If the British officer does still keep it from his public school and Sandhurst (in spite of struggles to make his slender pay cover his social needs) he is, with foreigners, usually at special pains to suppress it. The soldier, product of the elementary school and his Regimental Depot, feels it too. He is at no pains whatsoever to hide it. And in him, foreigners like it.

Two thumbnail sketches to illustrate this :—

(i) (A Corporal of British Infantry is directing the loading of urns and Civilian Plebiscite Officials into the centre lorry of a small convoy in the dark and a fierce snowstorm at a small Saar town. There are already in the lorry, one Presiding Officer—Dutch Burgomaster—and two party scrutineers one is a Herr “Obersomethingorotherrat” and looks the part!—Another similar party of local notables want to get in with their precious urn). *The Corporal*: “’Ere, ’Ere, Steady there! You, Murgatroyd, see that none of these blokes get in or ’akt till I see ’oo does get the joy-ride.” (Later, returning from consulting the officer): “Cap’n says one lot goes, the other don’t, and one of these cockbirds is ter say ’oo goes.” (To obvious Presiding Officer—Swiss Schoolmaster,—with gestures): “Eins, zwei, drei, goes! Eins, zwei, drei, stays! which lot is it?” Presiding Officer decides to waive his claim, explains; officials agree and all is well. Corporal waves with airy dignity as lorry starts and both officials (one a doctor and one a Trades Union boss) lift hats, smiling amusedly, but well-satisfied.

(ii) Party of N. C. Os., newly-arrived, are sampling the local brew round a table in a German inn in the city. A party of Germans, similarly engaged (but more copiously) nearby watch curiously. Then one young German writes on the dreadful cardboard disc which, in continental pubs, serves the triple purpose of advertising the local brew, catching the froth, and telling the waiter, *garçon, ober*, or what not, how many to charge you for. He writes in English, “You British think you own the World,” and catching the attention of one of the British party, tosses it over. A roar of laughter from the British, and Corporal Ortheris writes underneath, “We do, but have a beer on us,” and tosses it back. *Mirabile dictu*, no quarrel, but general laughter and all raise their “steins” quite happily for by-play as at opening of scene.

“*Otium cum dignitate*”

“A policeman’s life is not a happy one,” we’ve often heard. After the Plebiscite came a dull time in improvised quarters in dull places, with a villainous climate, no facilities for either barrack square, indoor for outdoor training. A man’s nationality, it is said, may be known when he is in his cups: the German gets drunk on beer and sings romantic songs in four parts: the Englishman gets drunk on

whisky and looks for a policeman's hat to knock off (now, I suppose, a Beacon !); and the Frenchman gets drunk on "*le bon vin*" and forthwith seeks something feminine and complaisant. The use of leisure by the four national contingents was also varied. The British played football and tramped the country; the Italians went on interminable shopping walks round the town, with a Valentino ogle that obviously thrilled the *Mädchen*; the Dutch did as did the British but always with cameras in their hands; the Swedes had German lessons, then toured factories, then tramped, then played football, then fenced, then did P. T. and went dog-tired to bed.

*V—Points of Military Interest
Principles.*

After three years' duty in Bombay I find that experience here has confirmed my confidence in the soundness of the principles laid down in our law to guide the military in this difficult task. Instructed by the League of Nations, the Governing Commission by Ordinance secured us indemnity for any necessary action taken in good faith in our task, as is done by the Indian Government. When the military are called in abroad it is usually a case of machine-guns at street corners. We had carefully to explain and rub in the implications of the Principle of the minimum of force to secure the object. In this, as in all other matters, the Commanders of the four Contingents readily accepted the wishes and views of General Brind and carried through these duties very scrupulously and loyally.

The police and the population knew the mailed fist was there, if needed. The C.-in-C. told the Contingents he wished our presence to weigh as lightly as possible on the inhabitants, so the troops were kept in the background though ready: the fist was not shaken under the nose. Afterwards we found that this was one of the features of our work that the people most appreciated. They repaid it by perfect good order.

Duty in Aid of the Civil Power.

The Army in India studies "Duty in Aid" quite a lot. Saar force's task was duty in aid of a mixed Governing Commission ruling a very uneasy populace mostly grimly opposed to their rulers, and ruling through officials whose party or national loyalty often came before their duty. This, too, on the frontier of two countries between whom an outbreak of war seemed very possible. These conditions may well obtain again in a similar case.

Imagine yourself commanding a Fire Brigade of strangers, speaking strange tongues, ordered to stand-by in a powder magazine to help an unpopular schoolmaster control mischievous boys allowed to play with a new Primus stove.

The Internal Security Scheme in this case had to prepare for (a) preventing disorder ; (b) failing this, to be ready to help the police to stamp it quickly down anywhere ; (c) failing this again, to be ready for a general state of martial law or (d) failing this yet again, to be ready to try to keep the heavy-weights apart till the referee could leave the ring. It sounds a full size programme. Actually a dash of good-humour and good-will (helped by the knowledge that there was the mailed fist in the background) soothed the simmering cauldron and the operation came successfully to a halt on the first objective.

The Civil Power.

The Governing Commission in their relief at our arrival played up nobly to the Force. The Instructions to the Force were drawn up with their approval and help and gave officers and men very generous support and immunity. The local civil functionaries once the German Front decided for Law and Order, proved helpful and did not justify any uncertainty once felt as to their reliability in co-operation.

The Police, both officers and men, were really admirable. Their position was reminiscent in some respects of the Police in India. They were true to their salt and readily subordinated party and national and religious differences to the call of duty. They were relieved at our arrival. They gave liaison officers and troops sent to them a very warm welcome. They made us free of all their information and plans. What mattered more, they were really stout fellows. Their officers, often foreigners, had to work them very long hours in tense circumstances. Several times they had to put in their last resting reserves. Yet they never pleaded this to get troops put in before the situation got beyond their control. And therefore things never did get beyond their control. They merited any bouquets that were going for the Plebiscite's peaceful progress—there were none going for them.

Thus we soon felt complete confidence in the Civil Authorities and all parts of the team felt the same. Yet three weeks before all were complete strangers.

Liaison and Good Humour.

How was it that this mutual confidence was so soon established ? The chief reason was that each and every military officer from the

Commander-in-Chief downwards made time as soon as possible to establish personal and friendly touch with all officials with whom they might have to work. This liaison was kept up throughout by daily visits and consultations. Not only was the task then much easier, but real friendships grew.

The job was too urgent and too big for any thoughts of *amour propre* or undue stressing any one person's point of view. At Force Headquarters there was a sense of pride in our task as a British Staff blended with a deal of good humour which prevented bearings running hot when working at high pressure. It was a happy ship. This spirit was very readily met by similar feelings and support from the officers at the various Contingents' Headquarters. There was time for a few informal friendly meals together before things got hectic and by that time there was a definite Saar Force Spirit in being.

Burgermeisters and their civil officials seemed to respond readily to friendly chats from officers moving about the Territory reconnoitring with or without their detachments. The troops behaved with friendliness not only towards the inhabitants but towards other contingents. The various Commissions and the various Headquarters of the Force all made each other completely free of their offices at all times and relief at the easing of a tense situation pervaded all. The amount of liaison and good-will that can be established in three weeks is remarkable. It lasted and, as I write, we are dispersing with no ill-will anywhere and with many new friendships made.

KENYA AND UGANDA

By MAJOR A. B. GIBSON, 13TH FRONTIER FORCE RIFLES.

My excuse for the following notes is the difficulty I experienced in India last summer in getting information for a proposed trip to Kenya. Kenya is a much discussed, criticised, and maligned country ; it has been somewhat inadequately advertised, and a considerable volume of literature has been written about it. Yet in spite of all this, the practical considerations of travel, sport, and residence in the country are generally little known among people in India to whom it should make a special appeal.

In the near future, when the War Block will cause premature retirement, and altered conditions may incline those who can afford to do so, to an early one, life in Kenya will be well worth considering. East Africa undeniably ranks as one of the very few countries offering a congenial life on retirement to the British Officer.

Prospects of Farming in Kenya for Officers about to be retired.

I am most strongly of the opinion that conditions in Kenya are entirely unsuitable to the needs of the average officer who is about to be retired under the War Block scheme. By average, I mean an officer with a wife and family, little or no private means, and who requires to find an occupation to augment his retired pay, and later on his pension. To an officer with enough capital to support himself and such hostages to fortune as he has acquired, without requiring to add to his pension by earnings, the case is totally different. This latter type is however not common amongst us, and his case is really analogous to that of an officer retiring in the ordinary course:

The occupations of the white settlers in the highland areas of Kenya are practically speaking only farming and gold mining. The latter may be dismissed at once from practical consideration. The gold rush started over two years ago, and a totally inexperienced newcomer arriving at this stage would be most unlikely to make his fortune. I met one ex-Indian Army officer who appeared to be well on the way to real big things, but he had been in the country ten years, was in the mining at the start, and was a trained geologist.

As to farming. At one altitude or another, and in selected soils, a very large variety of crops are grown with success, but at the present

time only tea, wheat, coffee, and pyrethrum are giving any reasonable return to the grower. Of these tea is the hands of large firms, and wheat has only a limited local market. Of the coffee, only that grown in very specially suitable soil and assisted by scientific fertilization is at the moment a paying proposition; in fact only a few experts are getting dividends from their farms. Pyrethrum, which is a daisy whose dried flowers have great toxic value, and are used in the manufacture of insecticides, is a new crop, and in certain high districts (about 8,000 feet) is doing very well. Here again however the market is limited and the price will probably fall. The extent to which Kenya has been affected by the world slump in commodity prices is hardly realised outside the colony. A tour through the country however makes it very plain. There are miles of uncut and deserted sisal, acres and acres of coffee unpicked, unweeded, and worthless, and vast stretches of land capable of producing good crops or of supporting stock lying fallow and empty. The farmers are almost everywhere in a precarious position. The land is commonly heavily mortgaged, and bankruptcy is not far off. One sympathises with their troubles, admires their optimism, and tries for their sakes to agree that better times must come. But it is not always easy to be convinced that such will in fact happen. Of the officer settlers of the 1922 Indian axeing few remain. I tried to trace two of them, but regret that they both appeared to have been "sunk without trace." The goldfields of Kakamega have given employment to a large number of broken down farmers. Others find a more or less precarious living in a variety of jobs, hotel and storekeeping, bar tending, running or working in garages. Nothing comes amiss, and nothing is *infra dig*.

From this situation it appears that Kenya holds out no prospects to the retiring officer in search of a livelihood. If conditions improve many experienced farmers will return to their abandoned farms. There is no opening for the inexperienced newcomer. I found the settlers scrupulously honest on this point. Though almost all of them would be only too ready to sell all, or a portion of, their farms, no single one of them suggested that I or any other officer would be well advised to acquire land with a view to making a living.

Kenya for the Retired Officer.

The idea of retiring to Kenya to live a country life without engaging in farming, otherwise than in a small way as a hobby, is a comparatively new one, and is even now only slowly gaining ground in

India. Yet the advantages to those of open air tastes, and especially to those without children are very great. The upbringing of a family is in fact the one real problem to settlement in Kenya, and this is a disadvantage which cannot be got over. Even if the facilities for education improve, there will always remain the question of climate and environment. It cannot be denied that from both moral and physical points of view English children are far better in England till they are fully grown up.

Apart from this disadvantage, the attractions offered by Kenya are almost endless. There is practically no game or sport which cannot be engaged in under delightful conditions and with a minimum of expense. As an example, there are three retired Indian Army colonels now living a few miles apart in one district. One of these breeds cattle and ponies, trains the latter, and engages in epic battles with wart hog which he says beats any pigsticking he has ever had in India. Another fishes in a marvellous trout stream, and takes photographs of dangerous game—both more or less on the front door step. The third plays tennis and specialises in a garden which at any time of the year is a joy to see. Yet even this considerable variety of tastes fails to exhaust the possibilities of the district, for there is a really first class golf course, a flourishing polo club, and a lot of gymkhana racing. Incidentally the district is quite lovely, and the climate almost ideal.

As a basis of calculation it may be said that a married couple would require about £1,500 to set themselves up, and an income of about £600 to live on. The value of land naturally varies considerably, that of coffee soil commanding the highest price. The retired officer only requires land suitable for a garden, and for grazing if he intends to keep horses and a cow or two to supply him with milk. From one hundred to two hundred acres would be amply sufficient for his needs, and this land he should be able to buy for a few pounds per acre. For those who have less ambitious ideas and who wish for a social life with an evening game of bridge at the local club, there are to be had in many places township plots of land suitable for a house and garden. While this savour of villadom in England, a house in a garden where the herbaceous borders flower throughout the year, situated say overlooking Nyeri golf course and facing the snows of Mount Kenya, is a very attractive proposition.

Houses are built as a rule by Indian contractors and workmen. If expense is a secondary factor, there are in Nairobi good architects

and building firms. With few exceptions settlers' houses in Kenya whether built of wood, brick, stone or concrete are both attractive and comfortable. Their building costs are low, and if the newcomer is short of money he can for a few pounds run up a perfectly adequate temporary house built on the "rondavel" or "banda" pattern out of bamboo and rammed earth and thatched with papyrus or other locally obtained material. With the addition of a brick fireplace such a house is perfectly comfortable. As a rule however settlers' houses are very civilised and are provided with all the amenities which we in India have accustomed ourselves, Heaven knows why, to do without.

It is to the horse lover who dreads the prospect of retired life in England where he will never get on a horse again, that Kenya is most attractive. There is almost endless scope in the country for the man of small means who is fond of horses. There are four classes of horse in the country—Somali ponies, "progenies," C. B.'s, and imported horses. Somalis are driven in by traders from Somaliland, and are to be picked up for a few pounds in the North of Kenya. They are very small, very coarse, and not of much scope. Many people however are very fond of them, and there is a lot of Somali gymkhana racing. "Progenies" are the progeny of a Somali mare by a non-Somali sire, usually a small imported T. B. or a C. B. stallion. The Progeny has therefore good blood in him, makes a good polo pony, and can be raced in gymkhanas and under rules at the larger meetings. C. B.'s vary considerably, English T. B. blood being mixed with South African and Arab. They provide the material for all the best races, and are on the whole a very good class of horse. Imported horses, other than stallions, are not very common. It is thus evident that the horse lover can suit his tastes and his pocket within wide limits. He can keep and race Somali ponies, buy cheap polo ponies, or if more ambitious and expert can try to breed and train a winner of the East African Derby, which is run at the Nairobi New Year meeting. Provided he settles in a "horse area" he will find his neighbours intensely keen on racing and on polo, and very ready to help him. The services of good class stallions are easily obtained, and breeding is neither a difficult nor an expensive affair. A horse's keep is very cheap, and may be put at £1 to £1-10/- per month, syce's pay included. Maize is largely fed and can be grown on almost any land.

From the experience of a short visit, the districts of Nyeri, Njoro, Molo and Moiben appeared to be the most attractive for the retired

officer. All these are areas where horses thrive and are kept by almost everyone. In any of them anyone interested in the horse is assured of a very warm welcome. Nyeri is perhaps the most suitable of them all, though for those who can face the height (over 8,000 feet) Molo is very attractive with country resembling a mixture of Wiltshire and Gleneagles. Njoro community have produced a most excellent pamphlet for the information of intending settlers of the retired army officer type. It is a most energetic district with a very good polo club.

Intending settlers would do well to gang warily. They should go to Kenya, get in touch with the Settlers Association in Nairobi, and then spend several months in the country before committing themselves to any purchase of land. They must remember that the figures given for the expenses of life in Kenya are, if not minima, at least only sufficient for a modest and quiet life there. They will find in Kenya many settlers possessed of large private means who live in considerable style. The country is delightfully free of any snobbery either of birth or of wealth, but the presence of these people is undoubtedly an inducement to spend money. It is almost essential, too, in calculating the cost of living, to make provision for reasonably frequent leaves to England. These may not be absolutely necessary from a health point of view, but indefinite exile does not make for happiness. The highlands of Kenya are all over 5,000 feet and a short annual holiday to the coast is very advisable.

Shooting in Kenya and Uganda.

Big game shooting in East Africa is both easier and cheaper than is generally realised. The tale of heavy expense has grown from the extravagant safaris taken out in the post-war boom years often by the worst possible type of so-called sportsman. The shooting was probably mostly done by the white hunter, who was paid at least £150 per month, and the total expenses of the shoot were enormous. These days have more or less passed away, and there are now only a few big safaris in Kenya each winter. In consequence there is much more room to shoot in, white hunters' charges have come down, and many would be only too glad to take out an officer on a small shoot for a very reasonable charge. No one I think is really capable of going out by himself on a big game shoot on his first visit. Native shikaris of the Kashmir type do not exist, though excellent trackers are to be found from among the local tribes on the actual shooting grounds. Lack of knowledge of country, of African conditions, of Swahili and tribal

languages would therefore make it almost impossible for a stranger to shoot alone. Added to these is the fact that the game most sought is definitely dangerous, must be taken on at the closest possible range, and if wounded, followed up and killed. There is however no reason why an officer who has shot big game in India, is a good shot, and has good nerves, should not go out with a professional hunter of a more modest type than the famous white hunters. This man would make all arrangements, run the camp, find the game, and assist in the shooting. For a month's shoot with such a white hunter, expenses including licenses, other than that for elephant, might be kept down to about £100. It is to be understood of course that this figure would mean the simplest type of camp on a scale similar to a Himalayan shoot. In one month's shoot a really good bag ought to be obtained, which should with luck include lion and buffalo as well as a large variety of antelope and gazelle. In Kenya an extra £10 license is required for a rhino, and a £25 one for one elephant. The days when elephant shooting could be made a profitable occupation have passed, as the price of ivory has fallen from about £1 per lb. to about 6/-. There are however often opportunities of shooting elephant on a cheap license as at present in the Meru Forest where the great increase in the size of the herd has caused the Game Department to order its reduction. The amount of game in East Africa has to be seen to be believed. Even the more sought after varieties are comparatively numerous. A white hunter offered me long odds that if expense was no object he could get me lion, elephant, rhino and buffalo all in one trip of five days from Nairobi.

Anyone thinking of a shoot in Kenya should write, preferably in advance, to Captain Ritchie, the Game Warden at Nairobi, or even to either of the Nairobi gunsmiths, Messrs. Shaw and Hunter, or Chas. Heyer and Coy. Both these firms arrange shoots.

It is questionable however whether an officer from India on the look out for a cheap shoot would not do better to go to Uganda. This country is not the pestilential tropical forest of our school books. It is a very beautiful and delightful country, and only ordinary precautions against malaria are necessary in its lower parts. It is far less shot than Kenya, and has some marvellous game districts. There are estimated to be 20,000 elephants in it alone. Finally the licences are very much cheaper; for £15 a serving officer can shoot everything he can find including one elephant and one rhino. Arrangements

for a shoot in Uganda are best made at Kampala, which can be reached by a cheap but slow railway journey of two days from Nairobi. Captain Pitman, the Game Warden, is an old 27th Punjabis and is delighted to do anything to help anyone from India.

While some seasons are better than others for shooting in East Africa, none is impossible and even in the period of a hot weather leave a good shoot in a very pleasant climate is easily possible.

East Africa for the Motorist.

East Africa even apart from its attractions for the big game hunter is a delightful country for a holiday. For a short visit it is somewhat expensive for a motor is essential to see the country, and hire in Nairobi is very dear. If some time is to be spent in the country it would be far better to buy a car trusting to sell it again on leaving. The cost of bringing a car over from India might be worth investigating. There is a road right from Mombasa to Nairobi, and as this passes near to Kilimanjaro and then through the Southern Game Reserve it is full of interest. Kenya roads are bad and motoring in wet weather is at times quite an adventure. The roads are made of unmetalled earth, and in black cotton soil areas cars are constantly bogged. Chains are essential even after a shower. Fortunately Kenya does not go in for whole wet days, and the roads dry very fast. The charm of the country however makes up for the bad roads, and there is hardly a part of the colony which is not worth visiting, for there is a complete lack of monotony, and immensely varied country and inhabitants. In Uganda the roads are excellent, and the scenery especially in the high western districts of Toro and Kigezi is very fine. From Kampala close to Lake Victoria, there is a very good circular tour of about a thousand miles. First West to Fort Portal and Ruwenzori (the Mountains of the Moon), then South through game reserve and across the Kazinga Channel between Lakes George and Edward to the lovely valley of Kabale in Kigezi country. From here there is a brand new high class mountain road over by the Mfumbiro volcanoes into the Belgian Congo. This connects with the Belgian road to Lake Kivu—a strangely beautiful spot. Returning to Kabale the circle is completed back to Kampala by Massala, and Kiwala overlooking Lake Victoria and the Sese Islands.

Everywhere the traveller will find the settlers most hospitable, and almost everywhere he will be amazed at the excellence of the

hotels. Nowhere will he have to endure the tawdry fifthrateness of the wayside Indian hotel or the grim horror of our filthy dak bungalows. The state of gross barbarism in which we are content to live is completely absent, and neither settler host nor hotel proprietor will expect him to provide the Indian "bistra," which may be left at home.

As regards the hotels, the "Outspan" at Nyeri would rank very high indeed amongst country hotels in England, and nowhere could its food be bettered. The Kiwala Hotel, and the unique "White Horse Inn" at Kabale, both in Uganda, would be famous at home. The "Highlands" at Molo, a collection of cottages and bandas smothered in herbaceous borders has an atmosphere only comparable to a shootin' and fishin' inn in Scotland, while in Tororo, an out of the way spot, is the most efficient hotel I have ever stayed in. Its proprietor should be running an "Imperial Palace."

The secret of these delightful country inns lies in the fact that they are run by gentlemen for gentlemen. Many of their owners are both ex-officers and ex-farmers, and often much better hosts than business men. Almost all would much rather stand you a drink at their bar than let you buy one. Hotel prices are round about 15/- to £1 a day.

The ambitious motorist, who is out for a bit of an adventure, can now motor right through from Mombasa to London. The route runs through Kenya and Uganda to Rejaf on the Nile in the Sudan, thence West through the Belgian Congo and French Equatorial Africa to Kano. From there it turns North passing near Timbuctoo, across the Sahara and Morocco to Ceuta and so to Spain. This route is organized, petrol, oil and water are obtainable throughout (though in some places at considerable expense), and the French Trans-Saharan Service give pilotage and assistance across desert. The distance from Nairobi to Ceuta is 6,000 miles. The Secretary of the Royal East African Automobile Association at Nairobi has prepared a pamphlet on this route and will give any enquirer full information.

More prosaic is the rail and steamer route down the Nile to Khartoum. This is a normal all the year round fortnightly service, and as far North as Nimule on the Uganda-Sudan frontier is very interesting, especially if a short detour to the Murchison Falls is made. These are on the Victoria Nile. As falls go they are not enormous, but they are in a closed and uninhabited sleeping sickness area, and the banks

of the river below them swarm with undisturbed game, especially elephant. Once the Sudan is reached however the journey down the Nile becomes slow and monotonous. Three days through the sudd are followed by five more through singularly uninteresting and barren country. Fares are high and the Sudan steamers slow and indifferent.

Kenyan Politics.

Kenya is in trouble. Her stable industry is nearly bankrupt, her budget unbalanced. Her native troubles are small at present, but can hardly avoid becoming serious in the not far distant future. And yet her troubles are mainly due to her settlers, to the endeavour to create in her Highlands a white man's country. Uganda next door, a native country run by and for the native with the British official in the position of an Indian Political Officer, is prosperous and happy. At present Kenya is choosing the worst way to help herself. Relations between her Governor and his Administration on the one side, and the settlers on the other are deplorable. They are about as cordial as those obtaining lately between the Government of India and the Congress party. The settlers have become exasperated, despairing of help from England or from their own Administration, and they are now drifting in the direction of civil disobedience. Kenya then, this lovely fascinating country, is in urgent need of help. Help from England, some system of bringing the producer closer to the consumer and eliminating the middle man who makes all the profits would be of great assistance to her. She needs help too from a reinforcement of settlers of the best type. She has in the past been cursed by being made a playground for the idle and the rich, who have given her a bad name, and alienated outside sympathy from her genuine hardworking settlers. Her development too has so coincided with periods of post-war boom and world slumps, that no one can say with any certainty what normal conditions or prices are.

An influx of retired officers from the civil and military services would be of great service to the country at this time. The best type of settlers are too immersed in the work of their farms to be able to take an active part in politics. There is in consequence a need of men of authority and standing who are willing to devote their time and abilities to this service. Here then to the politically minded who cannot aspire to a political career in England, is an opportunity to take up in their retirement an occupation of the greatest interest, and to be of service to a young and struggling colony.

INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION

BY MAJOR-GENERAL H. ROWAN-ROBINSON, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.

After the World-war Great Britain was seized with a *furor* for destruction. "Scrap the lot" became our national motto with regard to our defence forces. We had achieved pre-eminence in all the adjuncts of modern warfare. The possession of the most powerful Navy, of the greatest Air Fleet, and the best mechanized Army in the world, backed by an industry developed to perfection through four painful years of struggle gave us a dominating voice in international councils. It was, of course, neither necessary nor desirable that our military power should be maintained at so high a level. But we went to the opposite extreme. We are not indeed possessed of a "craven fear of being great," or we should not stand where we are; but we certainly have a strong obsession against anything that savours of armaments and armigerence. In spite of bitter experience, we believed that by shedding our armour we could ensure the peace so dear to our nature, so essential to our survival. We, therefore, cast our supremacy to the winds and proceeded to destroy our weapons. The process of reducing the fighting services had a corresponding effect on the industries which supplied them, and they too fell to a low ebb. That was only the natural outcome of our policy, but it was a pity that the war-organization of industry should not, for our future guidance, have been subjected to close study. Mr. Lloyd George has shown in his Memoirs through what travail we passed before reaching the light; and it is perhaps not yet too late to collect, collate, sift and systematize his teachings and those of others into an ordered plan.

The Americans are treating their hard-earned knowledge more seriously. It is true they did a good deal of scrapping just as we did, but they have kept some of the framework of a great army, and they have produced a plan for industrial mobilization which can be put into effect on the outbreak of war. This plan has been fully described by Captain Roy D. Burdick in the March-April 1934 number of *The Military Engineer*. His article is summarized below to draw attention to its carefully considered provisions, in the hope that it may help us to frame a suitable, if belated, plan of our own.

The author begins with a warning against rigidity of system. Were war to be made in Utopia, no doubt we could plan everything

beforehand and expect each element to function perfectly. In practice, we must allow considerable elasticity, because no amount of forethought can forecast the development of machines and the methods of their employment. Modern war is essentially a matter for improvisation, for the tremendous issues at stake greatly stimulate the inventive faculty and develop industrial capacity to a high degree.

Industrial mobilization is defined as "the diversion from normal tasks of such part of the industrial and economic resources of the nation as may be necessary to ensure the procurement, in the quantities and at the times needed, of the requirements of the armed forces in war." The production of the requirements of the armed forces in a major war involves the country so deeply as seriously to interfere, in the absence of preventive steps, with the regimen of economic life. The plan must, therefore, also include a general regulation of all industrial and commercial activities, so that the national resources may be devoted entirely to the winning of the war.

Most of the supply problems in the World-war grew out of two causes: the absence of a definite schedule of requirements, and ignorance of the capacity and capabilities of industry. No one knew where to go to get orders filled, how long their production would take, nor what quantities would be needed. Moreover there was no central authority to discriminate as to the relative importance of items on demand. The results were that there was much competitive buying by the various departments with a consequent lift of prices; often production of unimportant items was quick and of essentials slow; there were unnecessary migrations of labour, ill-advised expansions, and financial tangles. Most of these failures were due to absence of advance-planning, and they would have been much more costly had not the Allied armies stood as a buffer between the United States and the enemy during the process of organization and equipment; and had not the American factories been getting into their stride by supplying the Allies with vast quantities of munitions.

After the War, Committees in the Senate and in Congress deliberated painstakingly over errors, and sought insurance against their repetition in future. They took quantities of evidence political, industrial, financial and military; and out of their deliberations was evolved the Act of June 4, 1920, amending the National Defence Act of 1916.

Under this Act, as amended, an Assistant Secretary of War was specially appointed to deal with the procurement of all military supplies and connected business, and with adequate provision for the mobilization of material and of industrial organization essential to war-time needs. Moreover, the President was empowered to appropriate in time of actual or imminent war, and for just compensation, private property to public use. Further, the Secretary of War had to prepare lists of private factories capable of manufacturing ammunition or of being transformed into munition factories, with full information as to the nature of such plants.

Thus the Act provided a method for the procurement of munitions which included : the supervision by a central agency of the various supply activities ; plans for the utilization of the material and industrial resources of the country ; and a survey of industry as regards its war capacity.

Since 1920 the great mass of evidence taken has been unravelled, classified and evaluated. At the same time note has been taken of the great progress of science and of its effect on the lessons of the war. During this period there have been such quick developments in aircraft and in the mechanization of ground troops that "adaptability" was clearly indicated as the first test to apply to the whole or any part of the great plan ; for only an adaptable scheme would be susceptible of adjustment to rapid progress.

From 1920 to 1927 was a time for research and survey. During this period also a set of principles and policies was being slowly evolved, to crystallize during the succeeding years and finally to be woven into the pattern of a fully co-ordinated plan.

Organization for control.—The first question to settle was the nature of the organization that must carry out the plan of economic regulation. Many held this to be the affair of the Secretary of War. But that view was overridden on the ground that it is for him to send armies to fight, and it would be impossible for him at the same time to control most of the business of the nation. In attempting to do so, too, he would be absorbing some of the functions of the President. The decision was, therefore, given in favour of a civilian super-agency, independent of, but co-operating with, the permanent executive departments. This was divided into a number of agencies* each

* Corresponding in regard to the nature of the subjects treated with some of the Sub-committees of the Committee of Imperial Defence.

controlled by an administrator who would report directly to the President, and each dealing with some major element of the economic structure. The heads of the more important of these agencies, together with the Secretaries of War and the Navy, would constitute an Advisory Defence Council which, acting in co-operation with the Cabinet, would provide the President with expert information on all phases of the war effort.

The War Industries Administration is to form the keystone of this proposed economic structure. Its main duty is co-ordination between the supply and the demand for certain essential commodities and services—a duty that resolves itself into three fundamental parts, namely, the retention within reasonable limits of demands for critical materials and services; the encouragement of production to the point of meeting all reasonable demands; the establishment of appropriate priorities to deal with shortages in proportion to their respective urgency.

The office of the Administration is divided into an Administrative Division, performing the usual administrative functions of any large office, three technical and six control divisions. The technical divisions provide a technical staff for the administrator and serve as fact-finding and policy-formulating agencies. The control divisions deal with Commodities, Facilities, Power, Transportation, Labour and Industrial Contact. They interlock very intimately with the other Administrations so that the full implications of proposals of mutual effect may be considered before action is taken on them. They are also the points of contact between the Government and Industry. On the one hand, they represent demand—all demands from whatever sources—for the products of industry and, on the other hand, they co-ordinate that demand with the supply which industry is able to offer.

The War Trade Administration is intended to control and influence international commerce in war-time. Its purpose is two-fold. In the first place it will seek to augment and conserve the supply of commodities necessary for domestic consumption. In the second place it will endeavour to deprive the enemy of vital materials for which he is dependent on sources outside his own country. The principal means to be employed to these ends are control over exports and imports, preclusive purchase of materials needed by the enemy and other appropriate activities.

The War Labour Administration will have to deal with the many labour problems that arise in war. It will assist in providing men for the armed forces and at the same time ensure the equitable distribution of labour in industry and agriculture. While endeavouring to further the war effort to the utmost, it will minimise disruption of the economic life of the country as far as possible.

The Public Relations Administration deals with publicity, press, censorship and propaganda.

The Selective Service Administration is provided for operating the scheme of selective service that may be authorized by Congress. The plan contemplates that the burden of manning the fighting forces shall fall equally upon all who are eligible for such duty, while at the same time protection is afforded to essential industries against undue inroads on skilled personnel.

Other administrations may be formed as demanded by the exigencies of war. It might be found, for instance, that transportation which, under existing arrangements, is to be controlled by the Administration of War Industries, should be treated as a major element with an administration of its own.

War Committees.—In addition to the Administrations, there are to be a certain number of War Committees such as the Price Control Committee and the Capital Issues Committee, which deal with the less tangible matters of the nature indicated by their appellations. They are to be, in no sense, executive, but their decisions and policies will be enforced by the appropriate executive agencies.

National War Service Corporations.—It may happen in a major war that existing industrial establishments are inadequate for the demands made upon them. Moreover, it may be necessary to expand their facilities out of all proportion to the capacity for which they will have use after the emergency has passed. In such cases corporations may be established in which the Government would own the capital stock and manage the business. The Emergency Fleet Corporation furnished a notable example of procedure of this nature in the World-war.

* * * * *

War is now largely an affair of machines; and modern military forces can therefore only be kept in action in so far as their material is adequate. The small reserves it is possible to maintain in peace

are quickly exhausted, and then dependence has been placed on industry, which must be ready to produce at a suitable rate the material necessary for the prosecution of the war. To do this effectively the latent power of the country has to be transformed into military strength through industrial mobilization.

The plan outlined above has been elaborated by the heads of the Army and Navy, but it avoids any concentration of authority in their hands extraneous to their natural zones of influence. On the contrary, the task of welding together the component parts of the Nation's power is to be placed under a civilian agency, whose head is the President himself.

Enabling legislation is necessary before the plan can be put into full operation. A Legislative appendix is provided accordingly, and contains drafts of the necessary bills.

An Army Industrial College was instituted in 1924 with the primary object of training army officers to deal with the industrial problems with which they will be faced in war. The College has since grown considerably both in respect to the scope of its teaching and to the number of students it educates; and among the latter are now included both officers of the Navy and of the Civil services.

Such very briefly is the American plan. Prior to the war the Committee of Imperial Defence did a lot of valuable work in forging connecting links between the various departments involved in Defence; and no doubt it has been to some extent active in the same direction since the Armistice. But we would like to see something of the nature of a definite plan of industrial mobilization. The matter could be fully threshed out in Parliament and in the Government departments, for there need be no secrecy about it. The value of enabling bills ready in the event of an emergency for quick passage through the House hardly needs accentuation.

Our policy is no longer supported by arms alone, but by the whole power of the nation; and the more completely the latter is, or can be, mobilized, the more effectively shall we be able to intervene by voice or arms in world affairs. Moreover unless there is some definite plan for industrial mobilization founded on experience, survey and calculation, there can be no basis for estimation of reserves of men and material needed to bridge the period between the outbreak of war and the time that factories and man-power schemes become effective.

Consequently, we shall either have to keep a very large margin of reserves in peace if we wish to feel secure, which is an expensive process, or we shall have to take the risk of finding our reserves expended before we shall have exhausted those of the enemy. An estimate of the productivity of factories is also necessary as a guide to the choice of times when personnel must be absorbed into the fighting forces, so that they may be fully trained when the machines are ready for use. In the absence of correct correlation there will be obviously a waste of power. Great industrial strength is a very valuable asset in national defence. We should be ready to exploit it to the utmost; but that is impossible without a plan for its quick mobilization.

" V. B. "

(BUT ONLY AS A LIGHT AUTOMATIC.)

By " PHOENIX."

Not having thought about V. Bs. very much I am in a position to approach the problem of their employment with an unbiassed mind, with the broad outlook. Everyone else in the army has thought about them so much that they fear to tread where I am now about to rush in. If they rushed into print themselves they would certainly be wrong because they would not have got at the root of the trouble like I have. The root and the trouble lies in our past history. Here it is.

Many years ago, two gentlemen, (whom I will call Mr. Vickers and Mr. Maxim), thought out and made a rifle which, with the requisite coaxing, went on firing itself. This rifle was so pleasing to the soldiery that they decided to adopt it. Since it was a rifle, everyone agreed that the Infantry should have it. But the Infantry (who in those far-off times were very simple minded) didn't like the look of it. In the first place it was so big and heavy, and it didn't look a bit *like* a rifle. Then again it would keep on stopping for no apparent reason; and also it has a big bag of spare bits which looked very complicated.

So the Infantry looked round and said :

" Here, what's this ? This here's a Gunner job. Look at all the whatnots—no one but a Gunner can teach us this here."

And so it was.

(Although I can never understand why the Sappers were not given it first. They are always given every new toy till they get tired of it and hand it on to the Air Force or Tank Corps or some one.)

Well, the Gunners began teaching the Infantry how to use the Vickers Maxim Rifle (And that is why it was called the Vickers Maxim Gun, best beloved). They said, this GUN is unreliable and may stop firing. It must therefore be used always in pairs.

They said, this is a GUN and must be " Served." It must have a " Team" or a " Detachment." So they added to the rifleman who fired it another rifleman to help, and then another and then yet another. Then they said, for this SECTION of GUNS let there be a Range-taker, and Scouts to watch and protect it. Even, they said at times, this GUN needs an Escort.

So grew up the tradition of Machine Gunnery, (not machine musketry, mark you!) and it took root.

When the Lewis Rifle and the Hotchkiss Rifle were born they, too, became GUNS and had sections to serve them.

In those early days we could only afford two of those Maxims per battalion. What is why they only called them Machine-gun Sections. Had there been four of them they would have been called Machine-gun Batteries. As it was, when, in the War of 1914-18, automatic rifles increased the Infantry had become so bloomin' independent that they called them Machine-gun Platoons—a horrid anachronism. Machine *Rifle* Platoons, yes; but Machine-gun—no.

With only one section of Maxims we were naturally very anxious and fussy about our only child. We were anxious not to lose it. We are still fussy, in spite of having quite a large family. Hence we do not like letting them take risks or using them boldly lest, peradventure, one or two should be lost.

Now we have the V. B. and everyone has spotted that for the Light Automatic rôle, it has been issued in ones. Many have been staggered by this awful heresy and have said "Let them be grouped in a Troop." (Muttering under their breaths to each other, "Then, begad, we'll pair them off again.")

But it is worse than that. No provision has been made for a "Team" to "Serve" the V. B. gun! Many are thinking how to get over this difficulty. They take counsel together saying if we attach a scout and perchance a farrier also, then doubtless in practice we will be able to wangle a team of three or four to serve the gun.

Frankly, I know nothing about it, but I'm sorry for the Vickers-Berthier Automatic Rifle. I am sorry for Mr. Vickers and for Mr. Berthier who, I am sure, tried so hard to make a rifle and not a gun. I feel that if we have, say, sixteen V. Bs. in a cavalry regiment in peace, we will, if history repeats itself, have sixty-four in the next war. Why not?

I'll tell you why not.

Because a lot of machine-gun minded people will say, "*You Can't*, because there won't be enough men in a regiment to provide 'teams' for sixty-four V. B. guns." Also because the Finance authorities, very properly, will say, "Sorry. Impossible. Cost too much. Can't afford it."

Let me say this. Mr. Berthier's youngest grandson is already thinking out a way of making synthetic steel for V. Bs. out of seawater and hot air. Now then! Why, we'll be able to afford for each soldier a V. B. in his hand and another in his hip pocket.

Finally, I wish to make it quite clear that I am in no way biassed. I *like* machine gunners. (I was one myself for several years.) I also like my great aunt.

(*Note for Editor.*—A gunner friend of mine says, my history is not accurate: *but he can't prove it.* Anyway, it is the only reasonable explanation of the facts.)

THE TRAINING OF A RAILWAY BATTALION OF THE AUXILIARY FORCE (INDIA).

BY LIEUT. D. M. HAMBLY.

"To protect railway personnel and property in emergencies, normally entailing :—

(a) Co-operation with regular troops allotted for the protection of strategic railways.

(b) Acceptance of full responsibility, in conjunction with the police, and pending the arrival of regular troops, if necessary and available, for the protection of important non-strategic railways."

As a result of the recent reorganisation of the Auxiliary Force (India) necessitated by the economies which had to be effected by the Army in India, the railway battalions have been allotted a rôle different from that of other infantry battalions. The rôle laid down for them is reproduced at the top of this page.

Their training has also been altered and they now complete their whole year's work during the period of their annual camp. No work, except the firing of the annual musketry course, is done during the rest of the year.

The members of these units are divided into two classes :—Active and Reserve. The former class attend the camp of exercise and fire the annual musketry course, while the latter only fire this musketry course.

Officers and N. C. O.'s of the rank of corporal and above attend camp for 12 days while privates attend for eight days only.

During the first four days of camp only the officers and N. C. O.'s are present. They all work together in the ranks and are drilled, lectured and carry out T. E. W. T.'s under the permanent staff, consisting of an adjutant and drill instructors. The work done during this period is carried out with the object of training the officers and N. C. O.'s as instructors and leaders, so that they will be able to take complete charge of their platoons and sections on the arrival of the men. With this end in view T. E. W. T.'s and lectures are prepared which cover the same problems that will have to be worked out practically on the arrival of the men. During work on the parade ground officers and N. C. O.'s are given opportunities of acting as instructors.

On the fifth day the privates of the battalion arrive and the permanent staff retire to the background leaving the Auxiliary Force officers and N. C. O.'s to carry out the training of their men on their own.

It will be seen that the rôle of a railway battalion is definitely limited and when, or if, employed the activities of the unit will be restricted to defence. The whole training is based on this fact. Work on the parade ground is reduced to a minimum—just sufficient work is done here to “keep the man's hand in” in squad drill, platoon and company drill and bayonet fighting. No very high standard in these is demanded but it is surprising the degree of skill that is achieved at the end of the training period.

The training carried out by all ranks is as follows :—

Physical training for 20 minutes the first thing each morning. Then, after a break of 15 minutes to change into uniform, the hour before breakfast is occupied in training in squad drill with and without arms, bayonet fighting, guard duties, platoon and company drill, fire control and discipline. These are spread over the eight training days. The time allotted to each varies ; for some the full hour is given, for others only half an hour.

During the remainder of the day practical training in the work which the unit may expect to be called upon to perform is carried out. In the current year in the particular unit with which this article deals, the following exercises were adopted for this purpose.

Defence of a locality.—The general idea of this scheme was that insurgents had attacked the local railway station and, in addition to damaging the station buildings, had wrecked a portion of the permanent-way. As further attempts at wrecking were expected the company had been sent by train from its headquarters with orders to protect the station area and act as an escort to a working party that was repairing the damaged permanent-way. The exercise commenced from the arrival of the company at the station.

The company commander then carried on in the usual manner ; issuing orders to his platoon commanders after making his reconnaissance ; the platoon commanders subsequently giving the necessary orders to the section commanders who selected positions for their men. For this practice there was a skeleton enemy who, as well as the defending force, were issued with blank ammunition.

Armoured Trains.—Although the unit possesses armoured trains, these are not now in use. Therefore the men are given opportunities of learning to convert ordinary railway trucks into protected vehicles. Two types have been evolved. One is a low-sided truck with sand-bagged sides and ends with the necessary loop-holes left. The other is more elaborate. For this a high-sided truck is used. The sides are protected by a thick layer of sand, contained on the inside by old sleepers. In the middle of the truck a structure of old sleepers, protected by sandbags, is erected. From this structure to the front of the truck a roof of sleepers and sandbags is built.

Defence of a building.—For this some condemned buildings in the vicinity were fortunately available. There were no restrictions on demolitions or any other works that the officer in charge might consider desirable to achieve his result. This resulted in a really practical exercise in putting a building in a state of defence.

Escort duties.—This was combined with an exercise in procedure when working in aid to the civil power. The general scheme was that the women and children occupying a railway colony were to be evacuated to a 'keep' some distance away, owing to the presence in the neighbourhood of an unruly mob. For this exercise parties were told off for duty as the women and children and as the unruly mob; they were given a free hand in acting and dressing the part, and of this permission they gladly availed themselves with some remarkable and startling results. A member of the permanent staff impersonated a magistrate who did things he should not do, did not do things he should have done and often was not where he should have been. The first part of the scheme was the collecting of the families from the railway colony (the tents of the camp did duty as the houses for this) and bringing them to the assembly point. The convoy then moved off with its escort to the 'keep.' When the convoy and escort was attacked by the mob, the commander, already harassed by the most unruly "women and children," found the vagaries of the pseudo-magistrate more than trying. One N. C. O. was forced to open fire on his own. In subsequent questioning as to how many rounds he had fired he replied, without any hesitation "one." Unfortunately for him there were five corpses lying in front of his position! Needless to say the N. C. O. was an old soldier!

To members of an Auxiliary Force unit this scheme was probably the most useful of all those carried out in the period of camp for it

brought out all points of the procedure to be observed when acting in aid to the civil power and it is this work that the Force is most likely to be called upon to perform. In the course of the scheme it was evident that all ranks do possess a very sound knowledge of the actions they are required to take when acting in this capacity.

A regular army instructor who was attached to the battalion for the period of camp admitted that from this exercise he had learned a great deal on this subject and felt that he was then in a position to give the N. C. O.'s of his own regiment some very useful information on the very thorny points involved in this branch of a soldier's work.

On the final day was held a ceremonial parade and an inspection by the commanding officer.

Thus, in the short period of eight days, an attempt, and a very successful one, is made to train all ranks of the unit in the work they are likely to be called upon to perform if called out.

The camp itself is entirely self-contained. Tents are supplied by Ordnance ; rations are arranged by the nearest regular army Supply Officer. A small messing contribution is made by the men to supplement their rations. A contractor is engaged for the cooking and serving of meals ; he also runs a coffee shop and a canteen.

For the period of camp additional instructors from regular units are attached. Some, such as Lewis Gun and, in the days when armoured trains were in use, 12-pounder gun instructors are specialists, while others are for purposes of general training. The unit has always been fortunate in the N. C. O.'s sent for this purpose ; they have been keen to help in every way and have always realised that they are dealing with men of an auxiliary, as distinct from a regular, unit.

A medical officer is present throughout the period of camp ; his duties are, fortunately, usually light but his presence is reassuring. For the supervision of the sanitation of the camp he is assisted by the police, who are Auxiliary Force members, one of whose duties this work is.

An Auxiliary Force subaltern is orderly officer each day and he carries out the usual duties attached to this unenviable position, including the mounting of a quarter guard each evening. This guard is provided by the different companies in rotation and there is great rivalry in smartness of turnout and drill on this parade. The mount-

ing is witnessed each day by a large and hypercritical audience, composed of the more fortunate members of the battalion.

Each evening inter-company games of football and hockey are played in connection with the tournaments that run throughout the whole period of camp. These are all very keenly contested games and all contribute to that *esprit-de-corps* that is certainly a part of all railway units. The members all have a common interest in their civilian work, and, as their officers in camp are also their officers in their ordinary work, the unit has an *esprit-de-corps*, not only of the regiment, but also of the railway.

The officers during camp volunteer to give lectures on military subjects of interest to the men. Examples of such lectures are, the Gallipoli campaign, experiences when called out in aid to the civil power and wartime flying—the lecturers all having personal experience of their subject.

Obviously the absence of all the members of the battalion from their railway duties at one and the same time cannot be contemplated. The camp is, therefore, held for four periods. The attendance at each period is, approximately, four officers and 150 other ranks.

When the method of completing the year's training during the period of camp with no other parades for the rest of the year was first introduced many were sceptical of the results that would ensue. After two years of such training, however, all are agreed that efficiency has, on the whole, been in no way impaired but has probably, on the contrary, been increased.

FOR WANT OF A NAIL.

BY MAJOR T. H. E. WOODS, I.A.O.C.

After the fall of Kut-el-Amara in April 1916 the opposing forces in Mesopotamia settled down to a territorial stalemate which lasted until General Sir Stanley Maude's masterly drives sent the Turks fleeing helter-skelter to the north-west in the spring of 1917.

The British force badly needed rest and refitting and the Turkish High Command well realised the impossibility of pushing down the Tigris or the Euphrates; so there we squatted, facing each other, each trying his hardest to damage his enemy as much as possible by local raids, surprise bombardments, daily strafes and the like.

As the spring of 1916 merged into summer, arrangements for the exchange of prisoners were made. We had to give up two Turks or Germans for one British or Indian. Those of us who were camped near the river-head at Falayieh often saw the pontoon bridge open to pass steamer loads of ex-prisoners back to their own lines and freedom. Usually the Turkish prisoners were passed up during the night, an obvious precaution—but on one occasion, during May, for some unearthly reason the rule was broken. One hot afternoon, to our great surprise, the famous old "Blosse Lynch," full of Turkish and German officer prisoners, anchored in mid-stream, right in the middle of our camp, instead of anchoring about a mile downstream until dark and then coming through.

Someone had blundered, but little did we realise what this was to mean to us in the near future!

As the camp came to life after the midday heat, most of the personnel found time for a look at the prisoners boat. There was precious little to be seen as the canvas awnings were closely drawn, sentries being posted to prevent any inquisitive Turk or German having a peep at the surroundings. This seems to have been the only precaution against amateur reconnaissance.

The "Blosse Lynch" was moored almost parallel with the famous Tigris Corps Ammunition barges. Three massive steel barges of German make which had been captured from the Turks. These barges, each about 100 feet long, carried the whole of the Advanced Ammunition Park Ammunition, of all descriptions.

Almost simultaneously with the serving of tea to the officer prisoners on the *Blosse Lynch* the limbers and G. S. wagons of batteries and ammunition columns in the front line began to arrive for their daily refill of ammunition. The noise and bustle of their arrival and loading operations was clearly audible on the boat, as noise carries wonderfully over water, and one of the prisoners, the well-known German gunnery expert, Major Von X, determined to verify with his eyes what his trained ears told him must be happening.

The awnings round the upper and lower decks and the specially posted sentries made ordinary observation an impossibility. There was, however, one spot which was possibly unscreened and Von X resolved to try from there. On all the old river steamers the lavatories were suspended over the stern of the boat on the lower deck, outside the awnings. Each compartment had a small Louvre pattern ventilator, the flank compartments having an extra one each in the sides. When Von X, having proffered the only possible excuse to go below, reached the stern of the boat, he found to his joy that the compartment nearest the right bank of the river was vacant and that the ventilator had been left wide open. Here was a stroke of luck indeed ; he was able to make careful notes of the disposition and functions of the Advanced Ammunition Park barges without the least let or hindrance. What he saw opened his eyes to certain possibilities, the practicability of which could be tested at the Turkish Army Headquarters in Kut.

On his arrival there Von X with but little difficulty obtained an interview with Marshal Kemal Pasha and laid before him a clever scheme for the destruction of the British Army ammunition barges.

II

A few nights afterwards a Turkish officer of the Mesopotamian Levies, disguised as an Arab boatman, dropped silently down the Tigris, floating with the tide on a *qirbah*, or inflated goatskin. His outer garment, a brown camel-hair *abba*, rendered him practically indistinguishable in the dark. Soon after midnight, the waning moon got up and from the left bank the challenge of the sentries in the Turkish reserve, support and front line trenches rang out. Several shots were popped off at the black mass in mid-stream before the sentries decided that it must be the corpse of some animal or other and desisted. The firing of the Turkish sentries naturally started the British outposts off and the frail argosy nearly came to grief when a rather woolly-headed Gurkha Naik thought it a good opportunity

and excuse to loose off a couple of bursts of fire with his Lewis gun at the shapeless object, apparently so deathly still.

Towards dawn our voyager found himself bumping softly against the pontoons of the British boat bridge at Falayieh. The bridge had been cut at sundown, as usual, and fortunately for him he drifted against one of the pontoons sticking out from the right bank. This saved him the ordeal of crossing the bridge and running the gauntlet of the Bridge police. Deflating and sinking his tell-tale goatskin, he slowly reached the bank, finding plenty of concealment between the boats, and was able to dodge the bridge-head sentry with little difficulty. He soon found his way to the spot where a small fleet of *mahe-las*, or dhows, was moored alongside the bank to discharge bulk rations at the Supply Depot.

Representing himself to be one of the crew of a *mahela* which had gone downstream to Basra earlier than was expected and left him behind, he joined himself to one of the crews. The *rais-el-mahayla* at once questioned him about his pass, but he assumed a suggestive leer and hinted that the pass, together with his money, was stolen in a brothel in one of the marsh villages on the left bank the night before. This explanation also conveniently explained the fact of his wet clothes, suggesting that he had to swim across, having failed to catch the bridge the night previous.

When unloading operations commenced, the crew were glad of his volunteered help. They had brought up a good supply of Huntley-Palmer biscuits for sale to the troops and had perforce to carry them some distance to the "bazaar" enclosure. This was the only place to which the Arabs were allowed to sell goods to the troops. He had not been very long engaged on his self-imposed task when he discovered to his delight that the job he was on could be turned to the very best account. He found that, as the Arabs sold their biscuits to the troops, they also sold the packing cases, which were invaluable for store boxes, tables, chicken coops and the thousand-and-one things a soldier in camp knocks up out of such material. The tin linings seemed to have no sale, but were just thrown into a corner of the enclosure. Those tin linings suggested certain possibilities.

Our pseudo-Arab *mehalaychi* made himself very popular with the *rais-el-mahayla* by tidying up the jumbled heap of tin linings—a thing never attempted before—and soon he had a neat pile lying almost

due north and south ; slightly sloped, pyramid fashion, to the west. The reason for this will be seen later.

On the third day after his arrival, the friendly *mahayla* to which he had joined himself was suddenly ordered by the I. W. T. O. to join a P-boat going downstream. Two hours before sailing, the A. P. M. and his assistant came aboard in the course of a weekly surprise raid to inspect passes. Our hero promptly disappeared to the biscuit enclosure. Here, however, he met another check ; the British Military Policeman also asked him for his pass. Evidently a round up ! Thinking very quickly and lying hard he said his pass was in his clothing left on his *mehayalah* which was unloading above the *jissr* (bridge) and that he could not get it until the bridge opened again at 3-45 p.m. To his surprise the yarn was swallowed. But the double ordeal had frightened him and he determined to get away to Sheikh Saad or Ali-el-Gharbi by the friendly boat, if possible.

The *rais-el-mahayla* was only too glad to have such a willing worker and he had no difficulty in stowing away on board. Slowly the *mehayalah* dropped downstream and then came about to tie up for towing on the starboard side of the P-boat. The other tow was lying a cable's length or so ahead and the steamer slowly forged upstream and took her alongside, thus completing its double tow. Turning easily across the stream, the steamer's nose swung gradually round with the current and then straightened out. As her engine room telegraphs rang for three-quarters speed ahead, a faint cheer rose from the sick and wounded lying on her decks. Poor fellows, they felt that civilization was drawing nearer with every beat of the paddles !

Sheikh Saad was soon reached and passed. Soon the urgent question for the stowaway was whether the boat would go straight through, or tie up at Ali-el-Gharbi for the night. If the former, he would have to take his chance of a drop-off in the river and another wet night. If the latter, he would have no difficulty in slipping off the boat into the riverside bazaar and disappearing in the crowd. Here his previous good luck deserted him, as he found the boat going straight as a trout through Ali-el-Gharbi, although dusk had come on. The reason was that the river was high with the rains and the new P-boats each had an electric searchlight, and for them it was unnecessary to tie up for the night, except in traversing shoal water in the

summer. Here again he had to act quickly to avoid being carried a few extra miles downstream. Begging a handful of dates and a *chapatti* from the crew to keep him going, he was over the port side of the *mehyalah* like an otter and soon reached the left bank of the river. Walking by night and lying up in dead ground by day, he worked his way back to the Suiwaika marsh beyond which lay the Turkish outposts of Kut-el-Amara. Dawn on the tenth morning of his departure from Kut found him on the edge of the marsh, seeking a path. No path of any sort revealed itself, and there was nothing for it but to wade through the mud and slime and risk a bullet from the Turkish sentries.

After much difficulty he eventually found himself in the presence of the *bimbashi* commanding the outpost line and the explanation he had to give ensured his rapid passage through the lines, until he was soon telling the full story to the Turkish General Khalil Beg himself.

III

In the riverhead camp of the British force, life went on as usual; little occurred to upset the even tenor and routine and it seemed as if nothing could happen until reinforcements arrived from other fronts in the autumn to enable us to resume the offensive.

On the evening of the 12th of July the whole camp was beginning to get active after the long midday rest in the heat. By about 5-30 p.m. the bridge was opened, fatigue parties commenced to fall-in and bustle about. A. T. carts, G. S. wagons and limbers began to rumble past towards the A. A. Park, and the dreary round of a midsummer evening's work recommenced. Suddenly, there came the unmistakable scream of heavy shell at high-angle fire followed by a loud burst. Someone yelled out that some mules had been hit; a screaming stampede of mules through the lines confirmed this.

After a long interval the whistle of another shell was heard; this time it dropped in the river just ahead of the third ammunition barge. A voice yelled out "There's Fritz up!!" and there in the sky was an enemy plane doing a figure of eight high up, and firing an occasional coloured Vêry light. It now became patent to all that the Turk had got a long range gun up to the front line and was coolly shelling our barges, firing at extreme range. The biscuit tins were an unmistakable mark in the setting sun, making a gigantic heliograph!

Another shell screamed past us high over our heads to drop in the river on the starboard-quarter of the third barge. Then a very brave thing was done. The naval gunner captain of a small screw river boat (the T-2 as far as can be remembered), came boldly alongside the barges, hitched on and strove with might and main to tug them away from the bank. Three or four more shells dropped perilously close whilst this was going on, but the captain stuck to his heroic task. To our horror we realised that the barges couldn't be moved! We remembered that the heavy steel cables with the anchors of all three barges were carried over the high bund and were well buried in the mud on the far side. The gunners forming the personnel of the A. A. Park strove with might and main to get the cables up, but they had no shovels to dig with, no files or hack-saws to cut the cables with, and no means of getting the barges away. Could there have been a simple quick-release gadget on the cables the barges could have been floated off the bank very easily; the four-mile current of the Tigris would then quickly have carried them out of range. But it was not to be. Soon the T-2 was compelled to give up its efforts and we had the mortification of squatting down and of watching the shells creep nearer the target. The fourteenth—not the thirteenth—shell hit the matting roof of the hindmost barge, just before dusk made further spotting difficult for the observation plane. As soon as this happened, we realised it was madness to remain around in that neighbourhood. About three to four hundred yards away from the dumps, and about five to six hundred from the barges, there were some old Turkish trenches, facing towards the barges; into these we bolted like rabbits and lay close in the funk-holes, waiting for the awful smash we knew was bound to come. The roofs of the barges were burning like dry brushwood. Then came the explosion of the first barge. A most terrific bang followed by a fearsome firework display of all kinds of shell, Véry lights, bombs, etc., etc., describing various parabolæ in the air. Our dread and horror was that a shell might be thus hurtled into our cave and burst on impact! Soon followed the blowing up of the second and third barges, and when the rain of shell, etc., had subsided, we felt free to raise our heads and survey the scene. And what a sight for the beholders!!

Not a trace of the barges, as such, remained. The bank of the river was all blown in and a sort of tidal wave had spread over a wide area. In the midst of this lake were stacks of Q. F. ammunition in

boxes which had been placed in readiness for the Brigade and Divisional Ammunition Columns to draw that evening. These were blazing fiercely and a box would go up with a bang and a scream of flying fragments as the heat reached the cordite in the cartridges. Huge fragments of the steel plates of the barges were lying about, twisted into every conceivable shape; some were found five hundred yards inland. Near our Ordnance Dump a fire was burning away in a large stack of trussed hay. The wind was carrying the flames right across the dump and our first necessity was to put the fire out. A bucket party was formed on a "chain" to the river and the blaze tackled. Our dump was safe for the moment unless some blazing wood from the ammunition pile was thrown amongst the tents. By this time it was dark and the horror of the blazing ammunition pile and the danger from flying fragments of shell every five minutes or so were very real experiences.

We were warned that the Arabs would most probably attempt a raid whilst the camp was all upset, so some salvaged rifles were loaded and placed in readiness. All then turned in for the night to get what rest was possible amidst the incessant explosions of ammunition boxes. And what a night it was! The greatest possible measure of safety was achieved by piling trusses of hay between our open-air beds and the fire, but sleep was impossible. When morning dawned, the fires were nearly all burned out and it was possible to survey the awful damage caused by that fourteenth shell. Had the Turks been able to attack in force that night, or for the next few days, our batteries would rapidly have been silenced from lack of ammunition. About 9 a.m. two Turkish aeroplanes came over very leisurely and surveyed the scene flying fairly low. Fortunately, they dropped no bombs to add to the debacle.

A few days later, the dumps were moved downstream a mile or so to Arab village, out of range. Thus the stable-door was successfully shut—after the horse was gone.

"For want of a nail the battle was lost."

For want of a simple quick-release apparatus, the Tigris Force Ammunition Park was destroyed.

MAN-DAY PROBLEMS

BY CAPTAIN H. G. L. BRAIN, 13TH FRONTIER FORCE RIFLES

The difficulties of the problem have given rise to a feeling of horror among those who have to deal with it. A statement of the advantages the scheme bestows will perhaps help to assuage this feeling, but it cannot cure the problem of its difficulties. These are due to some fundamental causes. One must understand what these are and try to apply a remedy.

To appreciate the advantages it is essential to be clear in one's own mind how recruiting was carried out before the introduction of the scheme. This was done as vacancies occurred. It was a difficult operation because a Training Battalion could enlist recruits only when a vacancy fell in the combined strength of an Active Battalion plus that of its affiliated company. To ensure that a Battalion was always up to strength a very accurate forecast of its wastage was necessary and difficult to obtain. Enlisting in anticipation of vacancies occurring was not possible because it would have meant exceeding the authorised establishment thereby courting audit objection.

As denoted by its name, the basis of the present scheme is the "Man-day," *i.e.*, one complete day during which a man is housed, clothed and fed at Government expense. It will readily be seen therefore that an Active Battalion with an authorised establishment of 723 is entitled to cost Government :

723×365 man-days.

Similarly a Training Battalion 795×365 man-days.

A Regiment of five Battalions plus Training Battalion

$5 \times 723 \times 365$ 1319475

795×365 290175

1609650 man-days.

The advantages.

The Commanding Officer of a Training Battalion derives the following benefits :—

1. So long as its authorised number of man-days for the year is not exceeded, a regiment may enlist recruits when it likes. It need not wait for vacancies to occur.
2. Subject to the above proviso, the authorised establishment of a regiment may be exceeded at any time without fear of audit objection.

The above give great latitude. The problem is how to derive the greatest benefit. In the methods tried certain difficulties have been experienced and the scheme has been blamed in consequence.

The difficulties.

The chief difficulty is the question of keeping Active Battalions up to strength. This is due mainly to three root causes. In the first place, it must be realised that recruits take time to train and that during their training some are discharged as "unlikely" or for some other reason. Secondly, the anticipated wastages as calculated by each Active Battalion are seldom accurate. These two factors, when coupled together, give rise to great fluctuations in the strengths of Active Battalions. One battalion by over-estimating its wastage thereby receives more vacancies for recruits. In due course, when these join, the battalion becomes over strength. It therefore receives fewer vacancies the following year when perhaps its wastage is greater. The exceeding of its establishment by one battalion is done at the expense of other battalions who have to receive fewer vacancies, as otherwise, the authorised number of man-days will be exceeded. It starts a vicious circle of one battalion gaining at the expense of others who in turn have to be compensated.

The stresses and strains upon the workings of the man-day scheme introduced by such factors as the above are difficult to estimate and once the equilibrium has been upset it is impossible to stabilise without some drastic action.

A step in the right direction.

In 1933-34 an attempt was made by A.H.Q. to stabilize recruiting and to counter the difficulties of fluctuating wastage by regulating the outflow to the reserve from each regiment, *i.e.*, a quota of 40 men from each Active Battalion was to be sent to the reserve during the year 1934-35. Owing to uneven transfers to the reserve in the past, a universal quota such as the above was found to be impracticable of immediate application without exceeding the total establishment of reservists. In consequence, the fixed number for transfers during 1935-36, was varied for each regiment and is so liable to vary until such time as the annual turn-over to the reserve in each regiment is equalised. When this occurs a universal quota of 35-40 per Active Battalion will be possible of application.

The advantages of the above measure are that by fixing the quota for the reserve the total annual wastage per Active Battalion will be ascertained with some accuracy. Recruiting will be made easier.

The above is excellent enough ; it is a step in the right direction which will eventually lead to the introduction of the universal quota, referred to above, for each Active Battalion. This should be our one aim and object, *i.e.*, to stabilise the yearly outflow. It is essential that it must be so because of the time recruits take to train.

In addition to stabilising the annual turn-over to reserve, we should aim at stopping Active Battalions strengths fluctuating and so to keep all Active Battalions as near their Peace Establishments as possible. The fact whether or not an Active Battalion plus its affiliated company is up to combined strength is really immaterial. Variations in the number of men for pension and unforeseen discharges will remain. Similarly small fluctuations will occur in the quota for reserve owing to unforeseen wastage from the reserve itself. To compensate for these variations the A. H. Q. scheme (to regulate wastages and facilitate their calculation), requires supplementing within the regiment by some measure which will give the man-day scheme the chance it requires to justify its potentialities. Some such tentative measures are put forward in the following paragraphs.

The Ideal Solution.

The ideal would be attained if all battalions could waste an even number every year and if all recruiting could be done on a regimental as opposed to a battalion basis. The former is difficult for the present because each battalion has a variable annual number for pension. The latter could be done and was in fact tried out in one regiment, with a view to its general adoption. For various reasons it was rejected. The "pool" system of receiving, training and drafting recruits is admittedly the ideal from a war point of view, and will probably have to be adopted in a war of any magnitude, but it would be difficult to persuade all battalions that they can get the best results from it in peace.

A Suggested Solution.

If one cannot hope to see the ideal adopted, one can at least adopt it in part. It is suggested, therefore, that the solution may lie in the following procedure.

Battalions should endeavour to waste as evenly as possible every year. At present this is hard, but as time goes on men for pension will become less and the handicap of uneven transfers to reserve in

past years will be overcome provided battalions try now and co-operate with A. H. Q. to equalise turn-over. This will help to steady down the present variations.

To combat present fluctuations and subsequently to eliminate any small variations that may remain, it is desirable that the Officer Commanding Training Battalion be empowered to post to any Active Battalion 25 *per cent.* from each Company of those recruits about to be attested irrespective of the affiliated Company to which they may belong. In this manner should one Active Battalion be under strength, the Officer Commanding Training Battalion can rapidly build it up and so ensure that all the Active Battalions of the regiment are of equal strength.

The idea is simple enough. The difficulty lies in adapting it to the present system with the minimum dislocation and discontent.

There need be no dislocation if a proper system be adopted. Room does not permit of details being given here. The scheme has been adopted in one regiment already and no difficulty has been experienced.

As regards discontent, grouses there will be : the chief one being that Battalions are liable to lose their good recruits who may, in this manner, be posted to another Active Battalion. If this assertion be examined it can hold no water. To begin with only 25 *per cent.* are liable to transfer. The 75 *per cent.* left is more than enough to cover recruiting of men with family connections. Those enlisted directly by a Recruiting Officer and who have no such claims do not really mind which Active Battalion they join. They will find men from their districts in all battalions. When they enlist they do so for the regiment and are only posted to particular companies on arrival at the Training Battalion.

Conclusion.

It is submitted that the above solution has the merits of preserving the present system of healthy rivalry between Active Battalions and of their affiliated companies in the Training Battalion. It ensures that Active Battalions get the recruits they want enlisted for them and the same time gives the Officer Commanding a Training Battalion power to reconcile unforeseen fluctuations in Active Battalion strengths. Man-days are more easily accounted for. One has not to worry constantly whether a certain battalion will over or under waste. The dislocation of recruiting demands is eliminated. One battalion cannot

gain in strength at the expense of another. Adjustments are made monthly as occasion may demand. Should the regiment, as a whole, prove to be over-wasting a general increase in the demand for recruits can be made without worry, as to which battalion will require the extra recruits so demanded. Grey hairs will be less perceptible among O's C. of Training Battalions. No Active Battalion can say it is being done down—all have the same chance. Each can vary its actual wastage without fear. Each will be maintained at approximately the same strength. The strengths of companies at the Training Battalion will remain equal thus facilitating accommodation and administration and giving all companies an equal chance in games and sports.

AN UNUSUAL JOURNEY HOME FROM INDIA

BY CAPTAIN E. W. H. CLARKE, R.E.

Preliminaries.

In December 1933 two impecunious sapper subalterns, W. F. Anderson serving in Chitral and myself in Risalpur, were brought into touch with each other while casting round to achieve a solution to a common problem. We both wanted to travel home seeing as much of the world as we could with minimum discomfort and expense. The following considerations affected our decision as to its solution :—

(a) We could neither of us afford to spend more than £150 or two months on the journey.

(b) We both wanted to explore places of interest and not to turn the journey into a test of endurance or mechanical ability.

We had the good fortune to be able to consult Lieut.-Col. E. W. C. Noel, who has travelled most routes by most means of transport in the Middle East ; so, taking his kind advice, we decided to apply for sanction to travel by the following route, using transport acquired locally :—

Peshawar, Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, Meshed, Teheran, Kerman-shah, Baghdad, Damascus, Jerusalem, Haifa, Istambul, Budapest, Vienna, and then home.

Applications were therefore submitted through the normal channels to Army Headquarters for sanction for our itinerary, and Grindlay & Co. (Agents), Peshawar, undertook to obtain visas on our passports for Afghanistan, Persia, Iraq, Syria, Turkey and Greece. Visas for these countries excepting Afghanistan were obtained within six weeks, the Afghan visa was withheld pending Army Headquarters sanction. It was not till seven weeks later that I heard that sanction could not be granted for travel in Afghanistan, North-West of Kandahar, so an amended itinerary was submitted *via* Kabul, Kandahar, Quetta, Zahedan and Meshed. It was now the second week in February and our leave was due to commence on 7th April. Eventually, sanction was received on 6th April after frantic cabling at our expense between various high authorities. Our start would have had to be delayed, if we were to wait for Afghan *visas*, so thanks to kind assistance promptly given by Headquarters Peshawar District, we decided to do a quick tour of the North-West Frontier from Peshawar to Quetta instead of motoring through Afghanistan.

Our only other preparations were to settle that the weekly train leaving Quetta for Nok Kundi on April 16th must be a ruling fixture, and send requests to the Political Agent in Quetta for arrangements for transport from Nok Kundi to Zahedan, and to the Vice-Consul in Zahedan for assistance with transport from Zahedan to Meshed in conjunction with the train.

Our decisions regarding other details worked out well and were as follows :—

Kit to be limited to two suit cases each, so that we could carry our own luggage on European railways, plus a bedding roll and camp-bed each, which could be sent on by sea from Baghdad.

Stores and Food.—To live on local food and only carry a one-day reserve of tinned meat, vegetables, fruit, biscuits, tea, cocoa, etc., in case of emergency and to provide a little variety of menu, if required. We also carried a small supply of medicines, bandages, iodine, potassium permanganate, Keating's and ammonia. All this, with knives, forks, plates, kettle, etc., went in one small basket hamper, which was also jettisoned in Baghdad. We were able to replenish our tinned stores in Meshed and Teheran.

Money.—We each carried a letter of credit issued by Grindlays, Peshawar, and had no difficulty in cashing money on these letters of credit in any bank in any country. We had heard rumours that you were not allowed to bring money into Persia, but we found that the only restrictions were that our Indian notes were counted for record on entering Persia and that our Persian notes were all changed for silver at the Customs Office before we were allowed to leave Persia.

Languages.—Anderson, who already was fluent in Pushtu and Urdu, did three weeks study of Persian with a munshi before starting. We found Persian, French and Urdu were the three languages most used on our journey, while a smattering of Italian and Arabic would have added considerably to our interest and enjoyment of the later stages.

The First Stage.—*A tour of the North-West Frontier from Peshawar to Mirjawa (1,155 miles).*

We were fortunate in being able to borrow Anderson's five-year-old Ford, which had just been sold and overhauled. We had decided to spend the week-end in Parachinar, so with our luggage loaded up and a Pathan motor driver to do general servant to us both, we set off from Peshawar at 11-30 a.m. on April 7th.

The Kurram valley was looking lovely with the fruit blossom out in the village orchards and rambler roses on the bungalows. We struck heavy thunder showers in Parachinar (mile 163) but had a delightful week-end, foregathering with friends and visiting the Peiwar Kotal Pass and the hospitable militia garrison at Teri Mand on Sunday.

On April 9th we made an early start down the Kurram valley to Thal (mile 56), where we turned right to cut over into the Tochi valley at Mir Ali (mile 95). From Mir Ali we made good going, lunching in Razmak (mile 142). The new direct road Razmak-Wana had just been opened, but we decided to motor *via* Jandola and Sarwekai both to see the scenes of the fighting in 1919-20 and to look up friends in the South Waziristan Scouts. After a stop for tea in the Scouts Mess at Sarwekai, we reached Wana (mile 237) about 7 p.m., where we were entertained and accommodated in the R. A.—R. E. Mess. The roads were extremely good and well bridged everywhere. The gradually increasing barrenness and ruggedness of the surroundings was very striking the further we travelled Southwards.

The remainder of the journey to Quetta was made in easy stages over well surfaced unmetalled roads, on which it was possible to average 20-25 m.p.h. without any undue hurry. On April 9th we got through the sector of road that is normally closed owing to possibilities of raiding, this brought us *via* Gul Kach (mile 39) and (fording the Gomal and the Zhob rivers on causeways) to Fort Sandeman (93 miles). On April 11th we motored on from Fort Sandeman to Loralai (114 miles) and on the 12th to Quetta (124 miles). This route is longer than the direct road down the Zhob valley, but it runs through more varied surroundings and gave us a chance of seeing Ziarat, Quetta's hill station, a fascinating collection of round, thatched, single roomed huts perched among the juniper trees, 8,000 feet above sea level.

Our week-end in Quetta was well spent, visits were made to Mr. Skrine, the Political Agent and to the Persian Consul. The former gave us useful advice on travelling in Persia and a promise that transport should be arranged for us, meeting the train at Nok Kundi, to take us on to Zahedan. The latter lent us a useful guide book on Persia, which we had failed to obtain elsewhere.

We left Quetta on 16th April by the weekly train to Nok Kundi (303 miles). Our Pathan driver left us in high spirits to motor the Ford back to its new owner in Peshawar *via* Dera Ghazi Khan and Lahore ;

he had been paid up to buy petrol for the whole journey and had visions of all the remuneration he would receive from the collection of taxi-fares *en route*. The rail journey was a dusty one, through a waterless desert, the stations being merely fortified posts supplied with food and water by rail from Quetta or Nuski. A motor track roughly marked with piles of stones runs alongside the railway. The rail fare (2nd class) is about £2 a head, and no food is available on the train or at any station.

We arrived at Nok Kundi soon after 9 a.m. The village consisted of a collection of mud huts in the desert, but it was remarkable the quantity of goods collected there—dried fruits from Persia, hides from Afghanistan, etc.—while it appeared that camel caravans of Afghans and Baluchis converged on it from all directions. After purchasing eggs and fresh fruit, we got away about 12-30 p.m. in the front seats of a Chevrolet lorry reserved for us by the Assistant Political Agent. Our fellow-passengers were a party of Pathans from the Kurram, who were on a pilgrimage to the Moslem holy places and were completely undismayed by the fact that only one of their number could speak any language but Pushtu. No road has been constructed over the Baluchistan sector, so that it took eight hours' uncomfortable travelling to cover the 109 miles to the Persian frontier at Mirjawa. The Persian Customs Officer spoke excellent French, and, after drinking tea with him and having our luggage cleared, we moved into the clean but unfurnished British Rest-house, a relic of railway days, which had a piped water-supply. It seems remarkable that no attempt is being made to construct a road over this alignment in Indian territory, where six or seven lorries travel daily in each direction between Nok Kundi and Mirjawa carrying goods and passengers. The present freight charges are Rs. 2/- per maund for the single journey, due to the extremely heavy wear and tear on the motor transport employed.

The Second Stage.—Through Persia by road to Khaniqin

(1880 miles)

The journey through Persia was chiefly remarkable for the extreme cheapness of road travel: for the vast areas of sandy deserts surrounded by rugged hills and interspersed with vivid patches of green round the villages, made still more fascinating by the blue green tiles of the minarets of the mosque peering out of the trees and the blaze of colour from the wild tulips and poppies in the fields: for the ever-present background of snow-capped mountains from the volcano Koh-i-Tuftan

west of Mirjawa to the peaks in Kurdistan north of Hamadan and Kermanshah : for the friendliness and curiosity of the village people throughout the country and, last but not least, for the impossibility of ever finding a Persian who was prepared to hurry or be punctual. The country bears striking tribute to the efficiency of the present regime ; banditry is apparently completely suppressed, private possession of arms is not allowed, the military and police are numerous and well organised, enterprise in the shape of town-planning schemes, road repairs and railway construction was found in evidence. The only obstacle to travel is the frequent examination of passports ; the *visa* must be made out in Persian script, as most police are unable to read Roman writing and lengthy, verbal explanations will be required before the foreigner is allowed to proceed on his travels. However, with only one exception, we met with courtesy and kindly assistance from all Persian government officials.

Quite a good unmetalled road commenced in Persian territory so the lorry did the forty-three miles into Zahedan in two and a half hours on the morning of the 18th. The fare was left to our discretion, but Rs. 25 from the two of us seemed to please the driver enormously.

April 18—21.—By Persian mail lorry, Zahedan-Meshed, 630 miles. We spotted the British Consulate at once on our arrival in Zahedan, as it enclosed the only two trees in the place. Major Rivett-Carnac kindly had baths and an invitation to stay ready for us. We decided to go on by the mail lorry leaving that night, as they only run three days a week, and do greater daily mileages than other lorries. They are manned by two drivers driving in reliefs and only halt for four or five hours at night. The contractor undertook to take us for 85 krans (just over £1) each to Meshed, and the drivers were ready to give us a front seat, but an unpleasant subordinate postal official turned us out into the back. The journey across the Seistan desert was hot, and we spent the first night carrying out roadside repairs in Hormuk (mile 45). The second night we erected our camp-beds in the garage yard at Birjand (mile 302). The road then climbed into the mountains, and the air got colder and colder, while we ran into rain and sleet. The third night we reached a dirty garage hotel at Turbat-i-Haidari (mile 540) at 2 a.m. in pouring rain, we had rather an unpleasant night, sharing a room with rats and a snoring Persian driver. At 4 p.m. next day we reached Meshed swathed in coats and blankets, to be met by a servant with a welcome invitation from Major Gastrell to stay at the

Consulate. We had no difficulty in obtaining tea and well-cooked Persian bread, rice and meat anywhere on the route; and a comic little Persian whiled away our time by recounting his versions of the stories of Joseph and his brethren, Abraham and Isaac and a discourse on the Moslem and Christian religions at great length.

April 22-23.—At the British Consulate, Meshed. It poured with rain for forty-eight hours and the Teheran Road was reported impassable. We managed, however, to look at the Shrine of the Imam Reza and the Golden Mosque from the outside, and Major Gastrell took us out to a beautiful Persian house and garden at Wakilabad, but our efforts to reach the Turk-i-Bey valley proved abortive; the car stuck in a river in spate, and we spent the remainder of the afternoon drying the ignition. The Consulate head clerk found us a car owner, who contracted to take us to Teheran *via* the Caspian Sea at Meshed-es-Sirr for 1,000 krans (£12)—742 miles, about 2d. a mile.

April 24-26.—By hired car, Meshed-Meshed-es-Sirr, 558 miles. A 1927 Dodge with a wild-looking Persian driver in a beret turned up at the Consulate at 9 a.m. The weather had cleared the previous night, so we got under way as soon as we had paid down our 50 *per cent.* deposit with the garage. The river crossings were still very deep, and we met Major Pybus, the Military Attaché in Teheran, stuck in one about fifty miles out; he immediately invited us to stay with him in the Legation, and promised to warn his wife by telegram of our impending arrival. We halted for lunch at Qadimgah, one of the most lovely of the Persian villages. Snow mountains backed the old mud fort on a hill with the village and its blue-domed mosque nestling in the trees at the foot, while wild tulips and poppies made a blaze of colour in the fields. The first night was spent in the garage Massis at Sabzawar (mile 150), a very clean and well-run hotel with its own electric light plant under Russian management, a pleasant change from Turbat-i-Haidari: the second we were again very comfortable in Semnan (mile 423). The third day we climbed up over an 8,000 foot pass, where snow was falling and lying in deep drifts near the road. We turned right at Firuzkuh (mile 465) and ran into dense fog on the top of the gorge leading down to the Caspian; the road descended steeply for some seven miles, and we suddenly ran out of the fog, to find ourselves in a new world of green turf and bushes, which rapidly changed to beech and oak forests, the scenery closely resembling the

Wye Valley. Railway construction was going on everywhere. The alignment had been cleverly laid out in most difficult country, and reinforced concrete was being used in the construction of all bridges on a most graceful design. Trains were already running on the last twenty miles into Shahi (mile 533).

April 27.—At the Orient Hotel, Meshed-es-Sirr. The Orient Hotel was clean, and they fed us on fresh bread, salmon, and caviare. The country round was like the edge of the New Forest, but with sand dunes along the seashore. So we spent a most enjoyable day walking, bathing, and exploring the country, while the car's spring, broken on our arrival, was being repaired in Barfarush.

The Caspian seaboard is quite one of the most attractive and interesting parts of the world. The wild flowers, the beech and pine forests and the green fields with their stake and bound fences remind one strongly of England. The new railway has brought a very cosmopolitan population in its track, a Swedish firm are supplying the rolling-stock, Italian, German, Belgian and Swiss engineers are working on the rail alignment and bridge construction, while Turkomani refugees from Soviet Russia are mixed with Persians in the labour gangs. The Shah has had a country house constructed in the pine woods close to the hot, sulphur springs at Chablus and a motor road is under construction direct from Chablus to Teheran over a 10,000 foot pass.

April 28.—By hired car, Meshed-es-Sirr—Teheran, 196 miles. Our combined hotel bill came to 90 krans (just over £1). Elsewhere we found 10 to 15 krans for the room, and about 5 krans per person per meal were about the normal charges. We struck trouble on the road, due to heavy rain and snow that had fallen higher up the gorge. The road was broken further along the coast beyond Chablus, and many cars were returning to Teheran after the Moharrum holidays. The first break was a causeway that had fallen in about mile 60; this was bridged by a gang of coolies with railway sleepers after two hours. The second obstacle was a stream in spate. Here a lorry had gone over into the torrent, but another coolie gang completed the construction of a temporary crib bridge within twenty minutes. A few miles further on snow was lying, and we met a lorry head-on at a bend; while the drivers were arguing as to who should reverse, down came the cliff with the melting snow; the bulk of the slide came down behind us, and we got away with a stove-in door and a flattened near wing after rolling away a few boulders that were resting against the car.

Then we made good going up to mile 160, where another causeway had fallen in and a lorry had taken a plunge over into the river. This obstruction had again got a coolie gang already working on it, so we got away after another twenty minutes delay. Night had fallen, and at mile 175 our lights discovered a car stuck and a Belgian family, including two children, wading helplessly knee-deep in slime. Our driver charged past them near the outer edge, where the going was good, and we then went back to get the Belgians out of the mess, after which the Belgians in a smart new saloon Ford V. 8 stuck respectfully to our tail as we knocked and rattled over the last twenty-five miles into Teheran. Our day was not yet done, as we were taken off after dinner to be initiated into Teheran's most up-to-date dance hall "The Canary," with its Russian band.

April 29-30.—At the British Legation, Teheran. Teheran is a strange mixture of the ancient East and modern West; wide avenues are taking the place of the old narrow streets and there are some fine modern buildings in the city, but the old covered bazaars still remain, where the old industries still flourish and Persian art and wares are still sold, and the normal transport throughout the city is still the drushky drawn by two ponies.

Everyone in the Legation showed us hospitality, and we spent two very pleasant days meeting the Corps Diplomatique in Teheran. A reception at the Japanese Embassy and a visit to the Gulistan Palace, where we saw the Shah's treasures and the famous Peacock throne, were of especial interest. A loan of some Legation ponies enabled us to get plenty of exercise and to see something of the surrounding country too.

May 1-3.—By returning petrol lorry, Teheran-Kermanshah, 355 miles.—A garage contracted to let us have two front seats on a Willys Overland lorry returning to Qasr-i-Shirin for 80 krans (£1 each). The road Teheran-Kazvin was terribly bad, and our driver unfortunately fell in with his brother driving another lorry in the same direction; this meant tea drinking at every roadside house and monkey tricks passing and repassing each other all along the route, with the result that we did not reach Aweh (mile 160) and pull up for the night until 1-30 a.m. Here we slept on the road, as there was no proper garage hotel. We got into Hamadan (mile 245) at 12-30 p.m., but after promises to start again within an hour we eventually got away

with a big load of currants and timber at 8-30 p.m. Hamadan is being town-planned out of all recognition and a vast square is appearing in the middle of the town. The road climbs up into the mountains from Hamadan, and the snow-capped peaks looked lovely in the moonlight, but it was so cold that when the lorry halted at the Kangawar (mile 300) that we decided to sleep where we were in the front seat. The carvings on the cliff face at Bisitun (mile 320) were very fine, and we got a wonderful view of the surrounding country from the cleft in the rock. The lorry was now going very badly, and we only got into Kermanshah at 11 a.m., after taking five and a half hours to do the last fifty-five miles. The British Consul, Mr. Summerhayes, was able to arrange two seats in a new Chevrolet touring car going down to Khaniqin that afternoon, so after a very welcome bath and lunch at the Consulate we paid off our lorry at a reduced rate and set off in the Chevrolet with an Iraqi gentleman in the spare seat.

May 3.—By touring car, Kermanshah-Khaniqin, 142 miles. The driver contracted to take us for 75 krans (just under £1) each, with all our luggage, and we had a very comfortable journey, dropping down the fine gorge off the Iranian Plateau into a valley not unlike the Swat in Northern India. The plateau appeared like the edge of a table towering some 2,500 feet sheer above the low country. We reached the frontier at dusk, and, after changing our Persian notes into silver, got through without delay. We found the entire Iraqi customs staff dressed in pyjamas, as it was a warm night. An immensely fat Iraqi customs officer greeted us with great affability and proceeded to pass us into the country and sign up the necessary forms without stopping eating nuts stored in his pyjama pocket and drinking coffee throughout the process.

At Khaniqin we were required to appear before a medical inspector, but our certificates of vaccination and inoculation from India carried us through without any actual inspection. The station at Khaniqin has a canteen and a rest house, so we were able to get cleansed and fed before boarding the night train to Baghdad, which left at 11-20 p.m.

The Third Stage—An inexpensive tour in Iraq, Transjordan and Palestine (1,000 miles).

May 4-6.—By train Khaniqin-Baghdad 110 miles and a week-end in Baghdad.—It had been pouring with rain all night, so

when we arrived at Baghdad East at 6-30 a.m., it was a pleasant, cool morning, but as the week-end progressed the weather warmed up and this was the only hot period during the whole journey. The cleanliness and orderliness of the city immediately impressed itself on us, but perhaps this was only in contrast with the Persian towns ; and we thoroughly enjoyed a real English breakfast, our first for some time, at Claridge's Hotel.

A visit to a Sapper friend working with the R. A. F. at Hinaidi had most fruitful results. We were invited to stay in a R. A. F. Mess, and offered our choice of a free ride to Transjordan, Palestine or Egypt on either a troop-carrier 'plane or a convoy of Riley cars returning to Cairo. This final offer was the means of saving us over £10 each, the Nairn Transport fare from Baghdad to Damascus ; this company runs two or three services a week between Baghdad and Damascus and also connects 'Iraq Railways with the Taurus express *via* Mosul and Nisibin, which is the quickest route home from 'Iraq by land.

We found other old friends just out from England and the R. A. F. were most hospitable, so that we spent an extremely pleasant week-end in Baghdad. The mosaic tiling on the minarets in the city is very beautiful, and a visit to Ctesiphon 25 miles out was very well worth while ; the view from the top of the arch, over 100 feet high, gives one a wonderful panorama of the unending flatness, palm groves and irrigated fields of the Tigris and Euphrates river basin. Our Sapper friend was Master of the Baghdad Hounds, so we got our fill of amusement, exercising hounds and picking up an occasional hunt after outlying jackals. The wonderful cheapness of the Arab pony, whose average price is £5—£15, has made polo, hunting and racing popular and within the means of everyone's pocket in 'Iraq, Transjordan and Palestine.

May 7.—By Air, Hinaidi-Amman (500 miles) and by car Amman-Zerka (15 miles).—We were away at 6 a.m. in a heavily-loaded Victoria troop-carrier with the English visitors. It was fascinating flying over the date groves of the river area, but as we cleared the Euphrates and reached the desert, the bumping began. We arrived at Rutbah about 9 a.m., by which time we had practically one and all including the R. A. F. crew succumbed to air sickness. Here we halted for half an hour's fuelling and refreshments (but not for me !) and the pilot glibly remarked that it would be quite all right at 10,000 feet, but that we

were such a heavy load that he couldn't climb there. After Rutbah, General W——, green but determined, firmly ejected the spare pilot from the cockpit in search of fresh air; he was the only military member to survive the ordeal. Rather more than two hours' yawing, pitching and bumping brought us with thankful hearts to Amman, 500 miles, in five hours flying time. Here the R. A. F. kindly arranged a taxi for us and we motored 15 miles north to look up another Sapper friend serving with the Transjordan Frontier Force at Zerka. The T. J. F. F. appeared to be a job in a thousand; they recruit a very fine type of man, mainly Jews and Arabs with an admixture of Germans, English or any nationality residing in the country; the force is organised as two full strength squadrons of cavalry mounted on Arab ponies and two companies of mechanised infantry with a large proportion of machine-guns mounted in half-tracked lorries, so they are a smart, highly mobile force equipped with the most modern equipment: the country round is brown, gravel, rolling desert and rather monotonous, but it is 3,000—4,000 feet up with a dry, cool climate and two or three square miles of very fine duck shooting are within easy reach: Zerka itself is equipped with every convenience from "h and c" to polo grounds and squash courts. At Zerka, again, we met with kind hospitality and as it appeared to be two officers' birthdays that day, champagne flowed in mess that night.

May 8.—By car, Zerka-Jerusalem (90 miles).—The C. O.'s car happened to be going in to fetch an officer joining the force, so we were offered a lift in the big Buick with its six-foot Arab driver, reputed to be the biggest expert on this very tricky sector of road. A halt was made in Amman to look at the fine Roman amphitheatre and the Emir Abdullah's capital. Then we twisted and turned down the long gorge from over 3,000 feet above sea level to 1,000 feet below it, passed the fruit gardens in Es Salt, and passed immense rhododendrons bordering the road and growing up to 15—20 feet in height. We crossed the Jordan by the Allenby Bridge and passed Jericho with Jerusalem already in sight on the hill above. After reporting our arrival at R. A. F. Headquarters we arrived at the Seaforth Highlanders' Mess in time for lunch. More hospitality and an offer of accommodation resulted.

May 9-11.—A halt in Jerusalem.—The city has a wonderful situation. Some 3,000 feet above sea level, looking over the Dead Sea to the mountains of Moab. The white building stone, which

attains a golden colour with age, and the fact that the modern buildings are in keeping with the old makes it especially attractive. Some of the holy places, particularly the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, are disappointing, but the Mosque of Omar, the little old church of the Ascension and the War cemetery, beautifully kept and wonderfully sited overlooking the city, are well worth a visit. Inquiries elicited the conclusion that sea travel round the coast was probably preferable to the rail journey through Turkey, and that a convenient Lloyd Triestino boat was leaving Haifa on May 18th, so we decided to board her.

May 12-14.—A stay in Hebron. We were lucky in running into a Cambridge friend of Anderson's, who was running a hospital in Hebron. He persuaded us to come out to stay with him. He had a big Stutz car and toured us round Southern Palestine visiting Beit Jibrin, Gaza and Beersheba. This part of Palestine is much less overrun by trippers and is full of both charm and interest with its large fields of waving corn, olive trees and poppies and memories of the early fighting in the Palestine campaign. Hebron itself has a purely Arab population and the stone archways in the old bazaar and Joseph's tomb are extremely attractive.

May 15.—By car, Hebron-Haifa (140 miles). The road runs along the ridge of the hills of Samaria through Jerusalem and Nablus until the edge is reached above the plain of Esdraelon. From here there is a magnificent view north to Mount Tabor and Nazareth, west to Mount Carmel and south to Nablus, the red soil of the plain shows up the green of the cultivation and the circular Jewish settlements nestling in newly growing trees most vividly. The road has a fine surface and once down in the plain the Stutz did her 70-80 m. p. h. in comfort and safety. In Haifa we found a very comfortable and well-run Italian hospice—the Stella Maris—up on Mount Carmel, which was very much cheaper and more pleasant than the hotels in the town. Haifa is rather a crowded modern and unattractive town full of refugee German Jews, its population and harbour trade appear to be increasing at a phenomenal rate.

May 16-17.—By 'bus to Tiberias and El Tabgah and back to Haifa (110 miles). After fixing up 2nd class accommodation on s. s. *Helouan* sailing on 18th, we boarded a 'bus for Tiberias. Only two days had elapsed since the cloudburst and Tiberias was six inches to a foot deep in red slime all over the lower portion of the town.

Railings had been uprooted and the contents of shops and houses were lying bedded in the slime, but the T. J. F. F. and police were doing yeoman salvage work and demolishing all houses in a dangerous condition. Another 'bus took us on to Father Tapper's hospice at the northern end of the lake. The hospice has a lovely garden with tropical flowers and fruits growing in it, and there is a perfect bathing beach of silver sand backed by a copse of blue gum trees. The setting sun turned the pink hillsides round the lake to a deep rose red and then to orange, altogether a heavenly setting. The next morning was spent in exploring Capernaum with its ruined Roman synagogue and the northern shore of the lake; we finished up with another bathe. After lunch we jumped a lorry into Tiberias, thence by 'bus to Nazareth, which was disappointing, St. Joseph's Church with its grotto only being worth a visit. Another 'bus took us into Haifa by 7 p.m.

May 18.—By train, to Athlit and back (25 miles). The old Crusader castle was one of the best finds we made in the country. We had the whole place to ourselves and spent a most amusing morning exploring its vaults and dungeons and finally a perfect bathe. You can dive straight off the castle abutments into ten feet of clear Mediterranean water. We embarked on the s.s. *Helouan* on our return to Haifa that evening.

The Fourth Stage—Round the Mediterranean on a Tourist Boat
(2,400 miles).

We secured second class accommodation, which worked out at £25 each for the round trip from Haifa to Venice with nine days living included, actually we should have been perfectly comfortable and have saved £9 on the fare had we booked third class special. These tourist boats run fortnightly in each direction round the Mediterranean throughout the season. Every class passenger is allowed to use any part of the ship and the whole ship's staff seem to be intent on seeing to the comfort and enjoyment of the passengers. However, we found that we could both economise and amuse ourselves better by making our own arrangements on land rather than by joining in the tours arranged by the ship's purser.

The first night on board we found ourselves at a table with two ladies, one Syrian and one Egyptian, and two men, one a Swiss and the other an Italian ship's officer. The latter's official capacity was the "Master of Pleasure;" he arranged all entertainments on board and

kept the ladies amused by stories told mainly in French, whenever he was not otherwise employed. The next night we were moved to an English-speaking table, where we found ourselves in congenial English and American company.

On May 19th we reached Beirut and secured a car for the day for £2 to take us up through the Lebanon Hills and the Syrian vineyards to Baalbek. This is a wonderful spot built in a fold of the Anti-Lebanon. Its massive temples were originally built by Solomon to placate his Baal worshipping wives and later reconstructed by the Romans for the worship of their gods as a last stronghold against the rapid increase of Christianity.

May 20th brought us to Larnaca in Cyprus with its quaint covered streets; here we had an amusing bathe off a jetty with a collection of Cypriot boys and one nigger, who were performing some amazing aquatics. The next day we reached Rhodes, one of the most beautiful and well kept islands in the world, in which the fort and its crusader chapel have been turned into a most interesting museum. We sailed at midday and sunset found us among the Greek islands off the Anatolian coast, which turned almost purple in colour as twilight set in.

On May 22nd we passed through the Dardanelles in the early morning and reached Istanbul at 3 p.m. So we rushed ashore and boarded a taxi six up to make for the Seraglio, which is only open three afternoons a week and closes at 5 p.m. Here are kept all the treasures of the Sultans, the finest collection of china and porcelain ware that I have ever seen, and the magnificent jewellery studding the thrones were just as fine as the Peacock throne in Persia and far better set. On emerging from the Seraglio, we were run to ground by an ex-Sergeant-Major of a Colonel in our party; he had secured the appointment of Chief Clerk in the British Legation. The said Sergeant-Major then proposed a run in his car along the Bosphorus to the Black Sea, which proved an extraordinarily pleasant way of seeing the country. On our return to Pera he introduced us to the Café El Refans, a really good Russian restaurant with a fine Balaika orchestra and two good vocalists. Thanks to a tip of two Turkish pounds (about 6/-), the orchestra played and sang entirely to our wishes until 11-30 p.m., and as we left the Maestro rushed down to present us with his photograph. The ship was not due to leave until 10 a.m. on 24th, so we had the whole of the next day to explore Istanbul. The mosques of St. Sophia and Ahmed were well worth a visit and a round trip on


a launch up one side of the Bosphorus and back down the Asiatic shore gave us an amusing afternoon. We tried sampling a Turkish place of amusement that evening but the "Moulin Rouge" provided only a very inferior entertainment in the form of dances and songs by Arab girls with the appropriate oriental musical accompaniment. The Ghazi's regime prohibits all dancing except in European hotels, and all places of entertainment have to close down at 11-30 p.m.; the streets are well policed and the law is strictly enforced.

On the evening of May 24th the ship passed through the Dardanelles and we were able to locate the various beaches, the wreck of Clyde and the old forts. Next day we reached Piraeus early, passing rows of rusty, idle ships lying at their moorings, a bad sign of Greek trade depression. Greece was practically the only country in Europe, where the exchange was in our favour, and we were able to spend an inexpensive morning in Athens seeing the Acropolis and touring round the city. The ship left at 1 p.m., and within two hours we were entering the Corinth Canal. It is a wonderful piece of engineering five miles dead straight channel blasted out of sheer rock towering up above the masts of the ship and only just sufficient width for our 11,000-ton ship to pass through with a tug towing her in slings to keep her straight.

On 26th we had an hour in Brindisi, a well kept, but featureless town, and we arrived in Venice on the evening of 27th. It was a dull day with a bitter cold wind, not at all the Lido weather we had hoped for.

The Fifth Stage.—A Short Tour in Italy and France and Home.
(1,500 miles.)

The only remarkable incidents about this portion of the journey were the very favourable impression created by Italian cleanliness and courtesy and the discovery that it was far more comfortable and amusing to travel 3rd class than 2nd on the railways. The 3rd class passengers are practically only day passengers between local stations, so that by night one almost invariably has the carriage to oneself. The 3rd class coaches on all Continental night trains have sprung seats, so that you can lie at full length and go to sleep. Lastly, we found that arriving 3rd class the Italian porter was very reliable in recommending clean and comfortable accommodation, where charges were more in keeping with our pockets than those of the larger hotels.



Two days in Venice were well spent seeing the sights and bathing on the Lido, as the weather warmed up. We were very impressed by the civilian discipline in the city, when a practice air raid was carried out. All lights and windows were blacked out with paper issued by government, all the populace were hustled under cover by the police, and the fire launches dashed out to douse imaginary fires in the shape of flames lit up on various buildings. The raid lasted from 8-30 p.m.

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Two days in Florence resulted in our becoming rather surfeited with the quantity of art displayed in the various galleries, but a concert attended by some thousands of people in the newly opened Theatre Communale was a real joy and the Boboli gardens behind the Galleria Pitti are a pleasant antidote to artistic indigestion.

The next day we moved on *via* Pisa and Genoa to Paris, thence by Havre to Southampton and so reached England early on 3rd June.

Retrospect.

Every minute of our travels was full of interest and enjoyment, and the total cost of the journey including our living expenses for the eight weeks was only in the neighbourhood of £90. In fact, travel in Asia was ludicrously cheap and it only became expensive in Europe due to the adverse exchange ratio of foreign currencies.

Our arrangements for kit and stores proved well suited to our needs. We did find, however, that we had overestimated our requirements of old khaki drill clothes and that a silk suit was not required, whereas the lack of a tail coat necessitated apologies for our turn-out both in Teheran and Jerusalem. The possession of a respectable lounge suit, dinner jacket and tail coat on such a journey certainly enable one to accept pleasant invitations with an easy mind.

We had no difficulty anywhere in finding some form of transport for the next stage of our journey in spite of having made practically no preliminary arrangements. Our original intention was to travel from Istanbul to Lom, in Bulgaria, on the Danube, thence up the Danube by boat to Buda Pesth and so home *via* Vienna, but we found travelling on the s. s. *Helouan* so pleasant and relatively inexpensive that we decided to forego our original plan.

The kindness and hospitality of English people throughout the world to travellers of their own nationality has to be met to be believed, and it is very well worth travelling in out of the way places to experience it.

WORDS

(THE INDIA BILL)

*(With all due acknowledgment to Mr. Rudyard Kipling's
tragic song, "Boots.")*

There's talk—talk—talk—talk—talking over India.
 Words—words—words—words—splashing over India.
 (Chitter—chatter—chatter—chitter—pattering on India)
 There's no respite from Reforms !

One—Round—Table ; then another—conference ;
 Two—Round—Tables—followed by another one—
 (Words—words—words—words—pouring like a waterfall).
 There's no respite from Reforms !

Statesmen—try—to—think—o' something different—
 ("Oh—my—God—keep me from going lunatic !")
 Words—words—words—words—moving round and round again.
 There's no respite from Reforms !

Count—count—count—count—all the dreary bulletins.
 Read—read—read—read—all the dismal telegrams ;
 ("If—your—eyes—drop—they will get atop of you.")
 There's no respite from Reforms.

We can—stick—out—hatred, cuts and weariness.
 But not—not—not—not the chronic sight of 'em.
 Words—words—words—words—for eleven years of 'em.
Ain't there no respite from Reforms ?

MOUSE.

"CONTACT!"

By "X. L. O."

He was a highly efficient officer. Let there be no mistake about that. Did he not append three little magic letters to his name? Very well then.

On leaving the august seat of learning he found himself with his battalion in a small Treaty Port of China where opportunities for training and for putting into practice the knowledge which he had acquired were few and far between. Anon, the tide of civil war flowed and there came a day when the local Defence Scheme was put into operation. He found himself in command of a company responsible for an important sector where a main road entered the foreign concessions by a bridge over a creek.

He entered with zest into the task of making his dispositions remembering that Chinese troops were not permitted to enter the foreign concessions. He also remembered that "Surprise is just as important in the defence as in the attack" and that "The framework of the defence will be the artillery and machine-guns." He had no artillery but he had some machine-guns and he proceeded to site these in the best position, concealed and in every way in accordance with the best theory and admirably adapted to sweep the approach to the bridge. His company he likewise disposed cunningly and after full consideration of "what facilities are offered for concealment..." On the far-side of the bridge he established a small advanced post.

Well satisfied with his dispositions he sat down to await whatever chances of glory the gods might bring him.

As the sun sank below the monotonous horizon and the dusk deepened, a column of Chinese troops appeared marching up the road to the bridge. Weary and dispirited, they wanted to gain the asylum of the native city and the nearest way lay by this road through the foreign area. Approaching the concealed advanced post they were nearly on top of it before they were challenged.

They hesitated. They had marched far and the city spelt rest and food; to turn back now would mean a weary detour of many miles.

Before them they saw in the gathering darkness a bare handful of foreign troops between them and the desired haven.

With a snarl they rushed the post.

A Véry light soared into the sky and the concealed machine-guns opened fire on the mass in the road.

II.

A sad and disillusioned officer returned, shaken, to his quarters after a most unpleasant interview at Brigade Headquarters with the Brigadier and the Consul-General who saw his C. M. G. going west.

Puzzled and hurt, he sat down and thought things out.

As a result of his cogitations an erstwhile shining light in the social firmament of the port was no more seen at the Country Club and other pleasant places where the foreign community was wont to forget its exile as far removed as it was possible to be from the life of the people among whom it lived.

He took counsel of his pal Bill Jones, a language officer, and was sometimes seen in the company of a missionary, who was not a social asset but who had spent a long life labouring among the people. He also spent hours with a venerable teacher of Chinese and passed much of his leisure in the company of Chinese friends, newly made.

The tide of civil war ebbed and there came a day when the local Defence Scheme was once again put into operation. He found himself once more responsible for the same sector of the defences.

This time his forward machine-gun positions were conspicuously sited. On the prominent hump-backed bridge itself was a high sandbag emplacement bristling with machine-guns and surmounted by an outsize in Union Jacks. He remembered that Chinese warriors had been wont to wear hideous masks wherewith to terrify their enemies and in his earnest conversations with his missionary friend had learnt something of the intricacies of "Face."

Once more a column of Chinese troops came marching down the road heading for the city, but this time they were not a defeated rabble, but the vanguard of a victorious army.

As the column approached he walked out and ceremoniously saluted the commander, riding ahead of his troops on a shaggy Mongolian pony.

He had by now acquired more than a smattering of the colloquial and, the preliminary stereotyped greetings over, he led the Chinese commander to his tent inside the defences where, over tea and cigarettes, they talked of this and that.

After a decent interval the conversation turned to the civil war then in progress and he spoke in this wise: "Your Excellency is doubtless aware of the stupid Treaty provision which says that armed troops of your sublime country may not enter the foreign concessions.

This places me in a sad quandary for, having seen the magnificent aspect of your glorious and ever-victorious troops I fully realise that no efforts of the insignificant force which I command could prevent your renowned army of heroes from using this road if they so desired."

Whereto came the reply: "I have been struck dumb with admiration for your splendid troops and for the strength of the position which they occupy and in which they are disposed with such transcendent skill. No efforts of my puny and undersized coolies could prevail against such giants led by a leader of such consummate skill. We will, therefore, enter the city by the long road. Moreover, have I not seen the notice near the bridge which announces in calligraphy worthy of the most renowned scholar and in classic purity of language 'No Chinese armies allowed this way?' "

As the tail of the Chinese column disappeared down the road his Commanding Officer entered the post.

"Well done!" he said, "We were certain you would have a fight. That was one of their best regiments and their tails are right up in the air. How did you manage it?"

"Contact, sir, contact!"

THE REDUCTION OF UNNECESSARY CORRESPONDENCE

Some suggestions to Staff Officers

BY ONE OF THEM.

Each one of us has some bee in his bonnet. Mine is the subject of this article. So let me say by way of a sighting shot that seventeen letters had to be typed in one branch alone of one formation Headquarters in one month, all of which could have been avoided by following the rudiments of office organization, to say nothing of obeying a mere India Army Order. Such a state of affairs is shown as an example to justify the writing of an article on a dull subject and to prove that this particular bee does not buzz with sufficiently continuous intensity in the minds of staff officers. I would go further and say that beyond a tacit acknowledgment of the platitude that it is necessary to reduce unnecessary correspondence few positive steps are taken. Let the reader take a piece of paper and write a list, headed "Specific steps I have taken in the last year to reduce unnecessary correspondence, especially in lower formations and units," and show the result to his conscience.

While, therefore, it is clear that this article can contain little that is new and must perforce end on a note of pious hope, it will show certain defects that have come to light in a study of the subject and the practical steps that can be taken to reduce the burden of the over-worked regimental dog. The writer, in short, having specially interested himself in the subject and having found how easy it is to effect improvement, would like to pass his experience on in the hope that it will inspire other staff officers to place this subject more highly in their lengthy mental list of duties.

The article is divided into two parts ; giving firstly, some of the current causes of unnecessary correspondence and the steps a junior staff officer may take on his own initiative to rectify these errors, and secondly, the steps which he cannot take on his own initiative but which he should urge whenever opportunity offers. As regards the first it must be regretfully admitted that a mass of minor errors are common. I will deal with this list as briefly as possible :—

(a) Of these perhaps the most vicious is the habit of sending only one copy of a letter which patently must be forwarded, without

any additions *en route*, right down to a certain unit. If all formations in the chain similarly only sent one copy, this would involve at least four retypes of the same letter while in the most absurd case—and it is not unknown—it may involve as many as, at a rough estimate, eighty-eight acts of typing of the same letter. If the cyclostyle were used, only one act of typing would be required.

(b) “The insufficient use of printed orders and instructions.”

Not only is a single copy of a letter sometimes sent when it must issue to a large number of units, but the use of printed orders which would have saved so much typing, registration, signing, stamping and posting is so often forgotten.

In all cases let us decide to use the “order” form if possible and if the subject matter is wide enough to affect a considerable number of the recipients. If not, and the letter form is adopted, there are three steps for consideration :

(i) will the letter go down the chain without alteration to a unit or brigade ;

(ii) if so, can it be sent direct to that unit or brigade as ordered in para. 760, R. A. I. ;

(iii) if not, how many spare copies are required to save retyping *en route*.

(c) “The use of loosely worded or incomplete orders, instructions, or paragraphs in regulations.”

This must lead to a difference in interpretation between units and the C. M. A. with a consequent batch of cases for either painful recovery or time-taking regularization by the Government of India.

(d) “The insertion of small sub-paras. and sections as amendments into existing paragraphs.”

This leads to inevitable confusion which would be avoided if the paragraph was reproduced *in toto*.

(e) “Asking all formations or units their opinion on a certain point.”

This is not always necessary, *e.g.*, the suitability of the form of diary blocks, and in some cases reference to a selected formation or formations should suffice. The junior staff officer should consider :—

(i) if he knows the answer himself ;

(ii) if a technical officer at his Headquarters may know the answer ;

(iii) which of selected lower formations he should refer to.

To turn now from the minor errors of staff duties to the actual handling of cases. It is the remarkable truth that a great deal of unnecessary correspondence is caused by lack of care on the part of units in putting up cases and lack of detailed examination thereafter in higher offices. The financial effect is often omitted or given incorrectly and this recoils on the originator, who promptly lays the blame on the C. M. A. Linked with the above are cases where all cards are not put on the table at the outset. I give an example :

Two units requested permission for certain officers and men to perform journeys by road (drawing road allowance) instead of by rail.

Unit X gave (i) cost by road ;

(ii) cost by rail ;

(iii) number of journeys performed ; various stations were involved and about two pages of detail were given.

Unit Y gave (i) cost by road, but did not give the cost by rail or the number of journeys.

The office in which this was received forwarded the information exactly as given by the units, not even spotting the lack of detail in the case of Unit Y, nor sending the case through the C. M. A. Incidentally the case was given so little thought that it was not even observed with the help of a little arithmetic that the cost in some of the journeys of the first unit was less by road than by rail as some of the railways were non-contract—a clinching argument had it been put forward in favour of the proposal.

It is obvious that cases put up in an incomplete form and without all the necessary facts must be referred back with consequent increased, but unnecessary, correspondence.

Of the many platitudes delivered in this article the most platitudinous must now be uttered. "Great care in the detail as well as in the essential matter of a case is the first duty of a junior staff officer in drafting a letter." "Big idea," you may say, but herein lies the essence of staff duties and herein is your chance to reduce unnecessary correspondence. Admittedly the junior staff officer should not miss the wood for the trees but primarily the "trees" are his job, and the "wood" is that of his superior officer. In the term "staff officer" is included and very much so—the Regimental Adjutant and Quartermaster.

So far I have confined myself to pointing out errors and their avoidance, but there is a still wider field open to the staff officer. I refer to the study of systems of administration which, though functioning satisfactorily, are capable of modifications which will reduce unnecessary correspondence while allowing the system to continue to function well.

Most staff officers have a series of cases of one nature which are dealt with in a certain way, and it is from the examination of whether this system of dealing with these is over-centralized or over-decentralized that the most far-reaching steps in the reduction of unnecessary correspondence will accrue. The adoption of the various measures I have referred to so far will each effect its saving in time, but in one case, and in one office, only. The revision of a system will have a lasting effect which will afford a frequent, if not daily, saving in many offices.

In general it may be said that correspondence flows upwards, spelling centralization, and downwards spelling decentralization, and it is in the watching of this flow that one can detect an undue tendency in one direction and endeavour to adjust the balance.

As the above suggestions are somewhat vague, I give a concrete case which may make my meaning clearer.

In one area certain examinations in a large number of different subjects were held throughout the year. It was the practice to hold these examinations in every station whenever a candidate applied for one. When such an application was received a Board was assembled to set a paper which was sent to higher authority for approval. The Board then held the examination.

This worked satisfactorily and there were no complaints, but on compiling statistics for one year showing—

(i) the number of papers which were set on various subjects (about 113) ;

(ii) the number of stations and boards concerned (about 113) ;

(iii) the number of officers employed on boards (about 230) ;

(iv) the average number of candidates per board (about 4) :

it became apparent that the subject was unduly decentralized thus throwing an unnecessary burden on regimental officers. Actually it was found that in some cases only one candidate was tested and three officers were employed on the Board, while the same thing was happen-

ing in another station only a few miles away. In some subjects as many as 36 papers were set on the same subject in one year whereas if demands were co-ordinated two papers would suffice. The solution is obvious :

Order examinations at fixed intervals on dates which do not interfere with training, collect the candidates at centres, let one board set one paper for each subject, let higher authority print the paper and distribute direct to the stations concerned.

The point I wish to emphasize is that the dull routine of working out items (i) to (iv) by a staff officer permits his senior to see the wood for the trees. One must of course guard against overdoing such centralization as it is bound to involve an increase in work in the higher formation, but in this case the increase is slight and negligible compared with saving in time to others.

Much has now been said as to how the staff officer can help by preventing minor errors and studying his work with this special aim in view. There is one further means of finding out in what way a reduction in correspondence is necessary, namely, in touring. If formations or units are asked beforehand to consider and make suggestions, and if on arrival the staff officer asks "What can you suggest to reduce unnecessary correspondence, How can I help?" A fine crop of suggestions is forthcoming. It may seem patronizing to go round saying "How can I help?" but the writer has always found enquiries of this nature most welcome both in lower and higher formations. Visits to the C. M. A. are especially valuable and the establishment of good personal relations will often not only lead to considerable reduction in correspondence but may lead to remarkable financial savings.

In dogmatizing so far the writer has felt more or less confident within the province of his own knowledge ; but now in embarking on the second part which aims at the steps more senior officers can take, he must naturally admit that he lacks sufficient administrative experience to gauge to what extent his proposals are practicable.

One of the primary causes, on a large scale, of correspondence is the fact that financial powers have been delegated to so slight a degree. It is easy for the junior staff officer employed at higher formations to make suggestions for greater decentralization, but in so doing he is embarking on a sea of inexperience and is only likely himself to cause unnecessary correspondence thereby.

* He can, however, watch and see that an amendment published is at least in conformity with the existing policy of financial decentralization and make suggestions to his seniors who will know if there is any possibility of the financial authorities agreeing with his proposal.

Largely bound up with this is the question of the large number of cases involving small amounts which must be sent to Army Headquarters and the Government of India for sanction or regularization. Here again the junior staff officer may feel inclined to suggest that the C. M. A. is causing unnecessary correspondence by refusing to pass the small amounts, and that he is ignoring the preface to regulations which reads "officers are expected to interpret these regulations reasonably and intelligently."

It cannot be stressed too strongly that the C. M. A. does not write financial regulations nor has he the power to interpret into them any meaning other than words used. His task is to advise the administrative authorities and to ensure that the requirements of audit are fulfilled, and he is quite right to object if the letter, not to say the spirit, of the regulations is disobeyed. The junior staff officer can best help by putting up the case as advised and avoiding an argumentative correspondence with the expert adviser. He can, however, take steps to prevent recurrence of such cases by suggesting to his seniors that the regulations should be amended; and his suggestions will usually be "further decentralization."

As already implied the possibility of getting this done will largely depend on whether the financial authorities will agree, but it is suggested that as far as the administrative authorities are concerned our policy should be to delegate powers, and if an officer abuses them, to remove him but not his powers, provided his errors are repeated and show culpable neglect. The Army surely has better means of enforcing its policy than a private firm which can only dismiss an employee or frame a charge in a civil court. The writer, however, argues that were such a policy laid down and explained, and guidance given in the opening years, cases of misapplication would be rare.

Turning to the question of Boards, Commanding Officers and senior officers are too frequently obliged to assemble boards of three officers to make a recommendation. Even then the matter does not end, and it is often necessary to forward the case to higher authority for sanction. It must be extremely rare that a junior officer on one of these boards fails to agree with the President; and the senior officer

must, if he has any personality, unconsciously influence the junior members whose signatures are really given "blind" and are not worth the time taken by their attendance at the expense of leaving their job of fitting themselves for war.

I do not go so far as to suggest that all boards should be abolished ; in some cases the principle of boards is justified in providing administrative training to young officers, and in some the requirement that superior authority should sanction the case is a wise precaution. I do, however, suggest that the regulations require too many boards to be assembled, and that it would in a number of cases serve the purpose equally and effect a great saving in time if, instead of holding a board, the responsible officer were authorised to sign a statement of the case.

Conclusion.

The writer does not know what is included in the Staff College term programme at present, but this is certain that some years ago peace administration was totally omitted and never once in two years was this need for reduction of unnecessary correspondence mentioned or if it was the writer (and a friend who was with him) cannot remember it. Admittedly it is hard to fit in everything into the two years, but the subject should, it is urged, find a place not only in lectures but in the execution of practical schemes which would be easy to formulate. Incidentally a high standard of shorthand and typewriting should be an optional, if not an obligatory subject for the Staff College examination.

Once the Staff Officer leaves and takes up his appointment he should be obliged to keep on his office wall a graph showing the number of letters issued. It should be a matter of pride to see this graph fall and a matter for enquiry should it, for any reason not easily explained, show a steady rise.

In tactics, the officer gets continued instruction. Time and again it is reiterated that dead men don't win battles and so on. Even in T. E. W. Ts., problems of war administration are introduced though they often have the appearance of being put in as an afterthought and because the setter of the T. E. W. T. knows someone will be looking out for them. But no one beats the drum about peace administration which bears so directly on training for war.

Let our senior officers give a lead to the juniors, in whose hands so much must lie, and let us hear, in respect of the reduction of unnecessary correspondence, a little more of "the brave music of the distant drum."

GENTLEMAN CADETS OF THE INDIAN ARMY TO-DAY AND YESTERDAY.

By C. A. SWAINSON

The daily Press, by means of reports and photographs, has conveyed to the public a very fair idea of the life of the present day cadet in India, and he, his instructors, his residence, surroundings and general well-being have evoked nothing but praise and admiration.

But the efficiency, the discipline, the health and the happiness of to-day's gentleman cadets at Dehra Dun, as witnessed by His Excellency the Viceroy when, some little while ago, he made over the colours presented by His Majesty The King-Emperor, are in the most striking contrast to the conditions that prevailed with those in training for commissions in the Indian Army little more than a hundred years ago.

Towards the end of the eighteenth century the Indian Government decided to establish a Military College in this country where cadets might be trained for service with Indian regiments. Baraset, about fifteen miles from Calcutta, an unhealthy and malarious spot, at that time chiefly known as a centre for indigo planters, was selected as being suitable for the purpose. Its suitability may best be described in the words of a contemporary writer, thus :—"It was a strange place was Baraset. If the Governor-General, with the best aid of the Commander-in-Chief, the Members of Council and the whole Secretariat, had assembled in solemn conclave, for the sole purpose of devising how best to bring ruin and demoralisation into the ranks of the young and inexperienced, on their arrival as cadets in India, it is doubtful if they could have hit upon so sure, safe and expeditious a plan of eradicating all good and instilling every evil as that same institution of Baraset."

The cadets were boys of fifteen, sixteen and seventeen who were brought out straight from school in England. As a rule they came out in batches of sixty to seventy at a time, being accommodated in different ships which at that period were wont to sail in fleets of ten or fifteen Indiamen so as to present a bold front to the privateers of the French which were in the habit of attacking and harassing the

ships of the Hon'ble East India Company. Immediately on their arrival, the cadets were taken charge of by the Town Major, an official who has long since disappeared but whose duties corresponded very roughly to those of a present day Assistant Provost Marshal. His immediate concern was to get the boys out to Baraset as quickly as possible, both to save himself the bother and responsibility of looking after them and, in a minor degree, so that they might be removed from the temptations of the taverns and other, less reputable, night attractions of Calcutta. Each lad was provided with a palankeen for the journey, but many of them, as soon as they were out of sight of the Town Major, directed their bearers to turn their footsteps towards Cadit Flout's a well-known punch-house of that day, where they would delay for as much as a week before betaking themselves to the Military College. The fact that nothing ever appears to have been said, much less any disciplinary action taken against the cadets who thus disobeyed orders is in itself an indication of the lax manner in which the College was conducted. And yet, such were the conditions at Baraset itself that it is doubtful if much more harm would have resulted from the cadets continuing to haunt the Calcutta inns indefinitely than actually accrued from their residence at the Military College.

Life, indeed, for the cadets, was a riotous pandemonium. The establishment was composed of an elderly, long past his prime, officer, as commandant and head schoolmaster; a second-in-command, whose main duty was to teach the vernacular, and two subalterns, the one, adjutant of the cadet company, and the other, drill instructor. There was also a sergeant-major and sundry N. C. O.'s but every official of the institution, from the commandant to the most junior N. C. O. appeared to have one object and only one in life,—to do as little as possible. As that object fitted in entirely with the inclinations of the majority of the cadets there was peace at Baraset as between the staff and pupils. But that was the only form in which peace existed. True, drill occupied the mornings for those who chose to apply themselves thereto, whilst classes and lectures were given in the daytime to those who felt inclined to attend them. It was, however, the exception for any cadet to make a serious effort to apply himself to work and it is doubtful if he increased his popularity amongst his superiors by doing so. Certainly it would appear that no action was ever taken against any cadet for failure to attend either drill or lectures. Riding country ponies, dog fighting, shooting crows, quarrelling—even duelling,

drinking, gambling, smoking, association with women of the bazar, these and other, similar distractions occupied the major portion of the cadets' time. One cannot blame them. Two hundred or more of them; well-built, strapping young men, just at the age when strict discipline and a firm, guiding hand were most necessary to save them from the temptations with which they were surrounded; left almost entirely to their own devices with to all intents and purposes no check on them whatsoever—is it any wonder that they behaved as they did? Rather, one is astonished that so many of them in course of time became the gallant and capable leaders of men they proved themselves to be.

The following extract from a Despatch of the Court of Directors of the Hon'ble East India Company, of the date 1808, is the first indication that the Home authorities were beginning to have an inkling that all was not well at Baraset. "And whereas it has been represented to the Court of Directors by the Government abroad that many of the cadets at the institution at Baraset have manifested a serious disposition to insubordination towards their superiors and have been guilty of gross irregularities and ungentleman-like conduct towards each other, the cadet is hereby informed that on his arrival in India he is subject to martial law." And the following strange Order by the Governor-General-in-Council, dated May 14, 1807, discloses another feature in the discipline or lack of it at Baraset. "The Honourable the Governor-General-in-Council, having had before him letters addressed to the officer commanding the cadet company by Mr. J. Kerns and Mr. C. Ellison, intimating their determination not to study the native languages, prescribed by the Regulations of Government, and deeming it highly expedient that a conduct so subversive of the principles of subordination as well as the objects of the institution at Baraset should be marked with his severest displeasure, has resolved that Mr. J. Kerns and Mr. C. Ellison be suspended from the service of the Hon'ble Company until the pleasure of the Honourable Court of Directors be known and that these gentlemen be ordered to prepare to embark for Europe by the earliest opportunity."

Matters gradually went from bad to worse and the conditions that obtained may, perhaps, best be illustrated by instancing some flagrant cases from the Military College which were tried at the first Sessions of the Calcutta Supreme Court in January 1808. One of the

cadets, a certain John Grant, was arraigned for "wilfully and maliciously setting on fire and burning a hut at Baraset, the property of Keenoo, bearer, on the twenty-fourth day of October last." He was found guilty and actually sentenced to death, the sentence being later commuted to transportation for life. Many other cadets were tried for duelling, cheating and other crimes and all who were found guilty were awarded sentences which, at the present day, would be considered nothing short of brutal.

In spite, however, of the evidence that was thus produced before them and in spite of reports from numerous non-official sources, the authorities at headquarters apparently continued to shut their eyes to the fact that Baraset was a complete failure and it was not until June 1811 that, roused at last from their lethargy through the utter ruin of the lives of numbers of the cadets, the death through riotous living and neglect of others, the trial and sentence for criminal offences of not a few and the imprisonment for debt of nearly half the full complement, that it was decided to close the college entirely. Baraset was, accordingly, done away with and a fresh plan was introduced whereby cadets, on arrival from England, were sent at once direct to the corps or regiment to which they were to be attached. From the moment of the initiation of that scheme an immense improvement took place. With the example of tried and proved officers before them and with the strict discipline to which they were subjected from the day of their joining, a discipline that was tempered with a never-failing willingness to teach and help the newly joined youngsters, the latter, almost without exception, made good and in due course of time qualified as first class soldiers, both in peace and in war.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

DEAR SIR,

In your January Number there was published an article entitled "Martial and non-Martial Races."

The author opened with a definition of the word "Myth" as to which few of his readers could have been in serious doubt. He did not attempt a definition of the word "Martial" as to which his own ideas were hazy. I propose later to remedy this omission.

He undoubtedly started with the intention of showing that the martial races lived in the North and the non-martial in the South and equally obviously faked his facts in an endeavour to prove this.

For two thousand years, we are told, the conquerors advance was consistently Southwards, but the Northward conquest of the Mahrattas which reached as far as the Indus and Calcutta is dismissed as a "backwash" or "the achievement of clever politicians." Again the Madras army are allowed no credit for their campaigns in Southern and Eastern India in the Eighteenth Century, this being given by a "novel but possible" proposition to peoples from further North.

But it is with regard to the facts of the late war that the author skates with such skill on the thinnest of ice. Apart from a somewhat patronizing and very half-hearted pat on the back to certain races whose claims to fame could not possibly be overlooked, he dismisses the whole war with the statement that data drawn from the war are entirely "inconclusive;" and turns with a neatly executed pirouette to "an entirely different source" for his arguments; and what a source!

The Pathan pedlar (better known as a money-lender) "Stalks the Deccan and the Carnatic." He does. In precisely the same way as his Hindu counterpart stalks the bazaars of Peshawar.

Are we to believe that because the French and the Italians provide the waiters of Soho that these nations are more martial than the English?, or that it is the sign of a martial race to find attendants on the race course or at the car park? Surely the author is correct in his statement that the forays of the Northerner "continue in a different guise," though hardly a martial one.

To put the matter on to a different footing altogether, let us begin with a study of the *Army List* and see which units have received as a result of their work in war the title of Royal; let us see the composition of these units and let us remember that it was won by some in the first war in which they had taken part and in the face of very serious numerical competition from the North.

Shortly before the war a Committee could find nothing worse to say of some of the classes of which these units were and are composed, than they were "unfashionable." Surely it is a distortion of argument to class them now as Royal but non-martial.

Had this been done in 1919 it would have been deemed both imprudent and untrue by every soldier in the army.

What is the meaning of this word "Martial" with which the author juggles so unsuccessfully? A martial race must make respectable and reliable peace soldiers, they must be happy and contented in unaccustomed and often beastly surroundings, adaptable and loyal. In war they must have courage, patience and perseverance, they must "never let you down," and stay the course to the end. They must not display the courage of the swashbuckler one day, to be followed the next by a penchant for desertion.

Let our author apply these tests to the peoples of India and he may realise that the Garhwali and, in Candler's estimation, the Mahratta, great discoveries as they were of the war, were no more surprising than the complete eclipse, long before the Armistice, of the Transfrontier Pathan and some of his kin.

The Commander-in-Chief in his lecture, published in the same number, said that the British Nation are the most unmilitary minded. This may apply to many of the peoples of India also, but of the races enlisted, all are martial and few, fortunately, are swashbucklers.

The danger in peace time is that the swashbuckler becomes fashionable to the detriment of the less showy but more solid martial races. This has happened before, but who would have expected it to occur again in presumably well informed circles within eighteen years of the Armistice?

Yours faithfully,

MALKAM.

SEPOYS DEBATE ON EDUCATION

DEAR SIR,

At officers' courses opportunity is generally given for students to express their views on the course and to suggest modifications. This is all to the good; it helps to keep instructors reasonably humble. For the teacher must ever beware of knowledge that is more easily gained than from the student's angle.

To encourage the sepoy to air his views we introduced a debate into our Section Leaders' training cadre. By a happy thought, on one occasion the subject was: Is education in the army really necessary?

From the manner of their delivery and the quality of the speeches it was clear that there had been a rehearsal; nevertheless, the stuff was there. The formalities were as correctly observed as in other chambers of grave debate.

As the following report shows, Johnny Sepoy has quite definite views on this thorny question, and as vigorous as those of the veteran sirdar who scornfully declared, "*Ham log likhte nahin.*"

Speaker Number One opened for the motion.

Education is necessary for efficiency in modern methods of fire, particularly for range-takers and those who control indirect fire. It is essential for the effective handling of modern machines of war. Reconnaissance by subordinate personnel is more than ever necessary, and good reconnaissance depends on good map-reading which, in its turn, depends on education. Education is valuable too for modern methods of inter-communication.

Speaker Number Two led the opposition, and vigorously challenged Number One's views on the prime needs for war. The first essential for success in war is discipline. Education makes people reflect, and the man who reflects makes a poor subordinate.

He agreed on the importance of controlled fire. But what controls fire? Fire orders—which must be obeyed without reflection.

It must be remembered that the difficulties of war can only be overcome by bravery, physical strength, and physical skill. In particular the machine gunner and the mountain gunner must be physically fit and strong. Education does not foster these qualities. It is therefore questionable whether the expense of money and time on education are justifiable.

Speaker Number Three argued that educated men could display bravery no less than uneducated men. And further he invited his hearers to note the ability for leadership which education conferred. In illustration he compared the knowledge and experience of Indian officers and young British officers. The young British officer, by reason of his superior education, is set in authority over the older and more experienced Indian officer. And his capacity to lead is acknowledged by all.

So far, all deadly serious; no humour. But *Speaker Number Four* made the rafters ring.

Who won the war? The *unparhawalas*, whilst the *parhawalas** did the babu work. Consider the time a *parhawala* takes over a job. A working party of twenty men reports to the Bom Police Havildar. What does he do? Immediately he divides them into two parties—*unparhawalas* and *parhawalas*; and the *unparhawalas* have finished their task before the *parhawalas* have formulated their plan of how best to do it.

Or again—a party of young lance-naiks read at a "Brigade class" for their 1st class certificate. One of them passes the examination. He's a fool. He has to go on guard, and so much time has he spent in educating himself he not only knows nothing of guard duties, but he does not even know where the guard-room is. The failures are wise. They still attend the "Brigade class" and get excused duty. (Be assured, reader, that here is rhetorical exaggeration.)

Number Five dwelt on the advantages of an educated runner. He can make notes of a long message and so ensure delivering it in full and correctly. The educated man from his reading too can fortify himself with the traditions enshrined in regimental history.

Number Six smartly riposted. Is there not much danger lest written notes of messages fall into the enemy's hands? As for historical example, that coin, too, has another side. Might not the stories of killings and woundings and prisoners undermine rather than fortify the young soldier's morale?

Number Seven exploited a new argument, perhaps a direct result of his cadre training. Can it be doubted that the successful solution

* *Unparhawalas* means the "illiterate."
Parhawalas means "the literate."—Ed.

of any military problem depends on ability to appreciate the situation ? And who but an educated man can accomplish this mental feat ?

Consider, too, the matter of administration. It is all very well to scoff at the babu, but war cannot be made without supplies and educated men to deal with the accountancy involved.

Number Eight, the closing speaker, knew, methinks, that he would not be answered.

Ration accounts may be necessary in peace, but in war we dispense with all that business. But let that pass. The crux of the matter is this:—If the *Sirkar* really needs educated men in the army, then why does it not enlist Bengalis ?

Mr. Editor, I ask you to consider what, as chairman, you would have said on closing this debate.

Yours, etc.,
X.

A CAVALRY CHARGE IN MANCHURIA

DEAR SIR,

Edmund Gilligan, a special correspondent of the *New York Sun*, who has just returned here from a tour in the Far East, has written an eye-witness account of a cavalry charge in Manchuria, which reveals that the days of the sword are not yet vanished from the warfare of the world.

Mr. Gilligan says :

“ A Japanese detachment of cavalry lay encamped in the middle of a great plain. A mile away the evening smoke rose from the hovels of the village. In a great circle round the camp and the village, the sentries, mounted on ponies, kept their watch upon the plain. No other sign of life could be seen in all that vast expanse, except for the bowed form of a farmer toiling in the last light of day.

Across that plain ran the empty bed of a river. The torrents of spring had deepened its banks. After drought and dry harvest time, there was no water. Dust flew up from the bottom when the black pigs snouted the parched gravel.

A shot rang out on the western bank of the river. The sentries in the great circle whirled their mounts westward and peered towards

the river banks. A pillar of dust rose there. Out of it dashed a pony, riderless and bloody. The sentries, shouting the alarm, rode after the pony into the camp and there the troops, busy over the cooking fires, sprang to arms.

Out of the river bottom rode a squadron of mounted men. They were Chinese, armed with pistols, rifles and swords. A young officer spurred his mount to the western bank and shouted orders. Another squadron rode out of the river bottom and another followed, all in orderly array. Each arriving unit of the troops trotted into its place.

With equal coolness the Japanese officers ordered their men into formation. Their command, according to the official report, consisted only of Manchu cavalry. These men are called traitors by the Chinese patriots, and they meet the fate of the traitor when they are conquered. The unofficial report agreed that the men were Manchu soldiers, recruited by the Japanese. It added that there were many Japanese soldiers and petty officers in the ranks.

The Bandit Explanation.

The first charge took place in the last few minutes of the sunlight. At the call of the bugle the Chinese trotted their horses forward half a mile, and at the second call the whole line lunged into the gallop with sabres at the ready. They were met with machine-gun fire. The charge broke on the Japanese position and fell back in confusion. Dead and dying men and horses kicked in the dust.

The Chinese, again summoned by the bugles, fell back and reformed. Again they trotted forward and again rose into the gallop when the charge had not gone far. The line broke into two and both units swept in a half circle down upon the Japanese flanks, where there were no machine guns.

The Chinese killed every Manchu and Japanese by the sword. No quarter was asked and none given. By the time the first darkness drew over the plain, the victors had loaded the carts of the Japanese with all the guns and munitions, and had tied the halters of the enemy mounts to their own saddles and had trotted off into the black plain.

Your, etc.,

HOTEL BREVOORT,
NEW YORK.

GAULT MACGOWAN,
Captain.

DEAR SIR,

With reference to the lecture of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief reproduced in the last number of the Journal, I venture to send you this quotation from the Journal and Letters of Viscount Esher—Volume II—(Journal, November 19th, 1907). It represents the resumé of certain remarks made to Lord Esher by Lord Haldane:—

“Politicians and others who are brought into contact with soldiers, notice the comparatively low standard of knowledge between the heads of the military profession and others; *not* in technique, but in general education. Men of fine natural abilities appear stunted. Exceptions there are, of course, but John Morley and Knollys, for example, are both struck by the comparative inferiority of our best Generals to men of equal standing in other professions, including the Navy. What is the reason for this? In most walks of life, the strenuous years are from 20 to 30. It is during these years that at the Bar, in Medicine, in the Church—whether at Universities or under special professional conditions—young men acquire the habit of application

In the Army, a subaltern, during the first years of his life, and generally until he reaches middle life, limits his efforts to acquiring such technical knowledge of his profession as can be absorbed between nine and one daily. There is no inducement for him to educate himself, or to do any more than he is obliged. Hence, during the ten most crucial years of his life, he acquires no habits of application, but devotes himself to sport, or sinks into indifference or idleness. Later on, when the responsibilities of the higher command begin to inspire prospective terrors, an officer tries to make up for lost time, and regrets lost opportunities.

No doubt some young officers read books, and improve their minds, but spasmodically, and without real incentive. A lad will think, for a week, that in order to be a General he must ‘work at’ strategy; so he will take real pains to master a campaign of Napoleon. The following week it strikes him that he cannot command armies until he is 40, and he falls asleep in the anteroom”

Some of the above remarks are controversial; but in the main the basic causes of the conditions which are as much deplored by His Excellency as they were by Lord Haldane, have persisted up to modern times. As far as India is concerned, these causes may be

summed up as lack of opportunity and incentive. By whom, and how, is opportunity to be provided and incentive fostered?

Yours truly,

F. DICKINS,

Colonel.

LIGHT INFANTRY

DEAR SIR,

I hope other infantrymen will not allow Captain Fripp's article "A few thoughts on Light Infantry, etc." published in your January number, to die a natural death. It seems to me that the matter should be thrashed out in your pages and an answer given to the questions:—

Are the training, weapons, equipment and tactics of our infantry fitted to the requirements of modern war? (Modern war; not only mountain warfare.)

If they are not so fitted, where do they fail and how can we apply the remedy?

In your journal in 1933 we fulminated about the disastrous effect on our tactics and training of the inclusion of heavy machine guns in our battalions. It does seem to-day that we are likely at last to be rid of this incubus and that the support battalion is to come into being; thus will we be able to train our riflemen and 'Light Automatic' men to fight.

But, before we can start this training on its right lines, we must examine the matter of equipment. Surely modern ingenuity can provide us with a waterproof and a light, extendible lining that will between them do the job of great coat and two blankets with a far smaller combined weight than those articles. The infantry need loose trousers, much like ski-ing trousers, brought in at the ankles by a short puttie or, better, a canvas, buttoned anklet.

Above all, to my mind, we need a far lighter rifle and therefore lighter ammunition. The present rifle is a bayonet carrier, and how often is that bayonet used in modern war?

When the infantryman is suitably equipped, he will be fitted to play a suitable tactical part. Here, in India and on its frontiers, we have probably the finest training ground in the world. We should be able to produce an incomparable infantry. We need a little money and much experiment, for we simply *must* quit the old grooves.

The book "Commando" is far nearer our needs than all that is written of 1914—18. No nation will again put up with the tremendous infantry losses of the Great War in France.

I am,
Your obedient servant,
AUSPEX.

SIR,

I have read an article in your Volume for January entitled "A few thoughts on Light Infantry and Mountain Warfare Training."

Interesting as it is to see that the writer has such thoughts, his criticism of the "average sepoy" and of the Indian Infantry Battalion will be grossly misleading to those of your readers having little knowledge of the Indian Army, or of its personnel. Moreover, the writer of the article commences his criticisms with the words "It is generally recognized," which is a direct misstatement, and is followed by a number of equally inexact remarks.

In the course of over 29 years' service, I have met Battalions representative of every Regiment of the Indian Army.

I have found the average sepoy to be physically fit and a skilled man-at-arms, emphatically master of his trade. I have found that the quick incidence of service on the Frontier does definitely keep Battalions "Frontier-minded," and that when they return to it, drop quickly into the rôle required of them.

I have found that the sepoy has a long memory, and that on his unit's return to the Frontier, he—by then a Lance Naik—is a capable and resourceful Section Leader.

In "peace" stations, moreover, much of the talk in Indian Officers' Mess, Havildars' Room and Barracks is of incidents on the Frontier from the Khyber to Quetta.

Frequently will a Platoon commander point the lesson of the day's training with a narrative of actual Frontier experience.

I hope this will serve to correct wrong impressions.

May I suggest to the writer of thoughts that if the average sepoy is well trained and well led, he, the thinker, can cheerfully put into effect any ideas he may have about defeating the Pathan at his own game, provided always that such ideas are tactically sound.

Yours faithfully,

A. W. MALET, LIEUT.-COLONEL,
Late 1st Bn., 17th Dogra Regiment (P. W. O.).

REVIEWS.

"THE P. V. H." BY CAPTAIN AND BREVET-MAJOR G. S.

HURST, M. F. H., ROYAL SIGNALS.

(*Gale and Polden, Ltd., Aldershot.*) 1 guinea net.

"The far-famed shires of the Eusufzai Valley have long been acknowledged to be the only real hunting country in India," is the opening sentence of the Peshawar Vale Hunt Records, dated 1870. With this complacent, not to say impudent, assumption I was, and I think I am still, in profound disagreement. Having tasted the delights of the Ooty country, having lost three horses in Lahore, and having had the occasional marvellous day when on tour with the Kirkee Hounds (not to mention some memorable kills in Delhi), I think it is a bit hard that I can only compare these real experiences with the plain tale of the P. V. H. as produced in this beautiful book.

Major Hurst not only knows his stuff, but he knows how to treat it and, with the collaboration of artists like "Snaffles" and Major H. M. Tulloch, has produced a book which ought to be on the shelf of every reader who is fond of either a horse or the frontier. Unlike most Hunts in India the P. V. H. has been able to preserve its records, and with this authentic data the author has been enabled to build his history into a well-documented and coherent whole. Avoiding the obvious and easy path of giving a dull chronological review, culled from possibly dead pages of hastily written records, Major Hurst has obviously saturated himself in the old wine and diluted it with his own personal experience, both as whip and M. F. F., in the new. The result is a fascinating account divided into well-chosen chapters dealing, for instance, with the History from 1863 to 1931-32 when Captain R. F. Rutledge of the Poona Horse handed over to the author; the Hounds; the Country; the Quarry (a first-rate and first-hand account of the habits of the wily jackal), and finally some splendid descriptions of various notable runs and points-to-point. We defy anybody, who knows Peshawar or who likes a horse, to put down this book without finishing it at one sitting.

With the author's views that "artificial means to supplement sport in order to produce galloping hunts" are wrong there can be no legitimate disagreement. On the other hand, those arid Hunts in

India, even more scentless than the Peshawar Vale, when, before Xmas especially, dawn after dawn the hounds and field meet to watch scent give out after a hundred yards from cover; when jackals refuse to leave the heavy undergrowth of *sholas* and *baghs*; when subscribers say "This is no ruddy good; I'd get a better hack on my own and at a more reasonable hour;" then can one blame the huntsman if occasionally he tries by artificial methods to produce some sport for his hounds? (No real M. F. H. ought to worry about the field except when they get too close.) It is a difficult problem in most places, but in the P. V. H. the hunt coverts and the jackal knowledge and lore imparted in this book should preserve this Hunt's enviable integrity for many years to come.

W. E. M.

The Princes of India (with a Chapter on Nepal).

BY SIR WILLIAM BARTON.

(*Nisbet & Co., Berners St.*) 15*sh.*

Since this book was published the Princes of India have suddenly come to public attention by their Hamlet-like indecision in Bombay as to whether they should be or not be participants in the Federal scheme. By their hesitation in joining the Indian Federation until all the other players' cards are on the table they have made a timely, if at the same time an unnecessarily dramatic, gesture to show that on them—and it may now be presumed on them alone—rests the successful emergence of the India Bill.

Our knowledge of Indian India, as opposed to British India is limited to a few odd shoots, a few polo tournaments, a few banquets and that sort of thing which give no idea of what lies behind the fact that one-third of this great continent is ruled by Indian Princes. The problems and the welfare of their subjects is their own concern at present but under the new Constitution will be brought more closely within its ambit and more intimately bound up with the affairs of British India.

In this book of less than 350 pages Sir William Barton presents the history, pageant and all the essential material details of the 562 States ("of which 327 are of relatively very little consequence"), with a smooth clarity and conciseness which make the reading both profitable and pleasant. Having served in three of the major States

as Resident the author is able to bring a well-stored mind and sober judgment to his task and his practical experience helps him wisely and fairly to discuss the various problems that have faced and face the Princes in their territories. We must admire this broadly sketched canvas filled with the cool colours of detached comment. The artist has blended his colours softly and refused to adopt the media of the vivid modernist with his ochres, vermilions, and ceruleans laid on thickly with a knife—methods so frequently and so unfairly used for this very subject.

But at the same time Sir William has introduced here and there the trivial authentic anecdote to illustrate the more serious point. His chapters on the relationship of the Political Department with the Princes is so well-balanced, so shrewd and so dry-humoured that at the end one feels he likes Political Officers almost as much as Princes. The final chapter is a good pointer to the present controversy and will help the interested student of Indian affairs.

For those studying the history of British India and for those contemplating the Political Department—as well as for the general reader who takes a genuine interest in India—this most readable and thought-provoking book can be cordially recommended.

M. E.

The Silent Division.

By O. E. BURTON.

(*Angus & Robertson, Sydney, Australia.*) 6sh.

This is one of, if not the first chronicle of the New Zealanders in the War. The author who was obviously one of those who joined at the very beginning and saw most of the fighting deals with his subject quite impersonally. We follow the New Zealand volunteers through their original training until they received their baptism of fire at the landing on Gallipoli. The description of that portion of the Peninsula which came to be known as Anzac and the hinterland as far as the troops ever saw it is particularly good. The nearness of success when on successive days the New Zealanders and the Gurkhas took Chunuk Bair and waited for the Suvla force to come up to them to consolidate that vital area is brought out very vividly. This is one of the many instances where the Gallipoli operations appear to have been fated to failure. Then follows the evacuation and the eventual move to France

where the New Zealanders participated in most of the big battles up to the end of the war. These included the Somme, Hill 63, Messines, Ypres, the March Retreat, which was perhaps the finest of their many exploits and the final advance commencing on 8th August 1918. It is shown how the exploits and sufferings of the war, giving as they did a history and justifiable pride of achievement, welded the New Zealanders into a race, confident in their own ability and imbued with a deep patriotism of their native island. In places this carries the author away and he makes comparisons between the New Zealanders and other races usually in respect of their fighting capabilities, which are by no means borne out by authentic histories; the fault perhaps lies in generalizations drawn from isolated instances. The psychological aspect of the independent educated volunteer towards authority is exceedingly well portrayed and whilst discipline is admitted as a necessity, such questions as the position and choice of officers, saluting and dull uninteresting parades are discussed from an interesting standpoint. The arguments adduced will carry much force to those who remember the type of man who formed part of the New Armies and who in the future, will again form the first expansion if a national army is raised. Apart from this viewpoint of the volunteer, the military student will find much interest in two tactical points which are well expressed as the result of practical experience. The first is the disorganization which sets in as soon as infantry get heavy casualties, the other the conduct of battle patrolling in which our Dominion troops excelled, and both are questions which are constantly lost sight of in peace time training.

H. R. S.

A History of the Great War—1914-18.

By C. R. M. F. CRUTTWELL.

(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1934.) 15s.

Mr. Cruttwell's history embraces the whole war, except the smaller side-shows, and without going into tactical details gives a very clear picture of it. It is almost unique nowadays to find a history of the Great War condensed into one volume, and readers will be grateful to the author for producing such a comparatively short book which will enable them to get a good and clear background on which they can fix their more detailed studies. Mr. Cruttwell served in the war

both as a regimental officer in France and as an intelligence officer, and is now the Principal of Hertford College, Oxford. His first-hand knowledge of conditions of service in the war and the detachment with which his life since the war has enabled him to look at it, have obviously helped him to appreciate fairly the difficulties of each of the higher commands and to be fair in apportioning praise and blame. Unlike one of his contemporary historians, he "keeps the party clean," and his book is all the more pleasant and interesting. Many will probably agree with his statement that every country had the General Staff which it deserved. It seems a pity, as General Fuller so aptly remarks, that he did not add that every country had the government it deserved as well.

However, let us be thankful for a fair and unbiassed account of commendable length by an author who has no axe to grind. This book should be of special value to those officers who wish to ride at the Staff College fence.

D. D. G.

The Infantry Experiment.

BY MAJOR-GENERAL H. ROWAN-ROBINSON, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.

(Messrs. William Clowes & Sons, Ltd.) 3s.

This book contains a "general survey of the present position and future prospects of infantry." Its object is to discover a solution to the infantry problem which, although admittedly without pretence to perfection, will meet with general acceptance. Opinion will vary as to whether this object has, or has not, been achieved. All will agree, however, that here is clear military thinking expressed in a readable argument that leads to conclusions that are drastic yet rational.

The characteristics of infantry and its tasks are considered with reference to small wars and then with reference to Continental Warfare. The author next proceeds to explain his suggestions in chapters on training, equipment and organization. The requirements of Imperial Policing and Small Wars are a peculiarly British problem which all attempts to arrive at an organization for our infantry must face. There are convincing arguments that our present methods, particularly on the North-West Frontier, are in need of radical alteration. The suggestion is that small, active and lightly armed and


equipped parties moving along the ridges should take the place of the present slow and cumbersome columns creeping along the valleys. Supply is to be by air, communication by wireless. There are two questions left unanswered. What is to be the fate of the wounded and would not the loss of even one of these small parties have an adverse psychological effect throughout the frontier ?

As regards Continental Warfare it is argued that the best assistance that we can give to an ally, beyond our naval support, is an air force and a mechanised element. The only infantry to be included is the minimum necessary for certain auxiliary tasks such as guarding aerodromes and tank harbours. Their rôle is to be almost entirely defensive and they are to be carried to the scene of their work in motor transport. Although certain weapons will be needed that were not wanted for frontier wars, for this rôle also, the infantry will require a light portable machine gun and light equipment. Accordingly, the suggestion follows that there should be a reduction in the weight and calibre of small arms, that the Lewis and Vickers guns should be replaced by a new weapon, and that animal transport will not be needed. Other weapons are still to be provided but the whole of a unit's armoury will not be taken whenever it goes out on an active operation. Choice is to be made just as a sportsman selects his gun or rifle from his gun room.

The proposed drastic reduction in the numbers of infantry at home involves the abandonment of the Cardwell system. Almost all infantrymen would do the whole of their service abroad except for recruits training and a year's break with a training establishment. As the author remarks, the Cardwell system has served us well for many years and it seems impossible to devise any alternative which will be half so convenient. But, if the conditions for which it was designed have changed and if modifications will not do, the only logical alternative is to abandon it.

Major-General Rowan-Robinson's book is one that should be read by all who are interested in the future of infantry in the British Army. It is a clear and reasoned statement which avoids detail and leaves in the reader's mind a broad picture of one method of solving the infantry problem.

W. E. U.





General Sir C. NORMAN MACMULLEN, G.C.B., C.M.G., C.I.E., D.S.O.,
A.D.C., G. O. C.-in-Chief, Eastern Command, India.

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EDITORIAL.

No words of ours can add anything to the outpouring of sympathy to the stricken city, once called Quetta. In two short minutes at 3 A.M., on 31st May, the City, Civil Lines, and Headquarters of the R. A. F. shuddered, collapsed and buried their inmates in an inescapable and, save for comparatively few instances, an inaccessible tomb. To all the bereaved and sufferers, particularly to the relatives of the R. A. F. dead—so tragically cut down in the prime of life—we offer our deepest sympathy.

Only those who survived the disaster can imagine its horror and its implacable force. It is presumptuous, therefore, for us writing in Simla, to dare to paint or enlarge upon this calamity. But we can and must write about it. All of us know or had friends in Quetta ; we knew the bazaar and had dealings with its shopkeepers ; we hunted and knew the surrounding country and the villages intimately ; we shot *chikor* which brought us further afield and added to our knowledge of the countryside and its simple, pastoral inhabitants ; we even had manoeuvres there ; and many of our members were at the Staff College. Quetta was almost India's Aldershot, a station with which the military forces had especial ties.

This is apparent in the Viceroy's Earthquake Relief Fund. It is significant to notice how all units, departments and formations have subscribed generously to this fund. It would seem that the Army in India, officer, man, sowar and sepoy, owed Quetta something in

affection or sentiment and wished to pay it with sympathy. Perhaps this spontaneous charity by the Army was a tribute to the forces in Quetta, who, for the greater part, escaped, and were mobilised immediately to succour the inhabitants. Adequate praise has been given to the Army and all its ancillary services by greater pens than ours. We all know how the Army, with Quetta trembling all around them, leapt to it. Most of the civilian administration, including the Quetta police had been killed. Chaos, that indescribable word, was triumphant.

Fortunately, the A. G. G., Sir Norman Cater, and the officiating G. O. C.-in-Chief, General Karslake, survived. Martial Law—could some less sinister adjective be devised by the authorities when it means, in such cases as this, that *guardian, protective, benevolent* (although summary) Law is implied?—was promulgated, as there were no other government authorities left to preserve and safeguard the remnants of Quetta.

Under General Karslake the 16,000 troops in Quetta performed their humanitarian tasks. They saved all the living in the catacombs of the city; they dug out and succoured the wounded and dying; they evacuated, fed, clothed and comforted the refugees. Camps, hospitals, information bureaux were improvised and all the military stores of Quetta were utilised for this purpose without question and, one hopes, without audit objection.

Thousands of wretched people were buried without hope of excavation in the jerry-built and mud-built city. Their corpses started the process of decomposition and the city became dangerously unhealthy. It was "sealed"—an expressive word meaning only that no person would be allowed to enter it until the serious risk of infection to the outside world could be limited, and that all the property therein buried was under the safe and patent seal of the military cordon surrounding it. This action needs no justification; it was imperative.

We have paid a wholly inadequate tribute to the military and civil authorities who worked unceasingly to bring relief to the sufferers and to this must be added our tribute to the generous and whole-hearted response made by India at large to the Viceroy's Earthquake Fund.

But we feel compelled to deplore the attitude of certain people who have seen in this terrible disaster an opportunity to make political

capital. Everything has its time and place and the attempts to belittle Government's achievements in a national calamity must be as abhorrent to Indian public opinion as it is to those who have been working so splendidly for the last six weeks in Quetta.

It is far more pleasant to record that on the 5th July H. E. the Viceroy, with H. E. the Commander-in-Chief in attendance, reviewed the Quetta Garrison. His Excellency conveyed to Major-General Karslake and the troops under his command his thanks and the thanks of the Government of India for their great work in the interests of humanity. It was a fine tribute and one which India knows was richly deserved.

* * * * *

In the recent re-shuffle of the Cabinet Mr. Anthony Eden had a new post created for his talents. He is now the minister dealing with the affairs of the League of Nations, and as such travels about the Continent keeping touch both with the daily changes in Europe's capitals and with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in London. It is an interesting and significant appointment betraying the anxiety of the British Government regarding her foreign affairs.

Europe has for the last few months been seething with uneasy excitement. Herr Hitler started it when he declared Germany's right and intention to re-arm.

The British Government realized that the only answer to this threat was to confront Germany with an established system of "Collective Security," hence the Stresa resolutions and the indictment of Germany by the Council of the League.

The principle of "Collective Security" was embodied in the original Covenant of the League of Nations, and it was applied to a limited extent in the Locarno Treaties. Since then its practice has fallen rather into disuse, mainly owing to the fact that in the last few years attention has been focussed on the Disarmament Convention.

It has, however, now been revived, and in order to give it the backing essential for its successful realization the British Government have been forced to overhaul and increase the Defence Estimates, and to undertake an immense expansion of the Air Force. Many serious observers considered the latter programme to be unduly precipitate and uneconomic, involving as it does the recruitment of 2,500 officers and 20,000 men, to say nothing of the necessary buildings and

aerodromes. It had the appearance of panic and of pandering to the hysterical outpourings of the daily press. But its effect on the Continent was undoubtedly steady. France saw in it additional security. Germany was certainly impressed, as instanced by the recent speeches of Herr Hitler and other German leaders.

Many of our readers have probably only vague ideas as to what "Collective Security" actually means and it is interesting to quote the words of Mr. Baldwin and Mr. Eden, the chief protagonists. Mr. Baldwin defined it as follows: "The idea of it (collective security) in its modern sense is that Europe shall not tolerate war, and that if any one country, whatever that country is and wherever it is situated, starts making war—in other words is an aggressor—every other country shall join in forcing that country to stop."

Mr. Eden amplified this statement later at the Queen's Hall. "Collective Security," he said, "assumed that its success depended upon each of its members playing an effective part in it. In an armed world like that of to-day, with an incomplete collective system, it was clearly impossible for this country to be unilaterally alone disarmed. A measure of armament was clearly necessary, a measure related to the armaments of others, and large enough to enable us to fulfil our responsibilities as members of a collective system. But armaments of themselves were not the best security. Clearly if all the nations were in a collective system, the lower the level of armaments universally adopted by everybody the safer we should be. But we were not, unhappily, in such a world yet."

The idea of world disarmament having failed so disastrously last year, European statesmen are now toying with the idea of an Air Pact so that a suicidal race in this arm may not occur. At present parity between Germany, France and England is mooted. Little is said about naval and military forces, now that Germany has agreed to build up to 35 per cent. only of the British Fleet. France has looked askance at this proposal, possibly because she was not consulted. In the meanwhile Italy is rattling her sabre on the frontiers of Abyssinia, there are signs of unrest in Austria and the Danubian territories, and in the Far East Japan strides unopposed through the northern reaches of China.

We do not envy Mr. Eden his colossal task and only wish his instrument, the League, were made of sterner and more durable stuff.

The reason why the North-West Frontier of India has always been a fascinating problem is probably because it is a riddle. It would be safe to say that not one of those protagonists of this or that view who has tried to solve it and put his solution on paper would be able to support all his arguments when confronted with the reasoning of the other side.

The Frontier and its problems remain ever fluid. Dogmatism or diehardism count for little when dealing with peoples whose civilisation is yielding perceptibly to the influences which surround it. Because, for instance, Sandeman or Roos-Keppel solved their immediate problem satisfactorily it would be wrong to imagine that their methods must always be correct for us to use to-day. Conversely, it would be idiotic if we did not examine their administrative dealings and not try to benefit from them when applicable.

In this Number we publish a critical appreciation of the Prize Essay, 1934. The author is an officer with distinguished frontier service and his criticism, constructive and fair, will help to show how many sides there are to this problem. He maintains that the object of our frontier policy is the security of British India, and not necessarily —(as so many sentimental critics have it)—the extension of the advantages of British administration to the tribesmen. Complete control of the tribes in law, order and administration, is the logical solution, but that would probably put India into the bankruptcy courts, and does not therefore come within the range of practical politics.

We commend this article to our readers' serious attention, and have only one criticism to offer. It appears to us that the writer, in advocating the maintenance of a tribal belt "buffer" between ourselves and Afghanistan, has overlooked one very important consideration. We have accepted responsibility for the political control of the tribes which implies that we will prevent them from attacking or interfering offensively in Afghanistan. This responsibility was unpleasantly brought to mind by the events of March 1933, when certain tribes from Waziristan made a dangerous incursion across the Durand Line. If Waziristan had been merely a "buffer" state, instead of being the controlled area it now is, the consequences might have been serious.

While dealing with this complex subject it is interesting to notice how Captain Liddell Hart proposes to settle it. In his recent book,

"When Britain goes to War," he devotes a chapter entitled "Air and Empire" to our particular problem. After careful perusal of this interesting, well-written and misleading chapter we must conclude that Captain Hart has never seen the country or the inhabitants west of the River Indus. It surprises us to the point of shocking us that this brilliant military writer should lend himself so ingenuously to the already exploded doctrine of Air Control of the frontier.

We imagine that even the most enthusiastic of our R. A. F. friends (including the writer of a letter in our Correspondence pages) will resent this ill-informed advocacy.

Captain Hart, anxious to prove his thesis, is, we are afraid, inclined to exaggerate or embroider history; so in fairness to the troops which were engaged we should like to refute just one of his statements:

"On May 11 a lashkar of Tochi Wazirs, 4,000 strong, besieged the militia post at Datta Khel. Aircraft came to the aid of the garrison at once, and also dispersed a fresh lashkar that was arriving on the scene, but air action against their villages was not unloosed until the afternoon of the 14th. That same evening the besieging lashkar heard the news and went home; submission was made next morning. . . .

It is difficult to determine what weight the ground forces exercised. The Razmak Column certainly marched out a *few miles* from its base and shelled some villages in the neighbourhood that were within range. But the tribes of this wide mountain region emphatically dwelt on the influence of the air action in making their submission."—"When Britain Goes to War," pp. 134-5.)

The less picturesque facts are that the tribes, unsettled by successful political agitation in India, thought that the Government forces would offer no resistance. Their first reverse was the splendid resistance offered by the Scouts who garrisoned the Post. They were then bombed from the air and withdrew from the close vicinity of the Fort to the broken ground beyond. Each night they renewed their attacks. Eventually Razmak Column was released to relieve the Post, and their approach combined with the hammering they had received caused the lashkar to disperse. Razmak Column marched 56 miles.

This whole chapter is redolent with similar clever half-truths, and although the last thing we desire is to raise again all the old arguments and dreary controversies, we must regret that a responsible

military commentator and historian such as this author can be of no help whatsoever to us in solving the riddle of the N.-W. F. P. Every sane soldier and every sane airman who have worked together there during the last ten years realise that our work is complementary, and that our successes were always measured by the degree of our close co-operation.

* * * * *

Now that the anxiety regarding the fate of the War Block officers has been removed, those officers commissioned between **The Unaxed.** 1914 and 1920 who are not to be retired are beginning to breathe again. Gasping a little with relief they have come to the surface and, not unnaturally, are taking stock of their brave new world. Now, what next is going to happen to me? is the general questioning. They all realise that a certain amount of re-shuffling among units is inevitable, but when this necessary adjustment is made they wonder what their chances will be of getting command of their regiments and battalions. Regarding the re-shuffle. We have reasons to believe that it will be much less than generally anticipated. All efforts are being made to keep the parties clean and to limit extra-regimental transfers to a minimum; inter-regimental transfers may be expected both this year and in 1937-38, but the more we have of that the better it will be to foster the real regimental spirit, which, incidentally, we think is still inclined to be sticky.

A contributor has gone into this command question with great thoroughness and courage in an article published in this number. Arguing from statistics he has produced a series of most depressing tables, but we would comfort both him and those of our readers who become unduly affected by the prospect, that you can argue anything from statistics and that such arguments are generally inaccurate.

We all know that the War Block Committee sub-divided the war generation of officers into three main grades; above the average, average and below the average. This was an arbitrary and necessary basis for selection and does not imply that the latter category means anything except the military-minded adoration of rigid documentation for serious purposes. We may assume, however, that the first two categories have greater chance of getting command than those left in the basement; which is only fair. At the same time, owing to the frailty of human nature, it is not unlikely that some of those now judged "below average" may discomfit their critics by displacing

the present blue-eyed boys before the bar of future Selection Boards. Peace standards are often upset by the more rigorous examination of battle.

But we cannot accept our contributor's gloomy forecast that only six out of every ten Indian Army infantry and cavalry officers will get command. Seven would be nearer the mark, and we have evidence from authoritative sources to justify this conclusion. And this we consider is a good thing. Promotion to command in the Indian Army has been considered for far too long a time as automatic. In the British Service rejections of Majors for command have averaged just over 30 per cent. in recent years, and this tightening of selection has been all to the good of the service. A similar levelling in the Indian Army, and all that it would contribute to keenness and a desire for efficiency among its Majors, will have nothing but an excellent effect. In this respect strict accountancy regarding the three-year tenure of command in statistics might be deprecated. There is bound to be some wastage—(early promotion, voluntary retirements and less natural causes)—and, even if everything else fails, the unlucky three out of every ten should be able to look forward to a year's leave at 26 years' service, with a pension of £700 at the latter end.

Our contributor has emphasised another important point. It is not generally realised how few officers were commissioned after 1921;—a remaining total of 73 only for the years 1921 and 1922, and a serious shortage for several years afterwards. This means that officers commissioned in the years 1918, 1919 and 1920 will have to remedy this shortage and some of them may not expect command until 1945-48; *i.e.*, after 27 years' service.

That is a long time to wait, but we may again comfort ourselves with the reflection that long-termed statistics cannot be judged too seriously, and that if all comes to the worst another war may intervene. *Dulce et decorum est pro pueris* mori*. In the meantime, we are glad to hear that there are so many applicants from the British Service for the hundred vacancies of these dog-years.

* Latin for "backward boy."

LYAUTEY, MOROCCO, AND THE N. W. F. P.

BY "SPINGIRAI."

(A Critical Appreciation of the Gold Medal Prize Essay for 1934.)

Last year's Gold Medal Essay begins with a lucid and interesting account of the career, as a Colonial Administrator, of Marshal Lyautey, and of the principles applied by that great Frenchman to the solution of the French Moroccan problem.

The Essay proceeds to summarize the existing situation on the North-West Frontier of India, the methods, or lack of method, by which the British Indian Government has hitherto sought to deal with the grave problems arising out of that situation, and the nature of the administrative and military organization employed to this end. The conspicuous degree of success achieved by the genius of Lyautey in dealing with the Moroccan problem is then contrasted with what is widely believed to be the lack of success of the Indian Government in dealing with theirs. It is suggested that the chronic malady of the Indian Frontier might yield to the treatment so advantageously prescribed for the Moroccan patient; the principal medicine being unity of control.

The unbiassed reader will readily agree with the judges that the Essay is a valuable constructive contribution to the study of our old and thorny North-West Frontier problem. Let it be said at once, too, that the author of the present study unreservedly accepts the essayist's main conclusion, namely, the desirability of unity of control on the Frontier. But when one comes to examine the practical application of that conclusion there are grounds for caution.

The lessons drawn by the Essayist from his study relate to both policy and organisation. It will, perhaps, be convenient first to discuss policy. The criterion of any proposed line of action must, of course, be whether or no it promotes attainment of the fundamental objects of policy. If it does so, it is sound; if it does not, it is unsound, however immediately comforting or specious its effect may be. This is a truism, but also happens to be a truth, and one which is not seldom overlooked.

A further truism, which again it is dangerously easy to lose sight of, is that the first object of British policy on the North-West Frontier

is, not the extension to the tribes of the advantages of British administration, but the security of British India. Yet another is that the main desideratum to this end is the existence of an independent, strong, united, and neighbourly Afghanistan. Independent, for the plain fact is that if Afghanistan became over-dependent on either of her great neighbours there would cease to be a "buffer" between them. So far as any reasonable course taken by the British Empire can avert this contingency, one obvious effect of which would be to raise the Indian military budget from the terrestrial to the astronomical, it should clearly be adopted.

It is towards this Afghan horizon—often stormy or lowering—that the ship of our Frontier policy must always be steered. Important though it is, the question of policy in the tribal area is of course only part of the greater problem of the land defence of India. It cannot be treated *in vacuo*; it cannot be separated from the question of policy towards Afghanistan. Truism again; and not quite overlooked by the Essayist, who has indeed twice quoted to this effect from a recent lecture by Sir Evelyn Howell. But one cannot help doubting whether in his preoccupation with his thesis he has really given sufficient weight to this vital consideration. It is true that the situation which originally confronted Lyautey in Algeria was in many ways similar to that existing to-day on the North-West Frontier of India. The position at that time of the tribes on the Algerian and Moroccan border may perhaps be likened to that of a nut in a cracker. One arm of the cracker was French Administered Territory. The other was a loose Islamic autocracy like that of, say, Muscat or Bahrein. The nut was (like our Pathan tribes), a large and hard one; one arm of the cracker was out of action; and not unnaturally the nut displayed no disposition to be cracked. Lyautey solved the problem in a way which after the event seems obvious; he took both arms of the cracker in his own hand.

But if this is a fair picture of what happened on the Eastern Moroccan Border, is it safe, or even reasonable, to assume that the British Government is in a position to imitate the process on the North-West Frontier? The main difficulty, *i.e.*, of moving the other arm of the cracker, though not ignored by the Essayist, has been disposed of by him by the simple assumption that Afghan co-operation can be counted on. Kabul, he considers, must realize that it is to its advantage as well as that of Delhi and Whitehall to set a curb on our Frontier

King-makers. But is it—and this is basic—safe or reasonable to assume that an Afghan Government, or the people of Afghanistan, or either will take this view? Both have to be reckoned with. May they not rather view with instinctive disquiet the drying up, however salutary and necessary, of that deep, ancient pool of tribal fighting strength, whose waters can so powerfully be stirred by the Angel of Islam (be it remembered that in tribal eyes the Amir of Kabul is the King of Islam) at times of its necessity; or of its opportunity? These are questions the answer to which cannot be lightly given.

In dealing with this aspect of his subject the Essayist seems to concentrate his own and his readers' attention on the problem of the Moroccan-Algerian Border as against the Riff Border of Morocco. In so far as the parallel drawn by him between the former and our problem on the North-West Frontier of India might be taken to imply any kind of analogy between the circumstances of the French-controlled Sultanate of Morocco and modern Afghanistan, the Essay flies directly in the face of the facts. Afghanistan is *de jure* and *de facto* a completely sovereign and Independent State. Even before the Peace of Rawalpindi in 1919, when Afghanistan's right to control her own foreign relations was first formally recognised by the British Government, that staunch friend of the British, the Amir Habibullah, had in fact exercised it, and without effective protest, when he received a German Mission at Kabul during the Great War. Afghanistan has for the last fourteen years maintained Legations at all the principal capitals of Europe. She has moreover for some months been a member of the League of Nations; and the chief point in her credentials as scrutinised by the League at the time of her admission was this very point of independence. These facts are well known; but a restatement of them will be justified if it helps to remove any shadow of a conception which would in this matter be not only erroneous but mischievous.

Without Afghan co-operation can we proceed, this side of the Durand Line, to the disarming (within a measurable period) of the tribes and their reduction to close administrative control? The Essayist has not explicitly stated this problem; but since it is obviously the most likely situation which we should be called upon to face, one must assume that he has envisaged it, and that he would apply his solution whatever the situation and effects on the other side of the

Frontier. Here it seems to the author of the present study that the parallel with Lyautey and French Morocco will no longer serve its purpose. True, we obtain a simple and comprehensible picture of our problem if we say: "For India read Algeria; for Afghanistan read Morocco; for the Pathan tribes read the tribes of the Algerian-Moroccan Border." Simple, but misleading. Some pitfalls of the North-West Frontier-Moroccan analogy have already been pointed out. Leaving aside the vital fact that beyond Afghanistan is Russia, while beyond French Morocco (apart from the Riff), is the desert and the sea, we can surely find a truer parallel between present-day Morocco and the days of the British Commission in the Punjab between the First and Second Sikh Wars. Then the watchword was administer, control, organize—yes, but only up to the foot of the Frontier hills, for beyond that lay what we could not control, even in those more specious days. So with all Lyautey's ceaseless penetration, organization, control, there was one vital exception. This was the tribal belt, itself in French Morocco, but virtually independent, and deliberately left so by Lyautey, to the North of French Morocco and serving as a buffer between it and the Riff, a country then as little amenable to French as Afghanistan to British or Abyssinia to Fascist Italian control. Interference or commitment in this tribal belt was carefully eschewed by Lyautey's "organization on the march." It was not till 1927, and then with reluctance and only under the pressure of Abdel Krim's penetration of the French "buffer" tribes of the Djebala, that Lyautey at last permitted French troops to cross the Vergha River, in order to stiffen tribal resistance to the Riffian advance. A move, by the way, closely resembling the British move into the Mohmand hills in the summer of 1933.

Even Lyautey then does not seem to be such good warranty for a full-blooded "forward" policy in the special conditions of our North-West Frontier as has been commonly supposed. It would, however, be a mistake to make the reverse deduction; the foregoing remarks are only intended to counsel caution in drawing conclusions or espousing sweeping new policies on the North-West Frontier.

Whether we wish it or not, penetration and ultimate absorption of the tribal belt seems inevitable. The tidal pull on the tribes, for centuries exercised by central Asia, has of recent years been exercised increasingly by India. It is really not so much a question of an outward movement of Indian control as of an India-ward movement of the

tribes themselves. Easy communications, trade, the excitement of Indian politics (now closely followed by the tribesmen), sympathy with the Muslim minority in India and response to its desire to draw strength from the tribes—all these things tend to bring and to keep Pathanistan in the orbit of Delhi rather than of Kabul. Some observers think the solution will be a Frontier Federation including the Transborder tribes. A Frontier Legislative Council seemed very far off not so long ago and is already a very lusty infant; and possibly a Federation of Pathanistan is not so distant a vision as it seems. But for the present there seems little need to force the pace.

Penetration will no doubt continue as in the past. It is sometimes the result of invitation, as in the case of the Turis of the Kurram, the Utmanzai Wazirs, the Shia Orakzais, or more recently the Lower Mohmands and the Tirah Afridis. Sometimes, of course, it is the result of gross misconduct tantamount to the declaration of war, as in the case of the Mahsuds. For this punitive kind of penetration military control from top to bottom is essential. It was in fact established and maintained in Waziristan so long (over four years) as the situation was so unsettled as to threaten a resumption of military operations on a wide scale; and it was in similar conditions that military control was established—and subsequently discontinued—from area to area in Morocco. Where the Essayist seems in this connection to go beyond the warranty of his Moroccan parallel is in suggesting that all trans-border areas adjoining the N. W. F. P. should *eo facto* be supposed to be in an unsettled condition necessitating military control. It requires a considerable stretch of the imagination to apply this description to most of the Agency territories, for example, the Kurram Valley.

There is perhaps some justice in the Essayist's criticism of the slowness of absorption and consolidation in Waziristan, one of the two tribal areas which he examples. But in view of the facts already mentioned the blame cannot surely be so lightly laid at the door of absence of unity of control (in the hand of the military commander) as seems to be implied. The civilizing of Waziristan has, though steady, undoubtedly been slow; but it has been no slower in the ten years of civil than in the four or five of military control. As regards the recent Mohmand operations, the observations in the essay seem to afford an example of the danger of seeking to apply a single "yardstick" to a collection of problems which are almost bewilderingly

varied in their essential features. The Essayist's account may be summarized thus: "Nothing has been done to guarantee the security of our allies the Lower Mohmands against aggression by providing communications which were essential to make our guarantee effective. Then came 'unified control.' Troops went up the Gandab Valley, they built a road; then unified, or military, control was discontinued; the troops therefore withdrew 'leaving the Gandab unabsorbed and unpenetrated, and the situation remained as it was, except for the road' (a big exception, surely?) 'which remains as a memorial of the brief interlude of unified control.'"

This account seems to be based on more than one misapprehension, and a fuller statement of the facts may be of interest.

The plans to deal with the threat on the Mohmand border were drawn up as early as the late Spring of 1932, the initiative being, as was natural and proper, taken by the Governor as Agent to the Governor-General for the tribal areas. As always, he acted in full consultation, and in this case also in full agreement with the military command. The plan subsequently received the approval of the Government of India, advised by their Foreign Office, no doubt again in consultation with the highest military opinion as voiced by the General Staff and Air Staff at Army Headquarters. The important point is that from the onset it was agreed by all concerned that far from its being desirable to "absorb" the Gandab ("penetration," the other desideratum of the Essayist, as will be seen was not only thorough but permanent), it is rather desirable to avoid than to seek commitments in this particular part of the Frontier. The Gandab is on the whole, barren and ill-peopled. Its intrinsic value to government is nil. Moreover, it lies between British India and a wild, fanatical and virtually uncontrolled pocket of Afghan tribal territory.

In this forbidding region only sixteen miles separate the Afghan frontier at its nearest point from the Administrative border of the Peshawar District. While, therefore, there is little to gain by absorption of the Gandab there is plainly much to be gained by its retention as a buffer. And here the considerations pointed out in connection with the position of Afghanistan between the British and Russian Empires apply, on a lesser scale of course, but with no less truth. A buffer ceases to be a buffer when it is absorbed. Thorough-going occupation of the Lower Mohmand country could only result in making the wild and ill-controlled stretch of Afghan tribal

boundary mentioned above in effect the boundary also of the British district of Peshawar. Each petty border incident would then have international and tribal reverberations out of all proportions to its intrinsic importance. And the more grievous the preoccupations of Government at other points, the more pressingly and frequently these incidents would clamour for its attention. Nor could they then be ignored as they now conveniently can when circumstances require it. Here, then, indeed, would arise in its acutest form the problem envisaged by Maurois in the words quoted by the Essayist, when two civilisations, in time separated by centuries, seek to live side by side in space. At present, the friction of contact in this delicate and dangerous zone is greatly lessened by the interposition of the Lower Mohmands, as a medium in close touch and sympathy with the primitive conditions and ideas on the one side and the civilisation on the other side of them. It is seemingly to the cogency of very similar factors that one must ascribe the recently reported establishment of neutral zone in the wild tribal territory between Italian Somaliland and Abyssinia.

As has been said, responsible opinion was and is that the Lower Mohmands had better continue to play this rôle of buffer for as long as possible. The plan, therefore, having as its object the security of the British Indian Border, deliberately avoided any further objective which might commit us to occupation than the construction of the road. The function of the road was partly to deter, by the threat of its extension into Upper Mohmand territory, these gentry from further aggression against the Lower Mohmands and the British Border screened by them, and partly to enable aggression to be met half-way in future. So the road was built, and well built, and as anticipated, its building produced the necessary guarantees (hitherto scrupulously observed) against either interference with its use, or future aggression. When it had been completed (not without a good deal of fighting) and all hostile bodies had dispersed, troops were peacefully withdrawn in accordance with the original plan, declared in detail to the Mohmands at large before troops crossed the border at all. Much dissatisfaction was felt by the rank and file, fine troops spoiling for a fight, at the strictly and rigidly limited nature of their task; but the fact remains that the plan was carefully and maturely considered and carried out in its completeness and exactly. The road is freely used, largely with the aid of petrol, by all kinds of Mohmands and Bajauris, by British and Indian officials, armoured cars and by Frontier Constabulary.

During these operations, political powers, as in Waziristan in 1919-1923, were vested in the military authorities concerned, the Governor (as Agent to the Governor-General) and the local political officer (the Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar) officially acting as advisors only to the Army and Divisional Commanders respectively. After withdrawal of the troops, normal control by the political authorities was, as usual, restored.

It will be seen that the facts in no way support the suggestions (a) that there was no permanent penetration; if a road from top to bottom of the valley regularly maintained and used as described is not "penetration," it is difficult to imagine what penetration is; (b) that "absorption" was desirable; (c) that an attempt at penetration and absorption was for the first time conceived after operations had begun, as the result of unified (military) control; (d) that it was then discontinued as the result of the discontinuance of that control and a reversion to the normal (by implication nerveless or purposeless) control of the Agent to the Governor-General.

The facts have been detailed at this length partly in the hope of removing what appears to be a misconception, possibly shared by others and in any case disseminated by the Essay; partly in an attempt to show the danger of advocating identical methods for parts of the Frontier so widely dissimilar in their circumstances as, say, Baluchistan and the Mohmand border; and partly because the operations afford an example of the working of the present system of military and civil control, based on the experience of a century.

The Essay does not state the ultimate object of policy on the Frontier, namely, the security of British India. As a means to that end, however, the bulk of modern thought will scarcely be inclined to cavil at the suggested definition of policy; "the establishment of effective control over all tribes which live on our side of the Afghan Frontier." Such criticisms as have been made in this study are concerned only with what seems to be an over-facile discounting of real difficulties in the application of this policy and (as instanced by the examples given) a tendency to over-simplify the problem by assuming uniformity of conditions all along the Frontier. A degree of administrative interference or control which might be both desirable and feasible in Baluchistan or in, say, the Adamkhel Afridi salient east of the Kohat Pass may for the reasons given be so undesirable in, say, the Mohmand country as to make its avoidance itself an object of policy.

Turning to organisation, the Essayist considers that for the effective prosecution of the policy of intensive penetration and absorption which he advocates, unity of control is necessary. And he makes it clear that this control in all of the hitherto unsubjugated (by which apparently he means unannexed, for it has never been part of British India, legally, geographically, or practically) tribal area adjoining the North-West Frontier Province-proper should be in the same hands as the command of the troops in that area. Further, that the Frontier Military Command should include a definite proportion of the Air arm as well as all the existing Civil Trans-Border forces (*i.e.*, Militia and Khassadars) and one Cis-Border force, the Frontier Constabulary. "The G. O. C.-in-Chief of the Frontier Command should be an Agent to the Governor-General in the Trans-Border tracts from Chitral to the Gomai River, and the Commanders of Peshawar, Kohat and Waziristan Districts should be his local representatives. At each headquarters one or more officials, specialists in tribal affairs, should be appointed in charge of civil administrative questions affecting the tribes."

Who these officials are to be, and what the nature of the civil administrative questions of which they are to be in charge, will be discussed later? First, however, it seems desirable to make one general observation on the proposals generally, as outlined above. The plan advocated in order to give effect to the policy as defined in the essay is apparently to include at least considerable disarmament as well as cessation of tribal allowance. If these objects are to be pursued with any energy it is probable, if not certain, that the transfer of political control from the hands of the Political Agent, Resident and Governor, to those of the District and Army Commanders, even under the existing system would be not only speedy but automatic. For it is difficult for anyone with first-hand experience of the Frontier tribes to envisage the general taking of steps, however pacific at the start, to speed up these highly desirable ends without involving military operations probably on a Frontier-wide scale. And, as has been explained in connection with the recent Mohmand campaigns, the undertaking of major military operations, even now, automatically involves the passing of political control to military hands. This control connotes command of all civil forces. Responsibility for advising the Government of India on questions of policy, it is true, remains with the Foreign Department. This appears to be the

practice in similar circumstances (the French Colonial Department corresponding to the Indian Foreign Department) of the French administration, and presumably the Essayist does not propose to alter it. The Governor, as Agent to the Governor-General, and his local political staff, are of course always in a position to influence with their expert advice the relations of Government with the tribes in the zone of operations. But so long as operations are in progress, or likely to restart, the contact of Government with the tribes is solely made through the General Officer Commanding in the operations.

Of these facts, the Essayist is doubtless aware. He is, however, suggesting not the retention of but a change in the present system, and, therefore, presumably means that even in a peaceful state of affairs, Trans-Border control should be in military hands as it is now in times of war. The reasons are not explicitly stated, but they appear to be, first, that unity of control is essential; secondly, that direct command over regular troops can only be exercised by a serving soldier; and, thirdly, the example of Lyautey, who was a soldier. The outstanding—indeed startling—feature of this proposal is that while it would certainly establish unity of control over troops and tribes across the Border in peace time as well as in war, it arbitrarily shatters the present—and immensely more important—unity of political control of the Frontier, Cis- and Trans-Border, in the hands of the Governor of the North-West Frontier Province. This aspect has not been touched on in the Essay, but it has hitherto been regarded as axiomatic, since the earliest days of British rule, that Pathanistan, Cis- and Trans-Border, Hills and Plains, must be in one and the same hand. For, apart from the fact that every important Trans-Border tribe (except the Mahsuds, and they have close and constant trading connections with British India) has its holdings on both sides of the administrative Border, it is notorious that not only raids and counter-raids but all important happenings and movements on either side of the Border have immediate repercussions on the other. Thus a Congress "hartal" in Peshawar City at once sets beards wagging at Bazar and Maidan in the Afridi Tirah and the Haji's holy caravan-serai in the Mohmand hills; while a raid on a post, or a pot-shot at a "brass-hat" in the Khyber, causes flutterings in the Red-Shirt dovevotes in Charsadda, Peshawar City and Mardan. The friction which would be bound to arise from the handling of such developments by two independent wardens of the marches would surely drive

the most long-suffering Viceroy ere long to insist on a speedy reapplication of the Essayist's first principle, Unity of Control.

Let us suppose, however, that this divorce of the Cis- and Trans-Border is really feasible ; and proceed to examine how the reform would in practice work out in a typical military district, say Peshawar, and at the new Frontier Command. The District Commander at Peshawar would still be charged, as at present, with the command and administration of the troops in his area ; but in addition he is to be saddled with the following nice little list of civil charges, *i.e.*, for all the responsibilities and activities of Government in these areas :

Malakand Agency (Yusafzai and Bajaur tribes, as well as conduct of the relations of Government with the rulers of Dir, Swat, Chitral and Amb).

Peshawar Border Agency (Mohmand and cognate tribes, Hassankhel and other Adamkhel Afridis, Yusafzai of Buner).

Kohat Border Agency (Kohat Pass Afridis, Orakzai and cognate tribes and certain minor clans). [So as not to reduce the argument to absurdity, it might be suggested that the Kohat area might be administered separately from Peshawar.—ED.]

The "civil specialists in tribal affairs" would presumably be the present Deputy Commissioners of Peshawar and Kohat and the Political Agents of the Khyber and the Malakand. Some of these are purely civilian officers of the Indian Civil Service, serving under the Foreign and Political Department of the Government of India ; and some are military officers permanently seconded from the Indian Army to the same Department, relieved of all purely military duties, and having several years of political experience behind them, in addition to a year's special training in such subjects as Land Revenue, Law, and Excise.

Now unless the District Commander is to function merely as a Post-Office, or shall we say a sort of military censor interposed between the Governments of India and the North-West Frontier and the experienced officers by whom the whole real work of administration would continue to be done, is it really conceivable that he should personally and closely supervise this work, see important Jirgaahs, grant constant interviews to civil officials and tribal notables, hear and dispose of petitions, go through the records (often vernacular) of law suits and the thousand and one miscellaneous cases which now

come to the Resident in Waziristan and the Governor for decision ; and simultaneously administer, in detail, as it should be administered, his own military command ? One can imagine all these duties being done by a military officer if he were divorced from all purely military duties and responsibilities ; had considerable knowledge of law and the intricacies of civil administration, including irrigation and land revenue (yes, these fearful wild-fowl are to be found even across the Border, *e.g.*, in the Tochi, Kurram, and Malakand) ; and above all an intimate knowledge of tribal divisions, dialects, and personalities. The District Commander with these qualifications would clearly be no usual District Commander. He would certainly not be readily interchangeable with Cis-Indus commands. In what essential would such a soldier differ from military Politicals such as Herbert Edwards, Nicholson, Sandeman, Roos-Keppel, Griffith,—or, one may not impertinently add, Lyautey himself ? And in what essential, except the retention of military rank (“the relics of old dacency,” as the Irish song has it) do these officers differ from your O’Dwyer, Bolton, Maffey, or Pears ?

Now to visit the new Frontier Command headquarters. If, as has been assumed, the administration of the tribal areas is to be real, the Frontier Commander must more and more be compelled to go behind the backs of his British Commanders for information on the purely military side of his charge. Indeed it seems inevitable that in time the divorce would (as it perforce was at an early stage of development on the Frontier) be formally recognized by the appointment of District Commanders (Troops) as distinct from District Commanders (Political). On the political side he would have to take important decisions without direct access (unless again he chose to short-circuit his own responsible local officers, the District Commanders) to the trained Political Officers, the Political Agents. Nor would he have a responsible adviser of his own ; for the Governor, who at present advises the Command during military operations, would not be available even then under the new regime. He is to be completely divorced from responsibility for Trans-Border affairs at all times, and advice without responsibility is a dangerous thing, and a thing moreover which the Governor might well hesitate to tender.

The fact seems to be that peace-time civil administration, that is the conduct of the business of state in all its activities except the military, is the work of an expert, and is a wholetime job, just as the

command of an Army is an expert whole-time job. The absorption of this foreign body by the Army is no more likely to be wholesome to either party than the absorption of Jonah by the whale. While therefore admitting the desirability of unity of control, is it not wise to recognize freely that this is not to be attained by any attempt at absorption? Let it also be recognized that no system will be workable which arbitrarily divides the Cis- from the Trans-Border on the North-West Frontier. The line which divides them is not one of race, language, custom, or religion. It is mainly one of hill and plain, of poverty and sterility on the one side, and fertility and comparative well-being on the other; and on this fact is really based the main case for the Forward Policy, as voiced by that forceful Pathan, Sir Abdul Qaiyum. There should and can be only one Governor, not two. He may have started life as a soldier or as a civilian, but he has a full-time job, and that is to govern the Frontier Province. It would be ideally best if all fighting forces in his area were under his general control as those of Morocco were under Lyautey, and those of the Sudan and the Aden Protectorate are now under the Governor (often a civilian) who is also Commander-in-Chief. As under the French Colonial System in similar circumstances, he would then take his orders in purely military matters from Army Headquarters, and in matters of general policy, and of purely civil concern from the Foreign Department. Both Departments of State would as at present be in close and constant consultation on all important and Frontier questions; but responsibility for policy would naturally be as stated. It should not be forgotten that a large and important body of Frontier forces—the Frontier Militias, the Frontier Constabulary, the Armed Police Reserve and the Khassadars—still is under the control of the Head of the Frontier Government, and so were once the famous “Piffer” regiments (including Artillery) of the Regular Army. The chief obstacle to restoration of that old control seems to be a fatal obstacle also to realization of the Essayist’s vision—namely, the post-war doctrine of interchangeability and what may perhaps be termed “continentiality” of the Indian Army. All officers and units, says the experience of the Great War, must be ready to take their place at any time in modern large-scale warfare, and there is no longer room for local specialisation; though the Frontier tradition is dying hard in many fine old regiments, such as the Guides. Unless this policy can be reversed—and of this there seems no prospect—neither the handing

over of the Army to the Governor, nor the handing over of the Civil Government to the Army seems possible. Nor indeed is either process vital to prosecution of the policy stated by the Essayist.

In conclusion be it repeated that this study has no quarrel with the main conclusions of the Essay, and in particular with its insistence on the value to us in India of Lyautey's example as a single vivid and forceful personality, inspiring and unifying all the activities of Government in a situation in many ways resembling that on our own Frontier. It is only when one examines closely the application of those conclusions that it is difficult not to feel that the Essay has gone astray in one or two matters of substance. This appears to be due mainly to a misapprehension of the true parallel, which seems to be not between French Morocco as a whole and the Indian Trans-Border tribal belt, but between the latter and the tribal belt on the Riff Border of French Morocco, or on the Abyssinian Border of Italian Somaliland. As regards the theory of military control of Trans-Border areas, provided this is to apply to really unsettled areas, that is, areas actually in or just emerging from a state of war with Government, this is already provided for under the existing system. As regards military control in settled Trans-Border tracts such as the Kurram or Tochi, or indeed any tribal Agency in normal times, no real reasons have been given for it and it is doubtful if such reasons exist, whilst the objections, as stated in this review, are certainly formidable.

The Frontier cannot be run according to schedule. To-day there is a craze for "Plans," Five-Year or otherwise. They are an admirable means of escaping responsibility for the moment; but their further uses are problematical. And nowhere is rigidity of conception or execution more dangerous than on the North-West Frontier. Steadiness of purpose, yes; but, as observed in a recent penetrating study in the "Spectator,"* government is not a science, but an art. "England does not demand detailed plans from them (her Ministers) in advance, recognizing that they will have to move by scent and sight as well as by any map. She puts what she considers to be the best men to grips with her problems, and leaves the rest to their good workmanship."

The difficulties on the North-West Frontier, like those on the Northern border of French Morocco, are mainly due to permanent

* "The Art of Governing; Plan or Map," by Sir Stephen Tallents, "Spectator," March 29th, 1935.

and widely varying geographical and political factors, which are not really affected by this form of plan or organisation or that on the British or French side. Government and its agents, whoever they be, while keeping the main object, namely, the security of British India, steadily in view, must always recognise and conform to these intractable and dominant factors.

PROMOTION IN THE WAR BLOCK

BY CAPTAIN G. CREFFIELD, M.B.E.

The War Block Committee has now completed its difficult task and for many officers the shadow of the axe has now been removed. The threat of premature retirement having disappeared, officers are discussing their chances of getting command. Many appear to think that, in spite of the axe, they will be badly blocked for appointment to command. The figures worked out in Table "A" may therefore assist officers in estimating their chances; they also illustrate several important points which will be mentioned later.

I have seen none of the statistics prepared by the War Block Committee; all the information in the tables was taken from the January 1935 Army List. A meticulous examination of the gradation list has not been made, consequently minor inaccuracies in the figures may be discovered. Furthermore, any estimate made now of what the position of any individual will be in four years' time is bound to be inaccurate. It is hoped, however, that the system employed may assist individuals in working out their own position when they are nearing 26 years' service. It also enables one to see, with reasonable accuracy, where the blocks will occur.

In compiling Table "A" the following was taken into account:—

- (a) Infantry regimental officers, including those in staff appointments, only were considered. Officers on the supernumerary and General Duty List were excluded.
- (b) There are 118 infantry battalion commands; other Lieut.-Colonels' appointments were not considered.
- (c) When assessing the number of officers due to retire, after completing 26 years' service, only Majors and Captains in the gradation list (January 1935 Army List) were taken into account.
- (d) The qualifying service for retirement was calculated on "Service for promotion;" *i.e.*, permitting every officer to attain the rank of Lieut.-Colonel.
- (e) That the 26 years' rule would be rigidly applied.
- (f) No allowance was made for wastage among officers on account of War Block retirements and other causes.

The reasons for the last consideration were twofold. In the first case it gives the worst possible case for every officer. That is to

say, that if an officer on the figures given in the table calculates he will not be blocked for command then on the question of seniority alone he will get command. Secondly, it is impossible to assess accurately the casualties that will occur. At the bottom of the table I have given an estimate of the wastage that will occur, based on the following :—

- (a) War Block retirements.
- (b) Casualties on account of sickness.
- (c) Officers prematurely vacating command to take up staff appointments.
- (d) Officers unable to get command on account of age.
- (e) Transfers of infantry officers to R.I.A.S.C. and I.A.O.C., etc., to make good war block wastage in those departments.
- (f) Officers considered unfit for command for reasons other than those mentioned above.

War Block Retirements.—400 officers are going and I consider 300 is a generous estimate of the number of regimental officers that will go. There are approximately 1,100 regimental officers in the war block years who complete 26 years service by the end of 1946, *i.e.*, 27 per cent.

Casualties on Account of Sickness.—Difficult to estimate ; 3 per cent. is considered a low estimate.

Transfers to Staff Appointments.—Numbers will tend to diminish as staff appointments are held for 4 years, whereas command is for three years only. Average estimated at 2 per cent.

Over Age for Command, say, 3 per cent.

Transfers to Departments.—Most of these appointments will be filled by transfers from the British Service, 1 per cent.

Unfits (i.e., Bowler Hats), say, 4 per cent.

The above represents a total wastage of 40 per cent. This percentage has therefore been deducted from the number reaching 26 years service by years. It should be noted that the wastage effect in the years 1938-39, and 40 is cumulative as there are no surplus officers in these years, and that the 1941 year will benefit and possibly the first three months of 1942.

Points brought out by the table.

1. Considering seniority alone all officers who complete 26 years service before the end of May 1941 will get command.

2. If the wastage percentage is considered a fair estimate the worst block will occur during the years 1942 and 1943, *i.e.*, officers whose service for promotion commenced in the years 1916-1917.

3. Any abnormal casualties occurring among officers, eligible for command, who complete 26 years' service before the end of 1941, will increase the chances of the 1942 officers up to the end of March only. The numbers completing 26 years' service during the remainder of the year and in 1943 are so big that the effect will not benefit them.

4. If anything is done to relax the 26-year retiring rule in favour of the 1942-1943 years only it will make it similarly bad for the 1944-1945 years; which years are fairly bad as they stand. If this is contemplated it appears that the end of March 1942 will be the best time to increase the retiring age to 27 years for all officers.

This will have the effect of extending the block to 1947; in which year 59 commands fall vacant.

5. The effect of the War Block retirements, and other causes of wastage, on officers' chances of getting command is interesting. Up to the end of 1940 every officer can get command before he completes 26 years service. It does not therefore give a true picture if these years are included when working out the average. The last estimate, *i.e.*, 6 out of every 10 get command, is therefore nearer the mark. I understand the War Block Committee figure was 7 out of every 10.

Conclusion.

I have no doubt that the War Block Committee have earmarked a big percentage of the 1942-43 for premature retirement, but it will be impossible to clear the block in these years by this means. The problem has received close study by experts during the last year and the suggestions mentioned below have, most probably, been fully considered.

1. The selection of officers for command should be made from among all officers who complete 26 years service in any one year. In fact, owing to the small number of commands falling vacant in 1942 and the large number occurring in 1941, officers completing 26 years' service during these two years should be considered as being of the same seniority for the purpose of selection for command.

2. Preference should be given to the 1942, 43 and 44 years when subsequent applications for voluntary retirement are received.

3. After March 1942 the 26 year service limit might be extended to 27 years, or more.

4. First grade staff appointments should be limited to a three years' tenure.

*Promotion in the War Block**Table showing months during which Infantry commands fall vacant.*

Month.	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945	1946
1	1	..	4	1	..	4	1	..	4	1	..
2 ..	2	2	9	11	2	9	11	2	9	11	2	9
3	1	4	2	1	4	2	1	4	2	1	4
4 ..	2	6	1	3	6	1	3	6	1	3	6	1
5 ..	2	2	2	7	2	2	7	2	2	7	2	2
6	3	2	1	3	2	1	3	2	1	3	2
7 ..	1	2	2	4	2	2	4	2	2	4	2	2
8 ..	6	..	2	7	..	2	7	..	2	7	..	2
9 ..	1	..	2	7	..	2	7	..	2	7	..	2
10 ..	1	3	5	2	3	5	2	3	5	2	3	5
11 ..	1	..	5	3	..	5	3	..	5	3	..	5
12 ..	1	..	5	8	..	5	8	..	5	8	..	5
Total	17	20	39	59	20	39	59	20	39	59	20	39

Compiled from January 1935 Army List.

Majors and Captains of Infantry Regiments who will complete 26 years service. Not allowing for War Block retirements and normal wastage.

	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945	1946	
1	3	24	27	28	1	52	
2	1	16	..	11	
3	5	9	5	..	1	..	
4	6	48	..	25	49	..	
5	41	24	14	..	5	..	
6	35	32	28	..	1	..	
7	9	22	14	..	10	47	
8	36	11	..	43	
9	14	9	23	1	1	1	
10	28	7	22	16	10	..	
11	33	17	8	2	
12 ..	144	14	..	15	38	6	31	
Total ..	144	225	219	156	164	84	131	= 1,123

Compiled from January 1935 Army List.



FOREST WARS.

BY CAPTAIN R. C. HOWMAN, 20TH BURMA RIFLES.

In recent years marked attention has been paid at Home to training for operations against second class and irregular enemies. Such training has proved a wholesome antidote to any tendency towards thinking along the narrow lines fostered by certain sections of the popular press. We have been reminded (if indeed reminder were necessary) that the British Army must be trained and equipped for purposes other than the despatch of a small Expeditionary Force "encased in steel" to the Continent of Europe.

When a survey is made of potential theatres of operations outside Europe, it is noticeable that many of these lie within the forest lands of the world¹. It is the purpose of this article to examine our past experiences when called upon to fight in such terrain, and so deduce the extent to which forest fighting merits attention as a branch of military study.

THE INCIDENCE OF FOREST WARS.

On the 8th of July, 1755, an American Indian scout reported to his French Commander that "a scarlet river coursed through the trees." A few hours later British regular troops, thus picturesquely described, had their first taste of forest fighting. They were to have a surfeit of it before operations in America ended, twenty-six years later, with the loss of our colonies.

The Nineteenth Century opened with a small but costly campaign in the jungles of Ceylon, followed a few years later by the Java expedition, where a force 12,000 strong, mainly composed of British troops from India, saw considerable forest fighting. In the same year, 1811, fighting recommenced in the backwoods of America, where it lasted until 1814. This was immediately followed by the Nepal War of 1814-16, and a further unhappy expedition to Ceylon.

After a brief interval came the First Burmese War of 1824. The expeditionary force of 11,000 men sent to Rangoon was followed up a few months later by several thousand reinforcements of all arms.

¹ The term "Forest" is taken to include any large tract of country covered chiefly with trees and undergrowth.

The following year an army, 12,000 strong, attempted to co-operate overland from India, but, becoming enmeshed in the intervening jungles, was decimated with disease and forced to turn back.

Simultaneously with the Burmese War fierce fighting went on in Ashanti, culminating in a pitched battle which cost us 1,800 casualties. Then came the Kaffir War of 1834, followed a few years later by operations in New Zealand. The scene next shifted to Burma again, where 20,000 troops were employed in 1852. This began a second cycle of Burmese, New Zealand and Ashanti Wars.

The Nineteenth Century closed with yet another Ashanti Campaign, that of 1895-96, and the Benin Expedition of 1897. Interposed amongst the operations mentioned were innumerable minor expeditions against forest peoples in Malaya, North Burma, Assam, Africa, South India, America and elsewhere.

The frequent minor forest wars of the period 1900-14 need not be enumerated. It suffices to mention the operations of 1912 in India against the Abors, and to remark that in Africa alone, upwards of thirty medals or bars were granted for purely bush campaigns.

The campaigns of the years 1914-18 differed from those of the Nineteenth Century in that they were mainly fought against European, or European-led troops. Once again, as in our Eighteenth Century struggle against France, they formed a part of the mosaic of a world war. In West Africa and the Kameruns, the British force numbered some 17,000 men, while in German East Africa 300,000 troops were engaged. These numbers exclude considerable Allied contingents in both theatres of operations.

In post-war years forest fighting may be said to have resumed its normal "peace time" proportions. There have been the usual minor expeditions, intermixed with more important operations. Of these, two particularly call for mention, the Moplah Rebellion of 1921-22 and the Burma Rebellion of 1930-31.

The foregoing brief summary shows that, taking the period 1755-1931 as a whole, campaigns involving forest fighting have predominated in our non-European Wars. Nevertheless, military writers have given them comparatively little attention, and in many cases recourse for details has to be made to contemporary diaries and memoirs. One reason probably is that most forest wars took place in diverse and little known corners of the world: unlike, for example,

our mountain campaigns, which were fought in, or around, the single famous battle ground of the North West Frontier. Again, active operations were normally overshadowed by the endless problems of administration inseparable from the terrain, and in bygone days administration was apt to be considered a somewhat dull mystery, uninviting to probe, and almost indecent to write about. But in truth the story of our forest wars is far from dull, and shows them to possess certain characteristics which call for consideration and analysis.

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF FOREST WARS.

The first characteristic of forest wars is that the time taken to end them has usually been out of all proportion to the strength and quality of the opposition. As examples, Wolseley's successful invasion of Ashanti was the climax of eleven years of desultory fighting, while the operations against the Maoris in the Second New Zealand War lasted, almost unbroken, for a full decade. The pacification of Lower Burma after the Second Burmese War took ten years, while that of Upper Burma after the Third War took five.

In the present century, the striking force in the Kameruns, 8,000 strong, took 19 months to round up the German garrison, largely composed of armed police, and considerably under half its strength. In East Africa, Von Lettow with a mixed force of 8,000 German settlers and askari diverted the attention of over thirty times this number of Imperial troops before the Armistice finally ended his activities.¹

Equally characteristic has been the excessive cost of forest wars in men, money and material. In the second Ceylon campaign the British force was decimated by disease, losing 2,000 effectives within a single period of three weeks. In the First Burmese War, 9,700 men were sick or dead within the first few months, while the Army which attempted to co-operate from India was practically wiped out, the average mortality in a British regiment being six out of every seven men.

In these days medical science was in its infancy, but statistics given in the *Military Effort of the British Empire* show that our dead

¹ In mandays, East Africa absorbed 21 per cent. of our total war effort on all fronts exclusive of France. This figure is based on *The Military Effort of the British Empire*, p. 742 *et seq.*

in East Africa numbered 20,000, while over a period of 30 months, 267,645 sick were admitted to hospital. In addition, losses from invaliding were very high, 12,000 white personnel being evacuated overseas in 1916 alone.

The financial cost of forest wars has inevitably been heavy, owing to the length of operations, the heavy wastage in personnel and animals, and the customary necessity for diverting ships and other transport agencies to the task of importing supplies into areas lacking in natural resources. In East Africa eight seaports had to be opened up, and everything—men, ammunition, petrol, and even food for some 150,000 carriers, brought from overseas. In money, East Africa cost the British Government £500,000,000, but in many cases the purely military expense of operations has been of secondary consideration. It is almost impossible to estimate the repercussions resulting from the breakdown of civil administration over large areas of a productive country. For example, the recent Burma Rebellion, which lasted fifteen months, is quoted as one of the main reasons for "the finances of Burma having for the time being gone out of control"! ¹

A further characteristic of forest wars has been the tactical setbacks, and even disasters, which have too frequently marked their course. The following extracts from *Wolfe and Montcalm* give a vivid account of an early example—the debacle which befell General Braddock's force in 1755.

While the British, covered by the orthodox protective detachments, were advancing through dense forest, "the French and Indian suddenly opened a deadly fire on our helpless soldiery, who could see nothing, and wasted volley after volley on the impassive trees. The invisible death was everywhere, in front, flank and rear. The troops huddled together in a bewildered mass, shrinking from the bullets which cut them down in scores. Both men and officers were new to this blind and frightful warfare. So matters grew worse and worse, the artillery doing great damage to the trees and little to the enemy, the soldiers loading and firing mechanically, into the air at times, and often into their own comrades." In this action our losses were nearly a thousand, while those of the enemy were under fifty. History repeated itself some years later when one of Cornwallis's detachments,

¹Report of the Burma Retrenchment Committee, May 1934.

1,100 strong, was surrounded and destroyed by American backwoodsmen.

As regards the Nineteenth Century, Fortescue tells of the campaign in Canada being marred by heavy and avoidable casualties caused "by the tactical blunders of the British Commander." Of the New Zealand war of the 'sixties he says "our assaults were always costly—we suffered more than one ignominious repulse—and so badly co-ordinated that, if a position were taken, the enemy had invariably gone."

These examples might be paralleled by many others in the Second Burmese War, but it suffices to add that both the major forest campaigns of the Great War began with disasters, in the Kameruns by the defeat of our three frontier columns, and in East Africa by the tragedy of Tanga. In the case of Tanga, the fact that the troops on landing had to advance through thick bush was probably only a contributory cause of their defeat, though Von Lettow makes the significant claim that it was his knowledge of the "clumsiness" of British troops in close country which finally induced him to stand and give battle.

In enumerating these general characteristics of forest wars it is not, of course, implied that every campaign has been lengthy, costly, and tactically undistinguished. In the following paragraphs our occasional successes will be measured against our failures, with the object of discovering why the debit balance has been so heavy.

ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION.

Organization and administration have played a great, perhaps the greatest, part in deciding the outcome. When initial arrangements have been faulty and ill-considered, subsequent operations have invariably been costly and ineffective. On the other hand, care and forethought have as inevitably received their due reward. Defects in administration have, however, sometimes arisen from causes beyond the control of military commanders. Administration in East Africa, for instance, has been drastically criticized, but while the failure of certain major operations was unquestionably due to fundamental errors in the composition of the force, the real fault lay with those responsible for the inception of the campaign in 1914.

The objective of the Expeditionary Force, as given to the G. O. C. by the Government of India, was to capture and occupy German East Africa. This amounted to an order to capture a base, and then conquer an undeveloped forest country, seven times the size of England, in face of certain opposition from German units trained to bush warfare. The military force allotted to this task was two improvised infantry brigades with an inadequate proportion of ancillary services.

A disaster was invited, and duly came about at Tanga. Following on the failure of the opposed landing, the British were forced to remain on the defensive until early 1916, by which time a Headquarters Staff had been improvised in London and sent to East Africa. The administrative staff was then faced with the task of re-organizing a heterogeneous patchwork of units in the field, and maintaining them in a country devoid of supplies. It is little wonder that their efforts did not meet with much success.

An instructive comparison with East Africa is provided by Wolseley's Ashanti Campaign. The circumstances under which it was undertaken were briefly these. In 1873 an Ashanti army, 12,000 strong, invaded the Gold Coast, proclaiming, not without reason, that "the British will not dare to attack us in the bush, and are incapable of harming us if they do."¹ The Government of the Colony, as usual unprepared, lost control of the situation, and "it was imperative that a signal victory over the enemy be gained if we were to remain any longer on the Coast."² The climate of the Gold Coast was then probably the deadliest in the world, while the country was undeveloped and covered with dense bush.

The task of pulling the chestnuts out of the fire was entrusted to Wolseley. His first care was to collect a staff with practical experience of the shifts and improvisations necessary for campaigning in uncivilized countries. It is noteworthy that he gave particular attention to the officers selected to organize his medical, supply, and transport services. Under Wolseley's personal direction, all officers accompanying him overseas then made a detailed study of the history and topography of the theatre of operations.

¹ A History of the Gold Coast and Ashanti, Claridge, Vol. II, p. 53.

² Claridge, p. 45.

On landing, the task of evolving order out of chaos was immediately begun. Communications were improved, transport re-organized, hospital erected, live-stock imported—in fact every detail of organization, even the smallest, received attention.

Particular care was given to economizing expenditure and transport by the utilization of material available in the country, and future contingencies were provided for, even to the collection of fuel at possible camping sites, and the marking down and preservation of natural building material in their vicinity.

When, at the end of twelve weeks, all was ready, Wolseley gave orders for the offensive to begin. Three weeks later his force had marched 180 miles, defeated the Ashantis in two pitched battles, and ended the war with a total loss of 70 men.

While it is unquestionable that this result was only made possible by the excellence of Wolseley's administrative plan, it is important to realize that he has one great asset on his side, namely that of *time*. Time in which to make adequate preparations was denied to the G. O. C. of the East African Expeditionary Force, and it has been denied to many other British commanders in similar circumstances. Wolseley would probably have been equally unfortunate, but for the fortuitous circumstances that, while the Cabinet discussed the Ashanti situation in August, climate conditions made it impossible for them to send British troops there before December. To quote Fortescue, "English ministers have a genius for thrusting their armies into positions from which they can neither advance nor retire . . . and they will very likely do it again."¹

Lest this prophecy be fulfilled, and inadequately prepared forces be again thrust headlong into forest wars, it would appear wise for a study to be made of the history of such enterprises in time of peace, in order that facts and figures to prove their futility may be ready in time of war.

The administrative defects of forest wars cannot, however, always be attributed to the impetuosity of politicians. There was, for example, adequate time in which to prepare for the First Burmese War. Yet operations in 1824 were held up, while the troops rotted in Rangoon, for the good reason "that the army came unprovided with the necessary equipment for advancing either by land or water."²

¹ R.A.S.C. History, Vol. II, p. xxxi.

² *Narrative of the Burmese Wars*, pub. 1827.

That this was so may seem incredible to us to-day, but it should have appeared equally incredible to a commander making his preparations for a Third Burmese War sixty years later. Yet we read that, in 1885, save for an inefficient coolie corps "the Expeditionary Force was entirely without land transport; this was a great clog on all operations undertaken. Without transport not only could moveable columns not be despatched, but posts, if established, could not be supplied with provisions."¹

These extraordinary oversights arose through a complete misconception of the topographical conditions, and of the probable action of the enemy. The troops probably accepted the situation philosophically as one beyond their comprehension. On the other hand, they took a keen interest in such transport as ultimately came their way, for the good reason that on its quality depended their fighting efficiency and personal comfort. The criticisms directed by the fighting soldier at his transport have been curiously similar over a period of nearly a century, and have been particularly free after operations in which regular units have fought side by side with local forces equipped for the work in hand. Criticisms of a constructive nature have been mainly concerned with the weight and nature of transport loads, and the type of equipment provided to carry them.

As regards the weight of loads, army equipment is made up in multiples of 80 lbs. for carriage on mules. Examples are the 160-lb. tent and the 80-lb. box of small arms ammunition. When coolie transport becomes necessary, such loads have either to be abandoned or, if and when possible, broken up and repacked. A similar difficulty arises when use has to be made of local animals, such as the Chinese mule, which carries only 120 lbs. The solution adopted by local units is the simple one of having their loads made up in 20 or 40 lb. multiples. Ammunition, for instance, is packed in 40-lb. boxes, while tentage is made up in 20 or 40-lb. sections.

It has also been pointed out that the army mule is too expensive a luxury for use on column, except for the carriage of Lewis guns and a few other specialized loads. The difficulty is that the Army mule eats a weight of forage equivalent to his own maximum load in under 15 days. His "useful load" thus rapidly decreases to

¹ "Frontier and Overseas Expeditions," p. 167.

vanishing point, while the carriage of forage adds enormously to the length and vulnerability of a column. The only satisfactory solution is the substitution of local hired transport, which can more or less live on the country. As has already been pointed out, the standard army load must in such circumstances be reduced. It is, of course, possible partially to overcome the "vanishing load" problem by ingenuity in forward dumping. Moreover, army mules can be made to tighten up their surcingles and accustom themselves to coarser fare. In this connection it will be remembered that careful experiment and training produced remarkable results in Palestine.

Another point which has been questioned is the suitability for column work of the standard type of pack equipment. If mules become badly bogged, the only remedy is to lighten them by manhandling their loads across the obstruction. As, with army equipment, every load has to be untied, retied, and re-balanced, this process may hold up an advance for hours. Again, camping sites are always circumscribed, and may often have to be cleared out of the jungle. Mules standing about while being unloaded foul the ground, and interfere with the work in hand. When breaking camp, loading up in a limited space is far from easy, particularly in self-contained columns where the proportion of animals is very high in comparison with the number of men available for loading parties. Any delay in pitching or striking camp is a very serious matter, as a column's marching day is shortened by the tactical necessity for halting in ample time to get settled in before nightfall.

The Chinaman has gone far to overcome these difficulties by constructing his pack saddle in two parts. The load, attached to an upper framework, can be lifted off and replaced *in situ* in a few seconds. The advantages of this arrangement for obstacle crossing are obvious, while on entering camp mules need only be halted for the few moments necessary to deposit their loads. Since only the few essentials for the night need be untied, considerable time and labour is again saved in the morning.

Of equipment in general, it may be said that the tendency has always been to carry far too much, to the grave detriment of mobility. Articles, such as coils of wire, nails and tools are, or should be, unnecessary in countries where almost anything can be constructed with bamboos and a cutting knife. Troops must, of course, first be trained

in the use of local materials, but this should be a part of the normal training of all units stationed in forest countries. Yet, while the list of desirable weight-cutting expedients is a long one, regular troops have, on the other hand, frequently suffered great discomfort from the lack of various small necessities of jungle life. Amongst these may be mentioned waterproof kit and ration bags, and individual cutting knives. These last are an absolute essential in the jungle, yet British troops have been sent on service without them during the last decade.

As the foregoing paragraphs indicate, much might be done to improve the equipment of regular troops for forest wars. The type of mule equipment described might indeed with advantage be adopted for general service purposes. Its practicability was recently proved at Aldershot where an Army pattern, based on the Chinese model, was successfully tried out. General stores suitable for column purposes are readily available, being already under production for Military Police and other local units. While it is not suggested that large quantities of such stores should be held in peace time, permanent provision should at least be made for regular units stationed in forest countries.

The organisation of forces for forest campaigns is too extensive a subject for detailed consideration here. Historically, organisation has been haphazard, and the student will find such curious anomalies as sailors storming stockades many miles from salt water. In the early days in East Africa, apart from a stiffening of a few first line regiments, the bulk of the force was composed of units insufficiently trained for employment elsewhere. The ideal was perhaps approached in the final stages of the Moplah Rebellion, when units were specially selected for their aptitude in forest fighting.

The bulk of the fighting, as may be expected, has fallen on the infantryman, while in modern times the Lewis gun has proved the most useful of his auxiliary weapons. While machine-guns were successfully used by the Germans in East Africa to ambush unskilled troops, later experience in the Moplah and Burma Rebellions shows that they are of little use for offensive purposes. Opportunities for effective fire are rare, and a proportion of their considerable transport could probably be more usefully employed in carrying mortars. When a jungle enemy stands to fight, he usually chooses stockades or

buildings. Opinions differ as to the utility of the rifle grenade. While it is effective against stockades, it must be used with discretion where there is any risk of the bomb striking intervening branches.

Artillery has on occasions proved useful for breaching stockades, and has a high moral effect. On the other hand, on the rare occasions when a jungle enemy stands to fight, it is doubtful policy to frighten him away. Moreover, artillery targets are few and far between, while the large number of transport animals required to move and maintain the guns, imposes a severe strain on lines of communication.

It is somewhat curious to find that cavalry were described as "the most effective arm" during the 1885-6 operations in Burma. Sir George White, in asking for three more regiments, remarked that "in a land where only ponies are bred the cavalry horses seemed monsters to the people and the long reach and short shrift of the lance paralyse them with fear." In general, opportunities for cavalry action in forest countries are rare, but since horsemen are dreaded by the people, they should be employed whenever the ground permits.

Mounted infantry have been extensively used in forest wars. In their case the primary object of the horse has been to increase the mobility of the rifleman in his pursuit of an elusive enemy. In the Third Burmese War and recent Rebellion, Mounted Infantry units were improvised from infantrymen mounted on country ponies. Those interested will find an instructive account of the capabilities of M. I. in close country in Deneys Reitz's "Trekking On."

While the whole subject of organization is controversial, there are two guiding principles. The first is that a force must be capable of pinning down and destroying the enemy in ground of his own choosing, which will often be in thick jungle. The second is that a force must give the highest possible fighting return for its cost in maintenance. The answer in both cases will generally be the infantrymen, or to be exact the forest-trained infantryman, as will later be made clear.

The duty of keeping the troops fit is probably the greatest administrative task of all, for disease has been the main reason for the length and costliness of forest wars. Efficient arrangements can bring about remarkable results, as in the Burma Rebellion when, contrary to all expectations, sickness amongst the troops in the field

actually fell below the usual cantonment rate. But it does not belittle a fine achievement to point out that our medical resources were not at the time seriously taxed in other directions, as they were in East Africa and may be again.

A note of warning is struck by the present forest fighting in South America. There the Paraguayans, trained by the French, are said to have learnt the military lessons of medical science very thoroughly. The best doctors in the country are established in well-equipped casualty clearing stations and field hospitals, a few kilometres behind the front line. Yet, though the Paraguayan soldier is physically strong and inured to hardships, the medical personnel have had more work than they can possibly cope with. By January 1934, Paraguay had already lost 20,000 men, chiefly from typhus and dysentery.

It is an obvious deduction that in forest wars the medical education of the troops, and the arrangements made to safeguard their health, must continue to be one of the first cares of a commander.

This brief administrative survey may be fittingly closed with a remarkable quotation—remarkable in that it was written at A. H. Q. in India with reference to an administrator who apparently usurped most of the functions of a commander and his staff. It reads as follows :—

“Forewarned by the first war . . . the absorbing interest which Lord Dalhousie took in the welfare of the troops, and all matters connected with this war (the Second Burmese War), was its most noticeable feature . . . He with vigilant forethought, exerted himself to the utmost to bring it to a rapid and successful conclusion. Reading his original minutes one cannot fail to be struck with the masterly way in which he foresaw and arranged for all contingencies. From first to last he personally arranged for everything ; now we see him dictating in short crisp sentences, the number of reinforcements to be despatched—now hurrying off to Rangoon to decide matters on the spot. . . True, there was little decentralization of command, but with such a man . . . one is prone to think how unnecessary this may sometimes be.”

We are not here concerned with who made these arrangements, but with the fact that they *were* made. The Viceroy's “vigilant forethought” unquestionably saved thousands of lives, while the war, both administratively and operationally, was highly successful during his tenure of office.

To sum up the administrative lessons of forest wars. The success of operations is wholly dependent on a sound administrative plan. This plan must, whenever possible, be complete before active operations begin. More than ordinary attention must be given to details of organization and equipment, for small bodies of troops may often be required to operate independently over considerable periods of time at a distance from centres of supply. The personal responsibility of a commander is very great. In order that he may be able adequately to supervise the work of his staff, it is essential that he should be fully conversant with the characteristics of forest wars, and particularly with these, if any, fought within the proposed theatre of operations.

STRATEGY AND TACTICS.

Operationally speaking, forest wars may be divided into two classes, namely, wars of conquest, such as those fought in Ceylon, Nepaul and East Africa, and wars of pacification, such as the Moplah and Burma Rebellions. Some campaigns, notably the Second and Third Burmese Wars, fall under both headings. The first phase has been one of invasion, and the second the pacification of the occupied territory. In all forest wars, British commanders, in order to gain a decision, have been forced to maintain the offensive in terrain markedly favourable to the defence. Conversely, their opponents have been able to adopt guerilla tactics with, in most cases, the advantage of local knowledge, and the assistance of such powerful natural allies as climate and topography. In wars of pacification an additional and particularly troublesome feature has been the fluidity of the opposition. As Private Mulvaney remarked, "such double-ended divils I never knew. 'Tis only a *dah* an' a Snider that makes a dacoit. Widout thim he's a peaceful cultivator, an' 'felony for to shoot.'"¹

Nevertheless, even when full weight is given to these difficulties, it seems that the progress made in overcoming them has been unduly slow. The mistakes made in one war have too often been repeated in the next, which argues either a misappreciation or neglect of the lessons of history. To take an example from our most recent campaign, the Burma Rebellion, we find that the opening phase, from December 1930 to June 1931, was chiefly remarkable for the lack of a definite plan. This appears to have been due to friction between the civil and

¹ "Frontier and Overseas Expeditions," p. 88.

military authorities, mainly arising from the demands which were made for the dispersal of the small available military force—demands which were naturally resisted in order that striking reserves might be maintained. Turning to the pacification of Burma, fifty years earlier, we find the Chief Commissioner writing as follows:—"It was found necessary from the first to restrain firmly the tendency of the local officials to fritter away the strength of the force in small posts. The moment anything occurred they wanted to clap down a post on the disturbed spot; and if this had been allowed to go on unchecked there would not have been a man left to form a movable column or even send out a patrol of sufficient strength."

It seems a fair comment that, with this warning before them, the civil and military authorities should have been agreed upon a *modus operandi* when rebellion broke out in 1930.

There is another curious example of history repeating itself in the Third Burmese War, when operations failed to get under way for several months owing to the mistaken policy of sending out flying columns. These marched rapidly through a part of the country and then returned to their headquarters. The result was that "if the people were friendly and helped the troops, they were certain to suffer when the column retired. If they were hostile a hasty visit had little effect on them. They looked upon the retirement as a retreat and became more bitter than ever."¹

This identical mistake had been made by the French, many years earlier, in their initial attempts to pacify the rebellious province of La Vendée.² Flying columns entered the country, burnt towns and villages, and immediately returned to their bases. The Vendéans retaliated by ambushing and harassing the columns, or if defeated, simply hid their muskets and turned into peaceful cultivators. The only lasting impression made on the population was one of bitter resentment.

The methods by which La Vendée was eventually pacified by General Hoche are of great interest. His policy was a complete reversal of that of his predecessors, and was identical in principle with the plan arrived at, after considerable delay, in both pacifications of Burma.

¹ "The Pacification of Burma," p. 57.

² A maritime province of France, largely covered with woods and marshes.

Hoche formed a circle of strong posts connected by patrols, whose duty it was to prevent any enemy from breaking through the cordon. The cordon then gradually closed, preceded by mobile columns which attacked and broke up the following of truculent chiefs. The posts as they advanced occupied each town or village in turn, and disarmed the inhabitants. The principal citizens, together with cattle and corn, were held as hostages for good behaviour. When submission was complete, the men were released and the bulk of the cattle and corn restored to their owners. Part, however, was retained as a Government tax, and stored in magazines in rear to lighten the difficulties of supply. Stringent orders were issued to the troops, enjoining fair treatment of the inhabitants, and the immediate fulfilment of pledges given. By such means Hoche left behind him a country at peace with, and even favourable to, his Government.

Hoche's methods of subjugating a forest country have never been materially improved upon, and, except in the case of savages who might require sterner measures, their principles seem equally applicable to the future. Some form of organized drive must always be necessary, and the main scope for improvement appears to lie in quickening up this operation, and reducing the large number of troops which in the past have been required.

If this is to be done, three things will be essential: firstly, to ensure that rapid information is received of hostile movements; secondly, to provide continuous means of inter-communication between detachments; and, thirdly, to bestow a high degree of mobility on striking columns.

A great deal must depend on the liaison maintained between the civil and military authorities in time of peace, particularly as regards the judicious improvement of communications, and the maintenance of an efficient intelligence system. This latter necessitates the pooling of resources, and a high degree of friendly co-operation. In order to facilitate troop movements in time of emergency, a pool of light cross-country vehicles, such as those recently tried out in the Sudan, should be available in the country. In view of the probable armament of the opposition, the provision of detachable armoured plates would enable this M. T. to be used for patrolling, and even offensive action. In this connection it is interesting to note that a few old armoured cars were tried out in East Africa. Although they proved too heavy

for rough work, they showed that they could deal most effectively with road ambushes in thick bush.

As regards the problem of inter-communication, the only practicable solution lies in the provision of wireless sets on an adequate scale. There is a widespread belief that wireless is of little use in thickly wooded countries, but this is not borne out by experience. In the Hereros rising of over 30 years ago the Germans maintained communication between columns operating in dense bush up to distances of 150 kilometres. Incidentally they showed considerable technical ingenuity by raising their aerials, or "antennæ" as they were then called, above the level of the trees by means of small balloons. In the Burma Rebellion entirely reliable communication was established by day, up to 150 miles in areas where hill ranges did not intervene.

The effectiveness of air-craft for reconnaissance purposes has hitherto been limited by the paucity of landing grounds and the difficulty of observation at flying speeds in close country. It is suggested that these difficulties could largely be overcome by the new C. 30 type of autogiro. This machine could operate from small clearings and hover over suspected areas. An autogiro's wireless, operating at heights superior to ground interference, would be a valuable addition to communications in the field. Moreover, it could, if opportunity arose, be used to call up fighting air-craft for offensive action.

As these suggestions indicate, modern equipment might do much to overcome the tactical difficulties imposed by the terrain. Furthermore, cross-country vehicles, wireless and autogiros can be put to a variety of peace-time uses in undeveloped countries. In any case, from the financial point of view their cost would only amount to a small additional insurance premium against the enormous expenses of quelling internal trouble. The Burma Rebellion increased normal expenditure under one civil head alone by over £160,000.

Before dismissing the subject of wars of pacification, further reference must be made to the relations between the civil and military authorities, for the majority of such wars have been fought, in part or in whole, in aid of the civil power. Mention has already been made of the grave consequences which may arise from lack of liaison. History indicates that by far the most satisfactory results are obtained when Government delineates a definite area of Army responsibility within which the military commander exercises supreme control.

Wolseley's Ashanti Campaign was an outstanding instance, for the Cabinet gave him absolute authority not only beyond, but within the civil frontiers of the Gold Coast. Such a counsel of perfection has been rare—unfortunately so, for it was the keynote of Wolseley's success.

Apart from such questions of high policy, liaison with the Civil closely concerns individual officers during the subjugation of forest countries. Operations centre round the townships and villages, in which are located the great bulk of the population. Column and post commanders have thus frequent dealings with headmen and other minor officials. Furthermore, area commanders are in constant touch with local administrators who, as is natural in view of their responsibilities, have a marked tendency towards interference in the tactical dispositions of troops. Errors in the disposal of a force cannot readily be rectified in undeveloped areas, where cross-country movement may be impossible. In order that injudicious demands may be successfully resisted, it is thus most necessary that officers should have a thorough grasp of the civil organization and political situation within their districts. While space precludes further discussion of this subject, its importance can hardly be over-emphasized. It will be found that Sir Charles Crosthwaite has dealt very fully with certain aspects of the problem in his book on the pacification of Burma.

As military operations, wars of invasion have been more straightforward than wars of pacification, but their strategy has followed much more divergent lines. In his invasion of Ashanti, for example, Wolseley correctly based his plan of campaign on the belief that the enemy would mass to resist a direct threat to their capital. In East Africa the problem was entirely different though, after Tanga, an attempt was made to solve it on similar lines. As might have been anticipated, Von Lettow was far too astute a commander to allow himself to be pinned to the defence of fixed positions, and his guerilla tactics called for nothing less than the systematic subjugation of the whole country. A little clear-thinking as to what this entailed might have prevented a campaign which was, from the point of view of world strategy, the least justifiable and most damaging "side-show" of the Great War. To the German higher command, East Africa was a heaven-sent diversion.

The strategy of wars of invasion, differing as it has in accordance with the characteristics and objectives of the enemy, is too vast a subject for detailed consideration here. An attempt has, however, been made to embody their main lessons in a general summary of the strategical principles of forest wars.

Firstly, the enemy are difficult to locate, and prone to purely harassing tactics. A commander must therefore decide, at the outset of the campaign, on the localities or material which are vital to hostile interests, so that the enemy must either collect and fight in their defence, or open themselves to being systematically starved into submission.

Secondly, in operations which entail the subjugation of a large tract of country, a commander must guard against the common tendency to under-estimate the number of troops, he will require.

Thirdly, offensive action must be the keynote of all operations. Withdrawals, over-caution and delay are interpreted as signs of weakness. Opportunities to strike a decisive blow are fleeting and any hesitation spells failure.

Fourthly, assumptions as to the absence of the enemy are fatal, and reconnoissance must always be pushed out to the furthest limit that prudence permits.

Fifthly, the moral effect of surprise cannot be exaggerated, but the facilities which the terrain offers to the free movement of enemy scouts and spies makes it most difficult of attainment. In order to create a situation for which the enemy is unprepared, a commander must possess a highly organized intelligence service, and observe secrecy to an extent which would ordinarily be considered excessive. The superior advantages usually held by the enemy in obtaining information can often be turned against them by the skilful dissemination of false intelligence.

Lastly, the degree of mobility and powers of concentration of a force depend on the suitability of its organization. No scheme of operations can succeed which is not based on a sound administrative plan.

TACTICS.

When all is said and done, however, forest wars have been described as "subaltern's wars," and the description is not inapt. A

commander must disperse his force from sheer lack of space, if for no other reason, and the successful execution of his plans consequently depends on the initiative of junior leaders and of the troops themselves.

On the necessity for training in forest tactics all authorities are unanimous. While Callwell soberly remarks that "experience of wood fighting . . . goes to show that even with the best of regular troops the men are liable to get out of hand," another writer has it that untrained units are "at first almost helpless in the jungles of Africa, India or Burma. Even intelligent and well read officers find the problems of bush fighting novel and bewildering."¹ Colonel Deney's Reitz simply says that "in bush fighting ordinary rules do not apply."

Fighting in dense forest is rather like fighting at night, and has the same psychological effect on the untrained man. There is the same uncanny stillness, the same absence of landmarks, and the same feeling of being watched at close quarters by invisible eyes. Even at mid-day it is dim under the trees, and at other times gloomy and almost dark.

Again, when things happen in the forest, they generally happen suddenly. A column marching along a jungle path may have its transport suddenly fired on by hidden enemy who have evaded the flankers. For a trained column the correct action is simple. Two previously detailed parties, marching in front and rear of the transport, force their way into the jungle with the object of surrounding the enemy and cutting off his retreat. The transport, meanwhile, clears the path, as far as may be possible, on the opposite side from the enemy; the baggage guard faces the enemy, and combines its protective rôle with that of a "stop." Firing is, of course, prohibited unless there happens to be a clear prospect.² The point to be emphasized is that this action must be instantaneous, for no jungle enemy worth his salt fires from ambush without first planning a quick getaway. If he brings off his *coup* unmolested, the news soon gets round, and the column is in for trouble. It can hardly be expected that an untrained column will have a plan ready to meet such an emergency, or even if

¹ "Jungle and River Warfare." Casserley.

² This means of dealing with an ambush was first suggested by Lord Roberts.

it has, that those on the spot will be capable of putting it into instant execution.

Yet, in expressing the opinion that training in forest tactics is essential, it must not be overlooked that such training must be carried out under conditions calculated to give officers and men the right "atmosphere." To do so at Home is admittedly not easy, for in most training areas troops are prohibited from entering woods. Nevertheless, wooded areas do exist on Crown Lands—those behind Sandhurst are an example—and if training in forest tactics were considered desirable it seems possible that the necessary arrangements might be made in most Commands. In overseas stations training areas may either be non-existent or there may be too many of them. The difficulty in countries such as Malaya or Burma is to find any clear space in which troops can deploy.

The conclusion appears to be that facilities for training are available, or could be made available, for a considerable proportion of units during the course of their Home or Foreign tours. In the case of units stationed in countries where forest fighting may occur, there can seldom, if ever, be any difficulty.

The question then arises as to whether the study and practice of forest tactics can materially contribute towards the general training of the Army for war. In this respect, history shows that the woodland and forest fighting of the American wars considerably influenced the evolution of modern tactics. Encounters with scattered sharpshooters taught the British the use of natural cover and the value of loose and flexible formations, while the need for individual marksmanship revolutionized musketry and led to the introduction of the rifle. From these beginnings Light Infantry tactics gradually emerged, culminating in the publication, in 1798, of "*Regulations for the Exercise of Riflemen and Light Infantry and Instructions for their Conduct in the Field.*"¹ This was the genesis of the famous Light Division of the Peninsular, and of Sir John Moore's system of training, which high authority recently suggested as a valuable subject for modern study.

While for this reason the American Wars are probably of unique general interest, the fundamental value to be derived from the study and practice of all forest tactics is much the same. In peace time

¹ Written by the Officer Commanding, the 5th Bn. (Rifles), 60th Royal Americans.

training in open country an umpire, even if trebly blessed with activity, imagination, and a sufficiency of screens, cannot prevent many consultations which would be impossible in war. Trees make a more natural and more effective barrier. By cutting off communications they throw individuals on to their own resources, and so foster the initiative and self-reliance so necessary in the modern soldier. This can best be illustrated by the following suggestions for simple training exercises.

Exercise 1.—Riflemen advancing through a belt of woodland are confronted by a succession of surprise targets.

Remarks.—This teaches men to keep their wits about them and quickens up snap-shooting under realistic conditions.

Exercise 2.—Lewis Gun sections advancing along a forest path are suddenly fired on.

Remarks.—Again a quickening up exercise which teaches section commanders to grasp a fleeting opportunity.

Exercise 3.—Patrols are sent out to report on definite localities in, or beyond, a tract of forest.

Remarks.—This is a practical test of map and compass reading. It also throws a considerable degree of personal responsibility and strain on to the patrol commander if the intervening country is, as it should be, occupied by "enemy."

Exercise 4.—Company or platoon columns march through wooded country in which ambushes have been staged.

Remarks.—As explained earlier in the article, this teaches both officers and men to think ahead and act immediately in an emergency with the minimum of orders. A well staged exercise resolves itself into a battle of wits with the "enemy," which keeps interest at a high pitch.

Exercise 5.—A company or platoon attack on a forest village, or similar objective.

Remarks.—This is a particularly valuable exercise for commanders. In particular, it tests the soundness of initial orders, and illustrates the difficulty of control and communication once troops have been committed to battle.

An important point about these exercises is that they hold the interest of the troops, especially if the "enemy" put up a realistic

performance. This in practice they nearly always do, owing to the soldier's love of playing a part. Before leaving this subject of training it is worth mentioning an objection sometimes made to practising forest tactics. It is that officers find it impossible personally to supervise more than a fraction of the work of their commands. This of course is just the reason which makes such exercises valuable for general training for war, and an essential preparation for forest fighting itself.

CONCLUSIONS.

Forest wars have been numerous in the past, and it is conceivable that they may be equally numerous in the future. Since the Empire has ceased to expand, wars of conquest are less probable, but differences on our frontiers are still likely to arise. Again in many of the forest lands of Asia and Africa this is an age of political advancement. Relief from the growing pains of progress is apt to be sought in political strife, in which British troops may be called upon, as often in the past, to arbitrate between the contestants. In the event of another Great War arising the lesson of East Africa must not be forgotten. Large areas of our Empire are covered with forests—they have been added to since the late war—and they are by no means the least important parts. Nor are they isolated from the influence of other Great Powers who might well seek to make diversions as profitable as was that in East Africa. The possibilities of propaganda increase the potential danger. This form of attack was not overlooked by our late enemies. At least one rebellion of a forest people in 1914 can be attributed to their agencies.

The forest wars of the future, unlike those of the past, will be fought in the limelight. There is now no part of the world so inaccessible that the gap cannot be bridged by wireless. The days of easy-going finance are over. Public opinion will insist on operations being finished quickly and economically. This can only be made possible by considerable specialized study, and some training, in time of peace. The benefits derived from such study and training would not be confined to forest wars alone.

WADHGAON

BY D. KINCAID.

The Wadhgaon campaign ended in the most peculiar and disgraceful reverse that ever attended British arms in India. Apart from this unenviable singularity it is worth a moment's study as an almost perfect object-lesson in how not to conduct a campaign.

A few historical facts are necessary as a background to that disastrous expedition. From the earliest days of the English establishments in Surat and Bombay the Company's neighbours in Western India had been the Marathas. The national Maratha monarchy was, after the death of King Shahu, eclipsed by the power of the Brahman mayors of the palace, called the Peshwas, who confined the king in Satara fort and themselves assumed the headship of the Maratha confederacy. The Bombay Government had for long been irked by the proximity of the Maratha power which effectively barred their expansion inland; and they envied the easy successes of Bengal and Madras. When, therefore, a claimant to the position of Peshwa, by name Raghunath, begged for English help in return for large territorial concessions, the Bombay Government eagerly agreed. Unfortunately this Raghunath was a peculiarly unsuitable candidate. He had caused the last Peshwa to be murdered and his offer of Maratha territory in return for foreign aid did not increase his popularity among his countrymen. On the other hand the virtual head of the Maratha Government, the Regent Nana Phadnavis, was both popular and extremely able. The Bombay Government, however, seem to have considered none of the difficulties of their policy; and though the Governor-General, Warren Hastings, angrily forbade the proposed "wild and precipitate expedition" they ignored his order and on November 22, 1878, sent six companies of sepoy and some light artillery to force the passage of the Bhor Ghat.

Then, as now, the road to Poona, the Maratha capital, ran east from Bombay to Khandala and then turned southwards through a wide valley enclosed by rolling hills. The Maratha government appear to have been taken by surprise and made no serious attempt to contest the passage of the Ghats, and the advance party of the Bombay army reached Khandala at the head of the Ghats without any trouble. On the way they passed through a tiny village called

Venegaon ; and the priest, Madhav Bhat, must have come out of his champak-shaded temple to stare at them. He was a young man and it was probably his first sight of Europeans. But his son, Dhondu, was to know them better, for he would one day be the Nana Saheb of the Mutiny.

Encamped at Khandala the English officers must have revelled in the cool air of mist-wreathed uplands after the damp heat of the sub-ghat country. The rains were but recently over and the hills green and many wild flowers in bloom. They were but two days' march from the Maratha capital and the most difficult part of the campaign was already over. Moreover their commander was a young captain who was famous in Western India for his bravery and leadership. He was James Stewart, the only foreigner who has ever been awarded the Maratha title of Pakde or "hero." To him and his officers the expedition must have seemed a pleasant military promenade, and they wrote to Bombay in the highest spirits reporting that they had easily beaten off the attempts of the Marathas to dislodge them from their fortified camp.

On December 13 the main army arrived at Khandala and Colonel Egerton took over command from Stewart. The British force was now composed of 3,300 sepoy and 591 European soldiers. They were accompanied by 4,000 Maratha troops whom their ally, the claimant to the Peshwai, had rallied to his standard. Had this army at once marched on Poona there is no doubt whatever but that the enemy's capital would have been occupied without a battle. Indeed, the Maratha regent had already given orders for the evacuation of Poona. Of course it is easy enough now to see that the occupation of Poona would have been of little value and that its capture would no more have ended the war than Napoleon's capture of Moscow ended his war with Alexander. But this was a problem inherent in the policy of intervention adopted by the Bombay Government. Egerton's orders were to occupy Poona, where it was believed a number of the pretender Raghunath's supporters would declare for him. Now Poona was only two days' march from Khandala and should have been occupied almost at once. Egerton, however, while boasting in his reports of anticipating an early victory, only advanced eight miles in eleven days. There were no enemy forces opposing him except a few snipers and bands of irregular cavalry who were easily swept aside. On January 4th the Bombay

army arrived at Karla (well known to-day for its Buddhist caves) and there engaged with an inferior Maratha force which was driven back. During the engagement, however, the one British officer of intelligence and energy with the expedition was killed. Stewart had climbed a tree to reconnoitre the enemy's position when he was recognised by the Marathas who greeted him with a cordial "Shabash." The next moment they trained their guns on the tree and blew him and tree away.

At that moment the Regent Nana was holding a council of war in the Saturday Palace at Poona. The boy-Peshwa lay sleeping on a sofa in a corner of the room, undisturbed by the anxious consultations of the ministers. Outside, carts filled with refugees from the country rattled past over the cobbled streets. Servants hurried down the long corridors of the palace piling up straw and dry wood along the walls; for it had been resolved to fire all the buildings when the capital was evacuated. During their discussions the ministers mentioned the name of Stewart as a resolute and brave commander. On hearing his name the boy-prince awoke and said "That Englishman is dead" for he had just then seen Stewart's death in a dream the very moment it occurred. The Regent was so much heartened by this curious instance of telepathy that he countermanded the preparations for evacuation of the capital and resolved to offer battle.

The English army was still advancing at the glorious speed of three-quarters of a mile a day, and on the 9th it reached Talegaon. There they found the village in flames and a Maratha army of about 9,000 men drawn up for battle. The numbers on both sides were about equal, but Egerton declined an engagement. Apparently, he was alarmed by a report that the Marathas were expecting reinforcements and that a considerable force was concentrating at Poona. This was true; but one would have thought that his obvious course was to attack before the reinforcements reached the forces opposing him. Instead of this he remained for two days motionless behind Talegaon. Then he became frightened that his supplies would fail, though, as was afterwards realised, he had sufficient supplies for all ordinary purposes. On the other hand, he had made no attempt to secure his communications and a Maratha army, marching over the hills to his right, dropped to the sea coast plain and lay across the Bombay road in his rear. On the 11th, though no reinforcements

had yet reached the Maratha forces facing him at Talegaon, he suddenly decided to retire and threw all his artillery and 2,000 muskets into Talegaon Lake. Such a retreat through a valley, in hostile country, was a hazardous enterprise, but could have been successfully carried out had Egerton moved with ordinary speed. But his retreat was as leisurely as his advance. In two days he only covered five miles. The hills were now alive with irregular cavalry who emerged out of the shadows of the great basalt rocks, swept over the yellow spear-grass and dashed on to the rear of the straggling army.

On the 13th Egerton stopped at Wadhgaon and offered to surrender. A member of the Bombay civil service by name Holmes, was sent as plenipotentiary and he agreed to the most extraordinary treaty. The Bombay Government was to hand over to the Marathas all their recent acquisitions and pay an indemnity of Rs. 40,000. In addition the Marathas were modern enough to anticipate the Versailles peacemakers and to insist on a detailed confession of war-guilt. It is some satisfaction to record that all the officers who were parties to this treaty were dismissed on their return to Bombay.

Egerton and his surrender are both forgotten to-day. Yet, but for the fact that Warren Hastings was then Governor-General, Egerton might have enjoyed a melancholy celebrity equal to that of Burgoyne whose surrender in not very dissimilar circumstances at Saratoga in the previous year had doomed British rule in the thirteen colonies.

THE WRONG SPIRIT IN ARMY SPORT

By "NIKE."

The purpose of this article is to plead for a recovery of our sense of proportion in regard to Army Sport. We seem to be in some danger of losing it, especially over competitions. Is it not time we asked ourselves whether games are still being played in the traditional spirit and to the benefit of both the Army and the Individual?

Sport plays such a large part in the life of most units that this question is of some importance and should be seriously considered. A number of us have heard ugly words like "cup-hunting" and "professionalism" applied to competitive tournaments. Up to a few years ago, such expressions would have been met with an angry denial. The accusations would have been false and unjust. To-day we must regretfully acknowledge that they contain an element of truth. There is creeping into Army Sport a spirit at variance with its traditions; those excellent traditions of true sportsmanship, team work and friendly rivalry.

Ever since the War the worship of sport has been an outstanding feature in most civilised countries. The Press has devoted enormous space and energy to the description of games, players, and the crowds that watch them. The grotesque stories of international contests leave many of us wondering what relation these much-advertised fixtures bear to true sport. We have been given graphic accounts of the private lives of "star" performers, even to details of what they eat and what they wear, what they think about and how they spend their spare time. If we chose to read it all, we should know far more about these people than we are ever likely to know about such national figures as the Prime Minister or the Commander-in-Chief. The head of a large business firm in Calcutta recently told the writer that after the War many big firms started recruiting athletes to the exclusion of other material. To be a 'Varsity Blue meant almost certain engagement. Business was sacrificed to sport. Now very few of these men are left. The firms found that expert athletes did not necessarily make good business men and that the sports arena could not replace the workshop or the office as a place of apprenticeship.

Is it reasonable to expect that the Army should have escaped this virus of Sport Worship? Far from having escaped, here are four instances to show how the virus is being absorbed in India :—

(1) There are Units which give special or accelerated promotion to their expert athletes. Many of these men being good sportsmen make good leaders. But some of them are merely mechanical athletes and acknowledged as useless N. C. Os. Their promotion is given them to keep them contented and to retain their services for competitive sport purposes.

(2) There are Indian Units which specially enlist outstanding athletes from Universities and Schools, demand from them little or no military service, and feed and train them like gladiators for the annual orgy of competitive tournaments.

(3) There are Units which if military training coincides with athletic training will excuse the former so that intensive training for competitions shall not be interrupted.

(4) There is a large Military District in India which calls its Sports Championship Cup "The Best Unit Cup." This is presented annually to the Unit gaining the most points in various sports competitions. The winning Unit can walk about for one year calling itself the Best Unit in that District. From the point of view of military efficiency, it may or may not be the best Unit. No test of military efficiency is included in the rules of the Cup.

No sensible person will deny the importance of sport. In the Service we believe in and acknowledge the benefit of games on the moral and physical training of the soldier. From the day he enlists he is rightly encouraged to play those games which bring out the military attributes of courage, physical fitness, self-control, unselfishness, and team spirit. We all know about Waterloo having been won on the playing fields of Eton, and we firmly believe in the real truth which underlies that seemingly exaggerated statement. But it has not been on the prowess of the individual player but on the spirit of the playing fields that we have always prided ourselves as a nation. To play games hard and keenly was what mattered. To excel at games was a heaven-born gift. And nowhere was the true spirit more in evidence than in Army Sport. Is there not now some danger of its decline? Have we not begun to lionize and encourage the star performer at the expense of the ordinary man who plays his games for recreation and

pleasure ? Is not most of our energy and money expended on the "stars" (hateful word) who may bring us back cups and help to raise our Unit's "sporting" reputation ?

There may be some who see no harm in this. Let us then observe the effect of it on competitive tournaments and within Units.

Annually at big District Meetings are collected hundreds of highly trained athletes under (in most cases) splendidly organised conditions. Many of these men have been struck off duties for weeks and sometimes months before the competitions start in order to train for the high standard required. It is no good saying this is against the rules. It happens because some Units refuse to play the game, and the rest, or most of the rest, can only compete against them by thus juggling with the rules. Then when the teams meet in the various games and athletic events, is there that friendly rivalry which always used to exist ? Unfortunately not always. Quite often now-a-days there is suspicion, distrust, and active hostility towards opponents. The Competition Hound is abroad ! The Cups are at stake ! Gone is the spirit of the playing fields and in its place has crept a new thing which we have always associated with the worst features of professionalism. Sometimes games are rough and end in violent abuse. See some of the competitors examining and criticising the cups and medals, and hear some of the winners and runners-up grumbling if each individual does not get a prize. Such behaviour is still rare, though unfortunately less rare in civilian tournaments for which military teams often enter. But the very fact that it exists and is growing unchecked points to something wrong.

The financial aspect of these meetings is becoming a matter of concern, and is bound up in the whole question of competitive sport. Few Districts in India are able to repay all the travelling expenses of outstation teams. Indian Units are not wealthy, but every year there comes a large bill on account of these competitions. Items such as extra feeding, clothing, gear, and part or whole of the travelling expenses to Brigade and District Meetings have all got to be met. Everyone is out-of-pocket, including the competitors who, if they are Indians, now consider it necessary to dress themselves up in special mufti befitting gladiators about to perform before the crowd. Many British Units also complain of their heavy sports expenses. With all this expenditure perhaps it is not to be wondered that Units are

anxious to get their money's worth, and strain every nerve to bring back the coveted trophies.

Now let us see the effect of all this within the Unit. Take Commanding Officers. There are a few who will no longer allow their Units to take part in these competitions either because they disapprove of the present atmosphere or on the grounds of expense. Most C. Os., however, feel it is up to them to support these meetings. A small number of them are so impressed with the importance of sport that they consider the efficiency of their Unit in the eyes of those above them, and their own professional future, lies almost as much in the sports arena as on the barrack square or in the field. This type of C. O. is always on the look out for new athletic blood, and cases are not unknown where excellent Unattached List material has been refused a vacancy because the applicant's games were not up to a sufficiently high standard. Such Commanding Officers are rare, but they must bear a large share of responsibility for the growth of the wrong spirit in Army Sport.

Amongst British Officers the effect is noticeable. There are now so many branches of competitive sport; the training for tournaments is so intense, and the standard so high, that many officers spend all their spare time and more in coaching Unit teams instead of playing ordinary games with their own more ordinary men as they used to do. The younger generation which has been brought up in this new atmosphere is apt to treat games as parades, and not infrequently they overwork and overtrain their teams. These same officers continue to play their own games of polo, cricket, tennis, golf, etc., in the traditional spirit, but as soon as they are charged with the training of Unit teams they seem to lose their sense of proportion.

As for the men. Here are remarks recently made by two Indian Officers of different units. Subadar-Major "A" :—" Games used to be played for pleasure and we all thoroughly enjoyed them. Now they have become hard work and there is very little enjoyment." Subadar "B" (not very well educated!) :—" It is time the conditions of service were changed. Instead of asking the recruit to serve so long with the Colours and so long with the Reserve, he should now be asked ' Will you promise to try and run a hundred yards in ten seconds ? ' "

So much for the disease. There may be readers of this article who consider that the facts quoted above are isolated incidents. The

writer naturally does not intend for a moment to accuse all those who are keen on sport or "cup-hunting" and "professionalism." He knows there are dozens of first rate Units who treat sport at its proper value, and who can produce splendid teams which play the game and win competitions without any extra special training, or special recruitment, or any other special trick. But he submits that there is an increasing number of Units which do not abide either by the spirit of Army Sport or by the A. S. C. B. rules. It is against them and the spirit they are inculcating that this article is directed. To clear himself of the charge of ignorant criticism, may the writer say that he has served on Brigade, District, Command, and A. S. C. B. Sports Committees, and for some years was in charge of large District Tournaments and Meetings. He speaks, therefore, from a fairly wide experience. And he knows, from talking to others, that there are many who are equally anxious to cut out this canker from Army Sport.

Why are so many Indian Units, qualified by reason of their composition or designation to compete in "private" tournaments such as the Punjab Native Army Hockey, Frontier Force, Gurkha Brigade Cup, etc., so much keener on them than on the average Army Meeting? Because up-to-date those tournaments have tried to preserve the true sporting atmosphere and friendly rivalry, which is growing rarer in Official Army Competitions.

What is the remedy? First and foremost let us recapture our sense of proportion. Let us continue to acknowledge the importance of games, but cease to make a fetish of them. Encourage and train the good player, but do not make a hero of him. Games are intended for recreation and should not be treated otherwise. To treat them as work and to extol those who happen to excel at them, as if they were the champions of military efficiency, is to ask for professionalism in Army Sport.

It is not suggested that competitive sport be discontinued. Friendly rivalry is an excellent thing and raises the standard of games. But if the proper spirit is to be preserved, it is essential that those responsible should deal ruthlessly with any Unit or team which fails to abide by the existing rules. A Unit found enlisting and paying "hired gladiators," striking men off duty for prolonged periods to train, or behaving in an unsporting manner, should be disqualified without warning and their names published in Army Orders.

And within Units let there be a little less intensity and a good deal more enjoyment in their games. Let them recapture the "Spirit of the Playing Fields" and take their chance in competitions, treating such as sporting and not business contests. While aiming at a high standard let us leave record breaking to professional and Olympic "Stars," whose object in life it is.

If we can bring the transgressors to a change of heart and methods, we shall restore the traditional spirit of Army Sport. There is yet time, but only if the disease is treated before it spreads.

THE FOREIGN LEGION

BY CAPTAIN J. A. CODRINGTON, COLDSTREAM GUARDS.

Early in 1930 I did an attachment to the French Army in North Africa. As I had already come in contact with the Foreign Legion in Syria, General Naulin, who then commanded the 19th Corps in Algeria, was kind enough in addition to allow me the privilege of staying with them at their depot at Sidi Bel Abbès for a few days.

First let me say that nothing could have been kinder and more friendly than the officers of the Foreign Legion, from their famous Colonel (now General) Rollet downwards, in showing me everything I wanted to see, and explaining everything I asked about. Even when I told them candidly of my wanderings in the evenings "*incognito*" in plain clothes round the public houses, etc., in the back streets, where I talked and drank with Legionnaires of various nationalities (including English), they accepted the fact calmly and generously, and did not attempt to discourage me from getting to know the men at first hand.

It stands to reason that a short tour at any depot is not sufficient to know a regiment properly; and to judge it one should see it not only on parade but in hard conditions on service. One ought not to judge the Legion only by its depot at Sidi Bel Abbès, and I should much like one day to meet the Legion again in the "bled." Nevertheless, I heard and saw enough to be able to correct some, at any rate, of the false, and one might almost say, libellous, impressions that are so prevalent in England; but I readily admit that to know the Legion properly and to speak with authority one must have been a Legionary, or, anyhow, have been with it under service conditions.

Ever since its formation, in 1831, the Foreign Legion has added more and more glorious feats of arms to its list of battle honours. It is safe to say that no corps of any army has known such a continuous list of desperate fighting, often under dreadful climatic conditions; and never has the Legion been known to fail in its task. *La Légion sait mourir.* Besides the numerous engagements during the conquest of Algeria, the Legion took part in the expedition to Mexico in 1863, where the battle of Camerone is its most famous

engagement. The conquest of Tongking owes much to it, and the siege of Tuyen Quan, in 1885, was a magnificent episode in its history. The history of the Legion is seen in detail in the *Salle d'Honneur* at Bel Abbès, which is really a museum where the relics of its numerous campaigns are piously kept.

At first the Legion consisted of companies of different nationalities, but it was found that it worked much better when the nationalities were broken up as far as possible. Its strength has varied ; in 1930 it amounted to about 20,000 men, most of whom have received their initial training at Sidi Bel Abbès.

After reading most of the books on the Foreign Legion, one gets the idea—I did, anyhow—that every legionary was a desperate cut-throat and black-guard, and probably “wanted” for murder, fraud, or robbery in his own country, and that Sidi Bel Abbès and its barracks was an absolute hell upon earth—a sort of glorified blockhouse miles from civilization, with nothing of any sort that could contribute even to the rudiments of comfort. Neither of these impressions is correct. Certainly there *are* black-guards, and certainly Bel Abbès is not Paris. I should think, however, that the average legionary enlists either purely for adventure, or because some love affair has gone wrong, or because an irate father has kicked him out of the house. Petty pilfering, or fraud committed in a moment of weakness or mental strain, may easily send a man in fear or remorse to the nearest French recruiting depot. For every two or three “bad hats” there are probably ten to twenty perfectly honest and reliable soldiers. Among the 20,000 men in the ranks of the Legion there are experts of nearly every profession. There are plumbers and priests, jewellers and joiners, musicians and miners, dentists and dramatists, bankers and burglars, and all are welded together by discipline and a strange comradeship of arms, and a feeling that the world up to now has dealt unkindly with almost all of them in some way or another.

Built by the Legion, Sidi Bel Abbès has been its home ever since it began. It is a square, dull, military garrison town, surrounded with ramparts. Though not a brilliant centre of social activity and amusement, it has many cafés, bars, and less respectable establishments ; a few hotels and restaurants ; trees, and a shady public garden ; a square and a church ; shops, cinemas and a dance hall. True, it is pretty hot in summer, but there is a compulsory siesta through the

middle of the day. The barracks consist of three blocks which enclose a parade ground with trees in it. Here it is that recruits first come to, and pass through their preliminary—and pretty energetic—training. Here legionaries come between different postings (*e.g.*, from Morocco to Syria or Tongking), and here, at the end of their period of service—that is to say five years—they come and are given a suit of plain clothes and are dismissed. Some re-enlist straight away for another five years; some re-enlist for less, in order to go to Tongking, while naturally some are only too thankful to go. Many even of the latter come back after a little time in civilian life.

In the barracks is a cinema, and the men have a library containing books and papers in every language, including English, and a writing room. The canteen (*Foyer du Légionnaire*) is a long room with little tables and a bar, where cakes, coffee, tea and non-alcoholic beer are sold. This room certainly seemed a bit small, but in fine weather there are little tables outside, like a French café. All these arrangements, while not so luxurious as in our own modern barracks, are far better than those in most other French barracks. There are shower baths and a long trough where the men have to wash their own clothes. Here again, the accommodation is becoming decidedly inadequate, for the barracks were built a long time ago when the Legion was much smaller, and washing, either of clothes or persons, was of less account. "Washing day" is a crowded affair, and I should think is an admirable opportunity for some of the cunning ones to increase their wardrobe.

The sergeants' mess is well run, and clean and airy; it is more spacious than some of our own. It consists of a library and a reading room, a series of mess-rooms (warrant officers and sergeants' mess in separate rooms), and a café with tables and a bar. In the N.C.Os' messes the nationalities are purposely mixed up, and French has to be spoken there, and on all official occasions. The N.C.Os. are often fierce, but this fierceness is common to the N.C.Os. of most depots. The sergeants' bunks are far bigger and more comfortable than those in the average British barracks. No sergeants sleep in the barrack rooms, which are each in charge of a corporal. The barrack rooms are kept very clean and tidy, even before afternoon parades. The beds, however, are very much closer together than in the case with us, and the rifles are kept in a rack at the end of the room. A legionary's meals, which he eats in his barrack room, are very different from those of a British soldier, but are much the same as those of most continental

armies, *i.e.*, a cup of coffee on getting up, *La soupe* at 10-30 (soup, meat, vegetables and wine), supper at 5-30 (meat and vegetables). In barracks it is generally very good.

Life at Bel Abbès is not one of ease and idleness. In the French Army there are no half holidays. Reveillé was at 6-30 a.m. when I was there (winter hours), and the legionaries are on the go most of the day. Their scheme of instruction for recruits is more or less run on the same lines as most British depots. Marches and physical training are carried out progressively—the weight of the equipment and the length of the marches increasing gradually up to about twenty-five miles; this is interspersed with weapon training and the range. I watched a squad of recruits being instructed in machine gun training by a Hungarian sergeant in bad French. His instruction was repeated in bad German by a Czechoslovak corporal. How a Greek, Spanish or English recruit understood I have no idea; *Ils se débrouillent* was the only explanation the officers gave me!

The proportion of nationalities is interesting. Far the greatest percentage is German, then Belgian or Swiss (many of these actually French), then Russian, French, and Central European, and a sprinkling of British and American. The question of the British in the Legion is one that still excites the English Press to a frenzy. General Rollet estimated the number of Britishers to be about 100 at the most. (This, it must be remembered, is in a force of some 20,000.) Naturally, they are, as a rule, far more lonely and therefore unhappy, than the men of other nations, for, on arrival, they probably will not find a single soul who speaks their language. I met several at Bel Abbès; they seem, on the whole more or less contented, or anyhow resigned, with the usual grouses without which no British soldier can be said to exist, wherever he is, but they feel a sort of isolation. There is no doubt that the British are very often failures in the Legion, and are—generally quite rightly—mistrusted by the authorities. I have often been asked, both by Englishmen and Frenchmen, why so few good men of British blood enlist, and I think it is due to four main causes:—

1. The average Englishman of all classes instinctively considers himself a superior and god-like being, on a plane above all creatures who are what he calls "ruddy foreigners." Therefore he does not like to mix with them, and still less to be ordered about by them.

2. Almost all continental nations have universal service. Barrack-room life and its ordinary annoyances, grievances and hardship is no new thing to foreigners, who all do their military service as part of growing up. The average English civilian, however, has no idea of life in barracks, nor of the rigours of military discipline of any sort.

3. The continental system of meals is so different that an Englishman would consider himself half-starved on what any continental soldier would consider quite normal diet.

4. If an Englishman has a taste for soldiering, he can voluntarily join his own, much higher paid, army; therefore, it may be supposed, the English Legionary has joined for rather special reasons.

The Legion, however, must not be judged by the tiny sprinkling of British subjects who naturally find themselves "fish out of water." One can only fairly judge the Legion by the many thousands of Germans, Russians, Swiss and Central Europeans, who make themselves happy in it, and either rise up and become N.C.Os. and perhaps officers, or who re-engage.

The strange stories that percolate to the sensational so-called popular Press, and to the House of Commons, are not worth bothering about, as they mostly come from the mouths of disgruntled deserters; moreover, when all is said and done, the French Foreign Legion is part of the French Army, and is really nothing to do with England at all. The Englishmen in it voluntarily and automatically become French citizens for the time being, and do not always warrant the fuss made by certain interfering busybodies.

The Legionaries are certainly a tough crowd. They need to be. They have to know how to look after themselves; *se débrouiller* means to fend for yourself, to "old soldier" others, to "scrounge," to "wangle" and to improvise. The Legion is no place for the feeble and helpless. *Se débrouiller* might be taken as the motto of the Legion. After the fortnightly pay day (a legionary is paid the same as a French soldier, and it is not very much) a large majority of them get drunk, and the bars and other haunts in the town become lively, and often exciting. Discipline is very strict and punishments are severe. This strictness is necessary in order to form such a mixed collection into an efficient force. Simple drunkenness is not a crime, even if a man falls in an unconscious heap at the barrack gate; the

prisons would not be big enough if it were. As is usual throughout the French Army, N.C.Os. can award punishments for small crimes, and these can be augmented by higher authority; corporal punishment is, however, strictly forbidden.

The legionaries in Bel Abbès are on the whole smart in their turn-out, and there is a full length looking-glass at the barrack gate for them to check their appearances before going out into the town. They are punctilious about saluting, and the officers are very careful to return all salutes. Nevertheless, the French do not understand leather like we do, and waistbelts do not have to be polished.

The officers come to the Legion from St. Cyr as to any other unit. It is a unit much sought after by those who have a flair for adventure and active service, and it is often the picked few at the top of the passing-out list who go there. At the same time, it is perfectly possible for foreigners who enlist in it to become N.C.Os., pass into St. Maixent, and finally to get a commission while retaining their own nationality up to the rank of Captain. As a general rule, when once an officer has served with the Legion, he never wants to serve with another corps. To lead Legionaries, an officer must have a very strong personality, and must be able to put up with hard conditions of service in many outlandish parts of the world.

In 1931 I was privileged to be invited personally to the celebrations in connection with the Centenary of the founding of the Legion at Sidi Bel Abbès. The celebrations centred round the unveiling, by the Governor of Algeria, of the Memorial to fallen Legionaries throughout the world, upon April 30th, the anniversary of the battle of Camerone in Mexico, the Legion's most famous fight.

Marshal Franchet d'Esperet made an inspiring speech, the keynote of which was that the iron discipline of the Legion had made it, throughout its history, an irresistible fighting force. It is this discipline which makes the Legion a *Corps d'élite* in every sense of the term, which has never failed in battle.

Detachments with bands, from the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Regiments (Morocco) joined with the 1st Regiment (Algeria) in the march past, and in other parts of the festivities, including a physical display of different items, by the *Equipes Sportives*. The teams—mainly composed of Germans and Scandinavians—were of magnificent physique and looked very fit; they could well compare with the bigger men in the Brigade of Guards.

What was, in a way, the most interesting thing about the celebrations was the number of ex-Legionaries present. They amounted to over 1,000, among whom were some thirty different delegations of *anciens Légionnaires* from Luxembourg, France, Switzerland, Germany and Austria, and of course, from Algeria itself, where many ex-Legionaries settle and make their homes. This reunion of "Old Comrades" speaks for itself, and requires no comment. It is a significant answer to much of the nonsense that is written about the Legion.

After his tour at the depot, a man has to do at least two years in the "bled," where he garrisons some desert post, and is ready for raids by tribesmen. After this he generally has a choice of going to Syria or Tongking, or of staying in Morocco; he may, however, manage to get some struck-off job. There are many "specialist" (which often means "cushy") jobs, among them a place in the Legion band, which is justly renowned. It contains many really first-class musicians, the majority of whom are German, Austrian and Hungarian.

On the occasion of the Centenary the band gave two admirable orchestral concerts, in which the discipline of the Legion was ever present in the precise execution of the items. There was also a *revue* of scenes from the Legion's history, and various other entertainments, which included songs and choruses by a German and by a Russian choir. The Germans continued their part of the show in a "pub" in the town, where I came upon them later in the night, drinking beer and singing songs in harmony, as they do in the Fatherland. They were certainly not "brutalised slaves and convicts, trodden down by savage and tyrannical methods," as some sensational propagandists persist in describing them.

Boring monotony is a far more accurate description of the life of most Legionaries (making roads, and garrisoning far-off posts) rather than perpetual adventures and hairbreadth escapes, such as one reads in most English tales. Anyone who thinks of joining, hoping to find himself for five years the hero of a "Threepenny Thriller," would be sadly disillusioned. It is this monotony which produces *le cafard* (an exasperated state of being "fed up," often bordering on madness).

The best (French) books on the Legion are those by Manue; in English, the only one I have read which gives a fairly accurate

picture of the life is the American book, "The Legion of the Damned," by Doty, which despite its somewhat flamboyant and uncomplimentary title, is a good book; it is, however, a description of active service in Syria, whereas the ordinary everyday life of many thousands of Legionaries would in reality be far too uneventful to weave into a saleable novel. It is the imaginative stories that Legionaries will tell you for the price of a drink that sell, and are "good copy." These stories are almost all at least partially untrue or highly coloured, and often entirely the product of alcohol and a vivid imagination.

One of the secrets of the Legion's success as a corps is the fact that officially no questions are asked of a man who joins, about himself or why he joined. He can tell lies about his age, name and nationality, and, no matter how obvious is the lie, it is hardly ever questioned by any of the authorities, on principle. A certain proportion of the Legionaries find the conditions too hard to be endurable; they cannot *se débrouiller*. They get *le cafard* and try to desert. This usually means the beginning of their real troubles, for if they are caught, fat doses of prison follow. Often attempting deserters are prompted by sheer bravado, as they hope to achieve a reputation among their comrades as dare-devils. One cannot help feeling that they have only themselves to blame if they are caught. After all, no one asked them to enlist. Anyone who is fool enough to engage on such a venture without having some sort of idea of the conditions, and then breaks his contract, can surely be allowed to submit to the consequences without much sympathy.

Why do they enlist? God alone knows (and I mean this literally, for almost everyone carries his reason secretly). One must, of course, never ask them; it would be the very last word in tactlessness. Sometimes, however, they themselves lift the veil. One of them told me quite simply that his wife, after having gone on the streets in Brussels, was now in a brothel in Antwerp; this, he considered, had permanently disarranged his home life, so he had found another in the Legion. He had just finished five years and had signed on. Love affairs that have gone wrong are responsible for producing most of the recruits, but sometimes it is the political situation in their own country that forces these men to start a new life under the French flag.

To a very large number the Legion is the only form of home they have known, and they are happy to have regular meals and to live

and forget in this strange, intense, and rough world of camaraderie, hardship and adventure.

It is the wonderful *esprit de corps* of the Legion which makes this possible. The Legionaries always stand up for one another in a scrap or brawl, no matter what nation they belong to, and it is not worth while other troops or civilians trying to interfere with the Legion when they are out on the spree. Indeed, nationality practically ceases to be ; they live—and die—not for France, but for the Legion.

INDIA—THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL HORIZON.

BY CAPTAIN C. B. BIRDWOOD.

In attempting to survey the Indian political situation, it is impossible for an amateur to present the picture with photographic accuracy. For the serious student, the Government reports are available. But for others, on whom the distracting wealth of available material in the daily press may have a depressing effect, an amateur review will have its advantages.

This paper attempts little more than a very brief précis of the existing and proposed constitutions and the present political reactions in India to the latter.

To follow intelligently the issues of to-day, retrospection is necessary; and at the risk of covering some very elementary ground, we may return to the famous 1917 declaration and from that point note the subsequent constitutional landmarks.

On 20th August 1917, Mr. Montagu declared the policy of his Government to be "the increasing association of Indians in every branch of the administration and the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realisation of responsible Government in India as an integral part of the British Empire." This policy was reaffirmed in the Preamble to the subsequent Government of India Act of 1919. It is to be noted that "responsible Government," a term open to a wide interpretation, was declared the goal. Dominion status had hitherto not been mentioned, though, in the Instrument of Instructions issued to the Governor-General in 1921, responsible Government in British India is the declared policy "to the end that British India may attain its place among the Dominions."

The Government of India Act 1919, gave India a constitution of which the following are the main features :—

The Centre.

1. An Executive, consisting of the Governor-General and his Executive Council of seven members, three of them being Indians.

2. A Legislature, consisting of—
 - (a) A Council of State of 60 members, of whom 34 are elected, the balance being nominated.
 - (b) A Legislative Assembly of 134 members, of whom 105 are elected, the balance being nominated.

The Provinces.

1. Governors, assisted by their Executive Councils of not more than 4 members and 2 ministers each.
2. Provincial Legislative Councils based on elected majorities in the Councils of at least 70 per cent.
3. Dyarchy. A dual system by which the Governor acting with the members of his Executive Council are responsible for "reserved" subjects, while "transferred" subjects are administered by the Governor acting through his ministers, the latter being elected members in the provincial Councils and thus responsible direct to the electorate for the administration of their subjects.*

The Franchise and Electorates.

In each Province, the electorates are designed to give separate representation to the various communities and interests. Thus in Bengal there are no less than seven classes of the electorate. The vexed question of separate as opposed to joint electorates based on a common electoral roll, is more conveniently treated later under consideration of the communal problem. Generally speaking, the franchise is based on a property qualification as tested by a minimum payment of either municipal or income-tax or land revenue.

For the Central Legislature the system is that of direct election. The electorate for the Council of State is on a basis of very restricted franchise designed to give that body a special character representative of men who have a definite stake in the country, such as the big land owners. For this reason, it is more conservative in its politics than its more aggressive sister, the Assembly.

The franchise for the latter is on the same basis as for the provincial Councils. But a higher electoral qualification is required. There are just over a million on the electoral roll for the Legislative Assembly as opposed to some nine millions on the provincial rolls.

* "Transferred" and "Reserved" subjects, see App. II.

Powers of the Legislature.

Under the present constitution, the Legislature's powers are of a very general nature. It can make laws for all subjects of His Majesty within India and for all Indian subjects beyond India. There are, however, certain limitations on the introduction of measures affecting the public revenues, religious matters, the discipline of the Forces and the relations of Government with the States.

The Legislature may not vote on certain classes of expenditure such as—

- (1) Interest on loans.
- (2) The pay of the Civil Service.
- (3) Ecclesiastical, political and defence expenditure.

Defence expenditure includes nearly the whole of the Army Budget with the exception of the charges for the Civil Secretariat of the Army Department. The latter charge was reduced to one rupee by a recent vote of the Assembly and was duly reinstated in the budget by the Governor-General. No vote may be taken on the Army Budget, but it may be discussed, a privilege which is exploited always to its full interpretation.

Whatever sins of commission or omission the Legislature may perpetrate, there is always the corrective power of the Governor-General, who may either pass essential legislation in the case of failure of either Chamber to do so, or who may certify a Bill which the Legislature refuses, if the measure is essential for the "safety, tranquillity or interests of British India."

Legal implications of the present constitutions.

To appreciate the contemplated changes, an understanding of the present constitutional relationship between the Secretary of State, the Indian Executive and the Legislature is essential. In theory the present Government of India is a subordinate Government, wholly responsible to the Secretary of State and the British Parliament. In practice, the direction and control of civil and military Government in India is vested in the Governor-General with his Executive Council. Such direction and control extends to the "reserved" field in Provincial Governments. The part played by the Indian Legislature, therefore, amounts only to a considerable influence on the policy and acts of the Central Executive; and although the Legislature may initiate legislation, only in the field of "transferred" subjects in the Provinces is true responsible Government enjoyed.

From the political confusion of the post-war years, with all its contradictions, among Indians, of vested interests and true patriotic endeavour, and with obstinate conservative opposition to reform among Englishmen alongside a more liberal desire to help, a surprisingly common measure of agreement has emerged on the part played by Dyarchy in the Montagu-Chelmsford Constitution. The reports of the Simon Commission and the Joint Select Committee, and Indian political opinion have all condemned it; so that, whatever the future may hold, we may take it as certain that Dyarchy, in the provincial sphere, is dead. Where major questions are concerned it has been found impossible in practice to separate the conduct of government into two halves. Provincial Councils have tended to forget their direct responsibility for the "transferred" field at the expense of remembering too well their lack of responsibility in the "reserved" field. Divided responsibility in any sphere of administration is a dead alley. And yet Dyarchy has served its purpose. For we may presume that such future extension of responsibility as is to be given to the Indian Legislature, is based on the very real service that Indian Ministers have rendered to the administration of their Provinces in the past twelve years and to the experience they have thereby gained.

The Government of India Act 1919 prescribed that within ten years a Commission should visit India to inquire into the working of the new system of Government and to report whether it should be either extended or restricted. Accordingly the Simon Commission visited India in 1928 and 1929. In India, there was much opposition because no Indian had been appointed to it. Its subsequent report was, therefore, received with vituperative hostility from political India, before its contents could possibly have been read, let alone digested. There followed the three Round Table Conferences, the publication of the White Paper and the appointment of the Joint Select Committee of both Houses of Parliament. For the present purposes, it is sufficient to treat the Report of the Joint Select Committee and the India Bill now before Parliament as one.

The New Constitution.

A very limited study of the proposed constitution leaves the reader with the general impression that, at least, its authors have done their work thoroughly. There is an iconoclastic touch in the proposals, which cut across the present system in a manner which

the most liberal-minded of English statesmen would not have contemplated a generation ago. Any précis of proposals which are covered by a Report of 280 pages and a Bill of 451 clauses, is bound to be unsatisfactory; and one can but ask the reader's indulgence for the inadequacy of the following summary:—

1. *A Federation** of Indian States and the Provinces of British India. Before the Federal Structure can be embodied, two conditions are to be fulfilled:

- (a) The States must nominate members sufficient to occupy half the number of seats in the Council of State.
- (b) The total population of the number of States federating, must represent half the total population of all the States.

2. *The Executive.*

Executive authority is vested in—

- (a) The Governor-General who will be responsible to the Secretary of State for the administration of defence, external affairs and ecclesiastical matters. For this task, the Governor-General is to be assisted by three Counsellors.
- (b) A Council of Ministers not exceeding ten, appointed by the Governor-General from elected Indian members of the Legislature who are likely to command the Legislature's confidence.

3. *The Legislature.*

- (a) A Council of State of 260 members, of whom 150 will be representatives of British India, 100 will be appointed by the States and ten will be nominated by the Governor-General.

4. *In the Provinces.*†

- (a) An Executive consisting of the Governor himself in whom is vested the whole executive power and authority of the Province, aided and advised by a Council of Ministers. The latter to be elected members of the Provincial Legislature.

* For Federal and Provincial subjects, see App. II.

† The scheme provides for 11 Governor's provinces adding Sind and Orissa and separating Burma.

- (b) In the case of Bengal, Bombay, Madras, the United Provinces and Bihar, a bicameral Legislature consisting of the Governor, a Legislative Council and an Assembly. In the case of other Provinces, a unicameral Legislature consisting of the Governor and a Legislative Assembly.

5. *Provincial autonomy*,* and the end of Dyarchy, with an Executive responsible to the electorate for advising the Governor over practically the whole of the provincial sphere, including "Law and Order." In order to ensure that the discipline and impartiality of the Police Force may not be undermined by political influence, special "Police Rules" are to be formulated.

6. *Special responsibilities of the Governor-General.*

These are the much criticized safeguards and consist of—

- (a) The prevention of any grave menace to the peace or tranquillity of India.
- (b) Safeguarding the financial stability and credit of the Federal Government.
- (c) Safeguarding the legitimate interests of minorities.
- (d) Securing the rights of the Public services and safeguarding their legitimate interests.
- (e) The necessary executive action to secure the prevention of discrimination against British subjects.
- (f) The prevention of action which would subject goods from the United Kingdom or Burma to discriminatory or penal treatment.
- (g) The protection of the rights of any Indian State.
- (h) Securing that the discharge of his functions when acting in his discretion or exercising his individual judgment in the matter of his special responsibilities, is not prejudiced by any action taken with respect to any other matter.

* The J. P. C. Report defines Provincial autonomy as the Scheme whereby each of the Governor's Provinces will possess an Executive and a Legislature having exclusive authority within the province in a precisely defined sphere and in that sphere broadly free from control by the Central Government.

7. *The Federal Court.**

The establishment of a Federal Court for the general interpretation of the Constitution and for the determination of disputes between—

- (a) The Federation and either a Province or a State.
- (b) Two Provinces or two States, or a Province and a State.

8. *The Reserve Bank.*

The establishment of a Reserve Bank to control the credit mechanism of the country. The Bank to be free from political influence and to be in successful operation before the Constitutional changes at the centre take place.

9. *The Franchise and Electorate.*

- (a) A greatly enlarged electorate of 29 millions; the vote extended to women and to 10 per cent. of the depressed classes. The present property qualifications remain to which are added educational qualifications.
- (b) The substitution of the indirect system of election to the Central Legislature in place of the direct system.

General Impressions.

To the layman, intelligent comment on the changes is fraught with difficulty. There are so many angles from which the picture may be viewed. Proposals have followed each other with bewildering disparity. Thus in the matter of the franchise system, the Simon Committee recommended indirect election, the White Paper was for direct election and the Joint Parliamentary Committee and the Bill revert to the indirect method. The increased electorate alone must mean a change, for better or worse, the effect of which cannot be gauged by a mere mental note of the figures involved. It is difficult to realise that one in every ten we see in the bazars and fields of India will have the vote. In England die-hard opinion has criticized the transfer of Law and Order in the Provinces. But it is difficult, after reading the well-balanced argument of the Joint Select Committee, not to agree with their verdict that responsible Self-Government without the transfer of the power to implement their own laws and control the Police, would be a poor form of responsibility to offer the Provinces.

* The Federal Court is not for the interpretation of Acts passed by the Federal Legislature.

The heart of the whole structure, the Federal conception, has grown in a manner that illustrates only too forcibly the difficulties which lie ahead. The Simon Committee did but touch on Federation as the goal of a distant future. In 1930, previous to the first Round Table Conference, under the suave spell of Pandit Malaviya and Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, the Princes were persuaded that in Federation lay the safe guarantee of their rights and privileges for many years to come. By direct association with Government at the centre, they could doubly secure their treaties and independence. At the time, Civil disobedience was at its height and there were symptoms of a genuine abdication of British power. In the obscurity that lay ahead, it would be wise to come to terms with Congress and political India.

The Indian Liberals were converted with difficulty in time for the opening session of the Conference. Finally British statesmen accepted the Federal idea. At the second Round Table Conference the National Government sought to postpone Federation, which they visualized as following Provincial autonomy at a later date. In face of the united opposition of the British Indian delegation including Mr. Gandhi and Pandit Malaviya, the Cabinet yielded and Provincial autonomy and the Federation were to be ushered in as one scheme in one Bill.

Compare this with the situation to-day. In Bombay the Princes have declared that "The scheme of Federation as adumbrated in the Government of India Bill and the Instruments of Accession are unacceptable to us without vital modifications."* Paradoxically in England, the National Government have now captured the first enthusiasm for Federation which formerly was the monopoly of the Princes and Politicians of India, while Pandit Malaviya seems to have forgotten Federation and remembers only the alleged injustice of the Communal Award. The story would be humorous, if it did not token an inconsistency and irresponsibility which does not promise well for the future.

Passing from the Federation, to matters of more detail, it seems generally to have escaped attention that Dyarchy has died in the Provinces only to be reborn at the centre; and all the invective which previously has been lavished on its operation in one sphere, may now legitimately be transferred to another. The Counsellors in

* (These pseudo-legal difficulties have now been overcome.—Ed.)

their administration of the three "Reserved" subjects are divorced from the ministry and although the Governor-General will undoubtedly summon Counsellors on occasions to the deliberations of his Ministers, the fact remains that the machine as a whole functions in two halves.

Political India, however, is more concerned to condemn the entire scheme than to waste its time on technical details; and the administrative defects of a dyarchical system pass without criticism, while we may be certain that unremitting condemnation of the safeguards will continue to the end; and here we should conveniently turn to the Indian side of the picture and attempt an analysis of the reactions of the various parties to the new proposals.*

Indian Political opinion.

The attitude of the Liberal party to the new Constitution is confused. Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru is of the opinion that, on the whole, the proposals represent an advance on the present position and he is for making the most of a bad business. Mr. Sastri admits that as a matter of academic comparison, this may be true. But he contends that the Constitution is so mutilated by the safeguards and reservations as to discount the value of any gain. Mr. Sastri's opposition has resulted in a measure of co-operation between Liberals and the Congress. The Liberal Federation has passed a resolution to the effect that it "does not want any legislation based upon the Report of the Joint Select Committee."

The Independent Party, through its spokesman Mr. Jinnah, objects to second Chambers in the Provinces and to the provisions relating to Police Rules and the Secret and Intelligence Departments, "which render real control and responsibility of Executive and Legislature ineffective." Mr. Jinnah, however, very definitely accepts the Communal Award. The party's attitude is that of critical acceptance of the proposed Provincial Constitution. It does not accept Federation with the States and advocates a British Indian Federation of the Provinces only. Mr. Jinnah has been consistent throughout in discarding an All-India Federation. But it is by no means confirmed that his views are shared by all of his party.

As is to be expected, Congress declare their complete rejection of the whole business though, within the Assembly, they have remained

* An attempt to catalogue the political parties is made in Appendix I.

neutral on the question of the Communal Award. Their constructive proposals have been limited to a demand for the formation of "a Constituent Assembly" consisting of delegates elected on the basis of universal franchise* which body is to work out a new Constitution for India. This proposal, however, has not been pressed lately. In the Council of State Rai Bahadur Lala Ram Saran Das, the leader of the Progressive party, has insisted that he prefers the existing Constitution, that the Memorandum of the British-Indian delegation to the Round Table Conference has been ignored and the time and efforts of the delegates wasted. Thus, if the India Bill had to await the declared good-will of political India, it is evident that the new Constitution would never see the light of day. But it has to be remembered that the Communal problem pervades every aspect of Indian life, including the political arena; and that, for this reason, opposition to or support of Government from any particular quarter is but a symptom of the reaction of those concerned to the Communal Award.

The Communal Problem.

The story of communal representation may be conveniently traced from the agreement known as the "Lucknow Pact." The principle of separate communal electorates had already been recognised in the Morley-Minto reforms. In October 1916, it received fresh impetus when Congress and the All-India Muslim League, both holding their Annual Conference of that year in Lucknow, came to an agreement regarding the proportion of Mohammadan seats in the Imperial Legislative Council of that time. The agreement subsequently formed the basis of Mohammadan representation embodied in the Montagu-Chelmsford Constitution of to-day.

At the Round Table Conference of 1932, in the absence of any agreement between the Indian representatives on the question of separate electorates and the distribution of seats, the Prime Minister took it upon himself to provide his own solution, having previously obtained a promise of consent from the parties concerned. It is round this settlement known as "the Communal Award" that the various party leaders have concentrated their vituperation.

The arrangements under the award by which the Depressed Classes received special representation, stirred the conscience of Mr. Gandhi

* B. Rajendra Prasad in the *Manchester Guardian*.

who held that an artificial barrier within the Hindu community had thereby been erected. His subsequent "fast into death" to obtain agreement between the two elements was derided by hard-headed Westerners as a touch of theatrical madness. Nevertheless, it had the desired effect and Mr. Gandhi's "Poona Pact" was embodied within the Communal Award.

At the moment, the attitude to the Communal Award is confused. Outside the Assembly, Pandit Malaviya has vehemently declared that there can be no Swaraj based on separate electorates, that the award gives excessive representation to Muslims and that it is a device of British statesmen to create obstacles to Indian unity. Anti-Communal Award days have been organised by the Hindu Sabha in Calcutta and Lahore. In the Punjab, the Sikh community further complicate the issue and Master Tara Singh has seen in the Award, the dawn of a Muslim "Raj" in that Province. The Sikhs, he declares, would "sacrifice their lives" to have the Award rejected.

Within the Assembly, efforts were made by Mr. Jinnah representing Muslim opinion, to come to terms with the Congress Parliamentary party, and in debate Mr. Jinnah's support of the Award was not opposed by Congress, whose attitude of neutrality incensed the Malaviya die-hards in the country. Private efforts in Delhi to negotiate an alternative to the Award were, however, completely unsuccessful; and Mr. Jinnah's talks with Babu Rajendra Prasad, the Congress President, broke down, after they had aroused the suspicions of Mr. Jinnah's own followers, who saw in the negotiations a trap to deprive Muslims of the position they hold under the Award. From the beginning, there was considerable doubt as to the objects both sides were striving to attain. Thus, while Congress leaders were concerned to substitute joint for separate electorates, the Muslim attitude throughout has assumed separate electorates and the Award itself as the basis of discussion. The only way to pave the way to joint-electoraltes is for Congress first to win the Muslim minority by unqualified acceptance of the Communal Award. The Congress attitude of neutrality to the Communal Award within the Assembly, which, at its face value, is a healthy omen, was later revealed as the result of the unexpected decision of the Government official *bloc* to support the Award. Congress, realizing they were unable to defeat the combined vote of Government and the Independents, refrained from voting.

In all this talk, there is only too evident, a complete lack of the appreciation of realities. Negotiations are based always on a spirit of manœuvre and counter-manœuvre rather than on any passionate realization of the criminal folly of endless schism and internecine communal strife. That Mr. Jinnah at least realises this, is evident from his advice to his Muslim colleagues, recently in Delhi, when he declared "the problem of all problems, the question of all questions is this : so long as Hindus and Mohammadans are not united, let me tell you that there is no hope for India and we shall both remain the slaves of foreign domination."

But whatever limitations the Communal problem may place on constitutional advance, it is only wise to appreciate the Bill's omissions from the Indian point of view. We have touched on the Communal Award and on some features that are objectionable to the Independents and on the inevitable hostility of Congress.

In very general terms, Indians have also criticized—

- (a) The omission of any mention of "Dominion status" in the Bill.
- (b) The safeguards.

Dominion Status.

The cry for Dominion Status first came from Congress in 1928, previous to the visit of the Simon Commission. It took the form of an ultimatum to Government, demanding complete Dominion Status by January 1st, 1930. In October, 1929, two months before the ultimatum was due to expire, Lord Irwin made his famous declaration, and announced the intention to hold a Round Table Conference.

A week before their ultimatum expired, Congress informed the Viceroy that the object of the Conference must be not to discuss whether Dominion Status should be granted, but the method of putting it into effect. The Government were thus in the position formerly adopted by moderate Indian opinion, while Congress now adopted complete Independence as the goal.

Meanwhile, the Report of the Statutory Commission was published and made no mention of Dominion Status. Nevertheless, a pledge had been given, so that when the Preamble to the new Government of India Bill again made no reference to Dominion Status, Indian politicians were quick to challenge the omission. In the House of Commons the excuse was given that once the actual words were put

into a Preamble, there would follow a legal wrangle as to their exact interpretation, that it was difficult to frame suitable language in regard to the nature of Dominion Status it was intended to confer, and that it would be valid only so long as a Government was in power which was prepared to support continuity of policy.

At the time of Lord Irwin's announcement, the recognised definition of Dominion Status was that of the Imperial Conference of 1926 under the chairmanship of Lord Balfour. This defines the Constitution in the following terms : "Great Britain and the Dominions are autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate to one another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations." In 1930, the Statute of Westminster did little else but add weight to this pronouncement and give a more concrete form to an Empire Constitution that was already defined. Whether or not those in authority had this definition in mind when the 1929 declaration was made, the issue has since been put beyond doubt by Sir Samuel Hoare and Sir Thomas Inskip, the latter having stated that it is the status adumbrated in the 1926 Conference which is intended for India's goal and that the day of its fulfilment will be "one of the proudest in the annals of England."

If this be the case, it is difficult to understand why suitable language could not have been framed in the Preamble as to the nature of the status for India.* If it is to be full Dominion Status, as accepted by the partners in the British Empire, it would seem impossible to qualify such status as to its nature. So far as India is concerned, when the time comes to doubt this partnership, the present Bill will be a back number and a new generation will be holding the baby.

The Safeguards.

These have been assailed by all shades of Indian political opinion. The phrases "individual judgment" and "in his discretion," which govern the Governor-General's application of his powers, have particularly rankled ; and indeed, India's case is based purely on considerations of pride. Without doubting the need of securing such things as the rights of the Public services, it does not seem to have been considered that Indians in the position of executive authority, will

* The new Instrument of Instructions to the Governor-General concludes as follows : "Finally it is our will and pleasure that our Governor-General should so exercise the trust which we have reposed in him that the partnership between India and the United Kingdom within our Empire may be furthered to the end that India may take its due place among our Dominions."

depend on the stability of the Constitution for the safety of their own salaries and that, for this reason alone, it is unlikely that they would initiate any spectacular or revolutionary changes. It is, therefore, possibly unfortunate that the I's have been dotted and the T's crossed quite so forcibly in the framing of the safeguards.

In their criticism of the commercial safeguards, however, Indian opinion has run amok. These are designed not to discriminate against India but to prevent India discriminating against England.

Some Conclusions and the Future.

After a string of platitudes, a politician once concluded an eagerly awaited pronouncement with the words "The future is pregnant with possibility!" and this we may justifiably apply to the situation to-day.

Much depends on the attitude of the Princes on the one hand, and Congress on the other. In the past, the latter's only constructive contribution has been the Lucknow Pact. They won the recent elections because they ingeniously avoided formulating a policy. They have purposely not committed themselves to support Mr. Gandhi's Harijan movement for fear of losing the orthodox Hindu vote; while their neutrality over the Communal Award has served to keep them in the good books of a section of Muslim opinion. There could be no more striking tribute to the barrenness of Congress policy since the war than Mr. X's proscribed book "The Indian Struggle, 1920—1934." In it we read a tale of wasted energy and futile inconsistency of attempts to wreck the Constitution first from within, then from without. Under the leadership of Mr. C. R. Das there was, for a time, hope of building a virile and constructive opposition. But Das died and, to quote the author, "The combination of political boss and world leader in Mr. Gandhi fixed upon Congress an aspect of futility in the political field." The new Bill will be passed before Christmas and so far as Provincial Autonomy is concerned, the new Constitution may well be functioning by the end of 1936. In several of the Provinces Congress will undoubtedly be in control, represented in the Provincial ministries, and responsible over the whole Provincial field including Law and Order. It may then be that with new opportunity and real responsibility there will develop a healthy regard for the details and difficulties of day to day administration. This, at least, has been the experience of England in a similar situation.

The Princes have, from the beginning, claimed the right to review the Bill as a whole before committing themselves to Federal

accession. Having seen the Bill, they have, in no uncertain terms, registered their disapproval. If sufficient numbers accede, the Central Constitution will be embodied. Congress may then capture such power at the centre as is offered and they may then initiate an attempt to secede from the Empire. Under full Dominion Status South Africa has framed an Act of Sovereign Independence under the Crown which has not been challenged by Britain; and the Union Prime Minister has asserted that the Union may now secede at its pleasure. The position in India is, however, safeguarded by Clause 110 of the new Bill which prevents the Legislature from altering the Constitution.

If, as appears more probable, the Princes refuse to accede, the Federal Scheme falls to the ground and only such clauses of the Bill as relate to the Provincial Constitution will stand.

Lord Wolmer has mooted "an Advisory Council of Greater India." Others have suggested a Federation of the Provinces exclusive of the States. But it has been rightly pointed out that such a structure would be analogous to Ireland which now enjoys all the evils of divided control.

In the event of the Princes wrecking the Central Scheme, one of two things may happen.

The Indian Intelligentsia, recognizing their opportunity, may desert the Central Legislature and grasp power in the Provinces, a course which all with the interests of India at heart would welcome; alternatively, if political India was suddenly to become alive to the fact that there was to be no change at the centre, however much they may now assert their preference for the existing Constitution, we might well expect a revulsion of feeling and a recrudescence of Civil Disobedience and terrorism on a scale not hitherto contemplated.

That some one has faith in the future is evident from the rush to buy shares in the Reserve Bank.

Taking the broad view, it is impossible to believe that the march of democracy elsewhere in the world will not have its repercussions sooner or later in India. For a time, pleading the protection of out-of-date treaties, the States may stay the hands of meddling democracy from encroaching on their preserves. But eventually, perhaps in another generation, whether by revolution or evolution, a new—may we dare hope, better—era may dawn for India.

APPENDIX I.

The Indian Political and Religious Organizations.

1. *The Independent Party.*—Leader, Mr. M. A. Jinnah.

Holds the balance of power in the Assembly as between Government and Congress.

2. *The National Liberal Federation.*

Leaders	..	{	Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru.
			Mr. V. S. Sastri.
			Sir Chimanlal Setalvad.
			Sir Phiroze Sethna.
			Mr. C. Y. Chintamani.
			Mr. N. M. Joshi.

Represents the more sober shades of political opinion though it has frequently joined hands with Congress in the past, in opposition to Government.

3. *The Indian National Congress.*

President	..	{	Babu Rajendra Prasad.
			Secretary: Vallabbhai Patel.

(a) *The Congress Parliamentary Party.*

Leader: Mr. Bhulabhai Desai.

(b) *The Congress Nationalist Party.*

Leaders:	..	{	(In the Assembly) Mr. M. S. Aney.
			(Outside the Assembly) Pt. M. Malaviya.
			Bitterly opposes Communal Award.

(c) *The Congress Socialist Party.*

Leaders	..	{	Mr. Subhas Chandra Bose.
			Pandit Jawahir Lal Nehru.

An extremist organization which stands for a communist dictatorship and economic social planning after the Russian model. Regards the normal activities of Congress as out-of-date.

4. *The All-India Muslim League.*

President.—Mr. M. A. Jinnah.

A religious-political organization founded in 1906 to represent Muslim interests throughout India.

5. *The All-India Muslim Conference.*

An organization which broke away from the Muslim League over the question of co-operation with the Simon Commission. Efforts to unify the League and the Conference, notably under the Aga Khan, have failed.

6. *The Hindu Mahasabha.*

President.—Bhai Parmanand.

The Official Organization of orthodox Hindu opinion. Has refused to take part in the Congress-Jinnah negotiations.

APPENDIX II.

1. *Under the present Constitution.*

(In the Provinces.)

“ Transferred ” subjects.

Local Self-Government.
 Public Health.
 Education.
 Public Works.
 Agriculture.
 Excise.
 Co-operative Societies.

“ Reserved ” subjects.

Administration of Justice.
 Police.
 Land Revenue.
 Provincial Revenue.
 Irrigation.
 Industries.
 Control of Public services within
 the Province.

2. *Under the new Constitution.**“ Federal ” subjects.*

The Defence Forces.
 Ecclesiastical affairs.
 External affairs.
 Shipping.
 Railways.
 Broadcasting.
 Posts and Telegraphs.
 Currency.
 Air Navigation.
 Income-tax.

“ Provincial ” subjects.

Local Self-Government.
 Public Health.
 Education.
 Public Works.
 Agriculture.
 Land Revenue.
 Administration of Justice.
 Police.
 Provincial surcharges on income-
 tax.

There is also a “ concurrent ” list of subjects which cover inevitable risks of overlapping between the Federal and Provincial Lists.

In such cases, where doubt arises, the Governor-General acting in his discretion is to define the field of responsibility.

NOTE.—Only the more important subjects are enumerated.

THE BATTLE OF SEDGEMOOR: ANOTHER VERSION

By "HAZARA."

In an article published in the January number of the Journal, describing the rebellion of the Duke of Monmouth in 1685, an account was given of the battle of Sedgemoor. The author followed the conventional story of the battle, a story which has the support of many historians ranging from Lord Wolseley in his *Life of Marlborough* to Sir Arthur Conan Doyle in his book "*Micah Clarke*." Briefly, this version of the story of the battle is that the night march of the rebel army against the Royal position failed owing to the unexpected presence of a serious obstacle, the Bussex rhine, which prevented the attackers from coming to grips with the Royal troops. Unable to cross this obstacle, the rebels were forced to remain within musket shot of their opponents till daylight allowed the Royal army to destroy them.

It is true that this story depicts in an admirable manner the forces of nature fighting for the King against his traitorous enemies, and it is perhaps the most likely tale to be told by the rebels to excuse their defeat; but for many years it has not satisfied a local antiquary, Mr. Maurice Page of Bridgwater, whose interesting booklet on the battle provides another explanation of the disaster. The present writer, also, has examined the ground in some detail, both as it is to-day, and, with the aid of old maps and the extremely accurate sketches made by Mr. Dummer of the Artillery who was present at the battle, as it was in the seventeenth century. As the battle provides an excellent example of an intricate night operation the following account may be of interest.

The chief reasons for suspecting the accuracy of what has been called above the conventional version, are as follows:—

1. The Duke of Monmouth, whatever his failings, was a good soldier. The tactics of the skirmish at Philip's Norton, to say nothing of his soldiering in earlier years on the Continent, when he and Churchill served together under Turenne, reveal him as no incompetent commander on the battlefield. It is surely unlikely that he would have led his army on a night march with the intention of delivering a night attack without discovering that a serious obstacle lay between his forming up place and the enemy's position.

2. The rebel army contained many men from this part of Somerset. The Bussex rhine can hardly have been unknown to them. It was indeed one of the mouths of the river Cary before the Somerset Drainage Board constructed the orderly system of rhines which now drain the moor. The guide, also, who volunteered to show the way over the moor lived within a mile or two of it and must have been well acquainted with its presence and nature. During the careful discussion of the route which must have taken place between Monmouth and the guide, it seems incredible that such a feature can have been ignored.
3. Further, when Monmouth had decided that a night operation might well be feasible, he called a council of war and asked his subordinates whether in their opinion such an attack was likely to succeed. Taking into account the lax discipline which was reported to exist in the Royal army, they replied that the attack was feasible provided that the enemy was not entrenched. The guide was therefore sent back to Chedzoy to discover if any entrenchments had been constructed. He made a careful reconnaissance and reported that there were none.
4. Finally, it would appear from many accounts that the Bussex rhine was no obstacle to infantry at all. For the Royal foot had no difficulty in crossing it when and where they liked, and did so as soon as the order to attack was received. That it was an obstacle to cavalry is more likely, but there were on either flank of the Royal position two crossings or plungeons, as they were called, by which the Royal cavalry crossed to envelop the rebels.

On the other hand, as Wolseley points out in his *Life of Marlborough*, an obstacle which would seriously impede an army might not seem to be one to a civilian who was accustomed to cross it at certain well-known places without giving the matter much thought. Even so it hardly seems possible that after the second reconnaissance, made particularly to ascertain whether the Royal army was entrenched, no mention was made of the Bussex rhine.

The most likely conclusion is that the Bussex rhine was no serious obstacle to infantry, but that it was so to cavalry; and that Monmouth

was aware of its existence and took it into account in making his plan.

Assuming then, that this was the case, we may reconstruct the events of the 5th July as follows. The rebel force had arrived in Bridgwater on 3rd July. On the 5th the Royal army, marching from Somerton, arrived at Weston Zoyland. Monmouth was at first inclined to move once more towards Bristol and the North, but the arrival of a local inhabitant who offered to show a way over the moor by which the Royal army could be attacked caused him to change his mind. This guide was a servant who had been sent to Monmouth by his master. The latter, who lived near Weston Zoyland, had examined the Royal camp in some detail and was able to give an accurate account of the disposition of the force. The infantry were in bivouac to the North of the village; the cavalry were in the village itself; and the artillery, much exhausted by the infamous roads and by far the last of the force to arrive, were parked on the left flank of the infantry. The militia, being untrustworthy, were left in rear in the village of Middlezoy some two miles from Weston.

So much was reported by the volunteer guide. What were not completely known were the arrangements Feversham would make for the protection of his force during the night. These will be explained later. The guide did, however, also report that a satisfactory watch was not being kept and that most of the Royal troops had been drinking heavily. It was this fact, coupled with the wide dispersion of the Royal bivouacs, which had suggested to Monmouth that a night attack had a good prospect of success.

The guide proposed that the rebel army should move by night along the route marked on the sketch map. It was to leave Bridgwater by the Bristol road, turn off down Bradney Lane, and, after negotiating about a mile and a half of droves (a drovs being an indifferent unmetalled track over the moor, frequently half flooded) it was to strike straight across the moor to Weston. Two serious obstacles would be encountered in the first part of the march, the Black Ditch and the Langmoor rhine, but the guide was confident that he could find the crossings over both of them. That over the Langmoor rhine was marked by a large boulder, the Langmoor stone, but it was unpleasantly close to Chedzoy village in which the Royal cavalry had been reconnoitring since the arrival of the army.

Once the force was safely over the Langmoor rhine there remained only the Bussex rhine between them and their enemy. If we assume that Monmouth and the guide were both fully aware of the existence of this partial obstacle, we can reasonably suggest the following plan for the final assault. The cavalry could cross the rhine only by the plungeons. Therefore it was essential that as soon as the Langmoor rhine was crossed the cavalry should push on as rapidly as possible to seize one or both of these crossings before they could be held by the enemy. The Upper plungeon was the one less likely to be guarded, and it was by this that the cavalry were to cross. Once over the rhine they were to attack the flanks and rear of the Royal foot while the infantry attacked them in front. That it was Monmouth's intention that his cavalry should move round the flank of the Royal position and spread confusion in the bivouacs and billets in rear is shown by his exultant remark, "We shall have no more to do than to lock-up the stable-doors and seize the troopers in their beds."

Such, it is suggested, was Monmouth's plan. It depended for its success on the Royal force being unaware of the approach of the rebels, who were, after all, undertaking an extremely daring and unexpected operation, and on the possibility of the plungeons not being held satisfactorily. It remains to show how the plan failed and why.

It has been remarked above that exact information as to the protective detachments of the Royal army was not forthcoming. They were in fact as follows. Three cavalry patrols were sent out. One was to establish a standing patrol on Knowle hill overlooking the Bristol road, for Feversham suspected that Monmouth might try to evade him and slip away towards the North. The second was to find a standing patrol in Chedzoy village, and the third was to guard the road Weston—Bridgwater which was blocked. There was also an "outguard of foot" posted near the road some little distance from Weston. An inlying piquet of 100 men of Dumbarton's regiment was also detailed. The plungeons over the Bussex rhine were unguarded.

Let us now see what actually happened during the night of 5-6th July. The rebel army set out a little before midnight, and it is worth noticing what good march discipline must have been kept by the very imperfectly trained troops. For some quite inexplicable reason the cavalry patrol on Knowle hill entirely failed to discover the

approach of Monmouth's army, in spite of the fact that the heavy baggage wagons which could not cross the moor were parked under their noses. Some time after the army had passed, the patrol actually moved down the road towards Bridgwater and discovered on nearing the town that the whole rebel army was gone. They then galloped back to Weston by the Southern road and arrived somewhat late for the battle.

One of his patrols, and one which might reasonably have been expected to do so, had failed to give Feversham warning of the approach of the rebels. Was the other to be more successful?

The night march, especially for such untrained troops as Monmouth's, must have been a considerable feat. They passed down Bradney Lane, making a detour to avoid a loyal farmer's house, and reached the end of the drove in good time. They then wheeled to the right and struck off over the open moor. The Black Ditch was crossed, and the guide headed for the Langmoor stone. In his anxiety to avoid the Royal cavalry in Chedzoy and confused no doubt by the mist which had risen, the guide missed the crossing. After some delay he returned from a rapid reconnaissance and led the force to the right spot. Realising the Royal dispositions we can see that this was the real danger point. The rebel force was crossing a considerable watercourse within a few hundred yards of a Royal patrol. It is easy to imagine the tension of those moments. Grey's cavalry splashed their way over the rhine, but still no sound was heard from the enemy. The infantry began to cross. Suddenly a single pistol shot rang out over the moor.

Some have suggested that this shot was the work of a traitor, Captain Hucker of Grey's horse. Hucker, when tried later by Jeffreys, pleaded this treachery in mitigation of his crime. Surely a more likely explanation is that the shot was fired by a sentry of the patrol in Chedzoy. There is no doubt that the patrol did discover the presence of the rebels at this moment, for its commander sent an orderly back to Weston to warn the sleeping force. The trooper rode up to the Northern bank of the Bussex rhine and shouted to all the sentries in turn till the whole force was roused.

Even now there was still a chance that the rebels might succeed. If Grey's cavalry could seize the plungeon over the rhine it would be possible for them to cross and carry out their task against the

Royal flank and rear. Everything depended on the leadership of the half-trained rebel cavalry. Unfortunately they bore too much to their right and struck the rhine midway between the two plunges. A wheel to their left upstream and a rapid search for the crossing, which was in reality so near, and they would have been across. But at this point disaster overtook them. Straight to their front they could see a twinkling mass of lights which they took to be the lights of Weston Zoyland village. Thinking they were too far to their left they turned to the right along the bank of the rhine. In fact the lights were the slow matches of Dumbarton's regiment, the only Royal troops still armed with the matchlock, and almost immediately their sentries shouted their challenge across the rhine :—

“ Whom are you for ? ”

“ The King,” came the rebels' answer.

“ Which King ? ”


“ King Monmouth and God with us ” (the rebel countersign).


“ Take this with you then,” was the reply and a volley raked the wavering squadrons which broke and stampeded to the rear spreading confusion throughout the whole force.

The rest of the story is well-known. Surprise had been lost and the infantry, many armed only with scythes and home-made pikes, could only wait there on the moor till they were surrounded and destroyed. The plan had failed, though like many another it had failed by a small margin. The plan was undoubtedly complicated and would have tried the capacity of even the best regular troops ; but it was not quite so bad as most historians have made out and it was not founded on complete ignorance of the existence of an obstacle. Though complicated it was not impossible, and, given a more competent leader than Grey, the cavalry might well have crossed the rhine as they were intended to.

Whether the rebels would have won the battle if their cavalry had succeeded in crossing the Rhine and interposing themselves between the Royal foot and their cavalry in rear it is impossible to say. Many, remembering the presence of Colonel Churchill in the Royal army, will not admit the possibility. It is fair to conclude, however, that the famous night attack was a better planned operation than is usually admitted, and it is certain that it was the only chance which Monmouth was likely to find of defeating the Royal army.

SKETCH MAP ILLUSTRATING THE NIGHT MARCH OF THE DUKE OF MONMOUTH 5th JULY 1685.





EDUCATION FOR ALL.

By *a. p. s. c. C. O.*

There has never been a time when the importance of good staff work and good relations between Staff and units has been more essential. Our army is dwindling in size; in India it is continually being called upon to perform most unpleasant duties, often at most unpleasant times of the year; the cadre of officers of the Indian Army is under strength and is likely to be considerably more so in the near future and yet the same standard of efficiency is necessary. At the same time the Staff cannot be reduced beyond a certain limit and there seems little doubt that this limit has been nearly, if not actually, reached. Some will say that it has been exceeded, hence any reduction of officers is bound to take place at the expense of units, active and regular units.

With the cadre of Staff and units at a minimum, it is essential for the efficiency of the latter that the most adequate methods are in force to maintain the highest standard of the former. The writer has heard a good deal of anti-staff talk lately, some merely due to prejudice or ignorance, but a fair amount founded on fact. It is essential that this latter is made impossible. How? I know that the subject is being continually discussed and that the consensus of opinion is that the present system is the best for the time being, but—is it? Are the most suitable officers passed into and out of the Staff Colleges? Let us consider the facts.

Every officer must qualify at a written examination in order to reach the Staff College. Written examinations are absolutely fair and valuable as far as they go. They ensure candidates working for them, a very sound necessity; they insist on a decisive answer to each question; they insist on that most important essential in a staff officer or good higher commander, the ability to put his thoughts and orders down clearly on paper for another to read.

But they cannot take into account the essential qualities of character and personality, both of increasing importance as higher appointments are taken up. I admit that these qualities are supposed to be considered when C. Os. are selecting officers for the Staff College list, but C. Os. are human, perhaps too much so, and there is no doubt that some do not give as much attention to these points

as they should. It is difficult to discourage a keen officer and the writer has known cases where a refusal to allow an officer to try for the Staff College has been looked upon as an adverse report. All very reprehensible, but facts remain. And the result is a case of "house full" as regards the examination. It means so much competition that a form of slavery exists, lasting sometimes for years. And the slave market is overstocked. Clever students at examinations get in and most of them manage to get out, but what of the rest?

It is a tragic picture. Strong men, proved as leaders in the field or at the "bar," lose their qualities of leadership and become disappointed, cynical middle-pieces; erstwhile good soldiers come on to parade with a vacant and hunted look, having been working at grand strategy or imperial air routes since 4-0 a. m., and are entirely useless at the job for which they are paid and for which their C. O. holds them responsible, with the result that other officers have to do their work; homes are wrecked; engagements are broken off; for who wants to maintain marital relations with a semi-human compendium of Imperial geography, the Great War and the Penal Code?; human beings become broken robots. Some of these shattered relics may gradually regain their perspective, some even may eventually pass into the Staff College, but they will have lost much of their buoyancy and self-confidence and is it worth it for them, and does the Army gain? Many wise ones say "no" and live cheerful, useful lives in consequence, but the Army loses their full services. I agree that working in order to better oneself and to "try, try and try again," brings out the quality of perseverance from the point of view of the individual, but does it help the State?

What is the solution? Some form of efficiency test is essential over and above pure selection, even if all students were selected; and how better than by an impartial written examination which at least insists on a certain standard of education and makes candidates work? Entry by nomination immediately raises the question of favouritism. It was possible and right just after the war, but wars to prove merit are rare.

There are two suggested alternatives. The first may be considered half-way, but has its points. They are discussed below.

First alternative. No officer to be considered for staff employment, namely, for employment which results at once in his dealing

with and often ordering the movements of several units until he has shewn himself of a very high order as a regimental officer who is keen on his unit and his men and understands their needs. Such officers, I am not going into details of ages, etc., will be recommended for appointment to junior staff billets. Any officer who has successfully acted as Adjutant in his unit and undergone a few periods of manœuvre training will be fit in a short time to be a Staff Captain or G. S. O.3, as actually is sometimes the case now.

Such officers as have successfully held these appointments will be permitted to take a qualifying examination a limited number of times and successful candidates will be nominated by a selection board on their nameless reports. Those who are unsuccessful, either through failure to pass the examination or through not having been selected (of which there will be a negligible quantity) will be allowed to carry the letters "s. q." after their names as an additional qualification for future employment.

This proposal will at least ensure that no officer is allowed to take the examination until he has shewn himself practically suitable as a leader and a staff officer.

It may be contended that this proposal will raise the age of staff college candidates. I hope it does. The present age-limit is too young if the Staff College syllabus is meant to include training for higher command. What guarantee is there that an officer who was lucky enough to undergo the two years training at 29 or 33 will be fit as regards character or up-to-date in his knowledge at 43 or 50? For the staff college course, though excellent in itself, is largely academic and little of it is of practical use in time of peace. In itself it does not build character, other than the self-confidence produced by knowledge, and it is character which is most required by senior officers. Hence a staff college training at 34 to 38 is considered of more value than from 27 to 34, always remembering that, under the proposed scheme, students will have shewn themselves fit for junior staff appointments by having successfully held them.

The second proposal, I fear, will be turned down with contumely, by the M. A. G. if by no one else.

I want every officer in the Army to undergo a course of command and staff duties between the age of 26 and 30. The length of the

course could be four months (still counting as temporary duty for purposes of allowances) and the syllabus would include problems including command of a small mixed force, staff duties for this force and the practical application of our fire support weapons of all "arms." Candidates to attend the Staff College proper would be selected from the most successful officers at the junior college.

There are many objections to this proposal as is realised. Expense, an extra course; officers away from their units still more; why cannot C. Os. teach their officers up to a sufficient standard and so on. But,—the correct training of the officer is of a value which cannot allow expense to interfere if the money is considered to be necessary.

It is held that such a course will be of the greatest value to every officer and to his unit. It will broaden the outlook of an officer who is not likely to serve outside his unit in the ordinary course of events. It will make him a more efficient regimental officer. It will give all officers an insight into the problems of Brigade command. It will help the Army by increasing the knowledge and experience of all Regular officers, who may at any moment when a big war breaks out take up appointments of all descriptions and especially the training and staffing of new units and formations which are raised on mobilization. It will standardize staff work as a whole.

To meet the cost of this establishment to some extent it is suggested that other schools might be abolished or reduced. If officers attending the proposed school receive practical instruction in the fire support weapons, I consider that a reduction of the Small Arms Schools can be effected. The rifle wing in India could be amalgamated with the M. G. wing in Ahmednagar, to the advantage of both and with a great saving in overhead costs. And is a school of cookery necessary? Good cooking is vital. An army still moves on its centre-piece, but could not some wife in each British unit teach this very domestic subject? It is, surely, unnecessary to maintain a special school. Research work could be carried out at Porton or Belgaum or even at the "Corner House." Other establishments might be considered with a view to their reduction in the same way; anything to raise funds for the vitally necessary instruction of the officer.

One main objection I forestall. The question of favouritism in selecting students for admission to the Staff College. But this is not

accepted. The choice of the Directing Staff of the new school should preclude criticism in this direction and, with the right personnel, their selection, in the experienced opinion of the Commandant, aided by his staff, should ensure that only those officers who would be of the greatest value to the Army in staff employ and later in higher command would be chosen.

THE FIRST BATTLE OF JABAL HAMRIN, MARCH
25TH, 1917, MESOPOTAMIAN CAMPAIGN.

By "SCORPIO."

Preface.

There is a natural tendency amongst soldiers to avoid an analysis of battles where things have gone wrong, for fear of hurting an individual's or even a unit's feelings. This seems a pity as mistakes are more easily recognized and difficulties better gauged after a defeat than after a victory. The terrain over which the battle of Jabal Hamrin was fought is not unlike much that we can find up and down India and beyond its frontiers. The enemy had much the same armament and characteristics of the second class power we find ourselves fighting against so often in our schemes and t. e. w. t's. When winning, he was also helped by tribesmen, and harassed by them in defeat, and so were we. There is much in this battle therefore of an instructive and interesting nature to soldiers serving in India to-day. Mistakes have been emphasized so that those without experience of war of this nature, to whom peace training, however imaginative the instruction, can never quite convey the true picture of battle, may be able to understand that mistakes which may seem trivial and pass unnoticed or unpunished in peace training rarely escape their just reward in war.

*Events leading up to the action at Jabal Hamrin, on March 25th,
1917 (See Sketch "A").*

On the capture of Baghdad, the situation confronting General Maude was :—

- (a) on his right flank, slowly retiring from Persia at their leisure and followed up by some weak Russian forces also very much at their leisure, two strong Turkish divisions. These divisions were two of the best in the Turkish Army and were well commanded ; moral was high, and their record in Gallipoli had been particularly good. Their retirement from Persia was strategical and not forced on them by tactical considerations ;
- (b) on his front, constituting a possible threat to Baghdad, were the remnants of the Turkish Army defeated at Kut,

Aziziyeh, Diyala and Baghdad a fairly large remnant owing to the supineness of our cavalry after the Tigris had been crossed at the Shumran bend at Kut. Their moral and fighting power were still fairly high, considering the defeats they had suffered ;

- (c) on his left flank, at Felujah and Ramadi on the Euphrates, about 30 and 45 miles respectively from Baghdad, were the Turkish garrisons of the Euphrates line, withdrawn northwards from Nasariyeh without serious loss as the advance of the British from Kut northwards progressed. The fighting value of this Turkish detachment was not high.

In addition, the action of the local Arab tribes, who were all well armed and supplied with ample ammunition, was very doubtful. While on the left flank, a powerful tribe was definitely hostile, the attitude of the rest was typically Arab, *i.e.*, they were out to get what they could from both sides.

To deal with the above situation, General Maude had, in addition to a cavalry division, the following divisions, all of which had been heavily engaged at Kut, and some of which had had heavy casualties during the subsequent advance on and capture of Baghdad :—

I Corps.—3 (Lahore) Div. and 7 (Meerut) Div.

III Corps.—13 Div. (British) and 16 Div. (Indian).

The long line of hastily organized communications, the lack of drafts, the bad effect of the long march over the thick sand and dust from Kut did not make the situation any easier. Supplies were scarce, units were at very low strength, and in many cases in need of a rest. The weak Russian forces in Persia were looking over their shoulders at the revolution in Russia, and were not to be relied on in any way.

General Maude's plan was :—

I Corps to take on the enemy on all three fronts :—

- (a) 3 Div. less 7 Inf. Bde. to advance *via* Baqubah and defeat the two Turkish Divs. retiring from Persia.
- (b) 7 Div. to advance along the Tigris on Samarrah Ry. Sta. (the end of the Baghdad-Samarrah Ry.) and drive back the remnants of the main Turkish Army.
- (c) 7 Inf. Bde. of 3. Div. to advance to the Euphrates, seize Felujah, and guard the left flank.

II Corps was kept in reserve, but 13 Div. of this Corps was subsequently moved northwards out of Baghdad along the West bank of the Diyala river towards Dali Abbas, with the object of cutting off the retreat of the two Turkish Divs. retiring from Persia, after they had been defeated East of the Diyala by the 3 Div., or had escaped from it.

The advance of 3 Div. less 7 Inf. Bde. along the Diyala, from Baghdad.

(See Sketches "A" and "B.")

3 Div. less 7 Inf. Bde. with 13 Lancers attached, called Keary's Coln., marched on the 19th March *via* Baqubah, 33 miles from Baghdad, and Abu Jisra, 15 miles further on, with the 8 Inf. Bde. leading. Opposition was not encountered till Abu Jisra, when the 8 Inf. Bde. advanced guard had no difficulty in driving back some weak enemy detachments. Information was here received from prisoners and agents that the two Turkish divisions had arrived at Kizil Robot, on the Persian side of the Jabal Hamrin, and were holding a strong position in the foothills and on the main ridge of the Jabal Hamrin itself, with advanced detachments holding the crossings of the Balad Ruz Canal. This canal flowed out from the Diyala river some 2,500 yards in advance of the advanced posts of the Turkish main position.

8 Inf. Bde. pushed forward rather leisurely, evicted with little loss a small Turkish detachment of infantry and cavalry from Shahraban, and by the late morning of the 23rd March had reached the South bank of the Balad Ruz Canal, and were in touch for about half a mile on either side of the road (*sic*) with the Turkish outposts, on the North bank. 8 Inf. Bde's attempts to advance were met with a heavy fire and by the afternoon, they appeared content to dig in and watch the enemy. The enemy outposts showed no disposition to retire on their main position in the hills, and their fire took heavy toll of the 8 Inf. Bde. forward battalions during that afternoon and during the whole of the next two days.

9 Inf. Bde. advanced to just North of Shahraban after a dusty and tiring march, and by 4 p.m. went into bivouac in vineyards and fields.

During the day, 13 Lancers guarded the right flank from Arab interference from the direction of Balad Ruz and reconnoitred this flank up to the foot-hills.

A digression is necessary here to explain two points.

- (a) The orders originally received from G. H. Q. by the Coln. Comdr. were to defeat the enemy where met, and prevent him crossing the Diyala river and retiring into the hills towards Kirkuk and Mosul, but rather to drive him back into the arms of the advancing (?) victorious (?) Russians. G. H. Q. appreciated that he would take up a position in the Jabal Hamrin facing South with a strong rearguard in the hills near Qasr-i-Shirin, while he was throwing a bridge across the Diyala near Kizil Robat to allow his transport to cross.

The first mistake was committed here owing to the lack of knowledge of the real situation *vis-à-vis* the Russians, and a consequent over-estimation of the pressure they were exerting on the Turks. The Turks needed no strong rearguard.

- (b) On receipt of the Coln. Comdr.'s information on the 23rd, that the Turks were holding a strong position in the Jabal Hamrin, G. H. Q., misled by their over-estimation of the Russian pressure, and their under-estimation of the numbers and moral of the Turkish force, and with a total disregard of the very tired and under-strength condition of the units of Keary's Coln., ordered the Coln. Comdr. by wire to attack the enemy's left flank and roll him along the hills into the Diyala.

The G. O. C. and his Div. Staff had full knowledge of the following facts :—

- (a) The under-strength and tiredness of all units.
- (b) The strength of the position in the Jabal Hamrin.
- (c) The fact that the position was strongly manned. This was reported by the Bde. Major, 8 Inf. Bde., who went up in an aeroplane sent up on the 23rd and saw the strength of the enemy position, and appreciated correctly their superior numbers of artillery and infantry.
- (d) The fact that any movement on the plain below was in full view of the enemy on the hills.
- (e) The fact that operations in the tangled mass of the Jabal Hamrin of which no map existed would be extremely difficult to co-ordinate.

- (f) The fact that at least one serious obstacle to movement northwards existed in the unbridged, unfordable, and 20 feet wide Balad Ruz Canal.
- (g) That the opposition of the enemy outposts in front of the 8 Inf. Bde. pointed to no lack of moral, but rather to a determination on the part of the enemy to resist very strongly any attempts to dislodge him until he was ready to go.
- (h) That the 13 Div. was proceeding up the West bank of the Diyala towards Dali Abbas.
- (i) That the Balad Ruz Arabs were distinctly hostile to the British, and, consequently, the Turkish Commander would get early and accurate information of our movements.
- (j) That the reconnaissance of 13 Lancers on the 23rd March up to the foothills on the enemy's left flank and the absence of any movement towards his right flank, was a sure indication to the Turkish Commander that an attack, if any was to be made, was likely to come on his left flank.

However, after a mild protest to G. H. Q. which was followed by peremptory orders to attack, the Coln. Comdr. appears to have accepted the risk, in spite of the above facts, most of which were not known by G. H. Q. sitting in Baghdad. The action described below, which is called the 1st Battle of Jabal Hamrin, was the result.

So much for what can be called the strategical aspect of the story.

Mistakes committed during this phase were :—

- (i) *By G. H. Q. :—*
 - (a) Faulty intelligence.
 - (b) Lack of appreciation of all the factors in the situation.
 - (c) Undue interference with the man on the spot.
 - (d) Lack of provision of sufficient aircraft. (Probably there were very few in the country at the time, but even if no Cl/R sorties were available, the Coln. Comdr. should have had accurate information daily of the movements and strength of the Turkish force.)
- (ii) *By Keary's Coln. :—*
 - (a) Lack of real decision by the Coln. Comdr. He should not have allowed himself to be dictated to by G. H. Q. with regard to the tactical direction of his force.

- (b) Lack of drive. The advance of 8 Inf. Bde. was too leisurely.
- (c) Misuse of the cavalry. Information about the enemy was the first essential; this was not forthcoming. Cav. did, indeed, guard the right flank by day but there was not enough danger from this flank to warrant the neglect of a thorough reconnaissance of the enemy's position.

Action of 9 Inf. Bde. on the 23rd/24th March. (See Sketch "B.")

On receipt of the peremptory orders from G. H. Q. to attack the enemy, the Coln. Comdr. ordered 9 Inf. Bde. to march into a position on the enemy's left flank on the night 23rd/24th, and attack his main position on the hills from East to West on the early morning of the 24th. A how. bty. was attached to the Bde. for this purpose, and the remainder of the Div. Arty. were to give support from their present positions South of the Balad Ruz Canal. A det. of S. & M. was detailed to bridge the canal on the 23rd as soon as it became dusk at the crossing place decided upon, which was about 2 miles south of the road, and to ramp the second canal which had been reported, on the morning of the 23rd, dry and easily ramped. A large reconnaissance party composed of some of the Div. Staff and the 9 Inf. Bde. staff had reconnoitred this crossing in broad daylight on the 23rd in full view of the Turks on the hills, but had not reconnoitred the second canal, owing to the Balad Ruz Canal being unfordable. This party was shelled during its reconnaissance.

9 Inf. Bde. had about $4\frac{1}{2}$ to 5 miles to march at night, the last $2\frac{1}{2}$ to 3 miles being over unreconnoitred country; the first 2 miles involved the crossing of two defiles, the bridge and ramp over the two canals. First light was at about 5-30 A.M., so that there was not much time to spare. On arrival at the first bridge at 12 midnight, H. Q., 9 Inf. Bde. were informed that the second canal had been flooded in the late afternoon, that it was unfordable, and would have to be bridged but that there was no more bridging material with the Det. S. & M., and more had been sent for from the neighbourhood of Shahraban.

It was clear that no crossing would be possible that night, and after a two hours' wait, the Bde. was ordered to bivouac in an area between the two canals, and shelter as far as possible in watercourses, behind walls and any cover that could be found.

Dawn broke on the 24th therefore with a whole Bde. massed practically in the open, 2 miles away from its positions the day before,

on the right flank, with one new bridge constructed over the canal behind it, and another being constructed over the canal in front of it—all in full view of the Turks!

The mistakes made during this phase of the operation were :—

- (a) Faulty reconnaissance by the Div. Staff. It should have been appreciated that the second canal was liable to be flooded, as the head works were in the enemy's possession and the R. Diyala was in flood.
- (b) Lack of provision of spare bridging material.
- (c) The massing of the Bde. in a constricted area in full view of the Turks, thus giving away all the advantages of the night advance, and thereby ensuring that little real rest for the troops would be possible.

Sound tactics would have been :—

- (a) to have withdrawn the Bde. to cover round Shahraban during the night, as soon as it was discovered that the 2nd Canal had been flooded and could not be bridged in time, and
- (b) to have camouflaged the bridge already made, and ceased all work on the 2nd bridge during the daytime.

Action of 9 Inf. Bde. during the night 24th/25th March, and on 25th March—the battle of Jabal Hamrin. (See Sketch "B.")

During the 24th March, it was decided to persevere with the original plan to move at night and attack the enemy's left flank, in spite of the fact that surprise had been forfeited. To make doubly sure that the enemy would be certain of our subsequent movements, the S. & M. were ordered to start work on the bridge over the 2nd Canal during the daytime. This they proceeded to do, and were duly hampered by some extremely accurate shelling, which took toll of the working parties, as well as of some of the units of the Bde., clustered as they were in close proximity to the bridge. The bridge was eventually finished shortly after dusk, when the enemy shelling ceased.

At 9 P. M., 9 Inf. Bde. marched across the 2nd bridge in the following order :—

Dorsets.
H. Q., 9 Inf. Bde.
105 Mahratta L. I.
1/1 G. R.
93 Burma Inf.
M. G. Coy. (16 M. G's.).
One 4.5" (How.) Bty., Fd. Arty

All units marched with full 1st line transport. At midnight the Bde. halted and bivouacked 300—400 yds. from the foothills, complete except for the battery which failed to arrive.

It might be as well here to digress and tell the story of the artillery. The first gun which attempted to cross the 2nd bridge, fell into the water and broke the bridge. All efforts to extricate it failed till the 25th, with the result that the battery took up a position *South* of the 2nd Canal to support 9 Inf. Bde. during the 25th. No artillery support moved further North during the whole action; artillery support, therefore, except at long range, was practically non-existent, and the broken nature of the country made observation and recognition of friend and foe almost impossible, so that the few shells which were fired in support of 9 Inf. Bde. during the 25th did no damage at all. In fact, our shells fell much closer to our positions than to those of the Turks. Counter-battery work was completely lacking.

9 Inf. Bde. bivouacked in diamond formation, as shown on Sketch B, each unit putting out its own sentry groups. There was a great deal of "trusting to luck" in the arrangements made for the defence of this bivouac whose position should have been given away to the Turks by the braying of the many mules in the column, who thus gave vent throughout the remainder of the night to their very natural disgust at the whole proceedings.

Luck was with the bde. however, owing to the fact that the nearest Turkish piquets, which morning discovered to have been only about 500—600 yards N. E. of the bivouac area were asleep. Not a shot was fired during the night.

The Brigade marched at first light, about 5-30 A.M., on the morning of the 25th, after a night when little sleep was possible for anyone.

Orders were :—

- (a) The advance to continue in diamond formation, 105th on the right, Dorsets advanced centre, 1/1 G. R. on left, 93rd in rear and reserve; H. Q. and the m. g. coy. to move with the 93rd.
- (b) 1/1 G. R. were to reach a suitable position about half way to the crest of the hills, face West, and form a pivot on which the Dorsets and 105th would wheel successively.

- (c) When all three battalions were in line facing West, the attack on the flank of the enemy main position was to take place under further orders from Bde. H. Q.

No information about the enemy was given, as none was known. The reader may be reminded here that no maps were available; a sketch map hastily compiled from the very inadequate air reconnaissance on the 23rd, and naturally very inaccurate and therefore definitely dangerous, had been issued to each officer.

The first phase of the attack was never completed. Instead of advancing well clear of the flank, the Bde. happened to advance on to the left flank of the Turkish position. 1/1 G. R. reached their position, a series of knolls, with scarcely a casualty. Dorsets and 105th, after a series of desperate efforts to wheel inwards, were driven back with very severe casualties, by some well timed counter-attacks, which threatened to involve the right flank and rear of the 1/1 G. R. The Dorsets and 105th finally withdrew under heavy pressure, across the plain, the 93rd were ordered up on the right of the 1/1 G. R., two platoons of the Bde. m. g. coy. were sent forward as forward guns, and the Div. reserve of two coys. each of 1 Manchester and 124 Baluch were ordered up to the foothills to cover the retirement. Two strong counter-attacks on the left flank and centre of the 1/1 G. R. and 93rd were driven back between 12 noon and 2 P.M., and at 4 P.M. orders were received for each of the remaining units to retire as best they could to the areas South of the 2nd Canal, where they had spent the day on the 24th. The Turks followed up this retirement with arty. and m. g. fire but did not themselves debouch into the plain, or attempt seriously to attack the Manchesters or Baluchis, who retired between 5 and 6 P.M., practically unmolested.

Casualties particularly in officers were very heavy. The 9 Inf. Bde. was very weak to start with, but in spite of this was ordered to attack, without artillery support, two strong Turkish divisions in a wonderful natural position who had eighteen to twenty guns to support them, and who had not only had time to improve the natural strength of the position, but had also been able to watch, as from an aeroplane, every move of the attacking force for two to three days before the attack took place.

13 Lancers spent the day on the plain well away to the right flank and took no part in the action. Their presence there may have kept off the Arabs during the day, though it is doubtful if the Arabs

would have interfered during the day. Their withdrawal at night allowed the Arabs to swarm on to the battlefield in great numbers, in order to loot, mutilate the dead, and kill the wounded.

The mistakes committed during this phase were :—

- (a) The night advance was wrongly directed. It was not directed far enough to the East.
- (b) The transport should have been whittled down to the absolute minimum. There was a great quantity of unwanted transport which got in the way, and suffered unnecessary casualties.
- (c) The lack of proper arrangements for the defence of the bivouac. It is all very well to trust to luck, but the brigade could easily have been mown down at first light by a few machine-guns brought down into position at close range during the night.
- (d) The haphazard "barging into the blue" orders for the advance. The Bde. Comdr. lost control from the very start. Even in easy country, his orders would have resulted in unco-ordinated action. In this country, the result was a series of completely unconnected actions, and, as soon as resistance was found to be greater than anticipated, disaster.
- (e) The carelessness of the artillery in driving over the edge of the 2nd bridge which broke it and blocked it.
- (f) The misuse of the cavalry. A squadron on the right flank would have been sufficient. The remainder of the regiment would have been invaluable even in these hills for protection of the immediate flanks of the brigade and for reconnaissance, or even as a mobile reserve.

There are also some good points about this phase of the action which bring out some valuable lessons :—

- (a) The value of a flank guard in a strong position. The 1/1 G. R. on the left flank though enfiladed and at times shot at in rear were in a naturally strong position and successfully resisted all the desperate attempts by the Turks to drive in the flank. If this had happened, nothing would have saved the brigade from complete disaster, and the division reserve moving up would have been badly handled as well.

- (b) The excellence of the supply of S. A. A. and bombs. In an infantry man's battle of this nature, the expenditure of ammunition is great. In spite of this, and the long carry across the exposed plain Bde. H. Q. kept 1/1 G. R. and 93 Inf. supplied amply with S. A. A. and bombs from their brigade reserve, which was replenished from the division reserve in time.
- (c) The great value, in fact necessity, of covering a withdrawal with fresh troops not previously involved in the withdrawal. The moral effect of the fresh troops advancing across the plain to cover the withdrawal was very great. The fact that they were there in position when the sorely harassed and disorganized units retired from the hills not only checked the Turks from advancing to close range but also enabled the retiring units to reform and so saved the retirement from developing into a *sauve-qui-peut*.


Wisdom after the event.

On receipt of orders from G. H. Q. to move northwards, the Coln. Comdr. should have insisted on adequate air reconnaissance, and on a free hand in carrying out the operations. G. H. Q. intelligence should have come to the correct conclusion that Russian help was negligible and the Turkish force was of good moral and fighting value.

On receipt of the information from the Coln. Comdr. that the Turks were holding the Jabal Hamrin in force, the best chance of decisive success lay in blocking his line of retirement with adequate forces, not in attacking him on the flank farthest from his line of retirement. A large force of cavalry—(there was a Cav. Div. in the country, only too anxious to make up for previous mishandling)—was available, and this backed up closely by the 13 Div. should have ridden hard *via* Dali Abbas to block the Kizil Robat-Kirkuk road.


Having decided, however, to attack the enemy's left flank in the hills, the Coln. Comdr. should have made quite certain that any attack or movement achieved surprise, however difficult it was. He should have realized that, with the Turks perched up on the hills watching all his movements, deception was an essential step to gaining surprise, and that haste did not mean speed. He should have realized that long marches on dusty and bad roads are not a good prelude to night advances and to successful attacks.

SKETCH A.



SKETCH TO ILLUSTRATE THE ACTION OF KEARY'S COLUMN AT THE BATTLE
OF JABAL HAMRIN 23rd-25th MARCH. 1917.

SKETCH B.



On the 23rd and 24th, therefore, the cavalry should have made reconnaissances of *both* flanks. His own reconnaissance of the flank decided upon should have been made inconspicuously under cover of the cavalry reconnaissance. Movements of infantry towards the Diyala would have helped to confuse the Turkish Commander. Air reconnaissance of the position should have been more thorough and should have fixed the exact positions of the flanks of the Turkish main position. A realization of the fact that the River Diyala was in flood and the head-works of the canal were in enemy possession should have led him to make sure that the 2nd Canal was crossable by arranging for it to be bridged, dry or not, and not merely ramped. He should have given the 9 Inf. Bde. a rest under cover in Shahraban on the 23rd/24th, and all day on the 24th, and postponed the night advance to the night of the 24th/25th and the attack to the 25th. He should have allotted the majority of his cavalry to the 9 Inf. Bde.

With such preparations made by the Div. Staff, the Brigadier, 9 Inf. Bde., would have had an easier task :—

- (a) There would have been no difficulty in crossing the two canals ; hence the attack would have come as more of a surprise.
- (b) The direction of the night advance would have been correct ; the brigade would have started the attack on the morning of the 25th well out of view or range of the Turks and the brigade comdr. would have been able to make his plan for the attack more deliberately and carefully.
- (c) The cavalry could have guarded his flanks during his westward attacking movement, and he would have been able to keep a strong reserve in his hand.
- (d) Some artillery support would have been available instead of none.

Combined with the strong thrust on to the Turkish line of retirement by the Cav. Div. and 13 Div., the attack by 9 Inf. Bde. followed by a forward movement by 8 Inf. Bde. as soon as the effect of the flank attack was being felt by the enemy, may well have had decisive results.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR.

DEAR SIR,

I should be glad if you will allow me to correct some statements in The Gold Medal Prize Essay, 1934, printed in the October 1934 issue of your Journal.

The statement at the head of page 499 is not correct. Various Army and District Commanders can in Watch and Ward order air reconnaissance from the nearest R. A. F. formation.

The statement at the head of sub-para. (iii), page 498, conveys an impression contrary to the fact and this impression is not wholly corrected by the first line on page 499.

There is an air annual allocation by Army Headquarters of flights and sorties to work with various Army formations and units, and such flights and sorties are under the Army Commander as allocated.

Thirdly, para. 5 of the same sub-para. (lines 7—9 on page 499) is incorrect, since sanction of the Government of India for bombing is only required in certain cases, for example, when bombing of villages is in question.

I enclose my card.

Yours truly,

“K. L. G.”

[It is regretted that owing to an oversight this important letter has not been published earlier, and we commend its careful perusal to all our members in conjunction with the Prize Essay of 1934, published in the October 1934 number. It will be of especial interest in this number in which we publish an article dealing with the same essay and its political reactions.—Ed.]

A FEW THOUGHTS ON LIGHT INFANTRY, ETC.

DEAR SIR,

I was much interested in Captain Fripp's article on the above subject which was published in your issue of January last and in the comments thereon in the April number. It did not strike me that Captain Fripp had any intention of criticising the Indian soldier's ability, as was suggested by one writer, and there is much truth in some of the points he brings out in his article.

It appears to me that the chief mistakes made in our training since the War have been :—

- (1) Excessive stress being laid on the inability of Infantry to advance against M. Gs. in open country without support from Artillery and A. F. Vs.
- (2) Far too much training of the "set piece" type.

With regard to (1), the tendency in India has been to damn the Indian Government for not providing the necessary support, rather than to concentrate on the means of overcoming the difficulty by training in manoeuvre at night and stalking tactics where cover exists. During the Great War there were, as a general rule, no flanks and very often no cover to speak of, but let us hope that in future wars, at any rate those on a smaller scale, there will at least be opportunities of effecting surprise by turning movements during the hours of darkness and we should train our men accordingly.

With regard to (2), such training has definitely been the result of the trench warfare complex and to my mind, as far as the individual soldier is concerned, time spent on "set pieces" is so much time wasted. Small schemes introducing an element of surprise are not only much more interesting, but also far better training for both officer and man, requiring as they do quick decisions, quick action and the maximum flexibility of the troops employed.

The P. B. I., however, suffer from two great handicaps, *viz.*,—

- (1) Inadequate opportunities for Platoon and Company training.
- (2) The incumbrance of the Lewis Gun in mountain warfare.

The first of these handicaps is a question of money, or rather the lack of it. To send companies out into company camps (and no really useful training can be done from barracks where there are too many other abstractions) costs money and the question almost invariably arises as to how the limited money available for training is to be spent, on the training of lower or higher formations? And though the Company Commander holds the baby, *i.e.*, the training of the soldier who wins the battles, the higher formations generally get the lion's share. Nature would not be human if it were not so. Higher Commanders also require training and it is they who allot the money. I remember arguing for an hour or more one day with a Staff Officer from a high command who tried to prove to me that Brigade training was more important than Company training. After

some judicious questioning I discovered that he had only done one season's training in his life.

Now about the Lewis Gun in mountain warfare. I submit, and I have always done so, that so long as the Platoon is tied to its L. G. mule, or the mule is tied to its Platoon, you will never get the Platoon away from what Captain Fripp describes as the roll of the tethered goat. If troops are going to take on the Pathan at his own game, small formations working independently must be unencumbered and be able to work across difficult country where roads or even tracks, don't exist. This they will never be able to with a blighted mule trapezing behind them. But in the Army our Platoons always stick to their L. G. cum mule. In any case the L. G. is a poor weapon in mountainous country as its flat trajectory will never dislodge determined men from behind cover. Why not, therefore, let troops drop it when occasion demands and rely more on the rifle grenade, a far more valuable weapon in such circumstances, training in which is sadly neglected. With regard to clothing, suggestions for drastic changes are invariably turned down on account of cost, but I am heartily in agreement with Captain Fripp's views about puttees and boots. Puttees are an invention of the devil, a nightmare inflicted upon the soldier from the day of his enlistment until the day of his discharge, or death from varicose veins. On the Frontier they are rapidly discarding these man-stoppers and taking to hose-tops and ankle putties instead, a much more suitable garb. Boots are a definite encumbrance on rocky hill sides and I can see no reason why all troops (at any rate Indian troops) should not be provided with a pair of stout chaplies in lieu of one of their pairs of boots. Shorts are not really suitable for active service, but the majority are loth to give them up on account of their comfort, particularly in the hot weather. In my own regiment in the days before standard patterns, when we made up our own clothing, our men wore loose plus fours with "continuations" of the same material, which fitted the calf and were buttoned down the side. In summer these were worn without puttees or hose-tops and, with chaplies on the feet, were smart-looking, serviceable and comparatively cool.

Yours, etc.,

"SHIGGADAR."

REVIEWS.

The Motorist's Vade Mecum from Lahore to London.

BY LIEUT.-COLONEL C. A. BOYLE, D.S.O.

Into this little handbook of some eighty pages the author has compressed every conceivable piece of information necessary to enable one to undertake, by car, and in reasonable comfort, the journey from India to London.

After leaving Quetta, the author's route took him through such places of interest as Meshed, Teheran, Baghdad, Damascus and Alexandretta to Moudanya on the Sea of Marmora; thence by sea to Istanbul (Constantinople) and onward *via* Adrianople, Sofia and Belgrade to Calais. The intervening places and the distances between each, in terms of mileage and daily stages, are shown. There are notes on the condition of the roads; accommodation-hotel and other, and the charges therefor.

The journey described took nearly three months, but, for the benefit of those with less time available, the author offers a number of alternative routes in both Asia and Europe.

The principal places of interest throughout the journey and the sights worth visiting are mentioned, and in many cases the author has added a brief historical account of them.

The chapters on finance and exchange, clothing and equipment, food and water, and general information are instructive and helpful.

This book should prove of value to those who contemplate spending a portion of their leave visiting places of historical, religious and artistic interest, and can afford the time necessary to do so.

J. S. B.

Between the Oxus and the Indus.

BY COLONEL R. C. F. SCHOMBERG, C.M.G., D.S.O.

(Martin Hopkinson, Ltd.) 15 sh.

"It is the duty of all young officers and staff officers to take every opportunity of travelling in the countries of our future allies and enemies; to study the topography of those countries, to get acquainted

with the inhabitants, and to learn their language. Then and then only will they be able to appreciate the information they will get in time of war, and so to frame plans of operations which will be suited to the local situation." So says *The Handbook for Young Officers and Staff Officers of the Turkish Army*.

In these luxurious days, however, there are few who are willing to exchange the warmth of their fireside for the snow-swept slopes of the Karakoram, or the congenial society at the Club bar for that of a Central Asian potentate, whose conversation is, perforce, translated by one whose knowledge of English is limited. Moreover the coveted reputation of being "a keen soldier who takes an interest in his profession" can be won, perhaps, by the study of little books whilst seated in an armchair at home.

In these days, therefore, we rely more than ever on our professional travellers and explorers to supply us the material and local colour for our Military Reports. Officers will welcome this book by the well-known traveller and explorer Colonel R. C. F. Schomburg, and in view of our new commitments in the Gilgit area it should be studied by all who take an interest in the problem of the defence of our Indian frontiers.

It deals with the Gilgit Agency, the States of Yasin, Hunza, and Nagir, and the land where Russia, Afghanistan and India meet. The book is full of information which should interest soldier and civilian alike. It is written in a very readable style, and sparkles with anecdotes and stories of adventures. The production of the book leaves nothing to be desired, and it contains many illustrations and an excellent map.

C. A. B.

Security.

BY MAJOR-GENERAL H. ROWAN-ROBINSON, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.

(Methuen & Co., Ltd.) 5 shillings.

The issue of this book will have particular interest at the present time, not only for Military readers, but for all those who study the international situation and the efforts that are being made to obtain a peaceful solution of its many problems. The author stresses the importance of maintaining peace and criticises the various methods that have been implemented in recent years. Whilst recognising

the value of the Locarno treaty and supporting the principles of the League of Nations, he is doubtful of the value of the latter as an instrument for preventing war or of any schemes for disarmament that have been produced up to date. He advocates the adoption of a clear policy as a solution of our defence problems, but his first chapter is apt to leave the reader in some doubt as to what this policy should be.

The menace to the peace of Europe that has arisen through the rebirth of Germany is very clearly dealt with, and General Rowan-Robinson points out that the conditions of strategy have changed. He draws attention to the increased difficulty of protecting our vital yet vulnerable communications and urges a readjustment of the values of sea and air power to safeguard these. He is of opinion that a strong air force is a necessity and that the increase of air power will sound "The knell of large armies on the Continent," limit the possibility of our employment of an expeditionary force, and make opposed landings even more hazardous than they have been in the past.

In view of the necessity for a common strategy, a common policy for armament, and the fact that true co-operation between the three services has not yet been attained, the author urges strongly that a Ministry of Defence be created. He advocates a complete reorganization of the army on a mechanized basis and a reorientation of Naval policy, possibly involving the removal of our Mediterranean fleet and the organization of the Cape route.

As modern war is a struggle which involves all the resources of a nation, he urges that the Nation should be so organized in peace that the necessity for improvisation on the outbreak of war will disappear. Since all political parties have really only one common object, the well-being of the nation, he pleads the necessity for a united national front to obtain economic efficiency and the preservation of peace.

Whilst all the author's arguments may not be agreed with and some of his solutions appear optimistic, this book shows very clearly the problems that confront the Empire and provides excellent material for thought on the subject of combination of effort as a means to security.

J. L. C.



Lt.-General Sir WALTER S. LESLIE, K.C.B., K.B.E., C.M.G., D.S.O.
Adjutant-General in India.

The Journal

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EDITORIAL

On August 2nd His Majesty the King-Emperor gave his assent to the Government of India Act, 1935. This Act has been evolved after careful consideration by the British Parliament and is the result of years of study of the problem of how to produce a constitution best suited to the needs of India. It may be described as the biggest political experiment of modern times.

The Indian political situation was ably reviewed in our last number, so it is not proposed to do more than touch on the implications of the Act. Briefly put, the Bill returns to the hands of the King-Emperor all powers hitherto exercised in India on his behalf, including those exercised by the Secretary of State for India. Certain powers are then re-delegated to the executive authority of the Federation through the Governor-General, and to the executive authority of the Provinces through their respective Governors. As a result of this direct delegation of power by the Crown, the Secretary of State will no longer be the primary authority for the governing of India, and the governments of India will cease to act as his agents.

The passing of the Act is not the lowering, but rather the raising, of the curtain on fresh political activities. An immense amount of work remains to be done in India itself; the inauguration of Provincial Autonomy, negotiations with the Princes to bring them into the proposed Federation and, finally, the inauguration of the Federation itself.

Especially in the Provinces, much political power will be put into the hands of Indians. Is it too much to hope that they will acquire a true sense of political responsibility, will abandon communal strife and petty obstructionism, and will work together for the common good of India ; so that in due course she may be ready to take her place as a virile member of the British Commonwealth of Nations ?

* * * * *

During the past three months the eyes of Europe, if not of the world, have been fixed upon the Italo-Ethiopian dispute. This for the time being has taken precedence over all other affairs, and such questions as the Western Air Pact and the Danube Pact have sunk temporarily into oblivion.

Italy has undoubted grievances against Abyssinia, but seems disinclined to listen to reason, and shows every sign of wishing to embark on a campaign of territorial conquest.

For some months politicians and officials of the League of Nations have strained every nerve to induce Italy to accept mediation by the League and to realize her responsibilities as a member of this body.

This is the first time that the wishes of an important European member of the League have run counter to the principles imposed on all its members, so that the matter really resolves itself into a test as to whether the League is an efficient machine for the settling of disputes between two of its members.

To forecast the outcome of the League deliberations, and Italy's reaction to any decision made, is almost impossible at the present juncture. She has made all preparations for a war with Abyssinia and does not seem inclined to be turned aside from her object. If the League decides against her, will she resign her membership ? The odds are that in her present temper she will do so : in which case it is a question whether the League, already weakened by the defection of Japan and Germany, will remain in being.

Apart from the problems which would arise in the Eastern Mediterranean and on the Red Sea littoral through a successful Italian campaign in Abyssinia, the whole question of European politics would require revision in the event of the collapse of the one institution on which we and other nations rely for the preservation of peace. Time alone will show what the result of the present dispute will be.

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The question of how best to solve the problems of the North-West Frontier is one that never fails to produce discussion. In this number both "Shiggadar" and the author of the 1934 Gold Medal Essay have returned to the charge in answer to the article by "Spingirai" in the July 1935 number of the Journal. Both critics advocate unity of control of the Frontier, and both favour the establishment of a service of military officers who would control the trans-border areas under District Commanders, and so relieve hard-worked Frontier Deputy Commissioners of many of their worries.

As if to remove the problem from the sphere of academic discussion, the tribes themselves have drawn attention to the pressing need for a settlement of a definite kind. At the beginning of August, the Burhan Khel and Isa Khel sections of the Mohmands interrupted repair work on the Gandab road. By the middle of August, opposition had increased and, spurred on by the powers of persuasion of our old friends the three Badshah Guls, the Haji of Turangzai and the Faqir of Alingar, a lashkar composed of both Upper and Lower Mohmands prevented freedom of movement up the road, and did their best to destroy it.

This action has resulted in the employment of a considerable body of troops, who have suffered quite appreciable casualties in order to re-open the road up to Ghalanai. In addition to trouble with the Mohmands, not only has the Nawab of Dir had to compete with an attack by his brother Alamzeb Khan, but the tribes on the Hazara border have adopted a most aggressive attitude. In this latter area there had been no serious trouble since Sir William Lockhart's expedition in 1892.

At the time of writing it is difficult to judge what the result of the disturbances in either area will be, but the attitude of the Mohmands at any rate produces support for the arguments of one author in favour of consolidation and absorption as a corollary to penetration. A tract of country that provides a harbour for malcontents who endeavour to stir up trouble amongst tribes who have never been amenable to reason can hardly be described as a suitable tribal buffer state.

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It is now four months since the city of Quetta was destroyed by earthquake shock, a brief account of which appeared in the editorial of our July number. The public have depended for their news of this disaster upon the many articles in the

newspapers, the information in which, though accurate in the main, has up to date not been co-ordinated.

The publication on the 29th August of the official pamphlet "The Quetta Earthquake, 1935," has, therefore, been most opportune. This pamphlet, which has been compiled almost entirely from official sources, gives a true, brief account of the disaster and the steps taken to afford relief.

The account brings home to the reader not only the appalling suddenness of the disaster, but also the amazing promptness with which relief measures were organized by the authorities on the spot, and the self-sacrifice and devotion to duty displayed by all ranks, civil and military, who were engaged in the work of rescue and salvage.

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In this number a very interesting article on the training of Remount
Training. remounts has been included. The following comments are made on this:—

There are two separate aspects to any system of training horses :
(a) Psychological, and (b) Pathological.

The system prescribed appears to deal adequately with (a), since during the handling process confidence is engendered between man and horse. In short, the system claims to produce an amenable animal, and if cases of casting for vice are eliminated, it further possesses the advantage of economy.

In normal circumstances, however, time gained in pacification must not curtail the period of training which is accompanied by the process of muscular development and hardening of tendons and ligaments.

With regard to (b), no matter how tame and amenable an animal may be, it is essential that he should be introduced gradually to physical exertion. No undue strain should be imposed on an immature animal or unsoundness will develop.

It is the slow but progressive period of muscular development and training that produces a horse that can control his momentum with the heavy weight necessitated by military equipment, in addition to the rider's weight. Only by this means can we ensure a sound horse that is at his best for war between the ages of nine and fourteen, and capable of enduring and recovering from prolonged effort.

The case of two-year old race horses is not a good analogy. These animals are prematurely developed by special feeding from birth, and only carry a light weight over short distances, otherwise they would soon break down.

The author has confined his remarks to the training of walers. It should be noted that the education and handling of the Indian bred remount commences from the day he is born, as he and the breeder practically live together. The process is continued after he enters the large Government rearing depots as a yearling, with the result that he is generally quiet and docile on reaching maturity, and the Lichtwark system of training should seldom be necessary for this class of horse.

It is understood that this system was originally tried out in remount depots in India, but could not be adopted permanently owing to a shortage of the officers necessary for careful supervision.

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On September 9th, 1935, the first batch of Indian Army officers of the War Block were transferred to the Special Valets. Unemployed List. It is understood that a total of 129 will go this year.

In spite of certain necessary inter-regimental transfers that are contemplated, there will be gaps in the ranks of regiments that will be hard to fill, and the retiring officers will be missed by their brother officers and men alike. Perhaps most of all by the latter, as even in these modern days the Indian soldier respects and trusts the officer with whom he has served for so many years. It only remains to bid them all God-speed, and to wish them prosperity in their new careers.

In furtherance of its previous efforts to help War Block officers to obtain employment, the Information Bureau at Army Headquarters has produced a second edition of its excellent pamphlet regarding settlement in the British Dominions and Colonies. This edition gives much fuller information than did the first. It is understood that it will be the final edition to be published.

In addition to the above, Major W. J. Cawthorn, 4/16th Punjab Regiment, at the special request of the Government of Southern Rhodesia, is carrying out a tour of that colony and also of Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland and Kenya. Preliminary pamphlets giving details of conditions in the first two colonies have already been published, and a book giving a comprehensive survey of conditions in all four will be issued very shortly.

The Information Bureau is in possession of information regarding farms and estates for sale in many parts of the Empire. Whilst accepting no responsibility for the accuracy of the details supplied, it will gladly reply to any enquiries it may receive.

ADOWA

BY MAJOR B. R. MULLALY, 10TH GURKHA RIFLES.

At the time of writing, the Abyssinian problem remains unsolved and there appears to be little chance of averting war.

It may, therefore, be of interest to recall the circumstances of the last occasion on which Italy and Abyssinia met in the field.

The writer has, during his service, met a number of Italian officers and there is no doubt that the tragedy of Adowa is a bitter memory which sorely rankles, and that to leave unavenged the greatest disaster which has ever befallen European troops at the hands of African natives is inconsistent with the spirit of the new Italy.

The campaign of Adowa is of special interest to students of military history, particularly of the history of small wars, and is an excellent example of the inexorability of the law of cause and effect.

The element of chance was eliminated, as far as it is possible to eliminate it in war, and each move had its inevitable result.

The result in this case was the annihilation of a combined European and native army of about seventeen thousand men by a native African race.

Events leading up to the campaign of Adowa.

On 1st January 1890, the Italian possessions on the Red Sea coast were united into one province under a Governor and given the name of "The Colony of Eritrea."

The Italians, in 1889, had supported Menelik, King of Shoa, when he seized the imperial throne of Ethiopia. Once seated on the throne, however, Menelik threw over his former allies and refused to sign the Treaty of Ucciali which the Italians had presented to him, and declined to acknowledge an Italian protectorate over his dominions.

The whole history of the period rests upon the terms of the Treaty of Ucciali and it is necessary briefly to summarise its main provisions.

Menelik was acknowledged as The King of The Kings of Ethiopia. Article 3 sought to define the Italian-Ethiopian boundary as the line

of the high plateau. One of the main reasons for Menelik's refusal to ratify the treaty was the insertion of an additional convention by which "rectification" of the boundary was to be made on the basis of possession "de facto." This entirely altered the original boundary as Italy was even then preparing for her advance and had, since the date of the original treaty, made important acquisitions of Ethiopian territory.

Under Article 17, Menelik "consented" to employ the Italian Government in its relations with other powers. The interpretation of this clause led to innumerable disputes and had an important bearing on subsequent events. The remaining articles need not be discussed in this paper as having no great historical significance.

Consequent on Menelik's refusal to ratify the Treaty of Ucciali, the Italian Government had concluded a convention with his chief rival, Ras Mangasha, the ruler of Tigre. To digress for a moment, it should be remembered that Ethiopia consists of five provinces, which, prior to the rise of Menelik, cemented by the victory of Adowa, owed more or less allegiance to the Negus Nagasti, the King of The Kings of Ethiopia, and were constantly plotting against each other.

For various reasons Menelik and Mangasha found it expedient to compose their differences and make common cause against the enemy of all Ethiopia, and from the time they concluded a secret alliance against Italy in 1894 the outbreak of war was only a matter of time.

In December of the same year Mangasha had started the ball rolling by raising a rebellion in Italian territory which had once been part of his dominion of Tigre. The rising was promptly and decisively suppressed by General Baratieri, the Governor of Eritrea, who pushed forward into the province of Tigre and expelled Mangasha from his dominions. After some months of uncertainty Baratieri decided to occupy Adowa, the capital of Tigre, and here he was treading on very dangerous ground. Tigre is one of the historic provinces of Ethiopia and to invade it meant war against the whole Ethiopian nation. In spite of their constant dissensions the native chiefs had a spark of national feeling which bitterly resented the violation of their ancient territory. Thus, unwittingly, Italy came face to face with an united Ethiopia which at the call of the Negus Negasti, could put into the field a quarter of a million warriors, fanatically determined to resist the foreign invader.

In a recent speech Signor Mussolini attributed the disaster of Adowa to a supine Italian Government, and he was to a certain extent right, for it seems that the government of the day had no realization of the impending danger. Whilst anxious to retain its African colony it did not realize the expense that was involved and allowed the Governor quite inadequate resources in men and money. Moreover, the Italian intelligence system was definitely inefficient so that both the government at home and the men on the spot gravely underestimated the ability and power of Menelik and the strength of the forces which he could put in the field. He was looked upon as a savage chieftain who could dispose of perhaps 30,000 ill-armed men. Actually, over 100,000 Abyssinian fighting men were present at Adowa, of whom about 80,000 were armed with rifles.

After Baratieri's success against Tigre the Italian Government was faced with the necessity for making a decision as to future policy, and the discussions on the subject and the varying views that were put forward showed once more how difficult it is for a government to stay its course once it has been committed to a career of conquest of an uncivilised people. Baratieri's own opinion is summed up in the following passage of a note to the government: "The occupation of Agame (the Northern portion of Tigre) and Tigre offers notable advantages both political and military; it will be my objective. But I do not consider it prudent to proceed to this occupation until our forces have been increased and preparations have been made for the undertaking."

While the government was trying to make up its mind the Governor was able to pursue his own course of action and to pave the way for an eventual occupation. He intended, for the moment, to remain outside the territory of Tigre unless forced to forestall an attack made from within its boundaries and to develop an Italian party by helping the smaller chiefs at the expense of the greater.

To secure the province of Agame he installed a friendly chief in Adigrat, the capital; only to find, after a short time, that his ally was in danger of being ejected by Mangasha and of involving Italian prestige in his flight. It was a typical example of a frontier dilemma and Baratieri was forced to depart from his chosen policy to the extent of occupying Adigrat. The occupation of Adigrat was an important event for it decided, to a great extent, the character of the subsequent operations.

A few miles to the South of it lies the very strong position of Edaga Amus, a mountain barrier which stretches right across the road to Abyssinia. It thus commands the natural route of invasion from the South and lies in the angle from which the mountain ranges and roads run southwards towards Ethiopia and westwards towards Adowa.

Up to now Baratieri had not greatly overstepped the limits he had prescribed for himself but, on 2nd April 1895, he followed up his invasion of Agame by occupying Adowa. He was in the grip of circumstances and, from a military point of view, the occupation of Adowa was but the logical and sound outcome of his seizure of Adigrat.

For financial reasons, however, the Italian Government was not prepared to acquiesce in a permanent occupation of Tigre and, as regards Adowa, considered that "it should remain under our hand but from a distance."

Baratieri was reluctant to go but the influence of the Treasury was too much for him and he was compelled to retire from Adowa, leaving behind him a battalion of native infantry and a section of artillery.

The retirement was followed by a sharp interchange of dispatches between Baratieri and his government. He repeatedly warned the government that Menelik was preparing for war and that the resources at his disposal were quite inadequate to meet the impending danger. He pointed out that the Italian colony of Eritrea had been increased to an area of 150,000 square kilometres and that for the defence of this territory he only had a force of 3,000 white troops, 8,000 native regulars, 1,500 militia and 1,700 irregulars and that, after allowing for necessary garrisons for defence against the Dervishes in the North, he could not rely on a field force of more than about 7,000 men. He bitterly pointed out that the whole dispute arose over a paltry sum of £150,000, and tendered his resignation.

It was refused and in the course of two and a half months he asked three times to be relieved. His prestige was great and on the third occasion he was summoned to Rome for a conference. He was received with great popular enthusiasm and the government was now beginning to realise the seriousness of the position so that he was able to return to Africa with the promise of an extra four million lire and an effective force of 10,000 men. The Governor reached Adigrat on his

return from Rome on 3rd October 1895 and resumed the direction of affairs. There were abundant signs that an early attack by Menelik was contemplated and Baratieri hoped to be able to block his line of advance by a series of alliances in order to interpose a barrier of friendly chiefs between himself and Menelik. Under different circumstances such a policy might have been the true solution, but in this case Italy had so few real advantages to offer the chiefs as against the very real danger of the wrath of Menelik, that very few of them ever really considered it worth while to betray their race. Almost every important chief was in communication with the Italians, either with or without the consent of Menelik himself, and it has been suggested that he used this means of throwing dust in the eyes of his enemy. Many of them were sitting on the fence and it therefore became a matter of supreme importance for the Italians to avoid anything resembling a defeat. Once their prestige was gone their case would become immensely difficult.

This then was the situation at the end of September 1895, when Menelik gave his first formal signs of hostility.

Preliminary Operations.

The first move was made by Ras Mangasha who had concentrated a force of some 5,000 men at Debra Aila, about 80 miles from Adigrat, and was expecting reinforcements. Baratieri quite naturally decided to attack Mangasha before his reinforcements arrived and, advancing in three columns, arrived on the morning of the 9th October, within striking distance of the enemy at Debra Aila. Owing to the left Italian column not going wide enough the intention to outflank Mangasha failed, and he hastily retired before dawn so that the engagement resolved itself into an indecisive rearguard action in which the Italians achieved success without gaining any decisive result.

The victory of Debra Aila was quickly followed up by the annexation of Tigre to the Italian colony and Baratieri proceeded to consolidate his position. He built forts at Adigrat, Macalle and Adowa and expressed his confidence that the triangle of strong points thus created would be adequate to resist any attempt at invasion from the South. From now on Baratieri displayed that curious over-confidence which led him to his ruin and caused the dreadful disaster of Adowa.

His intelligence service was sorely at fault and he appears to have been obsessed with the notion that Menelik could not place more

than 30,000 men in the field against him and to have seriously underrated the capacity of his opponent in other ways as well.

Baratieri's over-confidence was indeed a potent factor in the disasters that were to come, but other causes contributed to them and they may be summarised as follows :—

- (i) The failure of the Italian Government to provide adequate funds.
- (ii) The vagaries of party politics at home.
- (iii) The failure to understand the Ethiopian mentality which led to too great reliance being placed upon the negotiations with the chiefs.

The disastrous rivalry between Baratieri and General Arimondi, who, although he was named commander of the troops in Eritrea, was never allowed, by reason of the fact that Baratieri was a soldier, to exercise independent command.

While Baratieri was sending his optimistic despatches to Rome Menelik was gathering his forces. In answer to his proclamation of war the war-drum was heard in every village of Ethiopia from the mountains of Tigre in the North to the Gallas and Somalis in the South and the warriors were flocking to join their feudal lords, armed with spear, shield and sword and being served out with rifles and ammunition to an extent unknown to the Italian intelligence service.

After Debra Aila General Arimondi had been left at Macalle with a force of about 7,500 men, of whom 4,500 were regulars, and some irregulars, and tribal levies. Major Toselli, with a force of 2,150 men, had been pushed forward to the strong natural position of Amba Alagi, 35 miles South of Macalle, and had advanced still further to Belego. His orders were not to offer serious resistance but to prevent the natives in his immediate vicinity from rising and to collect information, falling back on Amba Alagi and thence on Macalle if seriously attacked.

As the result of his reconnaissance Toselli considered the position serious and reported in this sense to Arimondi, asking for orders.

Then occurred one of those incidents which, whether due to inefficiency or mischance, was typical of the series of misfortunes which dogged the Italians throughout the campaign.

Arimondi sent Toselli the following orders: "I leave you the choice of maintaining your position at Belego or of *retiring to the foot of Amba Alagi, or, according to circumstances, still further.*"

The actual message as received by Toselli read as follows: "I leave you the choice of maintaining your position at Belego or of *retiring to the foot of Amba Alagi according to circumstances.*" A very different significance. Arimondi was satisfied that he had given Toselli full discretion to act as circumstances dictated. Toselli believed that he was only authorised to retire as far as Amba Alagi *and no further.*

Toselli, with a force of 2,150 men was now face to face with a combination of Abyssinian chiefs with some 30,000 men, and was under the impression that Amba Alagi was to be defended at all costs and that he would be reinforced on reaching that place. It was just the state of affairs that leads to disasters.

Worse was to come. On the morning of 5th December, Arimondi informed Toselli that he would join him at Amba Alagi. On reporting this to Baratieri, the Governor forbade him to make the forward movement, and Arimondi forwarded the decision to Toselli the same evening. The message never reached its destination and so Toselli, fondly imagining that he would be met by Arimondi at Amba Alagi, was hurried to his doom.

The position was a naturally strong one, easily defensible by a force three or four times as strong as that of Toselli. He saw that he was not in sufficient strength to hold the position properly but, sure that he would be reinforced in a few hours, he made such dispositions as he could with the force at his disposal. At 6-30 on the morning of the 7th December 1895, the battle began and it soon became apparent that the Abyssinian forces were of such overwhelming strength that nothing could save the small Italian force, which was unable to cover the approaches round its flanks, East and West of the main massif of Amba Alagi, from being outflanked and overwhelmed. From all accounts the Italians put up a gallant resistance and the name of Toselli, who was the last to leave the main position, and, when he had given his last orders to try and save the remnants of his force, turned towards the oncoming enemy and met his death as a gallant soldier, has gone down in Italy as that of a worthy descendant of the heroes of ancient Rome.

The odds were, however, too great and a bare remnant under the command of a subaltern was all that succeeded in reaching Macalle.

The blow to Italian prestige was tremendous and the waverers now decided, one and all, to throw in their lot on the side of Menelik. It was fortunate for the survivors of Amba Alagi that Arimondi had

after all obtained leave to advance as far as Aderat. He had started the night before Amba Alagi and had sent a message to Toselli informing him of his advance, but this message like the others failed to reach its destination.

During the march Arimondi heard vague rumours of the disaster and made a plan to hold a position seven miles short of Amba Alagi. As his main body was approaching the selected position the small band of survivors of Toselli's ill-fated force joined him and he heard their report of the disaster. By now the Abyssinians were pressing forward and Arimondi's own position was becoming dangerous. He decided that the only course open to him was to retire on Macalle, which he was able to do without very much trouble after delivering a vigorous counter-attack upon the Abyssinians who were rapidly enveloping his column. The march was continued throughout the day and night and the force reached Macalle early the next morning by which time the troops, almost entirely Ascari, had covered fifty-six miles in twenty-nine hours, besides fighting an engagement. No mean feat of endurance.

On arrival at Macalle Arimondi had to make a big decision whether or not to abandon the fort. He decided that the soundest course would be to retire with his main force to join the Governor at Adagamus, leaving a small garrison at Macalle. The consequences of the disaster at Amba Alagi now became apparent and Arimondi found that the whole country was rising. His march was continuously harrassed by bands of armed peasants, nevertheless he succeeded in carrying out one of the most remarkable marches on record, covering the 115 miles to Adagamus in three and a half days, and this with a long baggage train and many wounded men.

The news of Amba Alagi at last awoke Italy to the danger in which her colony stood. Baratieri had undoubtedly gravely underestimated the danger and the resources which Menelik could command and the Italian Government had further discounted largely from his reports with the result that it was now faced with a dangerous situation with which the existing resources at the Governor's disposal were quite inadequate to cope. The situation in December 1895 was, briefly, as follows. Baratieri had abandoned the captured provinces of Tigre and Agame to the Abyssinians, leaving in their midst the small garrison of Macalle, 1,190 men, all Ascari with a few Italian officers.

At Adigrat he had his main force consisting of 6,000 native infantry with some 3,000 more in process of being raised.

One hundred and ten miles lay between him and the port of Massowah, so that he could not expect to receive reinforcements from Italy in under a period of weeks. Some 30,000 Abyssinians, flushed with victory, lay between him and Macalle. It was obvious that he could take no effective immediate steps for the relief of the place. He decided to concentrate his force at Adigrat and there to await the Abyssinian attack. The position of Adagamus, nine miles from Adigrat, is a splendid natural line of defence and it was here that Baratieri determined to stand. The mountain ranges here form a right angle, one range running southwards to Macalle and the other westwards to Adowa, so that the position commands the main lines of advance towards the Italian colony.

Having selected his position, the Governor set about the task of organising his resources. He began by sending Arimondi to Massowah to organise the transport and this was an added cause of friction between the two men. Relations between them were strained and the Governor blamed Arimondi for the disaster of Amba Alagi and for the predicament in which he was now placed by reason of the garrison which had been left at Macalle. Politically, the situation had deteriorated to a very serious extent. The disaster of Amba Alagi had destroyed, at one stroke, the elaborate structure of native alliances which Baratieri had laboriously built up and the native chiefs had lost faith in the Italian cause and felt that their own interests would be better served by support of Menelik. By now Macalle was surrounded by the whole of the Abyssinian army and it was only a matter of time before the inevitable end came. The town of Macalle stands in a hollow, surrounded by mountains, on one of which is the old church of Enda Jesus. It was this church and its immediate surroundings that the Italians had converted into a fort.

In spite of its high position it was commanded by the hill known as Mount Gargambessa on the North, parts of which were not more than a thousand metres from the walls of the fort. It was therefore obvious from the first that if the enemy could establish themselves on this hill the reduction of the fort would follow.

The siege officially lasted for 42 days but serious assaults only took place during the last two weeks, when Menelik arrived in person to conduct the Abyssinian operations. The first serious attack began on the 7th January and lasted intermittently until the 11th by which time the Abyssinians had succeeded in establishing themselves at five

separate points on the hills and had cut off the garrison from its water supply.

The Abyssinians attacked recklessly and suffered very heavy casualties in their attempts to capture the fort but desisted after four days hard fighting, knowing full well that the lack of water would very soon compel the garrison to capitulate. By the 14th it became necessary to allow the animals to die and the ration of water was progressively reduced. In the meantime Baratieri had been negotiating through various channels and on the 15th a messenger was passed through the lines announcing the orders of the Italian Government to surrender the fort.

Much controversy has raged round the terms of capitulation but the fact remains that Menelik allowed the garrison of Macalle to march out with the honours of war and even assisted them with transport.

The reason for his forbearance has been much debated and he himself took the opportunity of citing his action as a proof of his Christian faith and an earnest of his desire for peace. It is probable that, even now, he did desire peace and wished to treat whilst his victories at Amba Alagi and Macalle proclaimed him victor over Italian forces.

Having allowed the garrison of Macalle to march out unharmed, Menelik now made use of it in a curiously cunning manner. He realised that from both a political and strategical point of view an advance on Adowa was the obvious move for him to make. To do so, however, would entail a flank march across the front of the Italian position. He therefore determined to use the released garrison as a screen. Surrounding the captured Italian troops with a horde of tribesmen on the pretext that it was necessary to protect them from certain chieftains whose men had suffered severely in the assaults on Macalle, Menelik marched the garrison towards the Italian position and then made it, with its escort, march North-westwards, while he himself marched to Hausien, 37 miles from Adowa, thus interposing between himself and the Italians a screen of his own men marching under a flag of truce with the prisoners in their midst.

There is no doubt that the Italians had, from the first, made a very serious mistake in not occupying Adowa.

From Adowa Menelik was in a position to rouse the population all round Baratieri and once established there was so situated as to be able seriously to threaten his line of communications. The valley,

too, was well watered and rich in crops which enabled Menelik to supply his army.

Had he been deprived of this valuable source of supplies it is doubtful if he would have been able to maintain his hordes for his great effort. As one of his principal Ras said to an Italian officer after Adowa ; " If you had occupied the pass between Hausien and Adowa, the campaign, as far as we were concerned, would have been finished, for we should not have been able to enter the hollow of Adowa, and then, for want of provisions, we should have been compelled to retire. You permitted us to enter and live."

Before Adowa.

With Menelik established in the territory North of Adowa events moved rapidly to their tragic conclusion.

On 19th December 1895, the Italian Chamber had voted a grant of twenty million lire for the Abyssinian war ; a ridiculously inadequate sum, having in view the task in hand. The trouble was that the ministers themselves were undecided as to the proper course of action now to be taken. They could not make up their minds whether the campaign was to be offensive or merely directed to the defence of Eritrea. The result was a compromise and the voting of a sum which, while not large enough to meet his demands, was large enough to tempt Baratieri to undertake the action which led to the disaster.

A large proportion of the money voted was swallowed up in the purchase of the large number of transport animals required, and in the organisation and equipment of the long lines of communications. After Amba Alagi the great difficulty of the Italians was the lack of time.

They could not count on more than a few weeks respite before the enemy might be closing in on Adigrat and reinforcements could not arrive from Italy in under some three weeks to a month. The result was that Arimondi's troops on the Line of Communications were worked to the limit of their capacity and even then the arrangements were woefully inadequate to meet the strain which was soon to be placed upon them.

The state of Baratieri's mind at this juncture is an interesting study beyond the scope of this article but, briefly, he appears to have lapsed into a condition of indecision quite out of keeping with his previous brilliant record. He evolved elaborate plans for the defence of the colony and spoke of "surrounding Ethiopia with a circle of

iron," at one moment and the next was to be found frittering away his strength in a series of small operations with small columns, none of which met with any success commensurate with the losses involved. Indeed, several of these columns suffered severely and the only result was to lower the moral of his own troops and finally to convince the few remaining chiefs who were wavering of the hopelessness of the Italian cause. Interference from home also forced the luckless Governor on to disaster. The Italian people, ignorant of the conditions or the resources of the enemy, were anxious for "Rivincita," revenge for the disasters of Amba Alagi and Macalle and Baratieri received an official reprimand for his policy of inaction. He was told by the responsible minister that "there is no fundamental plan in this campaign, and I should like one to be formulated. We are ready for any sacrifice in order to save the honour of the army and the prestige of the monarchy." Such interference was, of course, quite unpardonable, but there is little doubt that it had the effect of forcing Baratieri, against his better judgment, to make his fateful decision to advance. A word must here be said concerning other factors which contributed to the coming disaster. Neither the nation nor the government had any conception of the formidable nature of the task before them.

They had allowed themselves to be beaten and then, stung into activity, endeavoured to retrieve the situation by launching on a wave of enthusiasm a hastily organised army—insufficient to achieve success and yet too large to be properly equipped and maintained on the niggardly financial provision made by the government.

The force was ill-found and its equipment was not above serious criticism, whilst the quality of some of the units sent from Italy has been called in question by several writers. As stated before, the intelligence system in the field was deplorably inefficient and Baratieri seems never to have appreciated the full extent of the forces, moral as well as physical, with which he was faced.

During February 1896 a condition of stalemate prevailed.

Baratieri carried out one or two minor operations, decided to retire, changed his mind, and displayed all the symptoms of a man torn by indecision. In the meantime Menelik was desperate. His supplies were running out and it is said that he not only literally prayed that the Italians would attack him but spread reports, through spies, of dissension in his own camp in order to entice Baratieri to advance. Whether his efforts succeeded or whether pressure from his own

subordinates and from home, and the dissatisfaction at their inactivity which prevailed amongst the troops who were imbued with the desire for revenge of Amba Alagi, induced Baratieri to make the decision, will never be known, but the fact remains that on 29th February, 1896, he finally made up his mind to advance on Adowa—a decision momentous in history, the repercussions of which are, at this moment, forty years later, causing such grave anxiety.

The Battle of Adowa.

The battle of Adowa was fought in very difficult country and as every phase of the action was governed by topographical considerations a brief description of the terrain is necessary.

The Italians were encamped at Sauria and Menelik's force at and around Adowa, sixteen miles to the South-west.

Between the two places, at a distance of about nine miles from Sauria, there are three hills in a row, known as the Spur of Belah, the Hill of Belah, and Mount Belah, which cover the direct tracks between Sauria and Adowa. It was Baratieri's intention to occupy the line of these hills and there offer battle to the Abyssinians.

South of these hills there is another hill, the confusion as to the identity of which was the main cause of the disaster.

Baratieri, on the extremely rough and inaccurate sketch map which he issued, and in his orders, referred to it as Kidane Meret. In actual fact it appears that the hill which Baratieri had in mind possesses no distinctive name, but four miles away, well in advance of the position which he had selected to occupy, there is another hill known as Enda Kidane Meret and near it a smaller feature which, it appears, is the true "Hill of Kidane Meret" and the only one which native guides would recognise by that name.

The country is extremely broken and difficult and is aptly described in an Italian account as ; "Green valleys covered with rich tropical vegetation in whose depths some muddy stream winds to and fro ; rugged slopes, precipitous and broken, abounding in ravines, gorges and crevasses ; narrow and tortuous clefts in the hard rock ; passes half closed, steep and very difficult, and granite summits that rear themselves to the sky in the most strange forms and dimensions. Here and there cultivated and green pastures in the declivities and on the lowland ; thick bushes and trees in the forests ; while scattered everywhere are many euphorbias, mimosas, wild olives, junipers and some giant sycamores."

The paths are merely narrow tracks winding in and out amongst the hills.

Baratieri's plan was to carry out a night march by three paths and then to take up his position on the line of hills abovementioned ; there either to await the enemy's attack or, if they showed signs of retiring before him, as he still seemed to think was likely, to enter Adowa.

The Italian force was accordingly organised in three columns and a Reserve composed as under :—

RIGHT COLUMN—(GENERAL DABORMIDA).

2nd Infantry Brigade.

Two Regiments of Infantry of two battalions each.
One Battalion of Native Militia.
One Company of Native Levies.
Three Italian Mountain batteries.

CENTRE COLUMN—(GENERAL ARIMONDI).

1st Infantry Brigade.

One Regiment of Bersaglieri of two battalions.
One Regiment of Infantry of two battalions.
One Company of Native Infantry.
Two Indian Mountain Batteries.

LEFT COLUMN—(GENERAL ALBERTONE).

Native Brigade.

Four Battalions of Native Infantry.
Two Italian Mountain Batteries.
One and a half Batteries of Native Mountain Artillery.
Some 300 Native Levies.

RESERVE—(GENERAL ELLENA).

3rd Infantry Brigade.

Two Regiments of Infantry of three battalions.
One Regiment of Infantry of two battalions.
One Native Battalion.
Half a Company of Engineers.
Two Field Batteries.

The total strength of the Italian force actually taking part in the battle was about 17,700 men all told of whom 10,596 were Italians and the rest natives. There was no cavalry and the rifle strength was 14,519 with 56 guns.

The strength of the Abyssinian forces has been variously estimated, but it was not less than 100,000, of whom about 80,000 were armed with rifles. They also had 42 guns of varying types but lacked trained personnel to make them effective.

The gist of Baratieri's orders was as follows :--

The three columns were to move out from camp at 21-00 hours on the night of 29th February 1896, on separate tracks, the Reserve to follow the Centre Column at half an hour's interval.

The Right Column was to occupy the Spur of Belah and the Hill of Belah.

The Centre Column was to occupy Mount Belah.

The left Column was to occupy the hill which Baratieri *thought* was Kidane Meret.

The Reserve was to occupy a position on a hill in rear of the Centre Column.

The columns moved off at the appointed time under a bright sky with a young moon. The troops were in excellent spirits and glad to be on the move after their weeks of inaction.

Each column had a body of natives as guides, Baratieri had allowed a full eight hours to cover a distance of nine miles, the tracks were found to be better than had been expected and everything seemed to be going well. The first hint of trouble came when Baratieri, marching in rear of the Centre Column found the column halted and, on enquiring the cause, was shown a message from Arimondi who said that he had been compelled to halt for the Left Column, under Albertone, which had cut across his track. It was apparent that the Left Column had lost its way, but the gravity of the mistake was not realised at the time. In point of fact this mistake had already made disaster almost inevitable for it was the starting point of a chain of circumstances which led inexorably to the tragic climax.

Albertone, having delayed the march for an hour and a half, arrived at the position allotted to him before the rest of the force was within miles of its destinations. It was, in fact, just after 3 A.M. that Albertone arrived at the hill marked on Baratieri's sketch map as Kidane Meret, and which it was intended that he should occupy. Albertone quite understood this and halted to await the arrival of the other columns on his right. After waiting for some time and still finding no sign of Arimondi's column on his right, Albertone began to think that perhaps there was some mistake. He thereupon consulted

his guides, who told him that the spot where he stood was not Kidane Meret but that the hill of that name was some four miles further on. This added to his misgivings for, if he still had four miles to go, there was no time to be lost, and he made the fateful decision to follow the letter of his orders and march on to the true Kidane Meret. The results were fatal; for it was not long before he was isolated and surrounded, which compelled the other Brigades to fight all day with their left flank uncovered, and to make futile efforts to help him—efforts which finally disorganised the whole line of defence.

After Albertone's Brigade had passed, the remainder moved on again and by 5-15 Dabormida had occupied the hill of Rebbi Arieni, in rear of the Spur of Belah, which had been given to him as his first objective. At 5-30 Arimondi's Brigade began to get into position on Dabormida's left, according to plan. The Reserve column was in sight and all seemed well except that Albertone was not in his appointed place on the left, a fact which Baratieri did not realise for some time.

In the meanwhile, the Abyssinian army was awake and moving. The great chance had at last arrived. Contrary to Menelik's most sanguine hopes the Italians had actually left their strong position and moved out into some of the most difficult country in Ethiopia. The whole Ethiopian host sprang to arms and hurried to envelop the invaders.

The first exchange of shots occurred at about 6 A.M., from Abyssinians at the true hill of Enda Kidane Meret. At about the same time Baratieri reached the hill of Rebbi Arienni. The sound of firing from so far in advance of the true position does not appear to have alarmed him and he thought that it came from scouts pushed out well in front by Albertone, and his anxiety seems to have been centred on the movements of Dabormida's Brigade, for he knew that only about three miles in front of his right there was a large concentration of Abyssinians.

He spent the next hour reconnoitring the ground to his front and right and, shortly before 7 A.M., ordered Dabormida to occupy the Spur of Belah. He ordered him at the same time "to join hands as quickly as possible with Albertone." This was another order which led to disastrous results. What Baratieri probably intended was that, after occupying the Spur of Belah, Dabormida should continue to advance with some of his troops and join hands

with Albertone, whom he believed to be quite close. What actually happened was that Dabormida evidently took the order to mean that he was to advance without delay to the help of Albertone and, not knowing exactly where he was, and owing to the difficulty of the country, was eventually led away towards the North, out of touch with either Albertone or Arimondi and became entirely isolated.

At 8-15 Baratieri saw, for the first time, from the height of Mount Esasho, where he had taken his stand, that Albertone was very seriously engaged. The situation was now evident to him but he did not recall Albertone, because, as he explained afterwards, the rest of his force was not yet deployed and he feared that he would not be able to support the retirement effectively. Messages now began to arrive from Albertone and Baratieri galloped over to the height of Mount Raio, immediately behind Mount Belah, and, arriving there, the seriousness of the position was brought home to him by a stream of wounded and fugitive Ascari of Albertone's Brigade. Briefly, what had happened to Albertone was this. On crossing the hill of Enda Kidane Meret, his leading battalion had come into collision with the Abyssinians who were massing on the other side. They were speedily heavily involved and Albertone sent them an order to retire. The rest of his brigade was disposed as follows: one Native battalion was on the right, resting on Mount Gusoso, a height to the right of Enda Kidane Meret; one Native battalion was on the left in the undulating valley before Enda Kidane Meret; the remaining battalion was behind the centre in reserve, and his guns were in the centre in advance of his reserve battalion.

When the advanced battalion started to retire, the Abyssinians hurled themselves forward and the battalion was thrown back in disorder upon the rest of the brigade. The action now became general.

The Abyssinians advanced in overwhelming numbers in their usual half-moon formation and their right had soon completely enveloped the position, reaching as far as Mount Semaiata, well in Albertone's rear, while their left obtained a footing on Mount Gusoso, on his right. By occupying Mount Gusoso the Abyssinians really decided the day for they here drove a wedge into the Italian position, and eventually, pushing Albertone to their right and Dabormida to their left, captured the Spur of Belah and rendered Arimondi's position untenable. Their first attacks were repulsed, but sheer

weight of numbers soon began to tell and a terrific onslaught on Albertone's left battalion finally crumpled up the brigade.

Albertone threw his reserve battalion into the fight in an effort to stay the tide, but it was too late and the numbers of the enemy were being momentarily increased. This reserve battalion, from all accounts, put up a very gallant fight and was practically annihilated where it stood, so that it was not until about 10-30 that Albertone gave the order to retire, ordering the Italian batteries to cover the retreat and to "sacrifice themselves where they stood." This they did, fighting the guns to the last round, when the enemy rushed in and they were annihilated to a man. The retirement was at first orderly, but the enemy had so completely enveloped the force that there was never much chance of escape and only a shattered remnant succeeded in falling back on the remainder of the Italian troops. General Albertone himself was taken prisoner, 48 Italian officers out of a total of 81 were killed and practically all the rest wounded and made prisoners.

While this tragedy was being enacted Baratieri sent to find out where Dabormida was, for he now realised that his right was out of touch as well as his left. He sent him two messages to support Albertone but neither of them arrived and he neither knew Dabormida's real position nor the fact that he was now far out to the right and was already heavily engaged on his own account. He believed that his right was secure and that the Spur of Belah was occupied by Dabormida.

In point of fact, this all-important position, which commanded Arimondi's right flank and his line of retreat, was not occupied by any troops whatever. It is easy to be wise after the event; nevertheless it is difficult to understand the failure of inter-communication, the bad orders, the misunderstanding of orders and the failure of orders to reach their destinations, which seems to have been the rule rather than the exception throughout the day.

While Baratieri was endeavouring to stem the onrush of the enemy on his left, who were streaming forward in pursuit of, and round the flanks of, the remnants of Albertone's Brigade, a huge mass of Abyssinians emerged from the valley in front of the Spur of Belah and in a very short time were in possession of this vital feature. All hope of establishing contact with Dabormida was now at an end. The Abyssinians had succeeded in separating the Italian force, each

portion of which was now isolated and faced with an enemy six or seven times its superior in numbers, nearly as well armed and filled with fanatical fury raised to white-heat by its initial success. An effort was made to counter-attack for the recovery of the Spur, but the attempt was repulsed with severe losses.

The units on the Hill of Belah and on Mount Belah were now outflanked and were soon compelled to give ground. Baratieri sent order after order to them to hold the Mount at all costs and sent a battalion from his reserve to help them. The Bersaglieri rallied and held their ground for a time, but the situation was now beyond recovery. The Abyssinians were by now pouring after and over-running the fleeing remnants of Albertone's brigade and rapidly working round the flank and rear of the reserve.

It was at this juncture that a native battalion on the left of Arimondi's brigade broke and fled. This decided Baratieri to order a general retirement and he was still so much in ignorance of the real position of affairs that he has recorded that he believed that a retirement could be safely carried out covered by Dabormida's brigade of the true position of which he was still ignorant.

It is now necessary to return to Dabormida's movements. On receiving Baratieri's order to "join hands with Albertone" he proceeded past the Spur of Belah in the direction in which he thought Albertone was. Owing probably to the difficulty of the country, however, he bore towards the right instead of the left and presently found himself in a valley some $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles from Rebbi Arienni, well in front of and to the right of the Spur of Belah. There were heights to the right and to the left and the valley in the centre. Abyssinians were seen on the left and Dabormida sent off a message to Baratieri at 9-15 which explains much of the subsequent action. "Extensive encampments of Abyssinians are to be seen to the North of Adowa; a strong column is advancing from them towards the Native Brigade (Albertone's); I am holding out my hand to it, while keeping a strong body of troops massed near the road that leads from Rebbi Arienni to Adowa, and watching the heights on the right."

A Native battalion was sent to the left in the direction in which it was thought that Albertone's brigade lay and a company of irregulars was ordered to the high ground on the right. As these two bodies moved across the plain they saw the enemy massing on the heights and a race developed.

The native battalion on the left gained the height which they had been ordered to make good, only to find another height beyond. They at once made for this and managed to reach it just before the Abyssinians. Now, however, they found that they were up against an overwhelmingly superior force of the enemy and were gradually compelled to give ground. The irregulars were still in the plain and were caught by the rapid advance of the Abyssinians. The enemy were now pressing forward on all sides in ever-increasing numbers and moving with extreme rapidity over the broken ground so that in a very short time the Native battalion on the heights and the irregulars on the plain were overrun and virtually wiped out. The remainder of the brigade was now deployed, partly on the high ground on the left of the plain and partly in the valley itself. They had hardly got into position before a dense mass of Abyssinians and Galla horsemen, taking advantage of the cover provided by the tall grass and the broken ground, flung themselves upon the Italian line.

The Italians stood firm and the attack was repulsed with heavy loss. Dabormida as yet felt no very great anxiety. Apart from the losses of the native battalion his casualties had not been very heavy and on his left rear he could see a battalion of Arimondi's brigade, so that it seemed all was well in that direction. Actually this battalion was one which had been ordered forward, early in the day, to establish contact with Dabormida's brigade. Colonel De Amicis, commanding this battalion was soon attacked by large numbers of the Abyssinians who were trying to surround Dabormida's brigade, and, realising the importance of protecting the flank of the 2nd Brigade, gave up all idea of rejoining his own brigade and occupied a strong position on Dabormida's left rear. This move prevented the enemy from completely surrounding the 2nd Brigade early in the day.

Dabormida sent one of his battalions to support De Amicis and they succeeded in repelling a strong attack so that, by twelve o'clock, the fire on both his front and flank had died down so that he had as yet no cause for alarm, being unaware of the disaster which had befallen the rest of the force. It was not until he was furiously attacked by the masses of Abyssinians let loose by the destruction of Albertone's and Arimondi's brigades that he was, in his turn, overwhelmed.

In the meantime complete and utter disaster had overtaken the main force. Having given the order to retire on the left, Baratieri

rode over to Rabbi Arienni on the right where he found that the confusion was already such as to make any attempt at an orderly retirement out of the question. The enemy were crowning the heights of the Spur of Belah and Mount Belah and pouring a heavy fire into the confused mass of broken troops in the valley below. The reserve had been gradually used up and only one battalion remained more or less intact. With this the General attempted to make a last stand but by now the Abyssinians were pouring on in an ever increasing torrent from the front and both flanks, and they were carried away by the stream of fugitives, with whom the enemy were now intermingled. Units no longer existed, and, except for isolated groups of Italian troops, all resistance was at an end and the broken force streamed away along the tracks to Sauria in a confused mass of Italians and Ascari, wounded men and transport animals. The Abyssinians swarmed over every hill and mound, pouring a deadly fire at close range into the disordered masses and, their enthusiasm raised to a pitch of fury by seeing the white men in flight, repeatedly dashed into the column with sword, spear and knife.


Baratieri and other individual officers made attempts to rally the troops but their fatigue and demoralisation were now complete.

In his own account of the retreat Baratieri concludes his description with the tragic words: "And we continued along our path of sorrow."

It was indeed a path of sorrow on which General Baratieri followed his shattered army.


The Abyssinians did not continue their pursuit for more than about nine miles and at sunset the battered column reached a small village where they were able to rest for an hour and a half, then continuing the march, now in some semblance of order, under cover of darkness. Three times did the column lose its way during the night but at last the remnants struggled into the fort of Adi Caje, from where Baratieri sent off his famous telegram announcing the disaster. It is not surprising to read that those about him feared that his reason was departing.

All this time Baratieri was ignorant of the fate of Dabormida's brigade. Having dealt with the remainder of the Italian force the Abyssinians were now free to turn their attention to the 2nd Brigade and swarmed forward to the attack. Dabormida delivered a vigorous counter-attack which drove the enemy back with heavy loss but the



SKETCH
TO ILLUSTRATE THE BATTLE OF ADOWA
MARCH 1ST 1896.

SCALE:-
0 MT. 250 500 750 1000 MT.
1 KILOMETRE.



triumph was short-lived for the Abyssinians were now closing in in huge numbers on his flanks and rear, many giving up the pursuit of the main force to swarm back to deal with the one remaining Italian column. At length Dabormida was compelled to order a general retirement. His retirement is regarded by the Italians as the one bright spot of that day of disaster for, although assailed on all sides, the retreat did not develop into the complete rout of the rest of the force and this was largely due to the stand made by the battalion of De Amicis, which held its ground and was able, in some degree, to cover the retreat of the rest of the brigade.

Dabormida himself was killed leading a counter-attack, as was De Amicis, practically the whole of whose battalion was wiped out.

The artillery was caught by the Abyssinians and the men and animals slaughtered. Under cover of the stand made by the battalion of De Amicis and by dint of several counter-attacks, the 2nd Brigade, although suffering severe casualties, withdrew in fairly good order. The elements saved the survivors for, as they wound their way along the difficult tracks, under fire from the Abyssinians who hurried to occupy every vantage point along the line of retreat, darkness began to fall and a violent thunderstorm broke which prevented the enemy from closing in on the column.

The Battle of Adowa was over.

As the remnants of the Italian force struggled painfully over the rugged hillsides there rose behind them the Amharic song of triumph : " Mow, mow down the tender grass, Ebalgume ! Ebalgume ! The corn of Italy that was sown in Tigre has been reaped by Abba Dagno,* and he has given it to the birds."

The Italian losses at Adowa were 2,918 white N. C. Os. and men killed, 430 wounded and 954 missing ; 261 officers killed or missing and 31 officers wounded ; about 2,000 Ascari killed and 958 wounded. The small number of wounded men speaks ill for the Abyssinians and it is certain that large numbers of wounded were massacred out of hand. Apart from killed, wounded and those never accounted for, there were 1,865 Italians taken prisoner and at least 1,000 Ascari. The prisoners suffered terrible hardships during their captivity, many of them dying, while a number were shockingly mutilated.

The disaster was complete and by the terms of the subsequent Peace Treaty Italy acknowledged the absolute independence of Ethiopia.

*Abba Dagno was the name given to Menelik because the horse he rode at Adowa was called Dagno,

THE BOX

By F. T.

In the bad old days, before the value of barbed wire as a deterrent to thieves was realised, many and extraordinary were the robberies committed by Border raiders in the cantonments within their reach. Among these raiders there was none more skilful, daring, and ruthless than Ahmad Khan, son of Ismail, commonly known as Tor from his dark and forbidding countenance. It was he who lifted, in the manner of the hero of Kipling's poem, two valuable polo ponies from the Colonel's stable, and rode them across the Border, whence they never returned; it was he who with five companions stole the rifles from a regiment which shall be nameless, and it was again he who performed the almost miraculous feat of depriving a sleeping officer not only of his wardrobe but also of his bedclothes without disturbing him. Many and dark were the tales of his prowess and his crimes.

One spring when many officers had gone to the War, and their kit and household property was stored in a disused granary, adjoining the lines of a certain regiment, Tor planned a raid. Even the most daring raider does not provoke a fight if he can help it, and this store house, full of other men's goods and chattels and only loosely guarded, seemed to afford an admirable opportunity for some quiet looting.

The raid was almost, but not quite, successful. Tor and his companions, leaving one man to guard their line of retreat, broke open the door, entered, smashed open boxes and trunks, and swiftly and systematically loaded themselves with loot. It was on the whole a disappointing haul, but as they were leaving Tor's eye fell on a long brass-bound wooden case lying by itself in a corner. It was heavy and solid, shaped rather like a large ammunition box, and obviously held things of value, ammunition perhaps or even rupees.

Tor was still stooping over it when from outside came a sharp challenge and a shot, followed immediately by another. Like a flash Tor picked up the box, gave a quick signal to his companions and bolted from the store house. Across the open they went, trusting to the darkness to hide them from the guard who had rushed out at the sound of the shot. Luckily for them the guard house was some distance away from where the sentry had fired and before the guard

could collect its scattered wits, the raiders had vanished in the darkness. In a few minutes they had put a mile between themselves and the cantonment and halting in a belt of thick jungle took stock of their position.

Normally after a successful raid the gang would lie up for the day in some safe spot not far from the scene of their exploit, divide the spoil and wait for darkness in which to make good their escape to the border, thirty miles away. But on this occasion shots had been fired, they had left a dead or dying sentry behind them, and one of their number was wounded in the thigh. The alarm had been given, in half an hour the pursuit would be out, and they must put all the distance they could between themselves and their pursuers without any delay.

And so off they set towards the hills, loaded with their loot, two of them carrying the box and the wounded man lagging in the rear. By noon they had reached the edge of the cultivation and paused again. The pursuit was now hot behind them and far off across the long stony slopes which lay between them and safety they could see the dust rising from a detachment of cavalry moving out to block the passes. The wounded man could no longer stand the pace and they left him by a stream. Here too they left most of the loot: only the box they carried with them, the precious brass-bound box whose contents Tor insisted would surely repay their efforts if only they could get it across the Border.

Off they went again trailing along at the untiring dog-trot of the frontier thief, four panting desperate men, determined to win to safety if they could, and if not to die fighting. So hot was the pace that the pursuit dropped back and for a time it looked as if the gang would escape. But they had reckoned without two instruments of modern warfare, the telephone and the bomb. As they topped the last slope and hurried down towards the great ravine which ran up to the hills and safety, they heard a shout. Not half a mile away blocking their path was a detachment of police, summoned early that morning by telephone from an outlying post to guard this very place. A shot whistled over their heads and another and another. Down they plunged into the ravine, up a side nullah and into a cave, a well known hiding place for many a raiding gang and one from which more than one raider had escaped under cover of darkness. A narrow entrance commanded the approaches and in the hands of desperate men it was well nigh impossible to rush it. But from the inside of the

cave it was not possible to see the top of the ravine opposite, and though rifle fire from this vantage point might be of no effect, a few well directed bombs into the cave mouth should soon make it uninhabitable.

And so it proved. Half an hour later the pursuit party from the cantonment came up, dispositions were made and the gang called upon to surrender. A contemptuous refusal was the only reply. Whereupon three Mills bombs in quick succession burst on and through the entrance. Hardly had the roar of the explosion died away when out of the smoke still swirling round the cave mouth sprang three figures. A volley from the opposite bank, and they dropped in their tracks. The fourth man, badly wounded, crawled into the open and surrendered.

A few minutes later the police officer in command of the pursuit party was questioning the wounded man.

"You'd never have caught us," the captive said, "if it hadn't been for that box. Tor wouldn't leave it: he said it was full of rupees or ammunition."

"What box?" asked the mystified officer.

"It's in the cave, we brought it, Tor wouldn't drop it.....but it kept us back....it was very heavy...." The raider's voice trailed away.

The police officer walked across into the cave. He returned in a few minutes, with a queer smile on his face, and came over to where his junior was contemplating the bodies of the dead raiders.

"Well," he said, "he was a blackguard, was Tor, and we're well rid of him. But he was a brave man according to his lights, a very brave man I should say, and I'm rather glad that he never knew and now presumably will never know, that he sacrificed his life in an attempt to carry off the latest edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, complete in brass-bound walnut case!"

CAMBRAI, 1917

BY CAPTAIN F. MACKENZIE, 15TH PUNJAB REGIMENT.

On 20th November 1917 many regiments added another name to their roll of battle honours, but to the Royal Tank Corps "Cambrai" was not "another" but "*the*" battle honour of the Great War. At Cambrai the existence of the Corps was at stake; success meant retention and expansion, failure discredit beyond redemption.

The immediate objective of the attack was the breaching of the Hindenburg Line between the St. Quentin Canal and Canal du Nord, and the responsibility for achieving this rested with the Tanks. The attack was a complete success and much has been written in praise of the Corps and the many stirring incidents which occurred that day; but the preparations for the battle, the secrecy observed, the surprise effected and co-operation between Tank and Infantry has been lost sight of.

It is with these aspects rather than with the battle itself that it is proposed to deal in this article.

Up to November 1917 the success of tanks had always been impaired by the nature of the ground selected; their debut had been made on the Somme in July 1916, the worst shell-stricken area in France; the ground selected in the Autumn of 1916 was no better; attempts to manoeuvre in the Ypres Salient were usually defeated by mud and their final employment in the morass of Passchendaele after the torrential rain of 31st July 1917 was merely suicidal.


In the Cambrai area tanks were given a fair deal, the ground generally speaking was good, but there was one obstacle, the Hindenburg Line, which it was impossible for tanks to cross without special equipment; the second asset in the Cambrai Area was the possibility of surprise.

The Fascine.—The span of a Mark IV tank was between 10 and 11 feet, but it was known that the Hindenburg Line in parts was as much as 13 feet wide. To overcome the crossing difficulty a stepping stone was devised; this consisted of a large fascine made of brushwood over 4 feet in height and about 10 feet long; this fascine was secured by chains and when in position rode on the hood of the tank; it was mechanically kept in position and its release was effected by turning the handle of the releasing gear which was inside the tank. The function of this fascine was to roll forward over the nose of the

tank into the trench and to form a stepping stone for the tank to cross by.

The Box Formation.—To make the most economic use of the fascines a system of leap-frogging tanks was introduced and given the name of "The Box Formation." Treating the enemy's defences as three lines of trenches, tanks were divided into sections of three moving in single file. Upon reaching the first trench the leader dropped his fascine into the trench, but without crossing swung left, and moving along the parapet engaged the enemy in that trench. Meanwhile, the second tank, using the stepping stone provided by the first, advanced straight to the selected crossing place in the second trench and there depositing its fascine swung left and repeated the tactics of the first tank. The third tank, using the stepping stones of the first and second, deposited its fascine in the third trench and repeated the tactics of the other two. Finally, the first tank, having done all the damage it could to the enemy in the first trench, moved forward across the second and third trenches and halted on the far side of the third where it was joined by the other two; the section being now united was ready to receive orders for a further advance.

SKETCH OF BOX
FORMATION.



Co-operation.—The wire entanglement in front of the enemy main position was known to be very formidable and untouched by shell fire. In order that the infantry in the attack should take full advantage of the track laid by the tank through the wire, rehearsals of Box Formation tactics were carried out behind the line by tank and Infantry battalions. Infantry platoons were detailed to follow each tank up to the point where their own tasks began and, to facilitate recognition, each tank carried a painted design on the petrol shield in rear.

Naturally there were many instances where theory and practice did not agree.

Blindfold in Battle.—In my own section there was one tank which was engaged early by enemy machine-gun fire, the fire being directed at the fascine. Without doing serious damage it affected the release mechanism and when the Tank Commander turned the handle inside to roll his fascine into the trench the furthest it would go was on to the tracks in front of the driver's window.

The tank was now on the brink of the Hindenburg trench and the view forward was restricted to about 6 feet. The Tank Commander wisely backed and, swinging left, carried out the rest of his programme as best he could, eventually crossing where a direct hit from a heavy shell had destroyed both parapet and parados. On reaching an open incline on the far side the tank was put sharply into reverse and the fascine that refused to go forward rolled backward over the tail.

Secrecy.—To ensure secrecy every move forward to the concentration area was carried out under cover of darkness. My own battalion moved from Bray on the Somme to Le Plateau, picking up fascines en route. Only those who have tried to drive an old Mark IV tank off a ramp on to an open truck in pitch dark with less than a foot to spare on either side can appreciate the difficulty and anxiety. There is only one greater form of anxiety and that is to drive the same tank backwards off the train in the dark, especially when you are furthest from the ramp and have the pleasure of negotiating eleven empty trucks before reaching the ramp. In spite of these difficulties statistics show that, except for a collision between a lorry and a tank at a level crossing, in which the lorry came off second best, no serious accident in the entraining and detraining movements occurred.

Autumn Camouflage.—Fashions change in camouflage as well as in other things. It was felt that the green nets with which we had covered our tanks during Summer would look out of place in November, so fresh nets were issued into which were introduced autumnal tints of red and gold. These nets were looked upon by us as a necessary evil; they weighed a great deal, occupied much space and were inflammable. During the night march from our detraining point at Heudicourt to the tankodrome nets were carried on the roof of each tank. The exhaust pipe also traversed the roof and it was not long before one of the nets caught alight and started a real bonfire. Every pyrene in the company was sent to extinguish it and we prayed that the enemy had not seen the remainder of us silhouetted against the blaze.

The last 48 hours.—The move to the concentration area having been carried out secretly and successfully, no risk was run during the last two days of undoing the good work. The Parking place selected for the tanks of my battalion was close beneath a high bank; this enabled camouflage nets to be spread above, and clear of, the vehicle thereby disclosing no outline, which is the secret of good concealment from the air. Also, for several hours each day, the tanks remained in natural shadow caused by the bank. A guard of minimum strength remained in the vicinity, otherwise no one was allowed to approach the position during hours of day light. The result was so successful that no trace of the tanks could be seen in the photographs taken by our own special reconnaissance planes. Meanwhile, the troops were also kept under cover, my battalion was allotted quarters in the Catacombs of Heudicourt. Presumably they were the tunnels of a disused mine, but whether catacombs or mine it was, without doubt, the most depressing place to spend the two days before an engagement. Shortly before sunset we emerged from our "tombs" and marched a couple of miles to the tanks. All night long the work of preparing for action went on.

The bigger items included :—

Ammunition.—Filling the shell racks with 200 rds. of 6 pdr. ammunition. Loading magazines for four Lewis guns and issuing revolver ammunition.

Petrol.—Filling to capacity the seventy-gallon tank, all hand done from two-gallon tins.

Water.—Filling the forty-gallon radiator, also from two-gallon tins, and keeping a sharp look-out in the dark to see that a tin containing

water did not stray to the petrol filling party as happened to one unfortunate crew. Filling the drinking water tanks.

Oil and Grease.—The oiling and greasing of about eighty caps and rollers.

Tracks.—Work on the tracks was the most arduous. Every third plate in the track had to be fitted with a "spud," or iron extension, which gave the track a better grip in muddy ground. "Spuds" were mass production articles and often refused to fit the track especially if the latter was in any degree bent. With their hands numb with cold the crews spent hours each night wrenching and hammering, trying to persuade nuts and bolts to fit. After the spuds came the unditching beam, a huge iron-wood beam which was positioned on rails at the tail of the tank, to be used as a last extremity if really wet ground was encountered, a cumbersome but very efficient device.

Etceteras.—When the outside of the tank had been prepared for action and petrol, water, grease, oil and ammunition were complete, it still remained to find room inside for the "etceteras" chief among which were the camouflage net, picks, shovels, periscopes, signalling shutters, smoke bombs, crowbars, food for the crew, a box of spare ammunition for the infantry, a cork mattress (use unknown) also for the infantry, great coats for the crew and last but not least a cage of carrier pigeons. Having now filled the tank from floor to roof it only remained to insert nine human beings complete with tin hats, equipment and gas masks and you get a picture of a tank as she went into action at the battle of Cambrai.

* * * * *

The Action and After.—As stated earlier in this article it is not the writer's intention to describe the battle as seen from a tank or to account for the mattress, much less the carrier pigeons. These and more important items will be recorded in sufficient detail in the "Official History of the War 1917," but it may not be out of place to quote here the comments of a German critic, particularly where his remarks refer to the degree of surprise effected. The remarks are taken from "Kritik des Weltkrieges" written some years ago by that very able author Captain Hans Ritter. He writes: "The British, following on their offensive in Flanders, delivered a subsidiary attack South-West of Cambrai. The German line in this sector was apparently secured against surprise by the strongly fortified Siegfried Line, and its extensive wire entanglements, and thus was only thinly

held. Previous experience had shown that an attack here could only be carried out after several days' preparation by powerful masses of artillery so that there would be ample time to bring up the necessary reinforcements. But the British, in addition to their strategic aims, were about to carry out a new tactical experiment; without making any attempt to blow a breach with artillery, they resolved to try and smash a gap with tanks. And they succeeded in so doing. The new device had this advantage over the former system, that it did away with the necessity for lengthy and obvious preparations before the offensive, for the tanks need only be brought forward to their jumping off line the previous night. This formed the ideal method for a surprise offensive on a large scale.....The attack came as the most complete of surprises; the tanks overran or broke through our trenches and our infantry, and, following close behind them, caught the garrisons in their dugouts.....this lesson (*i.e.*, surprise) the German High Command took to heart with regard to the operations of 1918 but not, alas! the lesson that the tank was the best and most effective method of securing Surprise."

DEBT

BY "M. STONE."

It has been ordained, and rightly, that it is the responsibility of the Commanding Officer to see that young officers live within their means. Rightly because no other person can possibly be held so responsible. From the aspect of professional training alone, this responsibility is justly placed. Personal debt is scarcely a good basis on which to build sound training in administration and interior economy. Incidentally, no amount of argument can obscure the fact that an officer who cannot manage his own affairs is scarcely the one best fitted to direct and superintend the administrative affairs of others. Another aspect too is that the ever pressing incubus of debt must militate against the efficient performance of every duty. Debt is closely wrapped up with the Commanding Officer's responsibility for the training and efficiency of the young officer and the conclusion appears inevitable that these matters cannot be divorced one from the other.

But however it may be argued, the fact remains that the Commanding Officer has been made responsible for steering his officers clear of debt. It may therefore be of interest to examine how he is to carry out this duty and if he fails, how he should deal with debt cases.

The reader will here note that if it is possible to carry out the duty any discussion of failure should not arise. Unfortunately the duty is at all times extremely difficult and it is not too much to say that in many cases it is almost impossible to carry out. This is so because of the one characteristic common to all debt cases; the debtor will prevaricate to the bitter end to conceal his financial condition. He frequently seconds this invariable characteristic by tortuous loan and credit manipulations which, when revealed, give rise to a wonder of how one possessing such "business" acumen should have so mismanaged his own affairs initially. For those who happily have not had to deal with these cases the thought may arise that this common characteristic of prevarication is surely due to wrong treatment. Do not dragoon the youngster or show him your distrust, you may say, but treat him as a man of honour. Point out to him the truly

terrible snowball effect of debt accumulating over years, accumulating at the extortionate interest rates tragically common to this country, until in the end there is danger of reaching a position from which rescue is impossible, life becomes a nightmare and career is ruined. If he has sense, surely he will respond to such argument? Well, try it if you will but don't build too highly on the hope of candid response or honest co-operation.

The three cases on which this article is based have followed certain general lines—

- (a) The young officer took his first loan from a money-lender during his year's attachment to a British unit in India. (This was only discovered after the debacle.)
- (b) On joining his Indian unit and at subsequent periods, he reported himself free of debt.
- (c) Until the discovery of his debt his social activities and general conduct gave no indication that he was living beyond his means. There were neither wine, women nor gambling.
- (d) After a period of years varying from 2 to 5 the thunderbolt arrived in the form of a Civil Court attachment of 50 *per cent.* of the officer's pay in satisfaction of a civil suit; usually in favour of a money-lender.

The last stage is usually followed by a general rally of the vultures to the carcase. Word flashes round that credit is no longer good and the bills and claims come pouring in. It may or it may not be possible to rescue the officer, but before dealing with these possibilities reference will be made to the means which the Commanding Officer has to prevent the young officer's first indiscretions, or having committed these, to save him before they become too serious.

On first joining his Indian unit, the officer should be asked if he is free from debt. If some measure of his confidence can be won before this takes place and if the matter is dealt with sympathetically and tactfully, the officer who is in debt may respond to such treatment. The word "may" is used by design for experience goes to prove that he is normally too afraid to confess. Conditions are too much for him. He hates to confess his foolishness; to start his career in his permanent unit under a cloud. He firmly believes too, that his debt is a small one which, with a little effort, he can work off. How can the Commanding Officer arrive at the truth? It must be confessed that he has little chance at this stage if the culprit is determined to

be secretive. Occasionally, the young officer may give a loophole by laying claim to a private income or to an allowance which gives opportunity to ask for the production of proof from (i) Trustees, Solicitors or Bankers, and (ii) Relatives.

From the date of joining the Commanding Officer may take certain precautions such as :—

- (a) Forbid the joining of Clubs during the first year or two.
This is a drastic course and the more usual one is to limit his Club to one and his monthly bill to a specified sum.
- (b) The Club bill should be paid through the Mess bill; the Commanding Officer inspecting the latter. His wine and stores account with the Mess can also be limited in amount.
- (c) He can be ordered to make up and submit each month a statement of expenditure backed up by his bank pass book and cheque book.

But here again, there is no conclusively satisfactory evidence. It is usual that the greater the debt, the greater the determination and resource used to conceal it, for it is relatively simple to conduct operations outside the orbit of a bank account. The latter may occasionally give a clue, *i.e.*, suspicious lump sum credits offset by abnormal expenses. Generally speaking, the Commanding Officer is in an invidious position for rarely is more than a portion of the evidence before him until the day when the denouement arrives. Even then, the extent of the liabilities is difficult to assess for the debtor conveniently forgets everything so far not brought to light and is both "surprised" and apologetic with each new debt disclosed.

If at this, or any preceding stage, it would appear possible to rescue the officer (*i.e.*, from funds provided by relatives, bank cover for overdraft guaranteed by the other officers, etc.), there is one action which is imperative and which should be taken forthwith. The money-lenders must be fought in Court. There are usually several of these owing to their successive importunities having forced the young officer to "borrow from Peter to pay Paul." And, by the way, "Paul" is rarely completely paid off. He merely receives something on account from the sum borrowed from "Peter," and so the process continues throughout the whole range of the Apostles. The money-lenders claims must be contested on two counts; firstly, to establish that the interest is extortionate and the whole claim unconscionable, and secondly, to cause the full amount adjudged

to be owed, capital and interest, to be fixed in the decree after which no further interest may be permitted in law to accrue except such as the Court decides. The decreed sums should then be paid into Court which automatically rescinds any attachment orders on the officer's pay.

As soon as an officer is discovered to be in debt, there is only one reasonable course for a Commanding Officer to take. He must directly assume control of the financial transactions of the officer and officially place him under certain restrictions. This applies whether the officer can be rescued or not. In the former case he must be made to repay by a monthly fixed sum, wholly or in part, the funds made available to him. In the latter case, the officer is "down and out," resignation usually follows and his resources must, in his own interests, be conserved with miserly niggardliness. A convenient method of exercising this control and of imposing the limitations is on the following lines :—

- (a) A detailed budget of maximum monthly expenditure should be drawn up for the officer.
- (b) Based on (a), an Adjutant's written order will be handed to the officer specifying precisely the limits of this expenditure and in how far his freedom of movement is circumscribed, if at all. It will contain an order for the resignation from Clubs, etc., and any restrictions on visits to cinemas, races, etc.
- (c) The officer will write a letter to his bank, countersigned by the Commanding Officer, to the effect that in future his account will only be operated upon by cheques signed by both himself and his Commanding Officer, and will contain the proviso that the order is not revocable except by another written request similarly countersigned by his Commanding Officer.

These steps completed, the officer must be under no misunderstanding as regards his position *vis-a-vis* the Adjutant's written order, *i.e.*, disobedience of its terms brings him within the scope of the Army Act.

To follow any contrary course such as relying on the personal honour of the officer in question to live within his means and at the same time to repay part of his debt, is not only taking unjustifiable risks; unjustifiable because past conduct lends no belief to support

the possibility; but it robs the officer of the best aid that can be given to him at this juncture. The course suggested removes from him the strain of attempting to square his finances, at which he has already proved his inaptitude, and with this burden removed from his mind he has opportunity to devote himself whole-heartedly (and probably gratefully) to his military duties.

If it has been possible to procure funds for the rescue of the officer, then great care should be exercised in making disbursements. Not every claim need be, or indeed should be, paid in full. Certain categories are susceptible of settlement at figures considerably lower than those claimed and, in fact, the funds may be so small as to render no other course possible. As a first step to approaching this matter, the debts should be listed under some such headings as follows:—

- (a) Court decrees.
- (b) Debts of honour, *i.e.*, Mess and Club bills.
- (c) Loans from private persons (usually the most difficult of all to discover).
- (d) Tradesmen's accounts.

The first and second categories must be paid in full, with this proviso that where funds are especially small, club committees might be asked to forego the subscriptions due. The third should be paid in full if this course is possible, but without interest. The last should be treated as a "part payment in full settlement" category. There is nothing unusual or innately dishonest in this. Bad debts are a normal and recognised concomitant of trading and the Trade is usually only too willing to see settlement of an otherwise bad debt at a price which, while giving no profit, at least entails no loss. It is usually reasonable to deduct from 30 to 40 *per cent.* from such bills. The trader's assent is normally forthcoming when an outline of the case is explained to him and it is made clear that funds are strictly limited. The trader's alternatives is to incur legal expenses in fighting the case which leaves him no better off. There is one point here worthy of special mention. Every receipt should bear the words "Received the sum of so and so rupees *in full satisfaction* for all goods received and services rendered up to so and so date." The three words in italics alone have the requisite legal force to prevent any future claim being substantiated on these debts, *i.e.*, they render null and void any claim to an unpaid balance on those debts,

The last aspect of these lamentable cases to consider is the action to be taken when rescue of the young officer is impossible. It is at once apparent that if the officer remains in the service he will never be free from debt. On the contrary, the tally of debt will accumulate to fabulous dimensions under the weight of which the officer will rapidly cease to be of military value. With his pay under constant attachment up to 50 *per cent.* he will be unable to maintain his position as an officer. Resignation becomes inevitable not only as the only avenue of escape but as providing the opportunity to start anew elsewhere. In this case, the onus of settling debts of honour, such as Club and Mess bills, falls upon the remaining officers and for this purpose the Commanding Officer is justified in collecting from the debtor officer certain assets, *viz.* :—

- (a) His military arms, equipment and accoutrements (for sale).
- (b) 50 *per cent.* of any privilege leave pay he may be entitled to after leaving India and immediately prior to the date of resignation.
- (c) 50 *per cent.* of any gratuity.

If the officer's pay is under Court attachment, which is almost inevitable, the sums under (b) and (c) should not be drawn in India. The Court attachment has no force outside India and, therefore, purely from the point of view of collecting the maxima assets, they should be drawn outside India. Similar to the Bank letter already referred to, the officer should sign a letter to the Military Secretary, India Office, directing that 50 *per cent.* of (b) and (c) be withheld by him and remitted direct to his Commanding Officer. (*N. B.*—The amount of 50 *per cent.* is the maximum permitted to be withheld in this manner.) The letter will be countersigned by the Commanding Officer and will contain the guarding clause to the effect that its provisions are not revocable except by written order countersigned by the Commanding Officer.

As regards passage on resignation, a Lee Concession passage cannot be used but normally Army Headquarters will grant a second class rail and steamer ticket from the unit to the port of disembarkation overseas. Request for this must accompany the letter forwarding the officer's request to resign. Money must therefore be produced for travelling expenses and for rail fare on disembarkation. This the unit must provide. It should be handed to the officer together with

a detailed statement of the items on which expenditure has been calculated.

Most articles appearing in the Journal follow the admirable practice of concluding with a recommendation or a solution. The effort will now be made but with the greatest diffidence, for the problem bristles with difficulties. Before putting suggestions forward it is desired to stress that we are not necessarily dealing with knaves; far from it. The typical case is the youngster, almost yet a boy, who has never previously had exclusive charge of his own finances. He receives a monthly income which, at first sight, appears to him to be comparative wealth. He may be, and probably is, determined to live within his means, but he finds little if any help in past experience to assist him in coping with the strange conditions of life in India. No matter how advised, it is difficult for him to realise the full import of changed money values in this country; that there never is a "normal" month; that there is only one general plane of expenditure for Europeans. He finds himself spending Rs. 50 or slightly more than he receives each month. With the approach of the time for him to join his Indian unit, the Bank becomes less and less amenable.....he may require some new kit..... a little loan on "note of hand".....easily repaid when he gets a hundred a month more in the Indian Army. Poor fool, he never seems to realise the devastating consequences of 6 *per cent.* compound interest a month. And it may be of interest to note that when an officer has crashed finally and his accounts are examined it becomes clear how little he has got out of the tens of thousands of debt standing in favour of money-lenders. Very often, he has in cold fact spent very little more than an officer struggling along on his pay: "spent" in the sense of receiving goods or service for money paid, or rather, owed. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that many might be saved if only they started on their career with a small reserve to tide them over the first year or so when they are finding their feet. £100/- in the first year would have saved many careers ultimately wrecked through debt.

And for the suggestions aiming at rendering these lamentable cases less frequent. These are given below and the intention underlying them is to afford assistance to Commanding Officers of the Indian Army in carrying out an invidious and extremely difficult duty; a duty which the vast majority conscientiously attempt to carry

out loyally and thoroughly :—

(a) Before leaving Sandhurst training should be given in the keeping of private accounts. The method of budgeting, the difference between "capital" and "recurring" expenditure should be explained ; and the necessity for budgeting to leave a credit balance be stressed. He should be taught to relate the private account book with his bank pass book and his cheque book. Apart from the particular object for this, the training would give a good basis for the cadets' future responsibilities in army administration.

On a suitable occasion the true meaning of foreign money-lender's terms of business and their devastating consequences to the debtor should be well brought home to the cadets.

(b) During his first year of service in India, both British Army and I. A. U. L. officers, should be most carefully shepherded. It is within the knowledge of the writer that the great majority of British units loyally attempt this. But advice and guidance should again be reinforced by instruction. The young officer should be made to submit, on the first of each month, his accounts for the last month and his budget for the next. The irksomeness of this action will be nullified if it is treated as military training ; the first step in administration.

THE DARDANELLES CAMPAIGN

BY MAJOR H. C. WESTMORLAND, D.S.O.,

THE HAMPSHIRE REGIMENT.

In the winter of 1914 the available military forces of the Empire were occupied in defending the Channel ports and in protecting our oil interests at the head of the Persian Gulf. Dominion resources in man-power had not, as yet, been developed, but in November the same year the first Australasian contingent had already embarked for Egypt.

The situation in December, a deadlock in the West and unimportant advances by Russian forces in the East, demanded an immediate military success if certain hesitant neutrals, in particular Italy and the Balkan states, were to be induced to take up arms on behalf of the Allies. The entry of Turkey into the war at the end of October had complicated matters by depriving us of direct communication with Russia and by forcing us to detain troops in Egypt to protect the Suez Canal. It became necessary, therefore, to review the situation with a view to the possibilities of employing forces offensively in the Near East.

The new theatre of operations was virtually decided by the necessity for relieving pressure on the Russian forces in the Caucasus, and the maintenance of sea communications with this same ally, who was already suffering from a shortage of war material of all kinds. To comply with the principle of Concentration it was first of all necessary to decide the front on which it was considered that the decisive effort should be made. After that it was for the military experts to say whether our resources were equal to any additional efforts in subsidiary theatres.

Unfortunately the Government organisation for war had not yet been perfected. The War Council, with the Prime Minister as chairman, still resembled more a Parliamentary committee than a body responsible for far-reaching military decisions. Military and Naval experts, although in attendance, formed no part of the War Council at this period, and their views were not prominent in the deliberations. The Secretary of State for War seems to have usurped the functions of the General Staff, although this may have been due to

the fact that this body was not yet in a position correctly to examine the whole field of strategy. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir Charles Douglas, had died in October 1914, and had been replaced by an officer whose personality seems to have been eclipsed by Lord Kitchener. Further, all the most experienced officers of the General Staff had gone to France in August with the Expeditionary Force. Consequently it was difficult for Ministers of the War Council to judge the correctness or otherwise of the strategical ideas that were conceived.

It was under these conditions that the decision of 24th February 1915 was arrived at. Military forces were to be employed to assist the Navy in forcing the passage of the Dardanelles without due consideration as to either the forces required for the operation or as to whether such forces, as on the face of it seemed necessary, were indeed available. It was not known that a Turkish force of nearly 200,000 was ready to defend Constantinople. It was thought that 75,000 men, irrespective of their state of training, were sufficient to overcome the resistance of an enemy known to be stubborn in defensive operations. The imperfection of the intelligence and the general disregard of the strategical preliminaries advocated in our Field Service Regulations (F. S. R. Vol. II, Sec. 18, para. 2) were not to be without dire consequences.

Th choice of Constantinople as an objective was strategically sound. This is borne out by the effect of the Naval attack of 18th March which, in the opinion of competent observers, was confidently expected to cause a révolution at the Turkish capital and the Germans present there feared that Turkey would conclude a separate peace. If the Turks had evacuated their capital they would have been unable to continue the war. They would have been cut off from their own meagre arsenals, which were situated just outside Constantinople, and supplies of war material from Germany could not have reached them.

Although it was on 24th February that military action was decided on, it was not till 10th March that the 29th Division, on whom it rested whether operations were possible or not, received orders to proceed to Mudros. It is remarkable that the General Staff at the War Office were not informed until the following day that these operations were intended, although the C. I. G. S. was present at the conference of 24th February. The result of this omission was

eventually to delay the concentration. The warning in our Regulations (F. S. R. Vol. II, Sec. 18, para. 4) that any miscalculations in the strategical concentration may be fatal, was to be amply justified.

The instructions given to Sir Ian Hamilton on appointment as Commander-in-Chief (Official History—Appendix I) are a curious mixture of instructions from the Government and military orders. In any case no such assistance as is enumerated in Field Service Regulations (Vol. II, Sec. 5, para. 1) was afforded the commander and his remark that "The instructions seemed vague," (Gallipoli Diary) was quite justifiable. Information about the strength of the enemy was uncertain, Bulair was incorrectly stated to be vital to the Turkish communications on the peninsula, and finally there was no plan of campaign beyond an instruction not to land in Asia Minor.

On 18th March, at Tenedos, Sir Ian Hamilton was informed by General Paris that the Naval Division had not been embarked so as to be able to land in fighting order on an open beach. His transports would have to be entirely reloaded. This could not be done at any place nearer than Alexandria. Thus it was that at a time when the dispositions of the enemy defending the Dardanelles were still faulty and not under German direction (Liman von Sanders assumed command on 24th March), the transports containing the troops were moving away from the scene of their future employment. On the arrival of the 29th Division at Alexandria on 28th March it was found that these troops also had been embarked without regard to tactical considerations. One of the infantry battalions had been embarked in four different vessels. Guns had been loaded in one vessel, their ammunition in a second, and, in some cases, the fuzes in a third.

But these were not the only handicaps under which Sir Ian Hamilton laboured. The delay in appointing the Commander (11th March) had prevented him from assembling his staff in time to accompany him. Thus his "A" and "Q" advisers were absent when he most urgently wanted them. Later, Sir Ian was to discover important deficiencies in the organisation and equipment of his force. There was no G. H. Q. signal company. High explosive shell was non-existent and there was no material or skilled labour for the building of piers. Added to all the disadvantages of delay caused by the disembarkation of the force at Alexandria was the loss of secrecy. The composition and destination of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force was proclaimed throughout the Egyptian press and soon become known by the enemy General Staff.


In the orders for the landing the intention of the commander is not stated, but from the instructions issued by G. H. Q. it is clear that the big drive was to be made at Helles where the 29th Division were to land. The landing of the Anzac Corps at Gaba Tepe was with the idea of gaining positions from which the retreat of the Turkish forces from Helles could be prevented. Although it was known that the Turkish General Staff were expecting a landing at the South West corner of the peninsula, the region was selected largely because the Navy favoured this part of the plan as likely to assist their efforts in clearing the minefields. Furthermore, the ground over which the troops were to advance was not defiladed by high ground near the shore, as in many other possible landing places.


The initial landings were to be made from men-of-war, except in the case of the "River Clyde." Although this involved the transfer of troops from transports, it was claimed that with their more reliable crews and protection from shell fire there was less likelihood of things going wrong. Troops were to be transferred near Imbros and Tenedos and brought thence in men-of-war.

The French force was ordered to land at Kum Kale with the intention of confusing the Turks and preventing them establishing field batteries to fire on the Helles beaches from the Asiatic shore. The Naval Division was to carry out a feint landing at Bulair and the French at Besika Bay.

The final objective for the Anzacs was given as Mal Tepe, a hill some four miles in shore overlooking the Narrows, while the 29th Division were to penetrate to a hill called Achi Baba, six miles from the toe of Helles.

The plan at Helles differed slightly from that at Anzac where there was to be a surprise night landing. In the southern landing there was to be a half hour's bombardment at daybreak, under cover of which the troops were to land. There was to be no general reserve. The plan seems rather far-reaching considering the very limited reconnaissances that had been possible and the shortage of guns and artillery ammunition which must be felt directly the enemy effected a concentration. In view of the hazardous nature of the operation it is surprising that no alternative plan was considered which would meet a situation such as actually occurred, a partial success at the landing places selected for the British force. This was to lead to a temporary state of indecision on the evening of the landing at Anzac (Gaba Tepe) which delayed the landing of troops at a critical period.





The Dardanelles Campaign.

The absence of a general reserve was to deprive the commander of means to exploit any initial success. Possibly, a shortage of small sea-craft would have delayed the effect of the Commander-in-Chief's intervention in this way, but it seems that too large a proportion of the French force was employed in the Asiatic landing.

A point which merits attention is the load which each man was to carry into the battle. Marching order with packs, 200 rounds of S. A. A., one day's ration and two days' iron rations. A load of 80 lbs. seems scarcely suitable for men who would probably have to wade ashore and scale cliffs about 100 feet high. It appears, however, throughout the plan that the degree of enemy resistance expected was not consistent with recent experiences of the British force at Basra.

The plan of landing the force at three points has been criticised as violating the principle of concentration. Against this the view may be advanced that the three landings might immobilise the enemy and prevent his concentrating until such time as the whole force had landed. With present-day knowledge it seems that a landing in force between Gaba Tepe and Suvla, combined with feints at other possible landing places, would have held the most chance of success, and might have enabled the Commander to have controlled the initial landing and exploit success better than was the case on 25th April 1915.

The support of infantry by naval guns, without adequate and efficient aircraft, must be classed as a dangerous experiment. Co-operation implies knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of the supporting arms; the army was not trained for such methods. As however the C.-in-C. was not supplied with the necessary artillery there was nothing else to be done. Possibly a timed programme for the Anzac landing would have produced better results than the arrangements made, which resulted in no ship opening fire for over twelve hours after the first troops had set foot on shore.

The foregoing remarks are not intended to belittle the judgment or deeds of soldiers and statesmen. Much controversy has raged round the campaign which makes its study all the more interesting. Many of the criticisms are hypothetical but many are too real, and mistakes led to the sacrifice of valuable lives. It is our duty to study the causes of failure and the mistakes that led to it.

EXPERIENCES IN LAPLAND AND KARELIA

BY BRIGADIER-GENERAL F. G. MARSH, C.M.G., D.S.O.,

LATE 9TH GURKHAS.

It is a matter of everyday experience for officers of the Indian Army to find themselves in command of soldiers of other races, far from the beaten track.

An experience of this kind, on an exceptional scale, befell several of us when, at the end of 1917, the Russian front on which we had been serving disintegrated. It happened in this way.

To quote the Secretary of State for War :—

“ After Lenin and Trotsky had signed a shameful peace whereby they betrayed their country and falsified its engagements to its Allies, and whereby they liberated more than a million Germans to come over and attack our people in the west—after that fateful event in history had occurred, there was a Czech army of about two corps made up of prisoners taken from the Austrians by the Russians, whose hearts were always on the side of the Allies ; and this army refused to continue any longer with the Bolsheviks in Russia, and demanded to be set free from Russia and to make its way over to the western front, where it could continue the struggle * * * .

“ After an attempt to secure the exodus of this army by Vladivostock it was proposed that they should cut their way out by Viatka to Archangel. There was the danger of Archangel becoming a submarine base for the Germans, and the danger of the loss of all that great mountain of stores we had accumulated there in order to keep that means of contact with Russia ; and for all these reasons, combined with the fact that it was hoped the Czechs would make their way out by that route, the Allies in 1918, as an essential military operation and as part of the war, decided to occupy Archangel and Murmansk and put an inter-allied force on shore there.”

This force, consisting of some six hundred officers and men, sailed from Newcastle towards the end of June. Its mission and destination had been kept a profound secret and it was not until we had rounded North Cape that junior ranks on board learned where we were going.

We carried a company of infantry, a machine-gun company and two sections of sappers. These were under the command of Major-General

C. Maynard and were intended to assist the local Russian garrisons, with the clearly expressed approval of the central government, to deny the use of the warm water ports of Murmansk and Petchenga to German submarines.

There were also a number of officers destined for Archangel when the ice should clear; these were to raise a local force of Russians for the protection of the military stores above-mentioned and for the assistance of the Czech corps, whose arrival there might still be hoped for.

General Poole, with a detachment of Royal Marines and certain allied units, awaited us in Murmansk.

We landed there at the end of June. The port was a mere collection of log huts; there were no great warehouses or customs sheds such as are found in all large commercial ports, fit for the temporary shelter of men and stores. But the climate was perfect and our detachments were not to stay long at the base.

From Murmansk southwards for eight hundred miles ran a single line of railway, through low forests and granite-strewn swamps, over hundreds of wooden bridges and culverts. Hurriedly constructed during the first two years of the war as a strategic necessity for supplying and communication with Russia, this line was now to prove to considerable use to the Allies, as will be shown.

At the time of our arrival its locomotives were rusting, and its rolling-stock idle, except where allied detachments used its coaches and wagons as barracks, eyed mistrustfully by the Russian rail defence troops from their log huts.

At Kandalaksha, about 175 miles from our base, lay a far travelled Serb battalion and alongside it, also in railway wagons, a weary group of French artillery, once part of a military mission to Roumania.

Twenty-five miles further south, at the fishing hamlet of Knyajaya Guba, under a dozen Russian officers, were some five hundred "red" Finns, who had recently been driven out across their own frontier, sixty miles distant, by Mannerheim's "white" army of Liberation and its German allies, and who were now acquiring the status of a foreign legion in the Russian army. Their employment by us against the "red" troops of Russia and simultaneously against the "white" Finn invaders of Karelia seems one of the strangest of the many paradoxes that the war produced.

At Kem, three hundred and fifty miles from our base, two hundred British marines and a Serb company occupied the important bridge-head at the river Kem, beyond which for another four hundred and fifty miles the little railway ran on to the south—short of ballast, engines deteriorating,—the line now traversing more fertile and populated country as it left behind it the tundras of Karelia and made its way down to Petrograd and “red” Russia.

The arrival of our six hundred fighting men, with food, clothing and arms, put new heart into these detachments, and prompt action taken by our commander not only prevented bloodshed at the outset but cleared up an ambiguous political situation.

The Soviet government had definitely invited us and had promised the Czech corps free passage through Russia to the sea. On the other hand, there were twenty-five thousand German troops in Finland and seventy-five thousand more on the opposite shore of the Baltic, within striking distance of Petrograd, available for enforcing the views of the German general staff upon the Soviet government. Ludendorff in his *War Memories* (II. 654) has since then told the story from the German point of view.

At any rate, the Soviet attitude towards us and our Czech allies suddenly changed to open enmity. Orders were sent to the local government at Murmansk to drive us back into the sea, and the orders were followed up by trains full of “red” troops. But they were just too late.

As the first train-load from Petrograd arrived at Kandalaksha on the 28th of June, they were met by General Maynard in person with an escort of Lewis gunners backed by the allied detachments at that station. They were promptly detrained and, for the time being, told they could go no further.

Like sensible men, they accepted the inevitable and betook themselves to their comrades' comfortable log barracks in the village. But their leaders went to the telegraph office, and the government line, as yet not in our hands, conveyed the news to their headquarters. The gloves were off.

General Maynard now placed me in command of the allied troops at Kandalaksha with orders to organize the district, and continued his venturesome journey southwards to Kem where, as events proved, he detrained further contingents of “red” reinforcements.

He left with me Captain Mackie of the machine-gun company as adjutant, Major Utterton for supply duties, Lieutenant Dicks, who spoke Russian, for railway transport work, several officers from the Archangel group for ordnance and other duties, and Major Burton with a dozen other officers for duty with the Finn Legion. Dicks was a good fisherman, the rivers were full of salmon and, though we were often to be short of rations, we were always well supplied with fresh fish.

The next two days and nights, for in the Arctic Circle during summer the sun shines brightly at night, were spent in making the acquaintance of the French and Serbs and of Russian local officials, in arranging for special facilities on the railway and in the two telegraph departments, civil and military, and in exploring the neighbourhood. In these preliminaries Lieutenant Calder, R.N.V.R., who had been at Kandalaksha for some time on intelligence duty, was a useful guide.

On the evening of the 1st July, after having sent Burton and his officers to Knyajaya Guba on their delicate mission of taking over the Finn colony from the Russians, we were collecting wagons for the despatch of a French battery and a second Serb company with two platoons of British infantry to Kem, when the General's train returned. He had now definitely decided that all armed Russians, Finns or others, likely to hamper his operations, were to be deported by rail out of the area in our occupation.

He therefore ordered me to arrest the six leaders of the "red" troops whom he had detained at Kandalaksha two days before, to disarm the remainder, about three hundred and fifty men now sulking in their barracks near the port, to entrain and ration them, and send them south under escort. This task was quickly and tactfully carried out by the Serbs.

We learned later that as the deported "reds" travelled south from Kem they burned several hundreds of the wooden railway bridges behind them, thereby necessitating a walk of many weary miles for the several parties of their comrades who followed in the next few weeks, soldiers, sailors and, unfortunately for us, workmen who might have been useful but who preferred to go back to Russia.

The burning of the bridges, however, simplified the tactical situation, for the railway was the only practicable road for the free movement of troops during the summer. Later, the swamps which now

prevented such movement would be frozen over, and the countryside would be passable anywhere with ski. But for the present, with the sea held on our left flank and with the railway bridges destroyed for twenty-five miles south of Soroka, sudden attack by any large force was out of the question.

The local administrative problem was now comparatively simple. We could without interference establish military control over telegraph and telephone offices and in rail defence posts hitherto occupied by Russians. The Serbs were specially suitable for these duties, being able to make themselves understood by the local people.

The readiness with which Colonel Marinkovich responded to the demands made upon his battalion for detachments was beyond praise.

It was, of course, obvious that until the country became settled our long, single line of communications, with its numerous wooden bridges, might be constantly interrupted by "red" partizans, armed with matches and a few bundles of dry reeds.

It was natural therefore to turn to the sea for a possible alternative line of supply and communication, at any rate during the summer. But we had no ships for purely military work and the Navy was too busy to detach force for problematic necessities.

When therefore Calder, now port-control officer, telephoned that a "red" ship was coming into harbour, it seemed that here was the beginning of our wished for auxiliary marine service. The steamship "Novaya Zemlya" all unaware that a Serb picquet was on the quay awaiting her arrival, came into port and tied up alongside.

She was quietly boarded and her captain apprised of the recent change in relations between us and his government. His acceptance of the situation was justified almost immediately by the arrival of H. M. S. "Attentive" (Captain Altham, R. N.), who anchored in the bay a few hundred yards away.

Coming ashore and learning of the work now in hand, Captain Altham got into touch with Kem by direct telegraphic apparatus and, hearing that the "red" disarmament had not gone smoothly and that his help at that port was needed, he left at once with H. M. yacht "Kathleen" (Commander Richardson, R. N.), for the southern theatre of operations.

Our new acquisition, with a guard of ten Serbs on board to ensure her return, was then sent to Knyajaya Guba with orders there to embark three platoons of Burton's Finns and to tour the western ports of the White Sea, to collect recruits and to bring back other ships, boats, stores of coal and timber, and anything likely to be useful.

This venture proved the occasion of a pleasant surprise to the General a few days later when he came down again from Murmansk. He embarked at Kandalaksha in the trawler "Sarpedon" and joining H. M. S. "Attentive" at Soroka found there Captain Altham completing the clearance of undesirables and the confiscation of arms. He also found there fifty Finns, *ci-devant* "reds," smartly turned out in khaki under one of their own officers, taking part in the naval landing-party's operations, and this at so early a stage of their career as an allied unit.

The "Novaya Zemlaya's" first mission under the Red Ensign was carried out promptly and efficiently. Within ten days she and her mixed crew, for little love was lost between Serbs and Finns, duly returned to Kandalaksha with a hundred Finn recruits and four tugs, which the Navy allowed us to keep for military use. But the "Novaya Zemlaya" was an ice-breaker and she was needed elsewhere.

The four tugs, "Content," "Spokoini," "Mitrofan" and "Tolstik," were allotted to various duties, for communication with the many small hamlets dotted along the deep-water creeks and inlets, for reconnaissance, recruiting and propaganda, and for the search for timber and stores for barrack construction.

There were very large stores of timber at Soroka at the southwest corner of the White Sea, and that important port was now occupied by a Serb detachment. The damaged railway bridges between Soroka and Kem were repaired and our armoured train from Kem reinforced the Soroka garrison.

For the time being the large number of damaged bridges south of Soroka were left as they were; it seemed unlikely that either side would need them, for the reconnaissances which our commander pushed forward in the direction of Petrograd found no "red" activity and, on our part, no advance into Russia was contemplated.

Early in July General Maynard increased my administrative area so as to include the troops at Kem. It therefore coincided practically with the tract known as Karelia, extending from Imandra, sixty miles north of Kandalaksha, to Soroka in the south, and to the

Finnish frontier in the west, and was roughly about twice the size of Wales.

In the south-west of this area he had entrusted to Colonel Woods the raising of local levies for a unit to be called the Karelian Regiment. It was a county of lakes and rushing rivers, with a scattered population of independent, sturdy hunters and fishermen. To these the idea of voluntary service in defence of their homes, and the prospect of substantial rations, proved so popular that recruits came in faster than they could be entertained, clothed, armed and trained.

Their commander's personality and methods were largely responsible for this awakening of a practical patriotism and were entirely responsible for creating from it an *esprit-de-corps*.

Their regimental badge, a shamrock, cut out of ration tins, and kept in a state of polish that would not have shamed a guardsman, came to be regarded as a kind of fetish. Their enthusiasm surpassed our hopes, but, on account of their numbers, their demands upon our scanty treasury and our then meagre depots of supply, difficult enough to resist and to check, were even harder to comply with.

They were rough-and-ready people, and respect for such details as vouchers, present states, and the army forms and returns which help brigadiers and departmental officers to exercise check and control had no part in their mentality.

But the honour of Karelian quartermasters was kept as untarnished as the badges they wore, and short was the shrift that their own courts-martial meted out to traffickers in rations.

The regiment was, in the first instance, practically an independent unit, though it was not long before it received its orders, as it drew its supplies, through the district command. Its depot was at Kem, but its commander was usually on the Finn frontier.

The Finn Legion whose headquarters were at Knyajaya Guba was a somewhat similar unit, charged with a similar duty, frontier patrol and defence. But its officers and men were imbued with a different ideal, a consuming desire to return to Finland. Thankful as they were for British service and the food and protection that came with it, and too hard worked to brood on political grievances, they looked on that service only as a means of getting back to their homes. They vaguely hoped to do this in the van of a conquering army. Their exile ended however in another way, a year later, through British mediation with the Finn government.

The Russian officers under whom the Finns had originally been collected found employment elsewhere, and the men took at once to the methods of discipline introduced by Burton, whose soldiering had been learned in the Canadian Border Mounted Police.

Like most British officers placed in charge of fighting men of other races, Burton immediately and fervidly adopted a kind of second nationality, becoming in sympathy more Finn than the Finn, and gaining in return an admiration amounting to veneration.

The Finns, with their training depot on the coast only a few miles from district headquarters, came under the eye of control more effectively than the Karelians, and partook of a larger share in the routine of headquarters. They provided carrier transport for reconnaissance parties across the rocky swamps, lakes and forest, to the Finn frontier, fatigues for loading and unloading clothing, rations, ordnance stores and timber, by sea and rail, for hewing and bringing in logs for barracks and fuel, and so on.

Their recruiting field being limited, the Finns fighting tactics differed from those of the Karelians. They were the first troops to meet the "white" Finn intruders on our side of the frontier and drew first blood but, as a rule, they tried to take prisoners and convert them. They were not, as the Karelians were at this time, avenging the invasion of their homes.

A third locally raised unit was the Slav-British Legion. Recruits were of pure Russian nationality and the material was scarce. Depots were established at all our larger posts. At Kandalaksha the Russians were attached to the Serb battalion under the special care of the adjutant, Captain Skekich who, in fact, had enlisted most of them, hunting indefatigably in timber yards, workshops, and in fishing hamlets. But this unit never reached large numbers. As the country settled down, a Russian force raised by General Zvegintseff came into being and took the place of the old rail defence corps.

At the beginning of July therefore, the brigade, as yet in embryo, consisted of the three units above described, the Serb battalion, the French field artillery, a wireless station, brought by a Finn from Russia and at that time of little use, an armoured train improvised at Kem, and a proportion of British marines, sappers, infantry and machine-gunners.

Our chief difficulty at this stage was an ever-increasing discontent among railway and telegraph employees. Cut off from their

normal supplies from Russia, they looked to us for pay and rations ; our own fighting men were not yet on full rations, and local currency was hardly obtainable. It was only by working on a system of payment in kind for value received that we could deal with a state of passive resistance and obstruction, and this entailed very heavy work for our supply officer and his inexperienced assistants ; Utterton, for instance, was at one time issuing rations to thirty-two categories of persons, classified according to services rendered. Strikes however were frequent and some time elapsed before we were able to rely on loyal and efficient service. A " Hughes " typescript apparatus and a willing Russian operator, both found locally, gave us a private telegraph service and we installed our own telephones, but the railway service was unreliable for some months.

The work of the district staff lay chiefly in restoring order and the re-establishing confidence, sorting armament and ordnance, re-arming and clothing units, constructing new sidings to relieve the congested state of the stations, where existing sidings were full of wagons used as barracks, and in the collection of timber for barrack construction, not only at Kandalaksha but for Kola, Loparaskaya and other posts.

At Kandalaksha, blockhouses designed both for defence and for comfortable winter quarters were built round the perimeter, and a two-storied house in the centre of the high ground. The Serbs excavated the foundations, the Finns provided good carpenters ; potters for building stoves were found locally. A large depot of construction stores at Chupa yielded useful material, barrels of Portland cement, cases of glass, door and window frames, bolts, hinges, nails, axes, saws, lamps, kerosene and acetylene gas equipment ; and our recently acquired light craft brought in sawn timber from Soroka, Keret and Kovda.

The Chupa stores contained also other material which might have attracted hostile attention if it had been left there : 900 barrels of cheddite and dynamite and 1,100 cases of detonators and fuze. This was brought in gradually by our marine fatigue parties and bestowed in a barge in Kandalaksha bay under the eye of the port control officer, until an incident occurred which necessitated its removal elsewhere. It happened that at the beginning of August two steamers were in harbour with the diplomatic representatives of eight Powers and their staffs on board, waiting there while the allied coup,

which resulted in the occupation of Archangel, was taking place. Their escort, a Russian armed trawler, attempted against orders to leave the harbour, with the result that a brisk fire was exchanged between the trawler and our R. M. artillery which guarded the entrance. The trawler's 3-inch shells fell perilously near the steamers and the powder-ship; fortunately no accident occurred, but it was clear that a more remote location was needed for the explosives. Eventually the Murmansk government relieved us of this material.

The occupation of Archangel deprived us of officers who had rendered much useful service on the west side of the White Sea, and with them went Colonel Thornhill, I.A., General Poole's chief intelligence officer, who had returned to Kem from a reconnaissance to the south of Onega with a detachment of the ubiquitous Serbs.

In order, therefore, to keep touch with "red" movements, General Maynard who arrived in Kandalaksha before the ambassadors returned to Archangel, sent off by sea a strong reconnaissance under Captain Sheppard to continue Thornhill's work on our southern front. On the west Burton's Finns had already won their first skirmish at Ruva and were demonstrating actively along the frontier. The General, having inspected the troops at Kandalaksha and the preparations for winter quarters, took me with him to Kem where he also inspected, among other units, the fifth batch of a hundred Karelians, now fit to take the field.

The short arctic summer was already waning and the nights were getting dark. According to intelligence reports regarding the numbers of German troops in Finland, it seemed likely that as soon as the ground became fit for movement of large bodies of troops, our small force would soon be pitted against very heavy odds. It is easy to be wise after the event, but as yet there was no indication of the end of the war. Reconnaissance and close touch with the enemy frontier patrols was our obvious duty.

To assist in this work, towards the end of August the sea-plane carrier, H. M. S. *Nairana* (Captain Cowan, R.N.), came to Kandalaksha. Her planes reconnoitred from Kandalaksha to Alakurti and to the west of Lake Pyav where Burton had established his advanced post at Ruva. From Kem also they assisted in the last stage of Sheppard's reconnaissance. Their aerial photographs showed that along the Finnish frontier thick forest covered the country and could conceal large bodies of troops without detection from the air. Although heavy clouds and rain which began early in September interfered with

visibility, diligent search round Ukhta discounted Scandinavian reports that six thousand "white" Finns were concentrating there. In fact Woods occupied that place on the 11th September, driving out the Finn invaders and inflicting comparatively heavy casualties.

The sea-planes were also useful in maintaining more rapid communication between district headquarters and frontier commanders than had before been possible, an important service at this juncture when the details necessary to give effect to the plan, then under serious consideration, of withdrawing our forces to the north of Kandalaksha and concentration within defensive works at Kola, had to be worked out in close collaboration.

Early in October, however, it became evident that the higher command were giving less consideration to this plan.

In the main theatre of war, peace negotiations were beginning to take shape. In our own theatre the commands on the east and west shores of the White Sea were separated and General Maynard's force was organized on a divisional basis.

The troops in the Kandalaksha-Kem district became the "237th Infantry Brigade" and were now to have regular staff officers and departments and were to be reinforced with British units. General staff officers, Lt.-Col. Lewin and Captain Smythe, and officers of supply and control came through Kandalaksha, to pick up the threads of the existing situation, and, in advance of half of the 11th battalion of the Sussex Regiment, came a detention hospital and a hospital train, especially welcome as a serious epidemic of influenza was then raging. Brigade headquarters and the Serb battalion were to move south to Kem and Soroka where ample barrack accommodation was available in disused timber yards and saw-mills.


The movement to the south was not carried out without incident. As the first train with the Serb advanced party passed over a bridge outside Kandalaksha at night, a mine exploded and wrecked the bridge as the last carriage just cleared it. Three more explosions followed, further along the line. Next morning, too, while workmen were repairing the damage, two more explosions occurred and the civilian workmen bolted. Burton and his Finns, however, worked continuously for twenty-four hours in heavy snowfall and got the line ready for traffic on the next day. In the meantime six leaders of the local malcontents were arrested and sentenced to deportation and one of these was placed on each of the six troop trains which began again to leave for the south. No further accidents happened.

PO OF NORTH RUSSIA

Scale about 1 inch = 48 Miles.


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
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By the middle of November Soroka had become a large garrison. A sapper detachment was at work on the two railway bridges south of Olimpi and across the Lietnaya river. A company of Canadian ski-runners under Lt.-Col. Leckie, assisted by Commander Victor Campbell, R.N., were training the troops in the use of ski.

The sea in Soroka harbour was frozen over, but on land, snowfall having been small, sleighs were running with difficulty. The climate here, unlike that at Murmansk, was dry and bracing; the sun rose at ten and set at three, but there was light from eight until four.

Before I returned to England in the middle of December I had occasion to carry out a duty which seldom falls to an officer of the Indian Army. The Karelians in the 237th Infantry Brigade now numbered over 2,000, and among these were a number of women, transport workers. During the summer campaign when every able-bodied Karelian was in the front line, two of these women, poling and paddling their boat-load of British rations upstream to their advance supply depot above the string of lakes near the Finn frontier, were suddenly attacked by three armed Finns. Promptly adopting shock tactics, the two women turned their boat to meet the onslaught, rammed the Finn boat amidships and, with their poles, disabled and drowned the marauders and saved their consignment from plunder. Their gallantry, reported to General Maynard, earned for them the immediate award of the British Military Medal. I had the honour of presenting them with it; in one case in the sick ward of the hospital where the heroine lay recovering from wounds received; in the other, within three sides of a square composed of detachments of all the brigade units, British, Finn, French, Karelian, Russian, Serb and Slavo-British.

NOTE.—The following figures are taken from a lecture given by Major-General Kirke (R. U. S. I. Journal, LXX. 480, November 1925), who had them from the Finn General Staff not long afterwards. He said that though the "whites" had completely gained the upper hand over the "reds" in Finland by the end of May 1918, our occupation of Murmansk and subsequent operations in Karelia kept a force estimated at 100,000 Germans away from France, the decisive point, at a very critical time.

The Secretary of State for War, in the House of Commons, said :—

"Up to the time we landed in Murmansk, German divisions were passing from the eastern to the western front at an average rate of six divisions a month, to attack the Allied forces. From the time we landed there, not another division was sent from the eastern front, and the line there remained absolutely stable, the whole of the German forces being riveted by this new development and the anxiety they had about Russia, until the complete rebuff."

A history of the expedition is given in *The Murmansk Venture*, by Major-General Sir Charles Maynard, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., (Hodder and Stoughton).

DUCK SHOOTING IN INDIA

BY COLONEL E. J. ROSS, O.B.E., M.C.

People at home, when they refer to duck shooting in India, generally think in terms of these famous shoots at Bharatpur, Hokra, Higham and so on, which are specially preserved by ruling princes, and are the perquisites of the Viceroy and other great ones in the land.

These shoots are not for the likes of you and me, though very occasionally we may slip into a butt in one of them. As a rule, however, they are reserved for the really great, and it is unlikely that many of the readers of this journal will ever rise to these dizzy heights.

They are wonderfully well organized affairs, but the guest sees little except the actual shooting. As a rule, his part in the show consists in getting into a carefully numbered car, leaving that for a carefully numbered and well-cushioned boat, and finally transferring himself into a butt, perfectly equipped in every respect down to *pate de foie* sandwiches, a bottle of champagne, and an armchair for his girl friend.

The general qualifications which are required from him are; firstly, a snappy shooting suit suitable for the high society with which he has to mingle—a sufficiency of cartridges whether begged, borrowed or stolen—the ability to get his gun off quickly and accurately without getting a head or a bruised shoulder—and finally a certain amount of self-restraint when he discovers the myrmidons of the exalted personage in the next butt making off with the birds which he has killed in the sweat of his brow.

It is not intended, however, to disparage these big shoots. They are marvels of organization and still greater marvels of hospitality. Even when duck are in thousands and tame by our normal standards, the sport is magnificent and the shooting will test the skill of the finest shot in the world. You and I, if ever we take part in such a shoot, will find ourselves in an outside butt where the birds are comparatively scarce and very high, mostly almost too high to kill. Even, however, if we do not get much shooting, the whole thing is terribly interesting. It is impossible for anyone not to be thrilled

by these wild fowl in their countless numbers and unbelievable variety.

Let us be quite clear on one point also. It is to these big shoots, and to the large scale preserving which leads up to them, to which we owe the fact that there is still good shooting to be got in a small way over most of India. Were it not for these great reservoirs of duck, the stock in India would get worn out, and, if these preserves were thrown open, the whole country would suffer.

Take the case of Kashmir. There are so many people who shoot there, and so many guns, that, but for Hokra and Higham, there would be practically no duck shooting at all. As it is, the keen flight shooter can go out evening after evening and morning after morning, and fire his fifty or more cartridges with complete regularity. If he gets twenty birds a day he will be shooting right well, but he can do this for weeks on end if he wants to, and surely that is enough to satisfy any body. Let the man who grouses at these big preserves, therefore, reflect where he would be without them.

Now a word about the actual shooting. Whether you are shooting at one of these big shoots, and out of a carefully constructed butt, or from a poor stance in mud and water, shooting duck differs in very many ways from normal shooting at driven birds.

In the first place duck are much more prone to swerve when they see the gun. Therefore, you must pay far more attention to keeping under cover till the last possible moment. When driving grouse or partridge, for instance, in a great majority of cases, the birds are out of sight of you until they are well in range. The ideal location for a line of butts is a short way back from a sky line. In a partridge drive too, the birds generally do not see you till they top the hedge in front. Duck come to you in the open and are essentially wilder, and, if they see a florid and expectant face waiting for them, they will swerve right or left, long before they are in fair range. You must, therefore, if you are going to do well at duck, pay attention to keeping completely out of sight to the last possible moment.

If you watch the first class man plating grouse, you will see that he takes bird after bird at the same angle and at an almost incredible distance out in front of him. He can do this with grouse because large packs follow the same general line and they do not swerve off as duck do. In shooting duck, you will have to alter your technique. To begin with, they do not come streaming along the same line;

they come from both sides, from in front, and from behind. You cannot, therefore, settle down to one angle and one type of shot as you do at grouse. You must be prepared to take them at any angle and coming from any direction.

Again, it is fatal to take duck too far out ahead. If you do so, they will swerve at your first shot and be out of range for your second. This applies particularly when you are using a pair of guns. Let your birds, therefore, come well in to you before you fire at them, and you will have a reasonable chance of getting off all four barrels within reasonable range. With geese this is especially the case. The tyro misjudges his distances and takes his geese thirty-five or forty yards away. He may haggle one down, but probably not. Let them come right in—fifteen yards is better than twenty-five. If you let them come right on top of you, you may get four of them, instead of a problematical one.

Here are the three most important rules in shooting duck—

- (a) Make yourself invisible.
- (b) Keep out of sight.
- (c) Keep completely out of sight, till your birds are well in range.

Remember, duck nearly always follow an open channel of water if they can. Site yourself, therefore, so that you can cover this, and so that your most comfortable shot will be at birds following the middle of the channel.

Nothing hampers shooting so much, especially in a bad light, as a few high reed stems close up to the end of your gun. Try, therefore, to get rid of as many of these as you can without spoiling your cover.

If you are going to perform well at duck, you must get the knack of being able to shoot well either sitting, lying or from a very cramped position. If cover is short, it is no use trying to stand up to shoot. If you do this, by the time you struggle to your feet, the birds will be out of range, or, at the best, will only give you a very long shot.

Shooting under these conditions is very like shooting off a pad-elephant. You can generally shoot fairly well to your left but not at all to your right. Remember that point in arranging yourself. If you cannot move your feet and legs, it is easier to shoot well out to your left, than it is straight to your front, so get your left shoulder pointing towards where you expect the bulk of the birds,

I do not propose entering into a discussion on the much vexed question of swinging or not swinging. Swinging is easy enough when you have a steady stance in a well kept butt. It is a very different matter trying to swing when your backside is stuck, as it often will be, in a foot of treacly mud and water.

Another point you have to bear in mind in shooting duck, is the question of the size of birds and their pace. One moment you are shooting at a minute teal, the next, at a great lumbering goose or mallard. The latter will look as if it is travelling half the pace of the smaller bird, but is actually travelling very much faster. It is for this reason that you miss clean with both barrels, these geese which come sloping gently over you. The reason why nothing happens even when you hear the shot rattling on them, is not because your gun won't kill them; it is because you hit them too far back. The only way to cure this is to disregard their vast bodies altogether. Think only of their heads and treat them as though their heads were all you had to shoot at.

If you watch a good shot killing duck, you will see that again and again he gets two or even three with his first barrel. If you try to do this, however, it is odds on that you will miss the whole boiling. The reason is this. You are trying to brown them—you are shooting vaguely at a patch of birds and not accurately at an individual. The expert's method is different. He shoots intentionally to kill two or even three, but he always shoots at an individual bird. He picks a bird that he sees will cross another bird, and just as they cross, he lets them have it. Never try to average for the two; stick to the individual, but if you can, take him as he crosses another bird.

The man who takes an interest in his average of kills to cartridges, will never make a really good bag of duck. Most of us can kill the easy ones fairly well. The man who makes the big bag, is the man who gets his gun off at every possible chance—who not only kills the high birds in front of him—but also is quick enough to get the unexpected teal which comes suddenly from just behind his hat. There is really far more in seeing birds quickly and getting your gun off quickly, than there is in accurate shooting.

The correct and accurate location of your stand is half the battle. Fifteen or twenty yards to one side or another makes all the difference between a really good series of comparatively easy shots and a few

birds haggled down at extreme range. The expert, with fifteen minutes reconnaissance, will put himself in exactly the right place in his area so that the birds come easily to him. The tyro will place himself just wrong and none of the birds will come properly to him. There is far more in this than in skill in actual shooting. In general, you want to place yourself in easy shot of where the birds themselves want to settle. Watch where the birds are sitting when you are getting into your area, and post yourself accordingly. Remember no shikari can do this for you. If you have an exceptionally good one, he will know roughly in which part of the jheel guns should be posted. It is for the gun himself to make a final and accurate selection of his post. It is for this reason that it hardly ever pays to get into position in the dark and start shooting immediately it is light enough to see. If you want to get roughly into position in the dark by all means do so, but let all your guns have half an hour or so of daylight to make the final selection of their places, and to get settled in.

My own experience is that people who are running parties, almost invariably allow too short a time for the rest of the guns to get into position. However keen you and your party may be, don't be in too much of a hurry. It is far better to allow a liberal margin and to make quite certain that your farthest gun is not only in position, but well settled down, before you start shooting. Nothing is so maddening as to find yourself still struggling through mud and water half a mile from your stand when all the other guns are brassing off merrily and the duck are streaming over the place where you ought to be. You must have a pre-arranged time and a pre-arranged signal to start. The best thing to do is to work out very liberally the time required for the farthest gun to get settled down, and to let him give the signal for firing to commence. A shot is generally the simplest way of doing this, but remember that there may be people shooting somewhere in the neighbourhood of your jheel and, if one of them fires a shot, it may set your party off too. If it can be managed, I recommend the use of a bugle or a hunting horn as a sign for shooting to start.

Incidentally, your local shikari will object to this delay. He will tell you that a large number of birds will clear out before you start shooting. This is true up to a point. Some of them do, but remember this. These birds will clear off in any case as soon as the first shot is fired. The birds from which you will make your bag are those which want to stay on the jheel all day, and it is for these that you must make your arrangements,

At the beginning of the year when duck first come down to this country it is easy enough to get good shooting. The birds are comparatively tame, there is cover everywhere and there are no difficulties about getting good sport. At this time of the year too, the majority of duck are teal and garganey which seem to be naturally tamer than the larger kinds. Early in the year too there is much more feeding on the main jheels and duck are much more likely to stay and rest on the places where they feed at night. At this time of the year one can often make quite a good bag even at places where there is practically no cover at all. I remember last year, for instance, two of us getting 48 duck, in about half an hour, off a place that was little more than a glorified buffalo wallow in the middle of an open grassy plain. There were hundreds of teal sitting on this and when we put them up they simply circled round and round and came past us again and again within reasonable shot, although we had no cover whatever and were simply lying on our backs in the open. They were so thickly packed too, that we were getting three and four with our two shots and we certainly, for the time being, had an average of well over 100 *per cent*.

Later on in the year, however, the whole business changes. Duck become scarcer, they become much more shy of cover, and they are inclined to feed on the smaller jheels only at night and retire to the big open stretches of water during the day. Occasionally, even at this time of the year, you can find a spot where the duck can be managed properly during the day, but far more skill will be required in the selection of your hide and in the way you handle the birds. During this mid-winter period, the best sport you will get will generally be flight shooting on the feeding grounds in the evening, and this implies very careful reconnaissance, even if you know that duck frequent a particular jheel at night. When feeding is scarce, there will only be certain parts of it to which they come in, and unless you are in exactly the right place you may as well be at home in bed.

The chief difficulty is that most shikaris are very unreliable on the question of the location of feeding places. You may send your shikari out to a jheel where duck feed, but the betting is that he will not stay there when it is getting dark and cold. What he will probably do is to ask the local people whether duck come into the jheel and will report what they say as gospel. A shikari who can be absolutely relied on to give correct information is a real jewel and should not be parted from at any price.

If you can, have your jheels reconnoitred in the early morning from the air. Let the observer have a good look at the jheels you propose going to the day before you intend to go shooting, and his information will be invaluable. Make sure that he is skilled enough to tell duck from coots or, better still, get yourself flown over the jheels you want to see.

One of the difficulties of air reconnaissance is that though birds can be easily seen in the open, if the reeds are fairly thick it is often hard for the observer to locate birds unless he flies really low. Personally, I always try to have a combined reconnaissance, one from the air, and one by a shikari from the ground. Between the two of them you can generally get pretty accurate information.

Later on in the year, by about February, in Northern India, the duck will be coming back again, and again conditions get much easier. The best bags I have made have nearly always been at the very end of the year when the duck are coming back Northward. At this time of the year too, one gets a very high proportion of big duck, Red Crested Pochard, and the like, and I always think duck, as a whole, are tamer then, than they are in the Autumn.

The trouble about the later part of the year is, however, that a jheel one day may be absolutely full of duck—two days later the weather may turn hot, and they may all disappear in the night. But duck shooting, as a whole, would be a poor sport if the unexpected did not happen at times.

There are two normal methods of shooting duck in India. Firstly, shooting them on a jheel by day, and, secondly, flight shooting. The methods employed are so different that they require different treatment.

Most duck in this country feed at night. They start feeding just after dark, feed throughout the night, and are still on their feeding grounds till nearly dawn. They feed on the edges and shallows of the main jheels, but more often in the smaller jheels and flooded fields. If they are undisturbed they will often spend the whole day on their feeding grounds, especially early in the season. If, however, they are much shot at, they will only be on their feeding grounds while it is still dark. They will come into them in the dark and will leave them again well before dawn. Even if they are undisturbed, however, they will generally draw away, as the day progresses, into deeper water, and they love spending the day in quiet openings in the reeds or amongst

green bents. The best jheels are those which combine good feeding with quiet resting places and where duck can spend the whole day undisturbed. If, however, they are much disturbed, they will leave all this sort of thing soon after daylight and spend the day either in the open rivers or in the middle of one of these wide open sheets of water where there is no cover for miles, and where they are quite unapproachable.

In the early part of the season when duck have not been much disturbed, it is extraordinary how they will cling to a jheel which they really like and how loath they are to leave it. If they are frightened off one part of it, they will go and settle somewhere else on it; but—and this is very important from the point of view of making a bag—they will eventually, sometime or another during the day, flight back to those parts which they really like. The way to make a bag is to take advantage of this habit of theirs, to get the guns placed so that they command those favourite patches and to leave the rest of the jheel as a settling ground. Birds which settle in areas which they do not really like, will eventually flight back to their favourite spots. If they do not do this on their own, they may be quietly disturbed by a coolie, and sooner or later they will come to the guns. By taking advantage of this you can often get good sport, even on a jheel which is so bare as to look hopeless at first sight.

There is one sure and certain way to spoil a jheel, both for the particular days shoot and for future days. It is to have so many guns on the jheel that duck do not get a chance of settling on it. If they are kept continuously in the air, you may get better shooting for a short time, but after the first burst is over, they will clear right away and you will never see them again. Two or three well placed guns on most jheels will generally get more sport and do less eventual damage than three times that number. This, ofcourse, is a comparative matter. Enormous lakes and areas like inland seas will take more guns, but I am talking of the medium size jheel on which one normally shoots. It is fairly safe to say that guns which are less than half a mile apart are spoiling each others sport and doing more harm than good. What one wants to aim at is to get guns so arranged and distributed that they are firing at birds which come *from* one another, and not shooting at birds which are going *to* one another. Nothing is so maddening as to be so near another gun that your birds swerve off from you each time he fires a shot.

Now about the actual placing of guns. Duck live in the water and fly over water. Only in exceptional circumstances will they fly low over land. Therefore, your guns must be in the water if they are to do any good. There is no place out duck shooting for the man who is afraid of getting muddy or wet. I always remember being out down Muttra way with rather a choleric Major in the Gunners and some of his subalterns. At the end of the morning's shoot, the major appeared wet up to the neck, but with a really fine bundle of duck. I wish you could have seen his face when one of his subalterns who was still dry and perfectly turned out, but had no duck to produce, remarked to him "How wet you are Major"!

Not only do duck fly more over water than they do over land, but where cover is scarce one is nearly always less conspicuous in fairly deep water than on land or in the shallows. A little patch of grass sticking a couple of feet out of the water is quite good cover for a man who is immersed up to his chest. If the water is not deep enough to give cover when you are standing, it is no great hardship to sit in it especially in this country where the temperature of water never falls much below freezing point.

The difficulty always arises over dealing with cartridges in these circumstances. My solution is to float them. If you look into the coppersmith's shops in Delhi or any other Indian bazaar, you will see large, round, copper bowls with small mouths at the top, and projecting rims, in which the sweetmeat seller boils his milk and his sugar. One of these will easily float two or three hundred cartridges, and the rim at the top will protect them from splashes. If you have one of these, you can quite comfortably float two or three hundred cartridges about with you, without any need for a coolie. Once you are in position you can even rest your gun on it, and you can keep your tobacco and matches perfectly dry. The only thing you have to avoid is dropping a high duck into it. It is well to remember too, that if you have a dog in the water with you, he will probably try and climb up on it and your cartridges will go to the bottom.

Look after your float carefully, for if you do not, your wife will probably pinch it as a bowl in which to put her miserable flowers. Your baby's bath will, however, do quite well as a makeshift.

A high built up butt in the open is worse than useless. The whole art in making a hide for duck is to keep it as low as possible. If you can use a dry patch of ground, dig a hole in it and sit at the

bottom of your hole. The sort of hide that your shikari will build, of grass, reeds, etc., will frighten away every duck within miles. This is particularly important with geese. The old goose is far too wily to come up to a built-up hide, but if you once get into a really well dug hole in the ground, you will score off him every time.

If the worst comes to the worst, you will be better off lying on your back behind a bunch of grass than you will be in a built-up butt on bare ground, however well constructed.

At the beginning of the year most of the jheels will have plenty of cover on them, and you can generally find either reeds or sugarcane well into the water. Later on in the year, however, all the cover is either cut by the villagers, or eaten off by cattle and you have to be content with very much less. You are then lucky if you can find enough natural cover to hide you sitting, or even lying. A roll of wire netting into which you can stick a little grass, etc. makes quite an effective hide specially in shallow water.

I have often thought that a well trained buffalo would be the right answer to this, but so far I have never met one that I could trust sufficiently. I believe, however, that a dried buffalo skin on a frame would make a very useful hide and I strongly advise somebody to try it.

Talking of buffaloes, it is not a bad thing to remember, especially when wading into the water before daylight, that most jheels have buffalo wallows, and often wells, in the middle of them. It is not a bad thing, therefore, when you are wading through strange water, to make your shikari go ahead of you. If he falls in, you can pull him out, and no great harm is done. If you fall in you will probably go a great deal deeper than he does and he wont find it so easy to extract you. In any case, the man you want to be careful of is the man who carries your cartridges. Nothing is so aggravating as to see the whole of the cartridges for your day's shoot disappear under water before you use them.

I, personally, am a great believer in camouflage, both for duck shooting and big game shooting. Nothing frightens duck so much as the outline of a Bombay bowler. If you sew a few strips of black cloth on your hat and your coat, it may not look very beautiful, but it does break up the outline and it has an extraordinary effect on the way birds will come to you without swerving.

A shiny gun barrel scares duck very badly, so make sure that you keep your barrels properly browned. Some people use a khaki cover over their barrels. I have tried it, but is not very satisfactory and it makes shooting extremely difficult. One Gunner I know used to paint his gun barrels a service khaki colour. I believe it was very effective but I can only take his word for it.

Remember that not only you, but your various followers, must be out of sight. Do not let your coolies wander about in the open looking for birds when there is any chance of duck still coming, and especially do not encourage them by cursing them at the top of your voice. The quieter you are, and the less disturbance you make in a jheel, the better for everybody. If you have birds down, leave them down until such time as the shooting is over. If, however, you have thick reeds round you, it is worth while having sensible men well away from you in the thickest part of the reeds, provided you can trust them to keep out of sight. If they are sufficiently sensible to go at once for birds which fall in the reeds, but not for birds in the open, you will find it makes an enormous difference to your pick up.


Unless there are a lot of hawks about, dead birds are as easy to pick up a couple of hours later as they are when you first shoot them. Do not be in too much of a hurry, therefore, to leave your hide to start picking up, and do not let your coolies start wandering about in the open till you are quite certain that there are no more duck coming in. If there is much cover about, you will nearly always lose a very high proportion of wounded birds. You will lose more, however, if you go looking for them immediately they are shot. The great majority of duck, except pochards, will, if winged, eventually crawl out on to dry ground or the bank to hide. A much more satisfactory way of dealing with strong runners is to leave them alone for an hour or two and walk round the edge of the jheel with a dog after you finish shooting. It is surprising the number of duck that you will pick up this way.

Try to drop your birds as much as you can on open water and always be ready to give a wounded bird a shot if it shows any signs of swimming away after it has dropped. Remember, it is easy enough to kill a wounded bird with the first shot that you fire at it on the water, but after you have fired at it once, it will learn to dive at the flash and you will find it very difficult to kill. The tip in shooting a wounded bird on the water is to aim very low. If you take a regulation aim at him you will go over him every time.

In open water where there are not too many weeds about, a good dog, given time, should be able to catch most wounded duck if once it gets sight of them or winds them, but remember, a great many wheels hold blanket weed, so do not run the risk of letting your dog get entangled and drowned. If your dog does get stuck in weed, be very careful about how you try to get it out. Weed which is strong enough to hold a dog is strong enough to hold a swimming man. I see no reason why a bachelor should not drown himself in rescuing his dog, but I think a married man should think twice before he does so.

One of the things which always surprises me in this country is the little use people make of decoys. A few wooden decoys, say half a dozen or so, put out in front of a gun, will make a 50 *per cent.* difference to his bag in the day's shooting. These decoys need not be very elaborate; they may be roughly shaped out of wood and roughly coloured to represent various species of duck. Solid ones are awkward things to carry in a car, but it is quite easy to make satisfactory ones out of three-ply wood, which will fold flat. I append a diagram of what they look like:—

**FLAT PORTABLE
DECOY.**




Float.

Painted to represent view of duck from above (deal & cork).

Slot A'-B'-C' is pushed into Slot A-B-C till B', C' coincide with B & C.

Anchor with string and lead disc so that Decoy floats with head up wind.



The advantage of them is that you can carry fifteen or twenty quite easily, whereas even three or four solid decoys are an infernal nuisance in a car. The more decoys you use, the more effective they are.

Remember that, in still water, duck always face up wind. You must place your decoys accordingly and, if possible, arrange them so that duck coming up wind to alight will pass within easy range of you. They are best if they can be constructed so that they will float and move a little bit with the ripples, and this can easily be done by anchoring them to a cord and a weight fixed in a hole in their front end.

These flat decoys look like nothing on earth from close quarters, but are quite effective enough to achieve your purpose of bringing high duck within range of you.

Decoys are particularly effective in dealing with those duck which come in high up later on in the day. These are usually rather suspicious and come into a jheel obviously looking for a safe place. If they see other birds sitting quietly in the water they will come down to join them.

Remember that the majority of your bag is not made, as a rule, during the first rise of duck. When the duck first get up you will probably get a mad half hour, but the bulk of your bag will be made later on when odd parties of duck begin returning to the jheel from other jheels from which they have been disturbed. That is the time when your decoys are really useful.

The pleasantest time in a shoot is after the big rise is over and when these odd parties come drifting in. This is the time too when one very often gets a lot of that excellent bird the Pintail. Pintail have a habit of going away quickly when shooting first starts on a jheel and of coming in again later, very high, in small parties to settle down for the day.

I wonder how often the average man who shoots duck in this country has found himself half-way between his hide and the shore when duck have started streaming in again, and how often he has struggled back to his hide, only to get there too late. One of the axioms for a keen man to remember is that so long as his hide is well placed and in a good jheel he can hardly stay in it too long, provided shooting is taking place on other jheels in the neighbourhood. You will get far more duck by sitting still in a likely place than you will wandering about the country looking for new places and fresh birds.

When you have shot a jheel in the morning and you have no where else to go, it is nearly always worth while going back to your

hide fairly early in the afternoon. I do not mean for the evening flight, but duck which have been kept off a jheel all morning will very often come in again quite early in the afternoon long before their normal fighting hours.

The duck which are on a jheel by day are nearly always those which have been on it during the previous night. Nobody but a lunatic, therefore, will shoot an evening flight on a jheel and then expect to get sport on it next day. The reverse is the right thing to do. Very often the mere fact that you have shot a jheel during the day improves the evening flight. The duck will then be coming in from a distance quite undisturbed, instead of being put off by your shots.

Now to turn to the question of flight shooting. This is of two kinds. Firstly, flight shooting proper, that is to say, when you are intercepting duck between their feeding grounds and their resting grounds either in the morning or evening. Secondly, evening flight shooting when you wait for them actually on their feeding grounds. The first method is far the finest sport. It is probably the best sport that you can get in the world with a shot gun. It is, however, not easy to get this type of shooting in India. The reason is that there are, as a rule, too many places in which duck can rest during the day and the result is that numbers of duck very seldom follow the same line. Where, however, there is a big preserve, or similar reservoir of duck, and you can hit off the line by which the duck leave it for their feeding grounds, you can very often get first class sport.

This is specially the case in Kashmir, and the fighting round the outskirts of Higham and Hokra is magnificent. The first thing you must do is to make certain that you are on the right line. Often duck, for some unknown reason, will follow each other over exactly the same line, even if they have got twenty or thirty miles still to go to their feeding grounds. Once you have got the right line, the next thing you have got to remember is that they will seldom flight till the last moment when it is possible to see them, and will often come long after dark. You must, therefore, place yourself so that you get them against a perfectly clear background—a clump of trees—a distant hill or even a patch of dark clouds will make fighting duck almost invisible. What you want to do is to get them up against the afterglow of the sunset with a perfectly clear horizon below them. The lower you are the better you can see especially if they have, as they

often do, a tendency to flight up a dip in the ground or a river bed. You will see much better if you are at the bottom of it than if you are on high ground beside it.

Generally, fighting duck come so late that you need not worry very much about cover, provided you are not on a sky line. It is wise, however, to start off under cover in case they flight early, and move into the open as it grows dark. When duck flight late, the most difficult night on which to see them is a perfectly clear night with a bright moon. If, however, you can get the same moon with a slightly cloudy sky, you will find that you can see them quite well. On a rough night with a high wind, duck will generally come lower and earlier, and the best shooting you can get is on a night like this when they have to struggle up against the wind. The best flight shooting I have had in Kashmir has been on a really rough evening with heavy snow falling. In these circumstances, if you put a white night shirt over your clothes and a white cover over your hat you scarcely need trouble about taking cover even if duck come by daylight.

The morning flight is generally, I think, better than the evening flight. Duck seem to come at longer intervals after they have been feeding all night and, therefore, your shooting lasts longer. In many places, moreover, you will be standing close to their resting ground for the day, and their feeding ground may be twenty or thirty miles away. Obviously, therefore, if they leave the latter at dawn, it will be getting fairly light by the time they reach you.

Unless duck have been much frightened and are fighting very high, I recommend your using a considerably smaller size of shot than you do during the day. This is specially worth while if there are a lot of teal about, as they will often flight as low and as fast as driven grouse, and it takes a master man to kill them with the small pattern which your gun will make with a large size of shot. Personally, I like using two guns for this sort of flight shooting. I keep one in reserve with large shot for big duck which come high and the occasional goose, but, normally, I use my ordinary gun with small size shot. I am no believer in trying to use a heavy bore for flight shooting. You may, with a heavy bore and large shot, kill a few exceptionally long shots but I am quite certain you will not perform as quickly and as well at the birds which come past you low down and which you can only see for a second or so.

The exception to this is, of course, when fighting geese. In

most places, unless they are much harried, they flight out to feed by day. In Kashmir, for instance, in winter, they generally leave the big jheels about 9 o'clock in the morning, but will often flight again early in the afternoon. They come over just too high for an ordinary 12-bore with small shot, and you must use a really big shot to kill them. An ordinary 12-bore will not shoot a large size shot well. It will nearly always make an irregular pattern. A 10-bore or even an 8-bore with a heavy charge of large shot, No. 1 or bigger, will be much more effective and can quite easily be used by an ordinary man.

In this sort of shooting too, you don't expect to have to shoot a large number of cartridges in a short time and there is much less objection to using a really heavy bore. Your heavy bore too, may be brought into action at duck returning to a jheel during the day but I, personally, advise you not to try to use it when duck are coming thick and fast, or during an evening or morning flight.

Flight shooting on the actual feeding grounds is more difficult in some ways than when you are intercepting birds between their feeding ground and resting ground. On their feeding ground, you can never be certain of the direction from which they will come and a great many of them will come very low and be swerving badly. Here again, the great thing is to post yourself covering a narrow channel of clear water, for birds alighting at a distance from you will often flight up and down the middle of the channel before they settle.

In this sort of shooting, as in all flight shooting, you must get a clear background and it is fatal to post yourself so that you get your birds up against high ground or a clump of trees. One difficulty is that all your birds will fall into the water and you will lose a great many of them, especially as your coolies will be frightened out of their lives of having to wade about in the water in the dark. They will expect every moment to be eaten by a crocodile or a kelpie, and their brains will entirely cease to function. The only solution is, of course, a first class dog, a Labrador for choice, and you will in any case get far more pleasure out of your evening flight if you have a keen dog to share it with you. He has his uses too, in other ways, because he will hear birds coming long before you can, and will put you on *qui vive* when you cannot hear birds yourself.

Flight shooting of all kinds depends almost as much on your ears as it does on your eyes. Unless you hear birds coming you will hardly ever see them quick enough to get your gun off.

Now about the size of shot used, and so on. The first thing to remember is that nearly all guns have their individualities, and the majority of them will shoot much better with one size of shot than they do with others. The majority of ordinary 12-bores, however, shoot much better with sizes from No. 5 to No. 8 than they will with No. 2 and No. 3 or even No. 4. Very few normal 12-bores will shoot a really good pattern with a large size shot. This is very important because, whatever size shot you are using, to kill birds dead you want to hit them with four or five pellets. A single pellet, however large, will hardly ever bring down a bird stone dead. With larger shot, therefore, although you may make occasional flukes at long ranges, on the whole, you are likely to have far more wounded birds. In the early part of the year, therefore, and specially where there are a lot of teal about, I strongly recommend you to stick to No. 6 and No. 7. Later, when there are more big duck and they are more likely to fly high, change to Nos. 4 and 5, but stick to the smaller sizes for flighting.

Whatever you do, do not try to get increased range by using a heavier charge of powder so as to get a higher velocity. High velocity in a shot gun always means a bad and scattered pattern. I have been told, but I have not been able to prove it by personal experience, that the right answer for duck shooting is to use the new low velocity cartridge with a small powder charge and a large size of shot, say No. 4. The idea is that the low velocity gives a much more even pattern, while, although the original velocity is less, a large shot maintains its velocity better than small shot and so gives a better penetration at long ranges. I believe this type of cartridge is being used a lot by wild fowlers at home.

If you are dealing with conditions where really large shot is necessary, such as flighting geese, you must use a special gun for it. An 8-bore or a 10-bore will produce quite a good pattern with No. 1 shot or S. S. G. at ranges far beyond those at which an ordinary 12-bore is at all effective. The difficulty about using a heavy gun, however, is that it is useless where quick shooting is required either at night or in cover. You also have to be a pretty strong man if you are going to fire off a lot of cartridges with one of these heavy guns without feeling the effects of it. A special wild-fowling 12-bore may meet the case, but for a strong man I recommend an 8-bore or at least a 10-bore.

One of the things that you must have, if you are going to be successful round the ordinary station in India, is a car that will go really well across country, and by a cross country, I mean over any road where the normal bullock cart can go. The "nutty" saloon in which you take your girl friend to the Pictures is not generally very much use to you. It may be comfortable and all that, but it will not go over really bad ground, while the smell of stale scent and the memories it engenders at dawn will probably put you off your shooting. What you want is something with a high clearance and a high engine power that will take you over ruts and pull you through the sand. One of the secrets of getting really good sport in this country is being able to get your car to places to which other people cannot. A two-seater is not much use to you. You must be able to take your shikaris, your dogs, your cartridges, your food, your decoys, a change of clothes and very possibly your bedding along with you in the car.

The best places in this country are now out of reach of cars altogether. You have got to be able to cut adrift from cars and go out by train, by ekka or by a bullock cart. If you do that you will soon find there are lots of places where you can get first class sport.

If you find a really good place, keep it to yourself. If you tell ever your best friend about it in the strictest confidence, the betting is that next time you go there you will find him and *his* best friend shooting in the middle of it.

I am always being asked how many coolies one wants for duck shooting and how much one should pay them. Numbers, of course, must vary in accordance with the type of jheel on which you are shooting. If it is open and you can use a dog in it all you require is enough men to carry your cartridges and the birds you shoot. Your dog will pick them up after the shooting is over. If the jheel is really thick and a lot of your birds are going to drop in heavy reeds, you may want four coolies. Do not keep them with you. Post them in the reeds 80 yards or so away on all sides of you. Instruct them very carefully that it is their business to pick up any birds that fall close to them in the reeds, but that they are on no account to go for birds which fall in the open.

In addition to these, every gun should have a shikari or at least a man of sufficient sense to keep tally of the birds he has down, and to control the coolies' work. It is a great saving having a man like this, because you can then concentrate on your shooting and not spend

half your time fussing about the picking up of your birds. You must, however, yourself keep count of the number of birds you have down and the rough directions in which they have fallen. If you do not you will never pick up half of them.

However good cover is you will nearly always want to improve it. It is a very good plan when you are going into a jheel to make each of your men bring a big bundle of grass along with him. You will find it is nearly always useful, even if it is only to thicken up existing reeds sufficiently to make a resting place for your gun, etc.

Do not over-pay your coolies. If you do, you are spoiling the market for other people, but, if they do you well, give them the *baksheesh* they deserve, on the spot. It is far better and more effective than giving it later, and has the advantage that it will not lead every other coolie in the country to expect some *baksheesh* too.

Normally six annas is enough for a day's work by a coolie. If he does really well, you might give him two annas more, but that is about the limit, except for some specially meritorious deed.

A shikari's pay varies in every part of the country. Round Delhi, about Rs. 20, plus travelling allowance and an extra tip when you have a good shoot is about as much as you should give. Personally, I only pay mine Rs. 10, but then I pay him on a sliding sale according to results. This works out at about an anna a bird up to 25, two annas a bird over 25, and so on, and in a really good month he may make up to Rs. 40.

I am sure this method of payment by results is much the most effective one to adopt, but it is not easy to get a strange shikari to agree to it. He will naturally be rather shy of taking on a bargain which depends, at least in some measure, on whether you can hold your gun straight.

You will have to pay your shikari travelling expenses for reconnaissances and so on. This probably leads to more quarrels than anything else. He will try, wherever he goes, to charge you two or three rupees for an ekka, when in reality he probably paid a two-anna 'bus fare, but you must fight him over this, not only in your own interest but in the interests of the rest of the shooting community.

One of the most interesting parts of duck shooting is the variety of species you meet. Half the interest lies in being able to recognise them. This is not at all easy with the majority of duck, because their plumage varies enormously according to the time of the year.

I have not space to go into this question here, but I strongly advise you to get hold of a really good book of reference, say Stuart Baker's famous book, and every time you find a bird that you cannot recognise at first sight, look it up in the book and identify it carefully.

Keep a record of the duck you shoot, by species, sexes and dates. Far too little is known all the world over about the migration and habits of duck and it would help enormously in this respect if you would send statistics in detail to the Bombay Natural History Society, who are working on this subject.

The above notes make no pretension of either being complete or authoritative. They represent certain very obvious things which one has learned from often bitter experience. One of the joys about wild fowl shooting is that you are always learning something new and you are always pitting your brain against birds which are naturally both wild and cunning. To be successful in wild fowling you must have, somewhere within you, the instincts of a born poacher. It is only by using this, and the rest of your low cunning to the fullest possible extent, that you can ever hope to be really successful.

LYAUTEY, MOROCCO AND THE N.-W. F. P.

(A REPLY)

BY "SHIGGADAR"

May I venture to make a few observations on Spingirai's very clever and interesting "Critical appreciation" of the Gold Medal Essay, which was published in your issue of July 1935. Anyone with a knowledge of the frontier who reads this appreciation cannot fail to be struck by the writer's vast knowledge of frontier problems and the apparent soundness of his arguments, but it must be borne in mind that this appreciation is really in the nature of a review of the essay and that Spingirai, while pointing out the difficulties, indeed the impossibility, of bringing into force the measures advocated by the Essayist on the North-West Frontier, does not himself attempt to produce arguments to show how unity of control might be brought about. In fact his appreciation is, presumably with intention, more in the form of a justification of the Government point of view, and it conveys the impression that all is well on the frontier and that no change of method in our dealings with the tribes across the border is possible. Nevertheless, he goes so far as to say that he "unreservedly accepts the Essayist's main conclusion, namely, the desirability of unity of control on the frontier."

It is very difficult to give adequate reasons for the necessity for unity of control on the frontier in peace-time without bringing to notice certain naked facts and without running the risk of offending certain people's susceptibilities. This Spingirai has been at pains to avoid, but at the same time he remarks that the Essayist has given no real reasons for the necessity of military control in the trans-border tracts.

The Essayist advocates complete military control in trans-border areas, even to the extent of depriving the Governor of the control which he exercises over the trans-border tribes, and Spingirai proves, I think convincingly, that this is not a practicable proposition. In the course of his arguments the latter lays considerable stress upon the insurmountable difficulties which would be set District Commanders if the responsibility for the trans-border tribes were added to their military duties, but, in doing so, he appears to ignore the fact that the District Commander in Waziristan managed to exercise political control in Waziristan quite successfully for four years during and after the

Mahsud expedition of 1919-20. He also strongly emphasises the inexpediency of divorcing the trans from the cis-border tribes on account of the necessity for unity of political control over both, and he lays stress on the repercussions which incidents on one side of the border have on the tribes on the other side.

Now unity of political control by the Governor over all tribes, both cis and trans-border, is undoubtedly necessary, for without it the divorce between the two would become absolute, but the repercussions referred to do not appear to have much force as an argument. Such repercussions are usually due to intrigues in the cis-border districts and the first time they came to notice with real force was during the Red Shirt movement in 1920. At that time the object in view was to obtain the support of the trans-border tribes against the British. Since then times have changed and Pathanistan's main effort now appears to be directed towards Pathan unity. This is the result of the fear complex from which the whole of India appears to be suffering; fear of what is going to happen when Indians are called upon to control their own destinies. Such fear is quite natural in the N.-W. F. P. for the Pathans are still very backward boys in comparison with the Nehrus of the U. P., the Boses of Bengal and the Murthis of Madras.

Spingirai draws special attention to the main object of our policy on the frontier, namely, "the establishment of effective control over all the tribes which live on our side of the Afghan frontier." Now, surely, this is a military problem? And yet the Army have very little say in the matter, except when major operations are in progress. There must be something wrong about this, for who will deny that the present system of dual control is unsatisfactory? Some of the reasons for this appear to be as follows:—

- (1) In trans-border areas, such as the Malakand, the Khyber and Waziristan, we have working along side each other two authorities,—the O.C. Troops and the Political Agent. The former is almost invariably the elder and more experienced, but the latter has all the power and holds the money bags. If the two are friends, all is well (as a rule), but if they are not, there is often friction.
- (2) Political officers cannot be chosen for their aptitude for dealing with frontier tribesmen alone, as all sorts and conditions of men are required in the Political Department. Some prefer the frontier life, and these often make first

class frontier Political officers ; others are more suited to Secretariat work ; while others again incline towards the diplomatic life of an appointment in Indian India. But up-to-date officers of all these classes have been liable for service on the North-West Frontier and the result has sometimes been unfortunate.

- (3) Political officers, whether suited or unsuited to frontier work, find themselves up against an established system, including the old custom of what is known in polite parlance as "keeping the tribesmen content with liberal payments." Other people bluntly call it bribery. Anyway, whatever it is called, it has proved a failure. Look around and you will find that in almost every case the tribes which have been the worst behaved are those which have received the most money. Nevertheless, it is practically impossible for an officer to discontinue this custom without breaking faith with the tribesmen, a thing which nobody wants to do.

Many military officers do not understand this and are therefore inclined, under the present system, to view the Political Officer as merely a dispenser of bribes to undeserving tribesmen.

With regard to the appointment of officers for Political duties in trans-border areas, the French system in Morocco seems to be a much more suitable one than ours on the N.-W. F. Ten or more years ago, being interested in French methods of dealing with tribesmen, I got in touch with an officer who had seen a good deal of the French in Morocco and I asked him various questions. One of these questions was about the "Service des Renseignements." His answer to my question was as follows :— " Officers of the ' Service des Renseignements ' are recruited solely from the Army : the Service is a Military one and is never under Civil control : all dealings with tribes are conducted through this Service and this is its main function. In order to qualify for the Service an officer has to serve for one year in North Africa, after which he can get his name put down on the waiting list ; but it is difficult to get into and there is no hope of doing so unless approved and considered eligible by those already in it, in fact, one may say that the Service recruits itself without any outside interference. It is much sought after and has high standards of devotion and efficiency ; it impressed me more than anything else I saw in Morocco and to it is undoubtedly due a great measure of the credit for the work of pacification by the French."

The above speaks for itself and I suggest that a similar service, call it what you like, recruited from the Army might well be employed on our North-West Frontier, in all agencies except the Kurram, which to all intents and purposes is a settled cis-border district and could, at any rate, be treated as such. If the expediency of such a service be admitted, then I suggest that its officers should serve directly under District Commanders, who would be entrusted in peace time with the work which they will have to do in any case in war, namely, dealings with the tribes in their respective areas. This means military control in trans-border areas.

But previously in this letter it was admitted that unity of political control over all tribes by the Governor was essential. Why therefore should not District Commanders be responsible to the Governor for their dealings with the tribes? It has been my experience that real co-operation between Civil and Military is best assured when military officers serve directly under the head of the Civil administration and the very fact of District Commanders being directly under the Governor for Political duties would, it is suggested, go far towards guaranteeing the most cordial co-operation between the two services. This would particularly be the case in the event of a Civilian being appointed Governor in place of a Military Political, as is sure to come about some day.

Thus we would have military control in the trans-border areas under the direction of the head of the Province. There are of course objections to the scheme, as there are to any scheme, the chief one being that District Commanders would be called upon to serve two masters; but against that would be the undoubted advantage of District Commanders of the Covering Force being better prepared for their duties in war by being entrusted with political duties in peace time; also the difficulties inherent to the present system of dual control would automatically disappear. Other changes would of course be necessary, such as the redistribution of Political agencies in order to relieve the overworked Deputy Commissioners of Peshawar and Kohat of the burden of responsibility for the Mohmand, Adam Khel and Orakzai tribes, of which they are at present Political Officers in addition to their other duties.

I submit that such a scheme is feasible and that from its consideration there might arise that which the whole world appears to be seeking at the present time, namely, a formula acceptable to all parties.

A SUGGESTED METHOD OF HANDLING REMOUNTS BASED ON THE LICHTWARK PROCEDURE

BY MAJOR S. H. PERSSE, 15TH LANCERS

The psychological problem in horse training.

"The trainer must aim at gaining the confidence of the horse, which he can do by kindness....."¹

The object of "breaking" is "to prepare the horse's characterso that he will be fit.....to respond to the demands which will be made upon him"² during training.

The object of training is "to acquire complete control over the horse's mental.....powers."²

Brave words these, but, as many people have found to their cost, very difficult to put into practice. The problem of the army remount is further complicated by the fact that, unlike any other animal, his training does not begin until he has reached full strength.³ The majority of un-handled horses, too, have little cause to like man, and memories of the pain of branding and the discomfort of rail and possibly sea journeys must make them regard him more as a potential enemy than a friend. With all animals of the lower order, physical contact seems to be a necessary preliminary to obtaining the mental counterpart; but how are we to establish the former with a horse, infinitely more powerful than ourselves, which regards, not only us, but everything that we do with mistrust. "By patience" answer the "Yes-men" and promptly come into direct conflict with the framer of training programmes, who can only allot "X" hours for remounts, instead of the "N" which patience invariably demands.

Any method of handling the young horse, therefore, which results in his confidence being won quickly and permanently must commend itself to all those who realise that remount training, important as it may be, is only one of the many duties which the mounted soldier has to perform.

¹ Manual of Horsemastership, etc. (1929), Section 51 (1).

² *Ibid.*, Section 49 (3).

³ Fillis deals with this point at length, in his "Breaking and Riding" pages 215—225. Two-year old thoroughbreds in England are broken by a lad of about five foot high, with very little trouble.

The suggested method.

The method to be described has been in use for about four years and has been applied to several hundred horses. It has been the subject of discussion, criticism, many demonstrations and a great deal of correspondence. The results, however, are convincing and there is a growing school of thought which favours its extension throughout the Army. The saving of time being of great importance, the method has advantages over the normal procedure, in that all remounts can be mounted and ridden before they leave the paddock in which they are segregated for one month after arrival in the unit.

The originator: Professor Lichtwark.—It is believed that he was an Austrian, who some time in the 1880's went to Australia to see if he could not "break" and train the wild horse. It has been suggested that he was an exponent of "Haute Ecole."

His principles.—Three in number, are simple, incontrovertible and must be remembered throughout the succeeding paragraphs.

1. It is better to avoid a fight than to run the risk of losing one.
2. The horse, by nature, is a timid animal; the bulk of the trouble, therefore, which may be experienced during "breaking" and training is directly attributable to fear.
3. The horse is not frightened of that which he has seen, smelt and fed off.

His method.—To put the horse into such a physical condition that his nervousness cannot be translated into resistance. He can then be approached without danger, fed, petted and generally "made much of" in order that his natural fear of man and all other strange objects and sounds may be overcome.

His tackle.—It is obvious that such a condition cannot be reached without the use of suitable tackle. The following articles are essential:

- (a) A 6-foot pole with a soft leather "blob" at one end.
- (b) A 19-foot rope with shackle, quick release and "D" for use on the fore legs.
- (c) A blanket apron to hang round the neck and protect the chest.
- (d) A 23-foot rope with shackle, quick release and "D" for use on the hind legs.
- (e) The safety rein and crupper.

All ropes are covered with *numnah*, where necessary, to prevent galling.

The gaining of confidence.

In order to give the assistant a greater chance of checking a "break-away," the horse is held by a webbing long-rein. Both trainer and assistant keep well to the front of the horse, in order that he may see all that they are doing. The trainer's nose bag is full of lucerne or any green stuff. This is preferable to grain which a number of young horses—the Waler in particular—have never seen before.

Although not absolutely necessary, it is advisable, from the start, to introduce the horse to the 6-foot pole, the sole object of which is to enable the trainer to rub various parts of the horse's body without danger to himself. He puts a handful of lucerne on the "blob" and pushes it forward towards the nose. At first, there is great suspicion, but a well-known smell overcomes fear; and within a short time, the pupil is not only looking forward to the next mouthful but is actually allowing his nose to be stroked, first by the "blob" and then by the trainer's hand. From the nose to the eye is but a short distance, and the object of all this is to enable the teacher to tickle the corner of the eye and the forehead. There is no doubt that horses like this, for those that have been accustomed to it will frequently stretch their heads forward to have it done. From a number of possible explanations, the most probable one is, that when a foal is born, the dam will, as often as not, stand over it and lick it round the eyes. A repetition of this in later life may possibly strike a chord of pleasant memory in the animal's brain. Be that as it may, the fact remains that when once the pupil permits his face and head to be stroked and tickled, the trainer has progressed an appreciable way towards winning his confidence. It is from this basis that all subsequent work emanates and to which a return must be made if set-backs occur in later training. It is important that it should be thorough and practice should, therefore, be continued until all signs of fear have vanished.

The exploitation of confidence.

From the forehead, the rubbing with the hand—in difficult cases with the "blob"—is carried on slowly over the top of the head and down the neck to the withers. If the horse shows any signs of fright, the trainer must return to the nose and eyes and start all over

again. In difficult cases it may take an hour or two to reach the forelegs, but the work must not be rushed. In this, as in all other handling, the object must be attained by permission of the horse and not against his will.

(a) *Lifting a foreleg.*—As soon as the trainer can rub both forelegs as far down as the coronets, the horse is introduced to the 19-foot rope. *He is allowed to smell it and feed off it (coiled up); it is then rubbed against his nose and forehead, and finally passed right over the top of his head, down his neck to his withers.*¹ The rope is allowed to fall on both sides of him, the shackle being on the same side as the hoof which the trainer intends to lift. During this, and all subsequent operations, the assistant is holding the horse's attention by feeding him with small pieces of lucerne and rubbing his eyes and head. A little more stroking of the coronet and pastern—the shackle is fastened and unfastened several times round the latter—the slack end of the rope is passed through the "D"—and all is ready for lifting the leg. But the trainer does not lift it; any display of strength at this stage would undoubtedly awaken fear. He therefore makes the animal lift it himself by making him take a half-stride forward. As the hoof comes off the ground, the rope is tightened and fastened off with a slip-knot and the leg stays up. It is surprising how very quietly the majority of horses take this. Provided that his attention has been sufficiently distracted by the assistant, it seems as if he forgets altogether about the leg which went up, but didn't come down!

He is too weak to stand on three legs for long and so, after a minute or two, he is persuaded to lower his leg to the ground himself. The trainer slips the quick release and holds the hoof in his hand. He gradually lessens his lift and the animal, realising, so to speak, that his leg has returned, takes the weight himself and lowers it to the ground. What a credulous animal! Agreed, but let us, at least, take advantage of the fact where we can.

After a short rest, the other leg is lifted in similar fashion. During this stage, first lessons in shoeing are given by tapping the hoof

1. The horse is always introduced to articles of tackle and saddlery in the same way. He is allowed to see them, smell them and feed off them. They are then rubbed against his nose, eyes and forehead. Finally, they are passed over the top of his head and down his neck to the part of the body required. If the horse shows any signs of nervousness, the trainer must go back to the nose and start all over again.

To avoid repetition, this procedure is not described in detail again. It is referred to as "*the Lichtwark manner.*"

gently with a hammer. Any cuts and abrasions resulting from the train journey can now be attended to.

Finally, the snaffle—a straight-barred one, placed high in the mouth to check any attempt at getting the tongue over it—is fitted.

The main object of raising a foreleg is to enable the trainer to approach the hind quarters without danger. (Photograph No. 1.)

(b) *Lifting a hind leg.*—With a foreleg lifted, the blanket apron is fitted in “*the Lichtwark manner*” so that it hangs squarely across the horse’s chest as shown in photograph No. 9. This accomplished, the trainer gradually moves backwards, patting, stroking and talking, until sooner or later—if necessary, through the medium of the “blob”—he is rubbing the hind leg and pastern. Returning to the front end, the hind leg rope (23-foot) is then introduced in “*the Lichtwark manner*,” and, if the preliminary work has been well done, the horse will not be unduly disturbed when the shackle is fastened round his leg, just above the fetlock. If, however, he does attempt to kick it off, he can do but little as his foreleg, on the same side, is still off the ground. When he has settled down, the slack end of the rope is passed forward between the forelegs, through a loop or runner on the rope of the blanket apron, and back to the “D” of the shackle. The horse is persuaded to lower his foreleg in the way described above. The trainer then makes him take a half-stride forward and just before the hind hoof is lowered to the ground, the rope is tightened and fastened off with a slip-knot.”¹

The hind quarters are now immobilised and should the horse attempt to resist—this is one of the few occasions when he may be expected to do so—he can achieve little. He can neither rear nor kick, and only with difficulty move forward. More important than this is the fact that the trainer and assistant can both stand right up to him, and by patting, talking and feeding will convince him, within a very short time, that there is nothing whatsoever to be frightened of. In actual fact it is surprising what a small amount of trouble this raising of the hind leg causes, provided that the preliminary work has been properly carried out. If, as often happens, the horse takes it all quietly, the trainer confirms his mastery and the inability of the horse to resist by deliberately shoving the quarters sideways and pushing the animal off his balance. He staggers and may fight

1. Graduates of the Equitation School will note the slight resemblance which this bears to the Baldock Tackle. There is, however, a marked difference in the way the same result is achieved, and in the object.

for a moment or two, but the comforting process will soon calm him down. When all other fears have been overcome by kindness, why should not this one be too?

With a hind leg raised,¹ further lessons in shoeing can be given, wounds attended to, docility training carried out, the blanket and saddle put on, and ultimately the horse mounted without danger.

Prior to this, however, there is a small matter to be attended to which, unbelievable as it may seem, is nevertheless of extreme importance; the horse's tail!

The raising of the tail.

Professor Lichtwark is rumoured to have said that if the horse is made to relax his tail muscles he will cease to resist; or, in other words, he will give his confidence to his trainer. As soon, therefore, as a hind leg has been secured, the trainer raises and lowers the tail until he has turned it right up. A comparison between photographs 1, 2, and 3 (particularly), and number 4 is instructive. In the former it will be noticed that the tail is tightly clapped down and that the whole attitude is one of mental resistance. In the latter, resistance has vanished and submission is plainly shown.

Many reasons for this change have been advanced; the most probable one seems to be that in equine etiquette this lifting of the tail is such an undignified procedure that the poor animal gives up the unequal contest in sheer disgust. Whatever the reason may be, there is no doubt that from now onwards the horse seems to realise that man is, and intends to remain, master; and further, judged by the feeding and patting that has gone on, he is a friend rather than an enemy. Submission to, or the placing of confidence in, his trainer is only another way of saying that he is ready to allow his character to be prepared.

Henceforward, tail lifting is a regular feature of the day's work.

It has been suggested that this "indignity" tends to break the animal's spirit. Nothing could be further from the truth. Firstly, in a well-managed stable, every horse should have his tail lifted during grooming. Secondly, the behaviour of a Lichtwark-handled horse on a Monday morning is exactly comparable to that of any other horse after twenty-four hours holiday. A horse which "plays up" from *joie de vivre* can hardly be said to have a broken spirit.

¹ For several days to come, it will be necessary to raise a foreleg as a preliminary to lifting a hind one.

Details of further training.

Subsequent work, speaking generally, follows the lines laid down in the *Manual of Horsemastership, etc.*, a few differences are noted and commented on.

The rider's weight.—As the horse is mentally ready long before he is physically fit to carry his rider, a good deal of time is spent in rectifying the latter deficiency. Still adhering to the principle of avoiding a fight, the trainer lifts a hind leg; from first one side and then the other, he is lifted until he is lying across the horse's back. This is continued for increasing periods each day, in order that the muscles may be prepared for the weight they will shortly have to carry.¹ (See photograph No. 5.)

By way of a diversion, the trainer also mounts over the tail and, finally, over the head. (Photograph No. 6) was taken on the sixth day after training had commenced; those who attribute the ability to do this to the action of the hind leg rope will note that it is so slack that the horse's hoof is actually on the ground. Undoubtedly, he could have "humped his back" if he had wanted to do so.

Saddling.—The blanket, safety rein and crupper, and saddle are then fitted in "*the Lichtwark manner*," and photograph No. 7 clearly shows the last item being passed over the horse's head. He is then turned loose in the paddock and allowed to wander about and graze, in order that he may get fully accustomed to the feel of the saddle before the trainer attempts to mount. Although free, no difficulty is experienced in catching him, which is further proof that the trainer has captured his confidence.

Mounting.—Accustomed to both the weight of the rider and the feel of the saddle, there is no reason why the horse should object to a combination of the two. However, in order to make quite certain that no set-back occurs, a hind leg is raised before the trainer is lifted into the saddle.

First forward movement.—As soon as it is seen that the horse has no objection to make to his rider being "on board," the hind leg is lowered until he can take his weight on it, but not sufficiently to enable him to take a full stride. He is then made to take a few half-steps forward and, by a gradual progression from day to day,

¹ It is, of course, open to argument whether this method, or the one of long-reining advocated in the "*Manual of Horsemastership*," etc., 1929, Sec. 53, is the better for preparing the horse to carry weight. Time is an important consideration.

backing has been accomplished without incident. During this stage, the horse is taught to obey words of command.

Docility training.—This is carried out with the object of confirming the victories already won. Mounting and dismounting over the tail and head have already been done but are continued. Crawling between the fore and hind legs—strange sights, such as umbrellas, lance pennons and maps (photograph No. 8), strange sounds, such as the rattling of tins and the clatter of clipping machines, are all introduced. At this stage, too, the horse is prepared for the paraphernalia of “marching order.” Soft sacks of hay are hung from the saddle and from the tail; he is then turned loose in the paddock and it is a ridiculous sight to see a batch of newly-arrived. Walers wandering about, looking like complete Christmas Trees but quite unconcerned about it all.

From here to the end of the chapter is a short story and the final picture shows the finished article, as far as handling and mounting are concerned. The rider is “on board”—all four legs are on the ground—and the horse, surrounded by apron, sacks and umbrella looks as if he had spent months in the army and not a bare three weeks. (Photograph No. 9.)

The Safety Rein and Crupper.

So far, no detailed mention has been made of this and the reason is that its object is sufficiently important to warrant special comment.

It consists of an ordinary crupper to which are joined two thin ropes; these pass forward between the bars of the saddle, either side of the horse's neck, through the rings of the snaffle, and back to the rider's hand. (Photographs Nos. 7 and 9.)

The action of the crupper under the tail is obvious; it serves as a gentle, yet firm reminder of “tail-lifting” and that man intends to remain master. Its effect can be increased or diminished—according to the way the horse is behaving—by a subsidiary rope which is fastened to the front arch of the saddle.

The object of the running rein is not so plain, and has given rise to a great deal of discussion regarding the precise purpose for which Professor Lichtwark intended it. There are two schools of thought.

The first advances the theory that it was designed to give a sharp lesson at each end, if the horse, when mounted, played up or tried to buck. This is sound as far as the crupper is concerned; but a “jab in the mouth” is so inconsistent with Lichtwark's principle

of eliminating fear in order to gain confidence, that it may be dismissed.

The second school maintains that, provided the preliminary handling and preparation for mounting has been thoroughly done, the crupper itself is all that is required to prevent bucking; and that the running rein is simply for the purposes of "mouthing." There is a great deal to support this theory. Firstly, it conforms to the underlying principle of gentleness. Secondly, it is consistent with the suggestion that Lichtwark was an exponent of "Haute Ecole" for which a greater bend from the poll is required than in the case of the ordinary riding horse. The effect of a running rein is to increase the horizontal, but decrease the vertical action of a snaffle in a horse's mouth. It is not impossible that Lichtwark was a disciple of Baucher and was concerned with getting the exaggerated bend which that horseman taught.¹ This could have been obtained (but not necessarily was) by a running rein. Confirmation of this can be had by reference to many of the old prints of famous riders of the past. Apart from the fact that the crupper was a permanent fixture to the saddle, many are shown as using a running rein, and the horses have that incorrect—judged by present day standards—bend which Baucher advocated.

Be all that as it may, there is no doubt that the safety rein should be used carefully and sparingly; otherwise, it tends to produce symptoms of "overbend."

General Observations.

With the single exception of the question of loss of spirit, which has been answered above, it is not proposed to deal with any of the many criticisms which have been made about this method of training. It will suffice to say that some have been very helpful, some very amusing and some purely destructive.

The Effect on the Men.

Let us be honest and admit that there are very few of us who, when given a raw Waler remount to handle, are not rather frightened of him. In fact, it is debatable as to which is the more frightened—man or horse. If physical contact is difficult, mental contact must be nearly impossible to achieve. By minimising the danger—real or imaginary—to the trainer, his fear is eliminated, and mutual

¹ Cf. Fillis "Breaking and Riding," page 63.

A reference has been made to the Spanish Riding School in Vienna with the object of clearing up several points regarding Professor Lichtwark. It is regretted that the answer has not been received in sufficient time to be incorporated.

confidence between man and horse is no longer an ideal, but a fact, easy of attainment.

There is no particular necessity to teach the procedure in detail to each individual man. As most of the preliminary work is stationary, one supervisor can stand in the middle of a dozen horses and handlers and control them. It is, of course, necessary for the supervisor to know not only what he is going to do, but also what must be attained at each step before he passes on to the next one.

The Effect on the Horses.

In general, this method of handling produces horses:—

- (a) Which become and remain friendly throughout their service.
- (b) Which carry condition above the average. There is little doubt that unless and until a horse is on good terms with his rider, he is likely to fret and may lose condition.
- (c) Which are very steady in the ranks.

In particular, they are fully up to the standard laid down for the trained horse in the *Manual of Horsemastership*, etc.

The Financial Effect.

Admissions to hospitals.—It is not possible to give full comparative figures of the number of casualties due to kicks, bites and struggling in the lines. This method, however, produces horses which are noticeably quiet and well-disposed towards one another in the stables, and there is sufficient data to justify the statement that its adoption should result in a definite drop in the number of these injuries.

Castings for vice.—Before this is dealt with it is necessary to make certain postulates regarding the reasons why horses go wrong and become “outlaws.”

It is contended that, in his natural state, no horse¹ is vicious. The “*Manual of Horsemastership*” seems to differentiate between *bad habits*² and *general vice*.³ It is, however, suggested that the two are inter-connected and that the former is only the precursor of the latter; both are the outcome of lack of confidence in the trainer and an uncertainty as to whether he is friend or enemy. In short, they are both due to fear, the forerunner of frenzy in the horse, but “... the parent of cruelty” in man.

It is suggested, therefore, that the majority of castings for vice can be traced to a lack of sympathetic handling in the early stages, by

¹ Entires, not being allowed in the army, are not considered.

² “*Manual of Horsemastership*” etc. (1929), Sec. 68 *et seq.*

³ *Ibid*, Sec. 76.

men, who for a variety of reasons—insufficient time, personal fear, bad temper, lack of patience or sheer inability—cannot win the animal's respect by kindness and attempt to achieve their object by harshness. Conversely, if a method of handling can be devised which enables all trainers to obtain a result without having recourse to severe methods, the risk of vice appearing in after-service should be very small.

The method advocated does fulfil the above condition, and for this reason, coupled with actual experience, it is claimed that it can eliminate vice. As bad habits cannot be predicted, it is necessary, not only that all horses should be subjected to it, but that this should be carried out when they are remounts. Considerable time, therefore, must elapse before this state of affairs is reached.


The answer to the question "Can vice be cured?" must of necessity be evasive. The problem is not unlike that of attempting to cure a drunkard. In both cases, the prevention of a relapse after cure, is more difficult than the cure itself. In the case of the drunkard, it is the man himself who must do this; in the case of the horse, it is the owner.

As must be plain, this method of handling was designed to prevent, and not to cure. Nevertheless, a number of horses¹ with bad habits have been put through a course of training, and the results show that vice can be cured; but no guarantee can be given that the improvement will be permanent. The history of two such cases is given.

No. 1.—A charger, sold back to Government and issued as a troop horse, refused to allow himself to be shod or have his mane "hogged." He had obviously won many battles and had a shrewd idea of his strength. His mental resistance was most marked. It took a month before he became in any way friendly, and six weeks before he would allow his feet to be picked up. When rehandling ceased he was a normal horse, but, within a month, showed signs of relapse. He was put back for further training, with this difference, that his actual rider in the squadron was made to carry this out, and not the N. C. O. who had done it in the first place. It is hoped that this will lead to a permanent cure.


No. 2.—Sent for training from another unit. His particular faults were "bucking," striking with his forelegs, and refusal to

¹ All the horses referred to were of reasonably young age. The "old sinner," confirmed in his habits, has not been considered.




No. 1

After two days.




No. 2

After two days.



No. 3

After two days.




No. 4

After five days.




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
After six days.



No. 6


After six days.






No. 7

After seven days.



No. 8

After twenty days.




No. 9

These photographs are of a direct-issue Waler remount which arrived on November 20, 1934.

The subject-matter of each photograph is explained in the text. Under each is shown the number of days after training had commenced, on which the picture was taken.

After twenty days.



allow more than one man to go up to him. He came to hand very quickly, and was shown as a reformed character to H. E. The Commander-in-Chief during his visit to Jubbulpore in July 1935. In this case, the animal was not returned to his unit at once: his owner was made to come each morning and ride and groom him in the same place and under the same conditions in which rehandling had taken place. It is not known as yet whether a lasting cure has been effected or not.

War.

Whatever the advantages of this method of "breaking" young horses may be in peace, it is plain that it is well suited to conditions of war. During operations it will often be necessary for horse casualties to be replaced by raw remounts and these must be able to be ridden in the ranks with a minimum of delay. Finance, then, does not play the all-important part that it does in peace, and, if the plan demands it, horses will have to be ridden and increased wastage risked, long before they are properly trained and physically fit. The determining factor is the ability of the rider to remain "on top." By this method it is claimed that hitherto "unbacked" horses could, if necessity arose, be ridden in the ranks well within one month of the date of landing.

Conclusion.

There is no method of training in the world which is fool-proof, and the success which it attains must depend very largely on the care and attention to detail, with which it is carried out. Experience has shown that Lichtwark's principles are sound. Based on these, his method of handling is logical and consists of a gradual progression, each step being consolidated before the next is taken. Any attempt, therefore, to curtail the full programme either to save more time, or because a particular horse appears to be coming to hand so well, will inevitably lead to unsatisfactory results. The method must be completed in every respect, and not only in those which appear to MAN to be of value; the horse may hold totally different views. Lichtwark's teachings cater for both, and as he has obviously studied the workings of the horse's brain very deeply, his method is recommended in its entirety and in that way only.

NOTE.—Since this article was written information has been received from the Commander of the Spanish Riding School in Vienna, that Professor Lichtwark was not an Austrian. A further suggestion has been made that he was a Bohemian who learnt his equitation in Prague before going to Australia.—*Ed.*

A PERSIAN INTERLUDE.

BY MAJOR F. T. BIRDWOOD, 11TH SIKH REGIMENT.

It is one of the saving graces of war that it generally provides a leavening of amusement. Each crack of the showman's whip produces a new sensation ; and with a careful interweaving of the ridiculous and the sublime, the pill is rendered palatable and gulped down.

The late war was no exception to rule. Its blend of side-shows was not perhaps always strictly judicious, and it further departed from commercial practice in that in most cases it was the performers rather than the spectators that derived amusement from them. This, however, was to the good. Much deadening dullness is involved in the sorry job of war to-day, and the side-shows provided a refreshing contrast which was often as good as a holiday.

Side-shows of every kind were staged during the four long years of the war—and after. Some, in conception and execution, were homeric ; others bordered on the absurd. But all were marked by a tremendous loyalty on the part of the performers, and by a spirit of practical camaraderie which carried them through to the finish.

Much has already been written of the side-show that led our troops up from the alluvial heat of Mesopotamia into the mountainous recesses of the Persian Plateau and on to Baku. No such publicity, however, has been accorded to those that followed after. This is indeed natural, for their effect on the course of the war was at best negligible, and their adventures were in most cases of a strictly domestic rather than of a public nature.

Nonetheless there were elements of interest and humour in the experiences of the troops that followed in the wake of Dunsterforce ; and it is with the object of recording the petty humours of the life of those who wintered on the Persian Plateau while the guns in Flanders thundered to their denouement, and London went mad over the Armistice, that these lines are written.

It was the early autumn of 1918, and shortly before Allenby's famous push brought the world tumbling in chaos about Turkish ears. Mesopotamia had perforce stagnated through the summer in preparation for what proved an eventful cold weather and the troops, under canvas or in bivouac, had occupied themselves during the long

oppressive tedium of the seemingly interminable hot months in what preparation and training had been possible.

The 36th Sikhs at this time were quartered under canvas on the banks of the Diala River at Baquba. Training had been steady and progressive throughout the summer, particular attention being paid to route-marches and physical development generally. Regularly every week at that dispiriting hour when "the country cocks do crow, the clocks do toll, and the third hour of drowsy morning came," the regiment had turned out for a fifteen or eighteen mile march through the shadows, and later the burning heat, of the Mesopotamian desert; and good control of limbs and imagination alike, and the cheerful acceptance of the boredom implicit in long marches over an uninspiring desert had been instilled by these means.

With the advance of autumn, however, matters in Persia had become threatening. Large masses of Turks had been reported moving down from the North-West; and with only a handful of troops to stay them, the need for reinforcements was growing urgent.

To the general delight, the regiment was warned accordingly during August; and, entraining in mid-September for rail-head, two marches distant near the Persian Frontier, started off for wherever in Persia it might please the fates to send us.

The first few marches were strenuous in the extreme. Too hot for movement by day, the regiment travelled for the most part by night; yet, when successive posts were reached about dawn each day, and the men settled down to secure what shelter they might from water-proof sheets and blankets, flies and heat alike combined to spoil their rest. The first march was possibly the worst, involving a tramp of 34 miles, which were covered in 20 hours, including a four-hour halt in the hot part of the first afternoon, and sundry hour halts in addition during the seemingly endless night that followed. It required this succession of wakeful nights and unrestful days to bring home to one the exact significance of that state of exhaustion which seals the eyes the instant a fall-out is ordered, and the writer will remember to his dying day the nauseating realisation that he had collapsed on to an ant-heap at one of the hour halts when an uneasy conscience coupled with the interested investigations of the ants aroused him to a state of half-drugged consciousness at the conclusion of the hour.

At Paitak, at the foot of the Tak-i-Girreh Pass, which leads up to the cooler highlands of the Plateau, a rifle company was picked up,

and taken on—to an unknown destination—by lorry. A further large detachment followed by the same means from Kermanshah. But by now the die in Palestine had been cast; the hostile troops in Persia had receded in response to the menace nearer home; and the first week of October found us concentrating in Hamadan and settling down for the winter.

We were glad to be in. The march had been a long one, and the country traversed, though it was to be painted in all Spring's richest colours not many months hence, had been dry and arid. Still, there had been much to distract one. From the common karezes to the hard felt Persian hats resembling big black gourds, whatever met the eye was an abstraction and a source of interest. At one point in the road, where we left the main route and followed a short cut over a low bush-strewn hill, we stumbled on an ancient paved roadway where it needed little imagination to conjure up a picture of Darius's war-worn legions swinging along to conquest. The men were in splendid form. Spanish 'flu had attacked the regiment shortly before leaving Baquba, but morale rode superior to all but sheer physical incapacity, and nothing—not all the M. O.'s threats and promises—could make a man fall out while there was a mule or a charger to climb up on, or at worst a comrade's arm. Lashings of strong, hot tea and something to help him along were all a man would ask, and he got full measure of both.

The flow of refugees from Georgia and the North-west towards the big concentration camps at Baquba was at this time in full swing, and some of the pathos of the exodus came under our observation as we passed. Here there would be a toddler little more than two years old plodding sturdily along behind its parents. There a heart-broken wail would tell of a less fortunate small one momentarily separated from its guardians. Little groups fell out by the road-side to share a meagre feast of chance-found berries, but the quaintest family of all was one of five—father, mother and three small children—who had arranged their bedding like a sort of long platform along their very stocky pony's back and had then all climbed up on it, and were advancing on Mesopotamia like a swaying five-master under sail. Of the tragedies associated with these migrations I personally saw none, but the carcasses of horses, camels and donkeys that littered the track advertised themselves in no uncertain fashion.

The first bivouac occupied in Hamadan was an orchard, planted thick with fruit trees, and later floored with daffodils of a Sir Watkin

type, many of which are now peacefully thriving at home in England. Part of the orchard was occupied by a French sanitary mission. This mission was composed of some 14 officers, all gorgeously apparelled as it seemed to us, in contrast with our own ragged appearance, and perhaps 50 men. They had the duty, we understood, of cleaning up Persia but, regrettable though it may appear, when they moved off shortly after and left their share of the orchard to us, we found ourselves faced with a legacy that appalled even the stoutest-hearted of the regimental sweepers. Winter, however, was drawing on. We were over 6,000 feet up, and a substitute was clearly required for open bivouacs in a town where the thermometer was often below zero and the snow-fall apt to be heavy. The construction of barracks by local Persian labour had already been started on a grassy slope above the town, but progress had been desperately slow and the men were accordingly turned on to help. Under the guidance of M., an officer whose early training had embraced the mysteries of the plumb line, they plunged into the making of bricks and the erection of walls, with high enthusiasm. Incidents of course occurred. No clear distinction had been drawn between the puddling of mud for bricks and the mixing of lime for mortar, and there were burnt feet and rueful smiles to show for it when the victims waded out of the treacherous mud to investigate. Still, the work went on. Persian craftsmen were employed on the more skilled business of roofing; and on the day the first snow fell, the regiment moved out of its temporary bivouacs into the lines, which were regarded as models of sound work and solid construction at the time, though I misdoubt me there is not much left of them to-day.

Trouble, however, had been brewing elsewhere. Contracts for grain and fodder had gone adrift; and with the prospect of closed passes and the stoppage of supplies from outside Persia, things began to wear a threatening and hungry look for those—particularly the animals—cooped up within it. Persia was in no sense flowing with milk and honey at this period. Successive incursions by Russian and Turkish armies had impoverished the land to a tragic degree. Death by starvation had become an increasing commonplace during the preceding winters, and the pair of shallow depressions in the pebbly bed of a near-by nullah where tradition said two miserable women had been stoned to death by a populace which still shrank from the grosser alternative of cannibalism, were pointed out as a measure of

the horrors through which the city had passed. It was not perhaps surprising, then, that the contractors found difficulty in overcoming the unwillingness of the villagers to part with their hoarded supplies, though ample for all purposes was actually thought to exist. The people could only judge us by the standards of our predecessors; and some idea of what these standards must have been was conveyed to us next month by the resolute refusal of the townsmen of Hamadan to credit the news of the armistice on the grounds that had the tale been true, we should have sacked the bazaar and celebrated our victory in an orgy of licence and terror.

Available stocks, however, were daily shrinking and nothing was coming in to replace them. In the event, after a brief conference one night at headquarters, it was decided to send out detachments from the regiment to the larger villages in the neighbourhood to investigate the supply situation and to tap what resources were to be found in them. One of these, a platoon of Jats, accompanied the writer with a fellow officer called P. to Hussainabad, 17 miles distant, the headquarters of a contractor who was held to have defaulted over grain and fodder to the tune of several hundred tons.

On November 7, accordingly, we left Hamadan in glorious crisp weather, moving out along the Kazvin road. The detachment was accompanied by a policeman, rigged out in a fine blue uniform and long black boots and mounted on a small Persian pony. He had a Mauser pistol in a polished holster slung across his shoulder, and he made characteristic bids to attract our attention by galloping madly about firing his pistol in the air. His horse furniture was typical, with the high upstanding knob on the front arch, and the cruel little contrivance of sharp incurving spikes in place of a curb-chain. The stirrups were very broad, with hard sharp corners which could be used as spurs against the horse's flanks. Animals were not well treated, as a rule in Persia, and the short sticks with needle-like spines an inch long protruding from their ends for prodding the animals along were but one of many cruel contrivances.

It had been hoped that our policeman would fulfil the rôles of interpreter and liaison officer. As he spoke only Persian, however, he was of little value as an interpreter, whilst his theory of liaison duties was of still less service. His *modus operandi*, briefly, was to scour the country-side with a stolen carbine, terrorising the peasants into supplying him with opium. Further enquiry elicited the startling

information that despite the small pay attached to it, the police was so popular a service that a handsome premium had to be paid to get into it. The gaols, on the other hand, though run on similarly economical lines—the prisoners lived on casual charity and received nothing either in the way of food or clothing—apparently served as convenient repositories for those who came up against the police, so that on the face of it it was money for old rope for our policeman. Greed, however, outran discretion in his case. Opium was dear, and there were limits to what the peasants would or could supply. Our friend had misreckoned his market and his fall was swift. We sent him back—blue uniform, Mauser and all—and asked not to have him replaced. A high police official dressed in black patent boots, khaki putties, thin white linen breeches, and a gold watch chain later came out—to get a line on this piece of country for himself, we supposed—but was treated kindly and sent firmly away, and after that we conducted our own liaison duties.

Meanwhile, however, an interpreter had arrived—a Georgian, doomed inevitably to be nick-named George. He was a fine sturdy little man, with a broad forehead and intelligent eyes, and full of character and resource. A prolonged residence in America had enriched his vocabulary with one idiom only. Everybody he met was a God-dam son of a bitch, and this deplorable criticism was applied impartially, whether in good humour or bad, to the faces of those whom George considered his inferiors, and, behind their backs, to his betters. The story of his emigration from the neighbourhood of Lake Urmiya where he had originally lived was the measure of his general attitude towards life. Put as far as possible into his own words, he had grown tired of Persia (he always pronounced it Perzhia) thanks to having squandered his money, and had decided to be off quick while he had still “got it the money to reach the Vladivostock.” “Yes,” we would say, “that’s all very well, but what did you do when you got there?” Here George would look up with a twinkle in his merry eyes. “When I got to the Vladivostock, I done gone to the Perzhian Consul and asked for money.” George would pause again. As in duty bound we would express surprise and enquire what the Consul’s reactions to that might have been. “Oh, he—God-dam son of bitch! I say I sorry I leave the Perzhia. I want for to go back. Then he give me the money, and I go off to America with it same day.” And here George would rumble

away into explosions of deep laughter that shook his broad frame like a jelly.

George, later, was reinforced by a comrade—a most repellent looking fellow with a deformed face, but with a pleasant enough manner beneath it. Seen one morning walking along the road in the depths of misery from the bitter weather, he was accosted and, to distract his thoughts, engaged in conversation. What, we enquired, had his job been in America? The man rubbed his very moist nose with a half-frozen fist and replied with a pardonable shudder that he had been employed in an ice factory in Chicago.

The march to Hussainabad took about 6 hours, and we halted just short of the village on a broad stretch of grass bounded by streams of clear icy water about half-past three in the afternoon. Leaving the main body behind, I sallied into the village where, by great good fortune, almost the first person I met was the contractor. He spoke good English, I found, and was a Bahia by creed. I bluntly explained my mission, but was smilingly put off. The facts were, he said, that he simply could not give us the quantities we asked for. Pressed to state how much he thought he could collect for us, he named a figure that was barely one-twentieth of his commitments, and simply laughed at the idea of our extracting more. Three minutes later he was under a guard and marching to the bivouac where, despite the bitter cold—we had our first snow that evening—he spent the night in great discomfort. We were truly sorry for him, but big issues were involved and strong measures were essential from the start. Weakness and generosity had had but one result, so far as we knew, in the war; and it was felt that a night's discomfort for one man was a small stake to set against the possible success of our mission and the safety of our small and isolated party.

Surrender came with the dawn. Further nights like the last were more than our man cared to face, but he took his defeat in good part. We shook hands on the agreement that if he played fair by us we would do as much and more by him, and this arrangement he scrupulously kept to during the five weeks of our relationship.

Preliminaries thus settled, possibilities of shelter had to be explored. Undesirable though it was to become involved in the complicated depths of a Persian village, still the only alternative to singlefly tents which were no protection against blizzards was to put the men into billets. Search revealed a *serai* on the main street of

the village, and as this seemed suitable for our purpose, it was taken over.

It had been a large and well-appointed *serai* in its day, judging from its size and lay-out. Big wooden gates gave admittance to the usual court, round two sides of which ran a kind of dark cloister where man and beast could find shelter from the weather. On the right of the great arched gateway lay a small block of stables; and above these, approached by a rough earthen stairway running up, unroofed, from the open court, came a set of four upper rooms, evidently intended for the more monied class of traveller. These rooms were connected by a narrow terrace overlooking the village main street, and were shut off from the smells and noises of the courtyard within. During the war, however, as the headquarters of an important Turkish sector, it had suffered heavily from Russian artillery. And thereby hangs a tale. War on this front had been conducted on generous lines and with an eye to the common good. While no actual state of truce existed between Turks and Russians in this region, yet the claims of duty had been satisfactorily met. Inquisitive inspecting officers would find the troops of either side at their posts by day; but as soon as the shades of night crept over the land and concealed the minor activities of the trenches, the garrisons would withdraw into billets and pass the night in comfort. It followed from this that no overtly hostile act was ever likely to be effected by either side at any time; and this was a most advantageous state of things since it permitted of a Turkish "back area" and Headquarters not half-a-mile in rear of the excellently dug and sited front-line trenches, whilst the Russians, occupying an untidy line along the meandering banks of a deep cut stream between the Kara Chai nullah and Maran village, at the foot of a long glacis slope which fell gently northwards from Hussainabad, were a good three miles distant from the Turkish front, and even closer to their billets.

The common policy was thus, it will have been seen, to secure comfort in adversity for the troops of either side, and this idyllic state of warfare appears to have subsisted for several months. What actually was the underlying cause of the act of treachery that put an end to it will probably never be known, but the lure of the Hamadan fleshpots had doubtless something to do with it. Whatever it was, one early morning, in the half-light of dawn, the Russians had swarmed up the slopes towards the Turks—had occupied their trenches—had

shelled their headquarters at the *serai* and had overrun Hussainabad and ejected the Turks in their sleeping suits. They had swept irresistibly on, but the Turks, though temporarily forced back, had bided their time ; and when the tide of war once more carried them forward over the breaking Russian lines to Hamadan, they had tied their Russian captives hand and foot, and flung them down the karezes as a warning against future acts of treachery.

The damage done to the *serai* in this dishonourable fight was from the beginning an inconvenience. There was fair enough accommodation for the men, and ample protection for the convoys. The only possible place, however, for the officers lay in the little row of rooms above the stables. The Russian guns, however, had made good practice against these. The first of them had a gaping rent six feet long by two or three feet wide, in the floor. A second had no floor at all. A third no roof. But the fourth, a corner room, did look sound enough to tempt us in. Here, accordingly, we established ourselves, filling up the fire-place with tinder-like logs and rafters supplied us by the villagers, and making it pretty comfortable.

For some days, the weather held up but thereafter grew less pleasant. Come fair, come foul, however, the work went on. Large convoys of camels, donkeys, limbers, carts and what-not came out every day or so to collect whatever we had ready for them ; and this, packed in the scores of nets, sacks and ropes we had brought from Hamadan, went in in a seemingly endless stream. Our first hunting ground was Seifollah, the contractor's own house, where a thin gaunt man, the very antithesis of the well-fed owner whose own blood brother he was, acted as weighman. Sacks and nets were hooked up on the steelyard and noted down as they appeared from the dusty depths of the long tunnel-like barns in which grain and fodder were stored, and were carried thence to the *serai*. Work went on briskly, and the chant of the weighman as he intoned his "ombesh batman," or whatever the weight might be, was incessant.

It took three or four days to clear Hussainabad, and a few more to finish with the villages in its immediate vicinity. By this time, the wind had backed round to the north, and the weather had definitely broken. The first thing was a torrential downpour about 7 o'clock one evening, and soon after it started, to our horror the mud began falling from the raftered ceiling of our room—the mud-brick walls supporting it started melting away—and the roof beams

uttered queasy warnings which reached their climax so far as we were concerned, when one of them began ploughing earthwards through the liquified mud of the walls. We fled perforce, and took refuge in the room with the cavernous floor. It was no paradise, for sure, though commanding an overhead view of the two mules stabled below, and from whom a mild form of diversion could be obtained by dropping pebbles on their backs, and watching them try to locate where they had come from. Here we spent the next month, in a lodging that had little to commend it beyond the fact that the roof and walls were sound and doors and windows capable of being stuffed up with sacking. There was no fire-place, however, and what with the stable reek and the icy draughts, and the casting up over-night of the day's accounts with a pencil that could be barely held, much less manœuvred, between one's frozen fingers, it was indeed a place of very little ease. Into it, however, we went, stumbling along the dark terrace in the pouring rain, laden with valises, equipment, note-books and other paraphernalia, and then fared forth to enquire into the welfare of the men. The night was impenetrably dark, and a smoking hurricane lamp did little to relieve it. The worn earthen stairway had become a river of mud, and at the first incautious step, my feet shot from under me and I glissaded in one movement to the bottom, landing with a soundingsplash in a most unsavoury swamp. However, it was possibly as well that I went. Though the roof of the men's quarters never actually did fall in, it had turned to the colour and apparent consistency of soaked grey blotting paper, and if pieces of it had started falling in the night, there might have been casualties getting out through the one narrow doorway in the dark.

Work now taking us further afield, a detachment was posted at Maran some miles distant, and P and I would take it in turns in riding out there. The one whose turn it was to stay in at Hussainabad would do anything required in the nearer villages, and would see to the packing and despatch of convoys. This arrangement much lessened the discomfort of the long rides out, often in the teeth of furious rain and sleet squalls. It also saved the men long marches, though, in the absence of suitable billets, it involved their living in a tent, the walls of which were frequently coated inside with a thick sheet of ice.

Maran had been an important centre before the war, boasting of 5,000 houses, but the Russian occupation had had a tragic effect, and

not more than 1,000 houses were still standing at the time of our appearance. Witness to the disasters that had befallen the inhabitants was afforded by the great belt of graveyards, most of the graves being very new, which surrounded the village. Elsewhere there were whole rows of unroofed houses, their rafters standing out gauntly against the sky. Strangely enough, the remaining inhabitants were both kindly disposed and hospitable. George, of course, was a tower of ambassadorial strength, and was, one imagines, responsible for the invitation which he and I received to have lunch one day with the Mullah. About half-a-dozen of the village worthies were present, and we all sat down on the floor in a long dark room, lighted only from the door, to a regular spread of fried eggs with crosses of pepper drawn across the yolks, great sheets of papery Persian bread, pieces of which had to be torn off and twisted into rough spoons for eating the eggs with, bunches of grapes, and a huge bowl of milk. The milk bowl had an elaborately carved wooden spoon with a deep but very narrow bowl, lying in it; and as soon as the meal was finished, the bowl was passed round, and everyone in turn dipped in the ladle and drank it off, much as it might have been an Oriental loving cup.

Man and beast, as may be supposed, grew very hardy under the conditions in which they lived. The fare was simple but generally sufficient, and apart from the curious affinity that always appeared to exist between the sugar and kerosine rations, there was little to complain of. We still had cases of Spanish 'flu, but we treated them ourselves in the absence of medical personnel, and experienced little inconvenience from this cause. As for the animals, they had all the food they wanted, and they stood up in a remarkable way to the hard work involved. Mules, of course, bear charmed lives, and the adventures of a pair of them during one day's 12-mile trip are worth recounting. They started the day by plunging over the side of a small bridge into a deep, narrow water cut. Here, with their noses just poking out of the water, they jammed, and it was only by cutting through parts of their harness that they could be released. Being still near Hussainabad, the Transport Daffadar rode in for spare straps to patch up the harness, and when this had been satisfactorily effected, the journey proceeded. All went well for the remainder of the outward trip, but on the way home, in the middle of a long string of loaded vehicles, they suddenly ran away, and overturned the cart. It took some time to sort matters out, and the light was

fading when we moved off again. Just before dark, we crossed the big arched stone bridge over the dry Kara Chai nullah—built, we were told, by a former Shah to commemorate his admiration of Westminster Bridge, which he had seen, and tried—without any success—to copy. On the far side of this bridge, the rough paving of which was crossed with becoming and natural caution, the track bent round right-handed parallel with the nullah. No sooner had they reached the turn than our friends set off full gallop towards the six-foot vertical drop into the nullah. Over they went, landing with a stupendous thud upside down at the bottom. Once again they were disentangled, the cart righted and wheeled up on to the road, and the march continued—this time with the offending pair under close escort. Arrived at Hussainabad, a full detailed report of the damage was called for, and, barring a little superficial trouble with the cart, and the straps which we had been obliged to cut ourselves, it was discovered that while one mule had an insignificant graze on one fetlock, the other had come out of it without a single scratch.

It was about now that George applied for leave. He desired, he said, to visit "the Hamadan" to see a long-lost brother who had arrived there with a party of refugees from Lake Urmiah. To our surprise, he returned before his time—looking pretty glum. Enquiry proved quite useless; not a word would our sorry interpreter say. He had met his brother—yes. That was all. Finally, however, the story came out. George and his brother had met, and paid a visit to the bazaar. While there, someone had picked a quarrel with the brother. A pistol had been whipped out and the brother shot dead. Small wonder George was depressed. We began to commiserate, but had not got very far when a gleam suddenly shot into George's eye. He looked up in a comical manner. "Yes," he said, "they done kill him after he come all the way from Urmiya." And at the thought of the wasted effort George grinned broadly, then began to chuckle, and finally burst into a shout of the heartiest laughter we had heard for a long time.

So the days wore on to the middle of December when, the contracts almost fulfilled, the detachments were ordered back to Hamadan. It had been a good, a very good, life away in the depths of the country—and the surroundings had steadily grown more perfect. The November storms, with their grey skies, fierce sleety blizzards, and the bitter cold which we were poorly enough equipped to combat,

had given way to fine still days when all nature was at pains to beautify this already lovely country. Under the oft-renewed mantle of snow—the delicate branches of the trees all edged and lined with sparkling crystals—the hills and valleys wore a fairylike loveliness beyond the power of pen to describe. Of an evening, when darkness drew on, the gleaming Alwand range in the shadows of which lay Hamadan, stood out silver-edged and with a diamond sharpness against the star-lit sky; and it was, perhaps, on these cold, keen winter nights, when every tree and bush stood pricked out with glittering brilliants that the peculiar enchantment of the country was most fully revealed. After the heat and burden of the weary months of marching and fighting in the stews below, the dead-alive routine of hospital life, and the intermittent deadening months of depot duty in India, no happier contrast could have been devised by the illogical but lovable Fairy Godmother department we heard so much of but so rarely met. Time was passing, though. The war was done. And the opening of the passes next spring must surely see us on the move once more. The regiment was well sprung out; its tentacles reached well beyond Kazvin in the North—of the daily life of these there is neither time nor space to write the record here—and the report went round that we should concentrate forward rather than back, and return to India *via* the Black Sea and the Dardanelles.

Such was not to be, however. May came, and with it reliefs, and we embarked upon the downward road over the hills back to the Tigris valley. Regret was vain, but I think that few, down to the veriest bugler boy, were able to look back at the red roofs nestling among the fresh Spring green of the poplars without at least a sigh. In many ways it was a joyous journey though. The country-side was decked out in its loveliest colours, and burst upon us in a chromatic blaze that rejoiced the heart to see. Passing from the foothills of the Alwand, picked out with the puffs of cream and pink that marked, like vivid shrapnel bursts, the orchards that everywhere clothed them, the road led down into fields of blue and yellow, white and red, stretching mile upon mile, out to the distant horizon. Yellow mustard, tall white daisies, crimson poppies and a host of other flowers, sometimes mingled sometimes apart, spread out their dainty petals in colourful sheets for near 200 miles of road. And thus our nine months interlude found its climax in a scene of lasting loveliness that heartened for many the drabness and scorching heat of a summer on garrison at Kut.

FOREIGN TUNES AS REGIMENTAL MARCHES

By J. PAINE

Continental compositions have for many years been patronised by the bands of our Army and have proved ideal tunes for marching purposes. Many of these airs are still recognized by the War Office, since they are officially registered as regimental marches. After long usage, regiments are reluctant to change their quickstep and so, in the great majority of cases, the old tune still survives. But occasionally a desire is felt for a change in this direction and it will be remembered that two years ago. The Leicestershire Regiment was granted permission to adopt "A Hunting Call" in place of the Grecian air, "Romaika." For just over half a century both battalions of the regiment had marched past to this foreign tune, which is thought to have been introduced by a medical officer who was transferred to the First Battalion from another regiment.

Three of our infantry regiments march past the saluting base to the strains of French airs. That of The Royal Sussex Regiment, although dubbed "The Royal Sussex," is really an old French tune, which, according to regimental tradition, was taken into use by the ancestors of the present First Battalion just after the capture of Quebec a hundred and seventy-six years ago. The regiment would naturally be rather loath to part with a march which had done service for so long, and in so many quarters of the globe. Furthermore it recalls the conquest of Canada and the notable part taken by the old Thirty-Fifth in Wolfe's brilliant victory. Both battalions of The East Lancashire Regiment are partial to airs from France, that of the First Battalion being a composition bearing the title of "L'Attaque." But the Second Battalion have cloaked the nationality of their quickstep under the very deceptive name of "The Lancashire Lass." The story of how The West Yorkshire Regiment (The Prince of Wales's Own) came to adopt the French Revolutionary song, "Ca Ira" has been told so many times that one almost despairs of telling it again. As most of us know the regiment suffered a check at the battle of Famars in 1793, but what might have been defeat was turned into victory, thanks to a sudden inspiration of the Commanding Officer, Colonel Doyle, who ordered his drummers to strike up "Ca Ira," which was also being played by the band of the opposing forces.

And thus, to cut the story short, were the French beaten "to their own damned tune." The story when related in detail is one of the most romantic in the history of regimental marches and, unlike so many stirring scenes which have been painted in print, is true in every respect. The episode has been commemorated in many ways, the most noteworthy of course being the fact that the air still serves as the official march of the regiment. We find too that the regimental journal bears the same name as this march. The circumstances under which the tune came to be adopted by the old Fourteenth is also the subject of a fine painting and at least two poems, one of which was written by Sir Francis Doyle, grandson of the Colonel Doyle just mentioned.

During the Peninsular War The Thirty-First Regiment, now The First East Surreys, used to play a very fine piece of music entitled "Bonaparte's March." There is no evidence of it ever having been the regimental march, but it was certainly played by the regiment in the campaign and doubtless was often brought into use to liven the men when on the march. In his "Recollections" published in the early 'seventies Sir George B. L'Estrange, formerly of the Thirty-First Regiment, relates how two bandsmen deserted from the enemy, came over to the British and were taken into the band of his regiment. It was from these Frenchmen that the bandsmen of the Thirty-First learnt the tune of "Bonaparte's March." Unfortunately the air has been lost somehow and all efforts to trace it have failed. L'Estrange took a great fancy to the march and could remember the air of it at the time of the publication of his reminiscences. French compositions are not peculiar to the infantry branch of the Service. The 5th Dragoon Guards (Princess Charlotte of Wales's) used to march past to "The Soldier's Chorus" from Gounod's "Faust," but the amalgamation of the regiment with The Inniskillings (6th Dragoons) thirteen years ago necessitated some consideration being shown to the latter regiment whose march had been "The Sprig of Shillelagh." It was therefore decided to retain both tunes and the present regiment, the 5th Royal Inniskilling Dragoon Guards, marches by to a combination of the two, Gounod's being played before the lively Irish air. The late King Albert of Belgium was Colonel-in-Chief of the regiment at the time of his death.

During the last century the foreign element was still much in evidence in British military bands. Jingling Johnnies were played

at the head of several regiments, negro drummers and trumpeters were still the rage and many of the bandmasters were foreigners. The early 'forties saw the last of the coloured drummers, but German and Austrian bandmasters had become firmly established and were tolerated till late in the century. It is however to many of these imported gentry that regiments owe the fine marches they play to this day. A Commanding Officer would ask his bandmaster to select a distinctive piece of music to be used as the regimental march and if the suggested tune proved satisfactory, nobody worried about the nationality of the composer. Naturally enough these bandmasters invariably chose something which reminded them of their real home. Selections from the great operas seem to have been particularly popular and many of them are still cherished both in the cavalry and the infantry. Mention has already been made of a march taken from Gounod's version of Goethe's "Faust" and we find another regiment, The Grenadier Guards, using the well-known march from "Scipio." This is The Grenadiers' regimental slow march and there is an unchallenged tradition in the regiment that it was presented to them by Handel before being inserted in the famous opera. The first performance of "Scipio" was given in 1726 and the popularity of the march therefrom was increased by introducing it in "Polly," the sequel to "The Beggar's Opera." It is played by the massed bands of the Brigade of Guards when The Grenadiers march in slow time across the Horse Guards Parade at the Annual Trooping of The Colour and is often heard by spectators of the daily Changing of the Guard ceremony at the Royal Palaces in London. Handel has often been credited with having composed the regimental quickstep of The Buffs (Royal East Kent Regiment). It has even been stated that the great German composer wrote the march specially for the regiment. It is known as "The Buffs" and has certainly been used by the regiment for a great number of years, but nobody has ever been able to prove that it was composed by Handel. The Buffs originally bore the title of The Holland Regiment and the present Colonel-in-Chief is the King of Denmark. The Association of Men of Kent and Kentish Men recently presented a silver bugle to the Second Battalion to commemorate the one hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the regiment's connexion with Kent. Before taking leave of Handel, allusion should be made to his "Occasional Overture," since this is the air patronised by the 17th/21st Lancers as a regimental slow march for dismounted parades.

German music has been patronised by The King's Royal Rifle Corps for over a century. "The Huntsman's Chorus" must have been adopted as the regimental march in the early 'twenties, for it was taken from the "Der Freischütz" and it is known that the tune was used as a march-past shortly after the production of that celebrated opera. Considered by many to be his masterpiece, Weber's "Der Freischütz" was produced at Berlin in 1821 and proved an enormous success. It was not till a few years after the conclusion of the South African War that the regiment decided on a change and curious to note the composition which took the place of "The Huntsman's Chorus" was one which had been set to music by Weber. This was Lutzow's "Wild Hunt," which after a good deal of adaptation, became the regimental quickstep and as such is played by the regiment at the present time. "Nachtlager in Granada," the regimental march of the First Battalion of The Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry, was till quite recently thought to have been an air picked up by the old Forty-Third in the Peninsular War, but investigation on the part of those interested in the origin of the march have shewn that this long accepted story is a mere fable. The tune is really an adaptation of an air from "Das Nachtlager in Granada," a German opera first produced just a century ago. Conradin Kreutzer was the composer and, according to Grove, it was one of his two best works. He died in the late 'forties and it is interesting to remember that the air now played as a regimental quickstep was that of a military song introduced in the opera.

In addition to the opera excerpts, there are several other German compositions played as regimental marches. Curious to relate they are all associated with Royalty. That fine quickstep of The Worcestershire Regiment, "The Royal Windsor," was composed by Princess Augusta, daughter of George the Third, the tune being presented by her to the old Twenty-ninth, when the regiment was stationed at Windsor just over a hundred and forty years ago. Although George the Third has been described as "the first ruler of his house who could claim to be a Briton born and bred," his mother was a princess of Saxe-Coburg and his consort, a former princess of Mecklenburgh-Strelitz. The march composed by the latter's daughter had therefore a good deal of German about it. "Prince Albert's March" was composed by the Prince Consort for The Somerset Light Infantry (Prince Albert's) and is played by both band and bugles

together. It was in recognition of the gallant defence of Jellalabad in 1842 that this regiment assumed the designation of "Prince Albert's." The Prince's title, Prince of Saxe-Coburg, recalls the "Coburg" march of the regiment of which he was Colonel, The 11th Hussars (Prince Albert's Own). "Coburg" was also the regimental march of the old 21st Lancers (Empress of India's) and is still the mounted march past of The 12th Royal Lancers (Prince of Wales's), a regiment which, like the "Cherry Pickers," has now been converted into an armoured car regiment. It was near the town of Coburg in Germany that Queen Victoria's future husband was born. His association with The 11th Hussars is still commemorated, not only in the regiment's full title, but also in its Saxon crest and German motto. As many of us will doubtless remember, the Colonel-in-Chief of the regiment in pre-War days was the Crown Prince of Germany. In those early days of 1914 we had many other German associations. The German Emperor was Colonel-in-Chief of The Royals and "The King of Prussia" was the title of the regimental march of The 14th (King's) Hussars, whose badge was the Prussian Eagle. This march was introduced by the Commanding Officer when the 14th was stationed at Bangalore in 1880 and under the title of "The Eagle," is still played by the present 14th/20th Hussars, a portion of the march of the old 20th Hussars having been tacked on, as is customary in the case of amalgamated cavalry regiments.

Of the Austrian airs used as marches by British regiments, the best known is the March from "Figaro," an adaptation from Mozart's celebrated opera "The Marriage of Figaro." It has for many years been the regimental slow march of The Coldstream Guards and quite probably was adopted by the regiment at the suggestion of an Austrian or German bandmaster. The slow march of an infantry regiment is of secondary importance when compared with the quick march, which is of course *the* regimental march, but in the cavalry the regimental march is a slow march and is used as a mounted march past when the regiment passes the saluting base at the "Walk." The band has to break into another tune when the squadrons receive the order to "Trot," a third tune being played when they career by at the "Gallop." Some years prior to the Boer War the 1st King's Dragoon Guards had a march called "The Radetzky March," named after the celebrated Austrian field-marshal. It had been the marching past tune of a crack Austrian regiment of hussars and was

introduced to the K. D. G.'s by their bandmaster, an Austrian, who bore the name of Schramm. Prior to the late War, the Emperor of Austria had been the regiment's Colonel-in-Chief. The fact that "Radetzky March" was the title given to a recently published novel of Austrian military life recalls the one time immense popularity of the tune with regiments of the Royal and Imperial Army of Austria. Curious as it may seem, an Austrian hymn is always played at a church parade of The Seaforth Highlanders, a regiment which has a most extraordinary distinction, that of marching to church without music.

The fact that the Seaforth Highlanders also have a Russian hymn played at their church parade, brings to mind a celebrated tune of that nationality still retained in our Army. The Czar of Russia had been Colonel-in-Chief of The Royal Scots Greys since 1894, but "The Garb of Old Gaul" was never allowed to be supplanted in that distinguished regiment by the Russian National Anthem. The latter is, however, for some unexplainable reason, played by The Royal Ulster Rifles at the conclusion of band entertainments. A peculiar custom still in vogue with The 12th Royal Lancers (Prince of Wales's) is the playing by the band of five hymns after the sounding of the "Last Post." This penance was supposed to have been imposed on the regiment for sacking a monastery in the Peninsular War. Two of the tunes are foreign compositions, one being the Russian National Anthem, the other the Spanish Chant.

Mention of the latter air brings to mind a few other regiments in whose repertoires will be found a Spanish tune. Thirty years ago King Alfonso of Spain was appointed Colonel-in-Chief of The 16th The Queen's Lancers and the Spanish National Anthem was adopted as march by the regiment. His Majesty still retains his Royal title and, furthermore, his name still has its honoured place in the "Army List" as a Colonel-in-Chief of The 16th/5th Lancers. All the Fusilier regiments at one time marched past to the strains of "The British Grenadiers," but some years ago The Royal Irish Fusiliers (Princess Victoria's) took a fancy to another tune which now serves as the official quickstep of the regiment. It bears the title of "Barossa" and commemorates the gallant part played by the old Eighty-Seventh in that famous Peninsular battle. The tune is supposed to be an old Spanish one, but it cannot be said for certain whether this is a fact or not, especially as some writers maintain that it has a distinct

Irish flavour about it. The present Second Battalion of The King's Shropshire Light Infantry at one time marched to a Spanish air picked up by the regiment in the Peninsula, whilst the previously mentioned Spanish Chant, together with two other hymns, used to be played every Sunday evening by the band of the old Forty-First, now the First Battalion of The Welch Regiment. Apparently only one Portuguese air is favoured by a British regiment. This is "Braganza," the regimental march of The Queen's Royal Regiment (West Surrey). The title of the tune is a most appropriate one, since "The Queen's" was raised to garrison Tangier, which with Bombay, formed part of the dowry of Catherine of Braganza, daughter of the King of Portugal, on her marriage to the Merry Monarch. The National Anthem and, later, a Scots air, were in vogue before "Braganza" was finally adopted as the regimental march.

The most celebrated of the Italian airs played in the British Army is "Aïda," which, needless to add, is taken from Verdi's grand opera of that name. The tune is used as a quickstep by The Royal Horse Guards (The Blues). The opera from which it is taken is founded on an episode in Egyptian history discovered by the eminent archæologist, Mariette Bey, during his research work amongst Coptic manuscripts. The story was submitted to Verdi, who had just been commissioned by the Khedive of Egypt to write an opera expressly for the new opera house at Cairo. The great Italian composer was enchanted with the story and the first performance of the opera was given in Cairo on Christmas Eve, 1871. Five years later it was produced at Covent Garden Theatre and it was probably at this time that its music attracted the attention of the bandmaster of The Blues. "Aïda" has remained the most popular of all Verdi's operas and two years ago it was relayed from Covent Garden. Another Italian composition patronised as a march by the Household Brigade is "The Coldstream March," the familiar quickstep of The Coldstream Guards. The correct title of this march is "Milanollo" and under that name it is also used as a dismounted march by The Life Guards. It has been suggested that the visit to this country in 1845 of the two celebrated Milanollo sisters, violonists, provided the inspiration for this composition. Then we have "The Daughter of The Regiment," the regimental march of The Second Battalion of The King's Shropshire Light Infantry. The tune comes from "La Fille du Régiment," one of the sixty-five operas composed by Gaetano

Donizetti. The smoothly flowing, beautiful melodies of this celebrated Italian are familiar to all opera lovers and the battalion which marches to one of them may be complimented on its choice. More than one individual has been credited with the composition of "Mandolinata," the regimental quickstep of both battalions of The Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire Regiment. Emile Paladilhe, who was born about ninety-years ago, has been described as the real composer, but J. A. Kappey's name appears on a recently published score of the march. Kappey was one of the best known Army bandmasters of the last century and his "History of Wind Instrumental Bands" is a most invaluable work. He was a composer too and it is quite likely that "Mandolinata" was arranged by him to suit the requirements of a military band. Another theory, and one that has been put forward by the regiment itself, is that on the occasion of The First Battalion's stay in the Mediterranean over forty years ago, the bandmaster toured Italy, heard the air, obtained a copy of it and adapted it for the band. "The Mountain Rose" was the march of this battalion before "Mandolinata" was taken into use.

It was in honour of their Colonel-in-Chief, Queen Alexandra, that the 19th Royal Hussars (Queen Alexandra's Own) used to play the Danish National Anthem as a march. The same tune, together with the regimental march, is still played before our own Anthem at the termination of any band performance given by The Green Howards (Alexandra, Princess of Wales's Own Yorkshire Regiment), in whose badge the Dannebrog still figures. Five Russian drums captured at the battle of the Alma by the First Battalion of this regiment were carried on parade when the descendants of the old Nineteenth trooped the Colour on Alma Day at Aldershot two years ago.

To the best of the writer's knowledge, the British Army has only one march composed by an American. This is "The Royal Welch Fusiliers March" composed by John Philip Sousa to commemorate the association of the United States Marine Corps with the Second Battalion of The Royal Welch Fusiliers in the Boxer Rising of 1900. Sousa presented the march to the regiment five years ago, a special parade being held for the purpose. The tune, however, has not been allowed to usurp "The British Grenadiers," which is still the official regimental march of The Royal Welch Fusiliers. Before his own band came into prominence, Sousa was leader of the United States

Marine Corps Band. Renowned as a composer of stirring military march tunes he died in Pennsylvania three years ago at the age of seventy-six.

The only other airs from abroad played in our Army come from the East. "Zakhmi Dil," a Pathan tune, is played by the band of The Second Battalion of The King's Regiment (Liverpool) on guest nights in the officers' mess. It precedes the official regimental march and commemorates the battalion's services on the North-West Frontier of India. Another Indian tune deserving of mention is that played by The Second Battalion of The North Staffordshire Regiment (The Prince of Wales's). It has its native title of course, but in the battalion it is known as "The Afghan March." It was the regimental march of the old Ninety-Eighth Foot before the regiment became the Second North Staffords and to this day on battalion parades and at band entertainments it is invariably played as a reminder of days that are gone. The official march of the regiment, common to both battalions, naturally takes precedence over this Indian tune.

As mentioned at the commencement of this discussion, The Leicestershire Regiment recently adopted an English tune in place of the foreign one which had been played as the regimental march. One wonders if this change will serve as an example to some of the other regiments which march past to Continental airs. It is fairly safe to assume that in the great majority of cases it will not, for drastic changes are seldom welcomed in the Service, and when it comes to such a thing as changing the regimental march one is in danger of trifling with something which for many decades has been regarded with almost as much reverence as the Colours themselves.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR.

MARTIAL AND NON-MARTIAL RACES.

SIR,

May I be permitted to examine one sentence of your January article entitled "Martial and Non-Martial Races" to which a briefly comprehensive reply was made by "Malkam" in your April number?

The original article stated "The Mahratta earned high renown amid the dust and heat, the cold and mud of the fighting before Kut, but to-day the Mahratta peoples have difficulty in finding sufficient recruits of an adequate physical standard to fill the requirements of the five battalions of the 5th Mahratta Light Infantry."

The writer implies that though the Mahratta people managed to survive the enervating climate of the Bombay Presidency for so many centuries, the last few years, since the siege of Kut, have proved too much for the race. Further comment on this point appears superfluous.

It is not denied that recruits conforming to the high physical standard required are not always forthcoming in adequate numbers, but I submit that the reasons are other than a general, sudden, and permanent deterioration of the race.

The Konkan, which supplies 50 *per cent.* of the Mahrattas for the Army, has always provided the most meagre livelihood for its inhabitants, principally owing to its unproductive soil. The financial balance has been made up by members of each family migrating to the mills of Bombay. The post-war slump, both in agriculture and industries, has affected this population probably more severely than any other section of the Indian community, and reduced it to a condition of semi-starvation.

The Deccan supplies the other 50 *per cent.* of Mahrattas. This area is full of men as good as any ever produced. Although it is not for me to criticize an army policy, the fact remains that immediately regimental recruiting was replaced by the permanent recruiter supplies fell off in numbers. It is only natural that the permanent recruiter is not going further afield than absolutely necessary, and hence large areas difficult of access are untouched.

A further point is that a scrutiny of the touring programmes of the Recruiting Officer shows that only the same comparatively small

area is constantly visited, and that this area is vastly less than the total area providing Mahrattas both before, during, and immediately subsequent to the war. Possibly this policy is dictated by finance, but, if so, it appears scarcely just to put the blame on the race, or even the climate.

In support of my contention I may add that at a recent durbar attended by over 100 Indian officers (mostly pensioned), they entirely agreed that Maharashtra still contains plentiful material of the best type and physique, but that the present means of procuring it are inadequate.

Having promised to confine myself to the examination of one sentence of the article, I must not encroach on more of your valuable space to point out inaccuracies and half-truths which are contained in the article "Martial and Non-Martial Races."

Yours faithfully,

LEZIM.

EDUCATION FOR ALL.

SIR,

In the article "Education for All" by "a p. s. c. C. O." in your July issue the author made certain suggestions to which many will agree. But one of his methods of paying for his scheme is to close other training schools. To quote :—

"And is a school of cookery necessary? Good cooking is vital. An army still moves on its centre-piece, but could not some wife in each British unit teach this very domestic science? It is, surely, unnecessary to maintain a special school. Research work could be carried out at Porton or Belgaum, or even the Corner House."

I wonder if "a p. s. c. C. O." is in a British unit. In Northern Command I had the honour of being shewn round the domestic arrangements of a British battalion with a reputation. The feeding was excellent, and the messing charges negligible. I was told that this unit took every available vacancy it could at the School of Cookery, Poona, including refresher courses.

Lately, when temporarily at Poona, I was curious enough to ask the Commandant of the School to see his "show." I think a p. s. c. C. O. would be as interested as I was. Porton or Belgaum might do as well,—if the school were there; why the school should be there I do not know, as "gas" cookers are about the only ranges not used. There are Warren ranges, camp fires, field ovens, and the new oil

cookers. British students have to live on what they cook, so keenness is marked. Could the wives in British units cope with making field-service ovens, or hayboxes? Or would the Corner House? Sometimes there are demonstrations to families, and no food escapes after! Even bully beef and biscuits are disguised in a dozen different ways.

Finally, if a p. s. c. C. O. gets into hospital, let him pray for a Poona trained Indian cook.

The real answer to the query is in the fact that the Commandant had letters from the wives of officers who had been to the demonstrations: they asked if their own cooks could be allowed to do a course.

Yours faithfully,
ARTIFICIAL DENTURE.

PROMOTION IN THE WAR BLOCK.

SIR,

I think my article was rather cheerful reading for certain officers, on the other hand, possibly it did emphasize a gloomy prospect for others. This was *inter alia* a point I wished to bring out.

I agree that statistics are at times an unreliable guide but I can think of no other method of providing an approximate guide; except the politicians's "Wait and see." My estimates were given with due reserve and six out of every ten getting command may be a low estimate. On the other hand, what does the authoritative estimate of seven out of ten mean? Is this the average for all the war block years, or does it mean that among those commissioned in any one year seven out of ten will get command? If the former, then those completing 26 years service in 1942-43 will undoubtedly suffer; *i.e.*, 157 unmidwars, after allowing for wastage, and only 59 commands. If the latter, then the 1942-44 class must commence to get command about the end of 1939. This will mean that the tightening of selection, to which you refer, must commence fairly soon.

I agree with your comments about selection. What I tried to emphasize was that a little prevision between 1938-41, or sooner, is necessary to help the 1942-44 classes. If it can be avoided the standard of selection for command should not be particularly high for certain years; merely because officers in the war block years, as far as service is concerned, are still rather unevenly divided.

Yours faithfully,
G. C.

LYAUTEY, MOROCCO AND THE N.-W. F. P.

SIR,

My essay on the applicability of Lyautey's Moroccan policy to the N.-W. Frontier, which appeared in the October 1934 number of your journal, has resulted in two contributions to your last (July 1935) issue.

In your correspondence columns I am questioned by "K. L. G." on the subject of the control of the R. A. F. on the Frontier, while in the body of the journal an article by "Spingirai" gives an interesting and reasoned exposition of a point of view other than my own.

May I be allowed to say a few words in reply to both?

First with regard to "K. L. G.'s" charges of inaccuracy.

The regulations regarding the control of operations, including the employment of air forces, on the North-West Frontier are so elaborate that it has been found necessary to publish them in book-form. It is difficult therefore to condense them with complete accuracy.

When I wrote that "the formations and units of the R. A. F. which are spread along the Frontier are in no way under the command or control of the local military Commanders," I was well aware that, after consultations between the respective Headquarters, there is an annual allocation of "flights and sorties to work with army formations and units," and that "such flights and sorties are under the Army Commander as allocated."

This is, however, merely for training purposes and, except incidentally, has nothing to do with frontier control. "K. L. G.'s." remarks on this point are not therefore germane to the subject under discussion.

Then, again, "K. L. G." says that my statement that although local military commanders cannot order an air reconnaissance, unless an air unit has been placed at their disposal, the Political Authorities can do so, is not correct.

The actual situation is that no military commander can order a reconnaissance "except after consultations with the political officer concerned." This, in effect, implies the political officer's right to object to a reconnaissance desired by a military commander.

No similar restriction is laid upon political officials, who have a free hand to deal direct with the R. A. F.

"K. L. G." thirdly, criticises my statement that air bombing is only allowed by the sanction of the Government of India after

control of an operation has been delegated to an appropriate military or R. A. F. commander.

This again is absolutely correct in respect of all operations which are deliberately undertaken, though it should, perhaps, have been qualified by the remark that when ground forces are opposed, or an emergency arises, the R. A. F. may be called upon to take offensive action, provided such action is confined to the tribesmen actually engaged. These can seldom, if ever, be seen from the height at which the aircraft operate, and this in fact renders the qualification almost a prohibition.

Aircraft may only use bombs in retaliation against rifle-fire from the ground provided the *individuals* responsible for such firing can be clearly discerned. From 4,000 feet above ground-level, which is the height at which our machines operate, this obviously rules out this form of bombing—unless the airman stretches the letter of the regulation.

In my essay I was only able to deal with the broader aspects of frontier control—it is perfectly easy to advance minor exceptions to general rules and this is what “K. L. G.” has done.

Spingirai, who makes an interesting and dispassionate contribution to the discussion, rules out the eventual disarmament of the tribes because of the opposition among them which he feels this policy would arouse.

Disarmament, however, is the only method by which we can hope to reach finality and eventually to reduce our annual expenditure on Frontier Watch and Ward.

If taken in hand prudently and gradually it need lead to no major operations or great expense, though we must of course be prepared to grasp the nettle.

“Spingirai” has written a good deal on the desirability of our retaining a tribal buffer state—presumably in a state of savagery—between ourselves and Afghanistan.

The strategical buffer state of Indian frontier defence is, however, Afghanistan itself and not our tribal territory—the latter, uncontrolled by us, is nothing but a series of saps undermining our defences—witness Peshawar District in 1930.

“Spingirai” only applies his theory of the tribal buffer state to areas where the establishment of control would not be easy. If his argument is sound then it must be of general application, though our

position in Baluchistan and in the Kurram prove it not to be so ! For here we have no tribal buffer state.

The general contention that " Pathanistan," whether in hills or plains, must be under one control need not interfere with the transfer of the functions of Agent to the Governor-General to a Military Commander in tribal areas as yet unsubjugated.

I am aware that many tribes have interests and reside on both sides of the Administrative Border.

So they do on both sides of the Afghan frontier !

In any case there is nothing sacred about the Administrative Border,—nor even logical. It is merely the high water-mark of Sikh effort and was adopted by us when we took the Punjab from them because we, in our turn, were tired.

The Administrative Border could with great advantage be redrawn and Deputy Commissioners of Districts within that Border could and should be relieved of control of trans-Border affairs.

The distribution of military and political duties under the envisaged Military chief officials in tribal areas would present no difficulty. It would be merely a question of Staff organisation.

The events of August 1935 have been unkind indeed to " Spingirai." Penetration of Mohmand country took place by the building of the Gandab road in 1933 without that consolidation and absorption which I contend should always follow penetration.

" Spingirai " wrote that the building of the road " produced the necessary guarantees against either interference with its use, or future aggression."

The march of events has proved the worthlessness of those guarantees.

Finally, a calculated and unflinching policy for the establishment of real control in tribal territory need not involve rigidity of conception or of execution. It would, however, ensure that every step would be directed to the achievement of a policy and doubt and waste would be averted.

Yours faithfully,

THE ESSAYIST.

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REVIEWS.

"Ich Dien"

The Prince of Wales's Volunteers (South Lancashire), 1914-1934.

(Messrs. Gale & Polden, Ltd.) 6s. 6d.

The author of this history is Captain H. Whalley-Kelly, who is a serving officer of the regiment. The narrative is of general interest for the regiment had a battalion in almost every theatre of war and, in each instance, a clear outline is given of the various campaigns. Units which fought alongside the regiment will be particularly interested for neighbouring events are described, often in considerable detail.

The book covers the history of the Prince of Wales's Volunteers during the Great War. Chapter by chapter it relates the individual stories of the battalions, Regular, Territorial and New Army, that were members of the regimental family at a time when Britain was a nation in arms. At the end is an epilogue which brings the history of the regiment up to 1934.

The book is attractively written and well produced. It is provided with an excellent set of maps, an order of battle, showing every battalion of the regiment that was raised, and a complete list of all decorations and mentions in despatches. There are also many interesting photographs.

Facing the frontispiece, which is a photograph of the Prince of Wales in uniform as Colonel-in-Chief of the Regiment, is a facimile reproduction of a letter from His Royal Highness containing the following words :

"In the history of the regiment you will find your traditions."

These words are a fitting commendation to this record of gallant service in France and on the North West Frontier of India, in Gallipoli, Mesopotamia and the Balkans,

It is a story of duty done in accordance with the highest traditions of this distinguished Regiment of the Line, well-known to many friends as the "South Lancashire Regiment" but now, justly proud of the old title—"The Prince of Wales's Volunteers," which has been restored and extended to cover the whole Regiment.

W. E. U.

League of Nations—Armaments Year Book, 1935.

25sh.


The eleventh edition of this publication follows the same lines as its predecessors. It is, as usual, a mine of information concerning monographs on no less than sixty-four countries. It has been very carefully compiled and contains information available to the League up to March 1935, though in several instances it appears that this information is far from contemporary.

Each monograph contains, in as much detail as is known to the League, information on the characteristics of the armed forces of the country concerned, the organs of military command and administration, territorial military areas, the organisation and composition of the land, army, air force and navy, the system of recruiting and period of service and in some cases notes on the military training establishments. The area, population, length of railways and lengths of land and sea frontiers is also tabulated. Expenditure on national defence of course forms an essential feature, and tabulated with these figures are given the index numbers of wholesale prices and cost of living compared to 1914.

There are two annexures. The first is a valuable digest of the clauses of existing treaties which refer to or affect the reduction and limitation of armaments of the countries concerned. The second is a collection of statistical tables, mainly recapitulated from the monographs and summarized. An effort is made to produce comparative figures for world military expenditure, but as the book points out it is only a very imperfect picture. The trend, after a period of reduction, seems to be one of increase.

As a reference book it has much interest for the student, but even here its information is not sufficiently accurate and up-to-date. It is certainly not recommended as light reading.

D. H.



United Service Institution of India.


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CONTENTS.


	PAGE.
Secretary's Notes	ii
Frontispiece : Vice-Admiral Sir Humphrey T. Walwyn.	
Editorial	1
1. An Address by H. E. The Commander-in-Chief ..	7
2. Martial and Non-martial Races	16
3. China To-day and To-morrow	23
4. Saturday to Friday—An Air Journey, Part II ..	41
5. Infantry—Thick or Thin	51
6. The Royal Empire Society	58
7. The Tactics of Tiger Shooting	67
8. A Few Thoughts on Light Infantry and Mountain Warfare Training	86
9. Empire or	91
10. Trout Fishing in Austria	106
11. Sedgemoor	111
12. The Employment of Light Tanks with the Army in India	122
Letters to the Editor	131
Ski-ing in Austria—A Postscript	135
Military Notes	137
Reviews	147

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
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
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I.—New Members.

The following new members joined the Institution from 1st September to 30th November 1935 :—

ORDINARY MEMBERS.

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P. R. Pinhorn, Esq.	Major G. A. Mitchley.
D. E. Williams, Esq., M.B.E., M.A.	Major G. C. Pearson, M.C.
A. H. Wilson, Esq., B.A.	Capt. P. L. Hutchinson.
Major-General R. K. Hezlet, C.B.E., D.S.O.	Lieut. J. A. Cameron.
Brigadier G. R. Mainwaring, D.S.O.	Lieut. W. H. P. Middleton.
Colonel G. C. Gowlland.	Lieut. G. H. Nash.
Lieut.-Colonel W. Le C. Brodrick.	Lieut. A. L. Nelson.
Lieut.-Colonel B. I. Jones, M.C.	Lieut. A. Simpson.
	Lieut. J. W. Stephens.
	2nd.-Lieut. P. Nicholson, U.L.I.A.

Gentleman Cadet Gobinder Singh.

II.—The Journal.

The Institution publishes a Quarterly Journal in the months of January, April, July and October, which is issued postage free to members in any part of the world. Non-members may obtain the Journal at Rs. 2 annas 8 per copy, or Rs. 10 per annum. Advertisement rates may be obtained on application to the Secretary or to Messrs. L. A. Stronach & Co., Advertising Consultants, Stronach House, Ballard Estate, Bombay.

III.—Contributions to the Journal.

Articles may vary in length from two thousand to ten thousand words. Payment is made on publication at from Rs. 40 to Rs. 100 in accordance with the value and length of the contribution.

With reference to Regulations for the Army in India, paragraph 204 and King's Regulations, paragraph 522, action to obtain the sanction of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to the publication of any article in the Journal of the United Service Institution of India will be taken by the Executive Committee of the Institution.

The Committee reserve to themselves the right to omit any matter which they consider objectionable.

Articles are only accepted on these conditions.

IV.—Reading Room and Library.

The United Service Institution of India is situated in the Mall, Simla, and is open all the year round—including Sundays—from 9 a.m. until sunset. The Reading Room of the Institution is provided with the leading illustrated papers, newspapers, magazines and journals of military, naval and service interest.

There is a well-stocked library in the Institution from which members can obtain books on loan free in accordance with the following rules :—

(1) The Library is only open to members and honorary members, who are requested to look upon books as not transferable to their friends.

(2) No book shall be taken from the Library without making the necessary entry in the register. Members residing permanently or temporarily in Simla are requested to enter their addresses.

(3) A member shall not be allowed, at one time, more than three books or sets of books.

(4) No particular limit is set as to the number of days for which a member may keep a book, the Council being desirous of making the Library as useful as possible to members; but if after the expiration of a fortnight from date of issue it is required by any other member, it will be re-called.

(5) Applications for books from members at out-stations are dealt with, as early as possible, and books are despatched post free per Registered Parcel Post. They must be returned carefully packed per Registered Parcel Post within one month of the date of issue.

(6) If a book is not returned at the end of one month, it must be paid for if so required by the Executive Committee. Lost and defaced books shall be replaced at the cost of the member to whom they were issued. In the case of lost books which are out of print, the value shall be fixed by the Executive Committee and the amount, when received, spent in the purchase of a new book.

(7) The issue of a book under these rules to any member implies the latter's compliance with the rules and the willingness to have them enforced, if necessary, against him.

(8) The catalogue of the Library has been revised and is now available for sale at Rs. 2/8/- per copy plus postage. The Library has been completely overhauled and all books re-classified hence the new catalogue meets the general demand for an up-to-date production containing all military classics and other works likely to be of use to members of the Institution. Members who have not yet ordered their copies are advised to send a post card to the Librarian of the Institution, Simla.

V.—Library Books.

A list of the books received during the preceding quarter is enclosed in loose leaf form suitable for cutting into strips for pasting in the library catalogue.

The Institution is in possession of a collection of old and rare books presented by members from time to time and, while such books are not available for circulation, they can be seen by members visiting Simla.

The Secretary will be glad to acknowledge the gift of old books, trophies, medals, etc., presented to the Institution.

VI.—Promotion Examinations.

(a) *Campaigns*—(reference A. O. 243 of 1931, as amended by A. O. 80 of 1933 and A. O. 102 of 1933, as amended by A. Os. 119 and 155 of 1933 and I. A. O. 651 of 1933).

The following table shows the campaigns on which military history papers will be set for Lieutenants for promotion to Captain in sub-head *b* (iii) and for Captains for promotion to Major in sub-head *d* (iii), with a list of books recommended for the study of each:—

<i>Dates of Examination.</i>	<i>Campaigns.</i>	<i>Books recommended.</i>
March 1935	France and Belgium, 1914; up to and including the Aisne.	<p>"History of the Great War—Military Operations—France and Belgium, 1914, Vol. I." Revised Edition (for March 1935 Examination).</p> <p>"Liaison, 1914—A narrative of the Great Retreat." (Spears) "The Memoirs of Marshal Joffre, Vol. I." (Trans. Bentley Mott. Pub. Bles.)</p>
March 1935 October 1935	.. Mesopotamia, up to and including the capture of Kut-al-Amara, October 1915.	<p>"History of the Great War—Military Operations—Mesopotamia, Vol. I."</p> <p>"A Study of the Strategy and Tactics of the Mesopotamia Campaign, 1914-17." (A. Kearsey) (Pub. Gale and Polden).</p> <p>"Brief Outline of the Campaign in Mesopotamia, 1914-18" (Evans. Pub. Sifton Praed). "Tigris Gunboats" (Nunn).</p>
October 1935 March 1936 October 1936	.. Gallipoli-Inception of the Campaign to May 1915.	<p>"History of the Great War—Military Operations—Gallipoli, Vol. I. "Dardanelles" (Callwell).</p> <p>"Five Years in Turkey" (Liman Von Sanders).</p> <p>"The World Crisis" (Churchill).</p> <p>Notes and Comments on the Dardanelles Campaign (A. Kearsey)..</p>

Secretary's Notes.

<i>Dates of Examination.</i>	<i>Campaigns.</i>	<i>Books recommended.</i>
March 1936 ..	Mesopotamia, from October 1915, up to and including the capture and consolidation of Baghdad, April 1917.	"History of the Great War—Military Operations—Mesopotamia, Vols. II and III."
October 1936		"A study of the Strategy and Tactics of the Mesopotamia Campaign 1914—17" (A. Kearsley) (Pub. Gale and Polden).
March 1937		"Brief Outline of the Campaign in Mesopotamia, 1914—18" (Evans. Pub. Sifton Praed).

The campaigns set for Majors, R.A.M.C. and R.A.V.C. up to and including 1935 are published in I.A.O's. 651 of 1933 and 25 of 1934.

(b) Other Subjects.

In addition to the manuals and regulations mentioned in K. R. and R. A. I., the following books are recommended :—

- "Modern Military Administration, Organization and Transportation" (Harding-Newman).
- "Military Organization and Administration," 1932 (Lindsell).
- "A. & Q. or Military Administration in War" (Lindsell).
- "A Study of Unit Administration" (Gale and Polden).
- "Military Law," 1932 (Banning).
- "The Defence of Duffers' Drift," 1929 (Swinton).
- "Tactical Schemes with Solutions, Series I and II" (Kirby and Kennedy).
- "Elementary Tactics or the Art of War, British School." Vol. I. (Pakenham-Walsh).
- "Imperial Military Geography" (Cole).
- "Elements of Imperial Defence" (Boycott).
- "Changing Conditions of Imperial Defence" (Cole).
- "A Practical Digest of Military Law" (Townshend-Stephens. Pub. Sifton Praed).

VII.—Staff College Examination.—(See Staff College (Camberley) Regulations, 1930, obtainable from the Manager of Publications, Delhi or Calcutta).

(a) Campaigns.

The following campaigns have been set for the Staff College Entrance Examination ;—

Strategy of—

Napoleon's Campaign of 1796 in Italy.

Waterloo Campaign.

Peninsula Campaign, up to and including the Battle of Salamanca.

The strategy and broad tactical lessons of—

The American Civil War.

Russo-Japanese War, up to and including the Battle of Liao-Yang.

The Great War in France, Belgium, Mesopotamia, the Dardanelles and Palestine, including a knowledge of the influence on the strategy in these areas of the events in other theatres of the War.

The East Prussian Campaign, 1914.

The strategy and tactics of—

The Palestine Campaign from 9th November 1917 to the end of the War.

The action of the British Expeditionary Force in France and Belgium, up to and including the first battle of Ypres.

The 3rd Afghan War, 1919.

(b) The following books are recommended for the above campaigns :—

(i) *The Strategy of Napoleon's Campaign in Italy, 1796.*

Rise of General Bonaparte (Spencer Williamson).

Principles of War (Foch).

Vol. XI of 11th Edition of the Encyclopædia Britannica.

(ii) *The Strategy of the Waterloo Campaign, 1815.*

Six British Battles (Belloc).

Napoleon and Waterloo (Becke).

11th Edition of the Encyclopædia Britannica.

(iii) *The Strategy of the Peninsula Campaign, up to and including the Battle of Salamanca.*

Short History of the British Army (Sheppard).

Life of Wellington (Fortescue).

(iv) *The Strategy and Broad Tactical Lessons of the American Civil War.*

True History of the Civil War (G. C. Lee).

History of the Civil War in the United States, 1861—65
(W. B. Woods and J. E. Edmunds).

Stonewall Jackson (G. F. R. Henderson).

Robert E. Lee, the Soldier (Maurice).

The Generalship of Ulysses S. Grant (Fuller).

Sherman (Liddell Hart).

- (v) *The Strategy and Broad Tactical Lessons of the Russo-Japanese War, 1904, up to and including the Battle of Liao-Yang.*

Lectures on the Strategy of the Russo-Japanese War (Bird).

Campaign of Liao-Yang (Rowan-Robinson).

The Japanese in Manchuria (Cordonnier).

Critical Comments only in the "Official Account: The Russo-Japanese War (Naval and Military)."

Staff Officer's Scrap Book (Ian Hamilton).

- (vi) *The Strategy and Broad Tactical Lessons of the Great War in France, Belgium, Mesopotamia, the Dardanelles and Palestine, including a knowledge of the influence on the strategy in these areas of the events in other theatres of War.*

Official Histories—Military Operations, France and Belgium,

Vols. I—V. Egypt and Palestine, Vols. I and II, Parts I and II. Gallipoli, Vols. I and II. Mesopotamia, Vols. I and II.

N.B.—Vol. I of the Official History of Military Operations, France and Belgium has recently been revised.

The Great War of 1914—18 (Aston).

The Real War (Liddell Hart).

A History of the World War, 1914—18 (Liddell Hart)

Foch (Liddell Hart).

The World Crisis (Winston Churchill).

The Great War (Winston Churchill).

Brief History of the Mesopotamian Campaign (Evans)

The Palestine Campaign (Wavell).

Notes and Comments on the Dardanelles Campaign (A. Kearsey).

- (vii) *The Strategy and Broad Tactical Lessons of the East Prussian Campaign, 1914*

Tannenberg—First 30 days in East Prussia (Ironsides).

The World Crisis, Eastern Front, 1931 (Winston Churchill).

The Real War (Liddell Hart).

(viii) *The Strategy and Tactics of the Palestine Campaign from 9th November 1917 to the end of the War.*

The Official History, Military Operations, Egypt and Palestine, from June 17th to the end of the War, Vol. II, Parts I and II.

The Palestine Campaign (Wavell).

(ix) *The Strategy and Tactics of the action of the British Expeditionary Force in France and Belgium, up to and including the first battle of Ypres.*

The Official History, Military Operations, France and Belgium, Vol. I. (Revised Edition.)

A History of the World War, 1914—18 (Liddell Hart).

40 Days in 1914 (Maurice).

Liaison, 1914 (E. L. Spears).

(x) *The Strategy and Tactics of the 3rd Afghan War, 1919.*

The Official Account (General Staff, India, 1926).

(c) In addition to the above, the following books are recommended for the various subjects:—

(i) *Strategy and Tactics.*

Soldiers and Statesmen (F. M. Sir W. Robertson).

Governments and War (Maurice).

British Strategy (Maurice).

War Memoirs of David Lloyd-George, Vol. III (Lloyd-George).

Lectures on F. S. R. II (Fuller).

Lectures on F. S. R. III (Fuller).

War and Western Civilization, 1832—1932 (Fuller).

The British Way in Warfare (Liddell Hart).

Military History for the Staff College Entrance Examination (Sheppard).

In the Wake of the Tank (Martel).

Tactical Schemes with Solutions, Series I and II (Kirby and Kennedy).

Elementary Tactics—An Introduction to the Art of War, British School, Vol. II (Pakenham-Walsh and Dorman-Smith).

Passing it on (Genl. Sir A. Skeen).

Report of the Dardanelles Commission.

(ii) *Organization, Administration and Transportation.*

Staff College Examination Lecture Series, 1933 (Denning) also for
(i) and (iv).

Military Organization and Administration, 1932 (Lindsell).

A. & Q. or Military Administration in War (Lindsell).

Modern Military Administration, Organization and Transportation (Harding-Newman).

Administrative Schemes with Solutions (Kirby and Murison).

Outline of the Development of the British Army (Hastings-Anderson).

Short History of the British Army to 1914 (Sheppard).

The Annual Army Estimates of Effective and Non-Effective Services (H. M. S. O.).

Notes on the Land Forces of the British Dominions, Colonies, Protectorates and Mandated Territories.

The Statesman's Year Book.

Army List.

League of Nations : Armaments Year Book, 1933.

War Office Official Handbooks of Foreign Armies.

Declaration of British Disarmament Policy, 1932.

Commonsense about Disarmament (Lefebure).

(iii) *Military Law.*

Military Law, 1932 (Banning).

A Practical Digest of Military Law (Townshend-Stephens, Pub. Sifton Praed).

A Digest of the Law of Evidence in Courts-Martial (Stephen and Townshend-Stephens).

(iv) *The History and Organization of the Empire.*

Short History of the British Commonwealth (Ramsay).

Short History of British Expansion (Williamson).

British Empire (Basil Williams).

General Survey of the History of India (Sir Verney Lovett).

India in 1929-30, 1930-31, 1931-32.

Problem of the N.-W. F., 1890—1908, with a survey of policy since 1849 (Davies).

Modern Egypt (Cromer, 1908).

Egypt since Cromer, Vols. I and II (Lord Lloyd).

The History of Canada (W. L. Grant).

The Union of South Africa (R. H. Brand).

History of the Australasian Colonies (Jenks).

Imperial Military Geography (Cole).

Imperial Communications (Wakely).

Changing Conditions of Imperial Defence (Cole).

Elements of Imperial Defence (Boycott).

VIII.—Schemes, etc.

The Institution is in possession of the tactical schemes, complete with solutions and maps, set at the Army Headquarters Staff College Course for the past three years and also a number of precis of lectures. These papers are very useful to officers studying for the Staff College Course examination and are available for issue to members of the Institution at the nominal price of annas eight per copy, plus postage. The cost of maps is extra and is charged for at Rs. 2 per map.

In order to simplify their issue, the schemes have been classified as follows. When ordering members are requested to give the subject of the schemes, etc., required.

STAFF COLLEGE SERIES, 1932.

Tactical Schemes

Continuous Exercises.

- No. 1. "Message Writing."
- „ 2. "Order Writing."
- „ 3. "Advance Guards."
- „ 4. "Appreciation."
- „ 5. "Attack Orders."
- „ 6. "Defence."
- „ 7. "Defence."

Strategy and Tactics

Strategy and Tactics, Paper No. 1.

„ „ „ „ No. 2.

„ „ „ „ No. 3.

Tactical Exercise—Night Withdrawals.

Cavalry Exercise.

Mountain Warfare Scheme.

Precis of Lectures, etc.*Military History.*

The East Prussian Campaign, 1914 (1931).
The History and Organization of the Empire.

Tactical.

Military Evolution and the influence of modern Inventions on Warfare.

Tactical lessons of the Great War.

Cavalry I.

Cavalry II.

Artillery I.

Artillery II.

Engineers I and II.

Tactical Employment of Tanks.

Chemical Warfare.

Night Operations.

Frontier Warfare.

Air Co-operation.

Military Law.

Military Law I.

Military Law II.

Military Law III.

Military Law IV.

Specimen Military Law Paper.

Organization, Administration and Transportation

Mobilization.

Reinforcements in War.

Organization, Administration and Transportation (Peace)—
Specimen Examination Paper.

Organization, Administration and Transportation (War)—
Specimen Examination Paper.

" Q " Services in Peace.

Movements.

Movements—Specimen Examination Paper.

Supply of a Division in War.

Supply Problem—Specimen Examination Paper

General.

Notes on Military Writing.

Essay—Specimen Paper.

STAFF COLLEGE SERIES, 1933

Tactical Schemes.*Continuous Exercises.*

No. 1. " March Orders."

No. 2. " Operation Instructions."

Continuous Exercises.

- No. 3. "Military Appreciation."
- No. 4. "Attack Orders."
- No. 5. "Defence Orders."

Strategy and Tactics.

Withdrawal Scheme.
Counter-Attack Scheme.
Attack Scheme.
Mountain Warfare Scheme.
Cavalry Exercise.

STAFF COLLEGE SERIES, 1934.

Tactical Schemes.

Continuous Exercises.

- No. 1. "March Orders."
- No. 2. "Military Appreciation."
- No. 3. "Attack Orders."
- No. 4. "Defence Orders."

Strategy and Tactics.

S. & T. Paper No. 1.
S. & T. Paper No. 2.
S. & T. Paper No. 3. "Night Attacks."
S. & T. Paper No. 4. "Mountain Warfare Scheme."
Withdrawal Exercise.
Cavalry Exercise.

IX.—Historical Research.

The U. S. I. is prepared to supply members and units with typewritten copies of old Indian Army List pages, at the rate of Rs. 2 per typewritten page.

The staff of the Institution is always willing to assist units, authors of regimental histories and members by searching the many old military records in the Library on their behalf.

X.—The MacGregor Memorial Medal.

1. The MacGregor Memorial Medal was founded in 1888 as a memorial to the late Major-General Sir Charles MacGregor. The medals are awarded for the best military reconnaissances or journeys of exploration of the year.

2. The following awards are made annually in the month of June:—

- (a) For officers—British or Indian—silver medal.
- (b) For soldiers—British or Indian—silver medal with Rs. 100 gratuity.

3. For especially valuable work, a gold medal may be awarded in place of one of the silver medals, or in addition to the silver medals, whenever the administrators of the Fund deem it desirable. Also the Council may award a special additional silver medal, without gratuity, to a soldier, for especially good work.

4. The award of medals is made by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, as Vice-Patron, and the Council of the United Service Institution, who were appointed administrators of the Fund by the MacGregor Memorial Committee.

5. Only officers and soldiers belonging to the Army in India (including those in civil employ) are eligible for the award of the medal.*

6. The medal may be worn in uniform by Indian soldiers on ceremonial parades, suspended round the neck by the ribbon issued with the medal.†

7. Personal risk to life during the reconnaissance or exploration is not a necessary qualification for the award of the medal; but, in the event of two journeys being of equal value, the man who has run the greater risk will be considered to have the greater claim to the reward.

8. When the work of the year has either not been of sufficient value or has been received too late for consideration before the Council Meeting, the medal may be awarded for any reconnaissance during previous years considered by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to deserve it.

MACGREGOR MEMORIAL MEDALLISTS.

(With rank of officers and soldiers at the date of the Award.)

1889 .. BELL, Col. M. S., V.C., R.E. (specially awarded a gold medal).

1890 .. YOUNGHUSBAND, Capt. F. E., King's Dragoon Guards.

1891 .. SAWYER, Maj. H. A., 45th Sikhs.

RAMZAN KHAN, Havildar, 3rd Sikhs.

* *N.B.*—The terms "officer" and "soldier" include those serving in the British and Indian armies and their reserves, also those serving in Auxiliary Forces, such as the Indian Auxiliary and Territorial Forces and Corps under Local Governments, Frontier Militia, Levies and Military Police, also all ranks serving in the Royal Air Force, Indian Air Force, Royal Indian Marine and the Indian States Forces.

† Replacements of the ribbon may be obtained on payment from the Secretary, U. S. I., Simla.

MACGREGOR MEMORIAL MEDALLISTS—(contd.).

- 1892 .. VAUGHAN, Capt. H. B., 7th Bengal Infantry.
JAGGAT SINGH, Havildar, 19th Punjab Infantry.
- 1893 .. BOWER, Capt. H., 17th Bengal Cavalry (specially awarded
a gold medal).
FAZAL DAD KHAN, Dafadar, 17th Bengal Cavalry.
- 1894 .. O'SULLIVAN, Maj. G. H. W., R.E.
MULL SINGH, Sowar, 6th Bengal Cavalry.
- 1895 .. DAVIES, Capt. H. R., Oxfordshire Light Infantry.
GANGA DYAL SINGH, Havildar, 2nd Rajputs.
- 1896 .. COCKERILL, Lieut. G. K., 28th Punjab Infantry.
GHULAM NABI, Sepoy, Q. V. O. Corps of Guides.
- 1897 .. SWAYNE, Capt. E. J. F., 10th Rajput Infantry.
SHAHZAD MIR, Dafadar, 11th Bengal Lancers.
- 1898 .. WALKER, Capt. H. B., Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry.
ADAM KHAN, Havildar, Q. V. O. Corps of Guides.
- 1899 .. DOUGLAS, Capt. J. A., 2nd Bengal Lancers.
MIHR DIN, Naik, Bengal Sappers and Miners.
- 1900 .. WINGATE, Capt. A. W. S., 14th Bengal Lancers.
GURDIT SINGH, Havildar, 45th Sikhs.
- 1901 .. BURTON, Maj. E. B., 17th Bengal Lancers.
SUNDAR SINGH, Colour Havildar, 31st Burmah Infantry.
- 1902 .. RAY, Capt. M. R. E., 7th Rajput Infantry.
TILBIR BHANDARI, Havildar, 9th Gurkha Rifles.
- 1903 .. MANIFOLD, Lt.-Col. C. C., I.M.S.
GHULAM HUSSAIN, Lance-Dafadar, Q.V.O. Corps of Guides.
- 1904 .. FRASER, Capt. L. D., R.G.A.
MOGHAL BAZ, Dafadar, Q. V. O. Corps of Guides.
- 1905 .. RENNICK, Maj. F., 40th Pathans (specially awarded a
gold medal).
MADHO RAM, Havildar, 8th Gurkha Rifles.
- 1906 .. SHAHZADA AEMAD MIR, Risaldar, 36th Jacob's Horse.
GHAFUR SHAH, Lance-Naik, Q. V. O. Corps of Guides.
- 1907 .. NANGLE, Capt. M. C., 92nd Punjabis.
SHEIKH USMAN, Havildar, 103rd Mahratta Light Infantry.
- 1908 .. GIBBON, Capt. C. M., Royal Irish Fusiliers.
MALANG, Havildar, 56th Punjab Rifles.
- 1909 .. MUHAMMAD RAZA, Havildar, 106th Pioneers.
- 1910 .. SYKES, Maj. P. M., C.M.G., late 2nd Dragoon Guards
(specially awarded a gold medal).
TURNER, Capt. F. G., R.E.
KHAN BAHADUR SHER JUNG, Survey of India.
- 1911 .. LEACHMAN, Capt. G. E., The Royal Sussex Regiment.
GURMUKH SINGH, Jemadar, 93rd Burmah Infantry.

MACGREGOR MEMORIAL MEDALLISTS—(contd.).

- 1912 .. PRITCHARD, Capt. B. E. A., 83rd Wallajahabad Light Infantry (specially awarded a gold medal).
WILSON, Lieut. A. T., C.M.G., 32nd Sikh Pioneers.
MOHIBULLA, Lance-Dafadar, Q. V. O. Corps of Guides.
- 1913 .. ABBAY, Capt. B. N., 27th Light Cavalry.
SIRDAR KHAN, Sowar, 39th (K. G. O.) Central India Horse.
WARATONG, Havildar, Burmah Military Police (specially awarded a silver medal).
- 1914 .. BAILEY, Capt. F. M., I.A. (Political Department).
MORSHEAD, Capt. H. T., R.E.
HAIDAR ALI, Naik, 106th Hazara Pioneers.
- 1915 .. WATERFIELD, Capt. F. C., 45th Rattray's Sikhs.
ALI JUMA, Havildar, 106th Hazara Pioneers.
- 1916 .. ABDUR RAHMAN, Naik, 21st Punjabis.
ZARGHUN SHAH, Havildar, 58th Rifles (F.F.), (specially awarded a silver medal).
- 1917 .. MIAN AFRAZ GUL, Sepoy, Khyber Rifles.
- 1918 .. NOEL, Capt. E. W. C. (Political Department).
- 1919 .. KEELING, Lieut.-Colonel E. H., M.C., R.E.
ALLA SA, Jemadar, N.-W. Frontier Corps.
- 1920 .. BLACKER, Capt. L. V. S., Q. V. O. Corps of Guides.
AWAL NUR, C. Q. M. Havildar, 2nd Bn., Q. V. O. Corps of Guides. (Special gratuity of Rs. 200.)
- 1921 .. HOLT, Maj. A. L., Royal Engineers.
SHER ALI, Sepoy, No. 4952, 106th Hazara Pioneers.
- 1922 .. ABDUL SAMAD SHAH, Capt., O.B.E., 31st D. C. O. Lancs.
NUR MUHAMMAD, Lance Naik, 1st Guides Infantry, F. F.
- 1923 .. BRUCE, Capt. J. G., 2/6th Gurkha Rifles.
SOBAT, Head Constable, N.-W. F. Police.
HARI SINGH THAPA, Survey Department (specially awarded a silver medal).
- 1924 .. RAHMAT SHAH, Havildar, I.D.S.M., N.-W. F. Corps.
GHULAM HUSSAIN, Naik, N.-W. F. Corps.
- 1925 .. SPEAR, Capt. C. R., 5/13th Frontier Force Rifles.
JABBAR KHAN, Naik, 5/13th Frontier Force Rifles.
- 1926 .. HARVEY-KELLY, Maj. C. H. G. H., D.S.O., 4/10th Baluch Regiment.
- 1927 .. LAKE, Maj. M. C., 4/4th Bombay Grenadiers.
- 1928 .. BOWERMAN, Capt. J. F., 4/10th D. C. O. Baluch Regiment.
MUHAMMAD KHAN, Havildar, Zhob Levy Corps.
- 1929 .. ABDUL HANAN, Naik, N.-W. F. Corps.
GHULAM ALI, Dafadar, Guides Cavalry (specially awarded a silver medal).
- 1930 .. GREEN, Capt. J. H., 3/20th Burmah Rifles.

MACGREGOR MEMORIAL MEDALLISTS—(*conc'd.*).

- 1931 .. O'CONNOR, Capt. R. L., 1/9th Jat Regiment.
KHIAL BADSHAH, Naik, 1/13th Frontier Force Rifles.
- 1932 .. BIRNIE, Capt. E. St. J., Sam Browne's Cavalry.
SHIB SINGH NEGI, No. 4013, Rifleman, 10/18th Royal
Garhwal Rifles.
- 1933 .. ABDUL GHAFUR, Havildar, K. G. O. Bengal Sappers
and Miners.

UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION OF INDIA.

PRIZE ESSAY GOLD MEDALLISTS.

(*With Rank of Officers at the date of the Essay.*)

- 1872 .. ROBERTS, Lt.-Col. F. S., V.C., C.B., R.A.
- 1873 .. COLQUHOUN, Capt. J. S., R.A.
- 1874 .. COLQUHOUN, Capt. J. S., R.A.
- 1879 .. ST. JOHN, Maj. O. B. C., R.E.
- 1880 .. BARROW, Lieut. E. G., 7th Bengal Infantry.
- 1882 .. MASON, Lieut. A. H., R.E.
- 1883 .. COLLEN, Maj. E. H. H., S.C.
- 1884 .. BARROW, Capt. E. G., 7th Bengal Infantry.
- 1887 .. YATE, Lieut. A. C., 27th Baluch Infantry.
- 1888 .. MAULE, Capt. F. N., R.E.
YOUNG, Maj. G. F., 24th Punjab Infantry (specially
awarded a silver medal).
- 1889 .. DUFF, Capt. B., 9th Bengal Infantry.
- 1890 .. MAGUIRE, Capt. C. M., 2nd Cavy., Hyderabad Contingent.
- 1891 .. CARDEW, Lieut. F. G., 10th Bengal Lancers.
- 1893 .. BULLOCK, Maj. G. M., Devonshire Regiment.
- 1894 .. CARTER, Capt. F. C., Northumberland Fusiliers.
- 1895 .. NEVILLE, Lt.-Col. J. P. C., 14th Bengal Lancers.
- 1896 .. BINGLEY, Capt. A. H., 7th Bengal Infantry.
- 1897 .. NAPIER, Capt. G. S. F., Oxfordshire Light Infantry.
- 1898 .. MULLALLY, Maj. H., R.E.
CLAY, Capt. C. H., 43rd Gurkha Rifles (specially
awarded a silver medal).
- 1899 .. NEVILLE, Col. J. P. C., S.E.
- 1900 .. THUILLIER, Capt. H. F., R.E.
LUBBOCK, Capt. G., R.E. (specially awarded a silver
medal).
- 1901 .. RANKEN, Lt.-Col. G. P. P., 46th Punjab Infantry.
- 1902 .. TURNER, Capt. H. H. F., 2nd Bengal Lancers.
- 1903 .. HAMILTON, Maj. W. G., D.S.O., Norfolk Regiment.
BOND, Capt. R. F. G., R.E. (specially awarded a silver
medal).
- 1904 .. MACMUNN, Maj. G. F., D.S.O., R.F.A.

PRIZE ESSAY GOLD MEDALLISTS—(concl'd.).

- 1905 .. COCKERILL, Maj. G. K., Royal Warwickshire Regiment.
 1907 .. WOOD, Maj. E. J. M., 99th Deccan Infantry.
 1908 .. JEUDWINE, Maj. H. S., R.A.
 1909 .. MOLYNEUX, Maj. E. M. J., D.S.O., 12th Cavalry.
 ELSMIE, Maj. A. M. S., 56th Rifles, F. F. (specially
 awarded a silver medal).
 1911 .. Mr. D. PETRIE, M.A., Punjab Police.
 1912 .. CARTER, Maj. B. C., The King's Regiment.
 1913 .. THOMSON, Maj. A. G., 58th Vaughan's Rifles (F. F.).
 1914 .. BAINBRIDGE, Col. W. F., F.S.O., 51st Sikhs (F. F.).
 NORMAN, Maj. C. L., M.V.O., Q. V. O. Corps of Guides
 (specially awarded a silver medal).
 1916 .. CRUM, Maj. W. E., V.D., Calcutta Light Horse.
 1917 .. BLAKER, Maj. W. F., R.F.A.
 1918 .. GOMPERTZ, Capt. A. V., M.C., R.E.
 1919 .. GOMPERTZ, Capt. M. L. A., 108th Infantry.
 1920 .. KEEN, Lt.-Col. F. S., D.S.O., 2/15th Sikhs.
 1922 .. MARTIN, Maj. H. G., D.S.O., O.B.E., R.F.A.
 1923 .. KEEN, Col. F. S., D.S.O., I.A.
 1926 .. DENNYS, Maj. L. E., M.C., 4/12th Frontier Force Regi-
 ment.
 1927 .. HOGG, Maj. D. MCA., M.C., R.E.
 1928 .. FRANKS, Maj. K. F., D.S.O., 5th Royal Mahrattas.
 1929 .. DENNYS, Maj. L. E., M.C., 4/12th Frontier Force Regi-
 ment.
 1930 .. DURNFORD, Maj. C. M. P., 4/6th Rajputana Rifles.
 1931 .. FORD, Lt.-Col. G. N., 2/5th Mahratta Light Infantry.
 1932 .. THURBURN, Lt. R. G., The Cameronians (Scottish Rifles).
 1933 .. Medal not awarded.
 1934 .. DURNFORD, MAJ. C. M. P., 4/6th Rajputana Rifles.

NOTICE.

(i) With effect from the 1st January 1934, members of ten years' standing who retire from the Service may continue their membership on payment of the reduced subscription of £10/6 per annum.

(ii) Cadets of the Indian Military Academy are now eligible for membership of the Institution.

(iii) Officers of the Indian States Forces are eligible to compete in the Gold Medal Prize Essay Competition.

(iv) The revised Library Catalogue (1934) is now available and can be supplied to members and subscribers at Rs. 2/8/- per copy, plus postage.

GOLD MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY COMPETITION, 1935.


The Council has chosen the following subject for the Gold Medal Prize Essay Competition for 1935 :—

“ It has been widely asserted that a decision in modern western warfare will be gained in the air.” Discuss this assertion illustrating your arguments with any modification you think necessary in the organisation of H. M.'s Forces for the defence of the British Empire.

The following are the conditions of the competition :—

- (1) The competition is open to all gazetted officers of the Civil Administration, the Royal Navy, Army, Royal Air Force, Auxiliary Forces and Indian States Forces.
- (2) Essays must be typewritten and submitted in triplicate.
- (3) When reference is made to any work, the title of such work is to be quoted.
- (4) Essays are to be strictly anonymous. Each must have a motto and, enclosed with the essay, there should be sent a sealed envelope with the motto written on the outside and the name and motto of the competitor inside.
- (5) Essays will not be accepted unless received by the Secretary on or before the 30th June 1935.
- (6) Essays will be submitted for adjudication to three judges, chosen by the Council. The judges may recommend a money award, not exceeding Rs. 150, either in addition to or in substitution for the medal. The decision of the three judges will be submitted to the Council, who will decide whether the medal is to be awarded and whether the essay is to be published.
- (7) The name of the successful candidate will be announced at a Council Meeting to be held in September or October 1935.
- (8) All essays submitted are to become the property of the United Service Institution of India absolutely, and authors will not be at liberty to make any use whatsoever of their essays without the sanction of the Council.
- (9) Essays should not exceed 15 pages of the size and style of the Journal, exclusive of any appendices, tables or maps

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Castalia	..	March 16	Castalia	..	Oct. 5
California	..	" 28	Britannia	..	" 19
Tuscania	..	April 11	California	..	" 31
Britannia	..	" 25	Tuscania	..	Nov. 14
Elysia	..	May 22	Elysia	..	Dec. 2
Castalia	..	June 15			

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
APRIL, 1935.

CONTENTS.


	PAGE.
Secretary's Notes	ii
Editorial	149
1. The International Saar Force	158
2. Kenya and Uganda	176
3. Industrial Mobilization	185
4. "V. B."	192
5. The Training of a Railway Battalion of the Auxiliary Force (India)	195
6. For Want of a Nail	200
7. Man-day Problems	207
8. An Unusual Journey Home from India ..	212
9. Words	228
10. "Contact!"	229
11. The Reduction of Unnecessary Correspondence ..	232
12. Gentleman Cadets of the Indian Army To-day and Yesterday	240
Letters to the Editor	244
Reviews	253

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
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
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FORT

BOMBAY.

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I.—New Members.

The following new members joined the Institution from 1st December 1934 to 28th February 1935 :—

ORDINARY MEMBERS.

Sir Edward Benthall.	Captain R. S. Johnson.
Lieut.-Colonel L. B. A. Becher.	Captain J. J. L. MacKirdy.
Major B. H. Chappel.	Captain A. E. Snow.
Captain A. E. Armstrong.	Lieut. M. P. Huthwaite.
Captain J. L. Dawson, V.C.	Lieut. Nazir Ahmad.
2nd-Lieut. J. C. Stewart Jonas.	

II.—The Journal.

The Institution publishes a Quarterly Journal in the months of January, April, July and October, which is issued postage free to members in any part of the world. Non-members may obtain the Journal at Rs. 2 annas 8 per copy, or Rs. 10 per annum. Advertisement rates may be obtained on application to the Secretary or to Messrs. L. A. Stronach & Co., Advertising Consultants, Stronach House, Ballard Estate, Bombay.

III.—Contributions to the Journal.

Articles may vary in length from two thousand to ten thousand words. Payment is made on publication at from Rs. 40 to Rs. 100 in accordance with the value and length of the contribution.

With reference to Regulations for the Army in India, paragraph 204 and King's Regulations, paragraph 522, action to obtain the sanction of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to the publication of any article in the Journal of the United Service Institution of India will be taken by the Executive Committee of the Institution.

The Committee reserve to themselves the right to omit any matter which they consider objectionable.

Articles are only accepted on these conditions.

IV.—Reading Room and Library.

The United Service Institution of India is situated in the Mall, Simla, and is open all the year round—including Sundays—from 9 a.m. until sunset. The Reading Room of the Institution is provided with the leading illustrated papers, newspapers, magazines and journals of military, naval and service interest.

There is a well-stocked library in the Institution from which members can obtain books on loan free in accordance with the following rules :—

(1) The Library is only open to members and honorary members, who are requested to look upon books as not transferable to their friends.

(2) No book shall be taken from the Library without making the necessary entry in the register. Members residing permanently or temporarily in Simla are requested to enter their addresses.

(3) A member shall not be allowed, at one time, more than three books or sets of books.

(4) No particular limit is set as to the number of days for which a member may keep a book, the Council being desirous of making the Library as useful as possible to members; but if after the expiration of a fortnight from date of issue it is required by any other member, it will be re-called.

(5) Applications for books from members at out-stations are dealt with, as early as possible, and books are despatched post free per Registered Parcel Post. They must be returned carefully packed per Registered Parcel Post within one month of the date of issue.

(6) If a book is not returned at the end of one month, it must be paid for if so required by the Executive Committee. Lost and defaced books shall be replaced at the cost of the member to whom they were issued. In the case of lost books which are out of print, the value shall be fixed by the Executive Committee and the amount, when received, spent in the purchase of a new book.

(7) The issue of a book under these rules to any member implies the latter's compliance with the rules and the willingness to have them enforced, if necessary, against him.

(8) The catalogue of the Library has been revised and is now available for sale at Rs. 2/8/- per copy, plus postage. The Library has been completely overhauled and all books re-classified, hence the new catalogue meets the general demand for an up-to-date production containing all military classics and other works likely to be of use to members of the Institution. Members who have not yet ordered their copies are advised to send a post card to the Librarian of the Institution, Simla.

V.—Library Books.

A list of the books received during the preceding quarter is enclosed in loose leaf form suitable for cutting into strips for pasting in the library catalogue.

The Institution is in possession of a collection of old and rare books presented by members from time to time and, while such books are not available for circulation, they can be seen by members visiting Simla.

The Secretary will be glad to acknowledge the gift of old books, trophies, medals, etc., presented to the Institution.

VI.—Promotion Examinations.

(a) *Campaigns*—(reference A. O. 243 of 1931, as amended by A. O. 80 of 1933 and A. O. 102 of 1933, as amended by A. Os. 119 and 155 of 1933 and I. A. O. 651 of 1933).

The following table shows the campaigns on which military history papers will be set for Lieutenants for promotion to Captain in sub-head *b* (iii) and for Captains for promotion to Major in sub-head *d* (iii), with a list of books recommended for the study of each :—

<i>Dates of Examination.</i>	<i>Campaigns.</i>	<i>Books recommended.</i>
October 1935 ..	Mesopotamia, up to and including the capture of Kut-al-Amara, October 1915.	<p>"History of the Great War.—Military Operations—Mesopotamia, Vol. I."</p> <p>"A Study of the Strategy and Tactics of the Mesopotamia Campaign, 1914-17." (A. Kearsey.) (Pub. Gale and Polden).</p> <p>"Brief Outline of the Campaign in Mesopotamia, 1914-18" (Evans. Pub. Sifton Praed). "Tigris Gunboats" (Nunn).</p>
October 1935 ..	Gallipoli-Inception of the	"History of the Great War—Military Operations—Gallipoli, Vol. I.
March 1936 ..	Campaign to May 1915.	"Dardanelles" (Callwell).
October 1936		<p>"Five Years in Turkey" (Liman Von Sanders).</p> <p>"The World Crisis" (Churchill).</p> <p>Notes and Comments on the Dardanelles Campaign (A. Kearsey).</p>

Secretary's Notes.

<i>Dates of Examination.</i>	<i>Campaigns.</i>	<i>Books recommended.</i>
March 1936 ..	Mesopotamia, from October 1915, up to and including the capture and consolidation of Baghdad, April 1917.	"History of the Great War—Military Operations—Mesopotamia, Vols. II and III."
October 1936		"A study of the Strategy and Tactics of the Mesopotamia Campaign 1914—17" (A. Kearsey.) (Pub. Gale and Polden).
March 1937		"Brief Outline of the Campaign in Mesopotamia, 1914—18" (Evans. Pub. Sifton Praed).

The campaigns set for Majors, R.A.M.C. and R.A.V.C. up to and including 1935 are published in I.A.O's. 651 of 1933 and 25 of 1934.

(b) Other Subjects.

In addition to the manuals and regulations mentioned in K. R. and R. A. I., the following books are recommended :—

"Modern Military Administration, Organization and Transportation" (Harding-Newman).

"Military Organization and Administration," 1932 (Lindsell).

"A. & Q. or Military Administration in War" (Lindsell).

"A Study of Unit Administration" (Gale and Polden).

"Military Law," 1932 (Banning).

"The Defence of Duffers' Drift," 1929 (Swinton).

"Tactical Schemes with Solutions, Series I and II" (Kirby and Kennedy).

"Elementary Tactics or the Art of War, British School." Vol. I (Pakenham-Walsh).

"Imperial Military Geography" (Cole).

"Elements of Imperial Defence" (Boycott).

"Changing Conditions of Imperial Defence" (Cole).

"A Practical Digest of Military Law" (Townshend-Stephens. Pub. Sifton Praed).

VII.—Staff College Examination.—(See Staff College (Camberley) Regulations, 1930, obtainable from the Manager of Publications, Delhi or Calcutta.)

(a) Campaigns.

The following campaigns have been set for the Staff College Entrance Examination :—

Strategy of—

Napoleon's Campaign of 1796 in Italy.

Waterloo Campaign.

Peninsula Campaign, up to and including the Battle of Salamanca.

The strategy and broad tactical lessons of—

The American Civil War.

Russo-Japanese War, up to and including the Battle of Liao-Yang.

The Great War in France, Belgium, Mesopotamia, the Dardanelles and Palestine, including a knowledge of the influence on the strategy in these areas of the events in other theatres of the War.

The East Prussian Campaign, 1914.

The strategy and tactics of—

The Palestine Campaign from 9th November 1917 to the end of the War.

The action of the British Expeditionary Force in France and Belgium, up to and including the first battle of Ypres.

The 3rd Afghan War, 1919.

(b) The following books are recommended for the above campaigns:—

(i) *The Strategy of Napoleon's Campaign in Italy, 1796.*

Rise of General Bonaparte (Spencer Williamson).

Principles of War (Foch).

Vol. XI of 11th Edition of the Encyclopædia Britannica.

(ii) *The Strategy of the Waterloo Campaign, 1815.*

Six British Battles (Belloc).

Napoleon and Waterloo (Becke).

11th Edition of the Encyclopædia Britannica.

(iii) *The Strategy of the Peninsula Campaign, up to and including the Battle of Salamanca.*

Short History of the British Army (Sheppard).

Life of Wellington (Fortescue).

(iv) *The Strategy and Broad Tactical Lessons of the American Civil War.*

True History of the Civil War (G. C. Lee).

History of the Civil War in the United States, 1861—65

(W. B. Woods and J. E. Edmunds).

Stonewall Jackson (G. F. R. Henderson).
 Robert E. Lee, the Soldier (Maurice).
 The Generalship of Ulysses S. Grant (Fuller).
 Sherman (Liddell Hart).

- (v) *The Strategy and Broad Tactical Lessons of the Russo-Japanese War, 1904, up to and including the Battle of Liao-Yang.*

Lectures on the Strategy of the Russo-Japanese War (Bird).
 Campaign of Liao-Yang (Rowan-Robinson).
 The Japanese in Manchuria (Cordonnier).
 Critical Comments only in the "Official Account: The Russo-Japanese War (Naval and Military)."

Staff Officer's Scrap Book (Ian Hamilton).

- (vi) *The Strategy and Broad Tactical Lessons of the Great War in France, Belgium, Mesopotamia, the Dardanelles and Palestine, including a knowledge of the influence on the strategy in these areas of the events in other theatres of War.*

Official Histories—Military Operations, France and Belgium, Vols. I—V. Egypt and Palestine, Vols. I and II, Parts I and II. Gallipoli, Vols. I and II. Mesopotamia, Vols. I and II.

N.B.—Vol. I of the Official History of Military Operations, France and Belgium, has recently been revised.

A History of the Great War 1914-18 (Cruttwell).

The Great War of 1914—18 (Aston).

The Real War (Liddell Hart).

A History of the World War, 1914—18 (Liddell Hart).

Foch (Liddell Hart).

The World Crisis (Winston Churchill).

The Great War (Winston Churchill).

Brief History of the Mesopotamian Campaign (Evans).

The Palestine Campaign (Wavell).

Notes and Comments on the Dardanelles Campaign (A. Kearsley).

- (vii) *The Strategy and Broad Tactical Lessons of the East Prussian Campaign, 1914.*

Tannenberg—First 30 days in East Prussia (Ironside).

The World Crisis, Eastern Front, 1931 (Winston Churchill).

The Real War (Liddell Hart).

(viii) *The Strategy and Tactics of the Palestine Campaign from 9th November 1917 to the end of the War.*

The Official History, Military Operations, Egypt and Palestine, from June 17th to the end of the War, Vol. II, Parts I and II.

The Palestine Campaign (Wavell).

(ix) *The Strategy and Tactics of the action of the British Expeditionary Force in France and Belgium, up to and including the first battle of Ypres.*

The Official History, Military Operations, France and Belgium, Vol. I—(Revised Edition).

A History of the World War, 1914—18 (Liddell Hart).

40 Days in 1914 (Maurice).

Liaison, 1914 (E. L. Spears).

(x) *The Strategy and Tactics of the 3rd Afghan War, 1919.*

The Official Account (General Staff, India, 1926).

(c) In addition to the above, the following books are recommended for the various subjects:—

(i) *Strategy and Tactics.*

Soldiers and Statesmen (F. M. Sir W. Robertson).

Governments and War (Maurice).

British Strategy (Maurice).

War Memoirs of David Lloyd-George, (Lloyd-George).

Lectures on F. S. R. II (Fuller).

Lectures on F. S. R. III (Fuller).

War and Western Civilization, 1832—1932 (Fuller).

The British Way in Warfare (Liddell Hart).

Military History for the Staff College Entrance Examination (Sheppard).

In the Wake of the Tank (Martel).

Tactical Schemes with Solutions, Series I and II (Kirby and Kennedy).

Elementary Tactics—An Introduction to the Art of War
British School, Vol. II (Pakenham-Walsh and Dorman-Smith).

Passing it on (Genl. Sir A. Skeen).

Report of the Dardanelles Commission.

(ii) *Organization, Administration and Transportation.*

Staff College Examination Lecture Series, 1933 (Denning) also for
(i) and (iv).

Military Organization and Administration, 1932 (Lindsell).

A. & Q. or Military Administration in War (Lindsell).

Modern Military Administration, Organization and Transportation (Harding-Newman).

Administrative Schemes with Solutions (Kirby and Murison).

Outline of the Development of the British Army (Hastings-Anderson).

Short History of the British Army to 1914 (Sheppard).

The Annual Army Estimates of Effective and Non-Effective Services (H. M. S. O.).

Notes on the Land Forces of the British Dominions, Colonies, Protectorates and Mandated Territories.

The Statesman's Year Book.

Army List.

League of Nations : Armaments Year Book, 1933.

War Office Official Handbooks of Foreign Armies.

Declaration of British Disarmament Policy, 1932.

Commonsense about Disarmament (Lefebure).

(iii) *Military Law.*

Military Law, 1932 (Banning).

A Practical Digest of Military Law (Townshend-Stephens, Pub. Sifton Praed).

A Digest of the Law of Evidence in Courts-Martial (Stephen and Townshend-Stephens).

(iv) *The History and Organization of the Empire.*

Short History of the British Commonwealth (Ramsay).

Short History of British Expansion (Williamson).

British Empire (Basil Williams).

General Survey of the History of India (Sir Verney Lovett).

India in 1929-30, 1930-31, 1931-32, 1932-33.

Problem of the N.-W. F., 1890—1908, with a survey of policy since 1849 (Davies).

Modern Egypt (Cromer, 1908).

Egypt since Cromer, Vols. I and II (Lord Lloyd).

The History of Canada (W. L. Grant).

The Union of South Africa (R. H. Brand).

History of the Australasian Colonies (Jenks).

Imperial Military Geography (Cole).

Imperial Communications (Wakely).

Changing Conditions of Imperial Defence (Cole).

Elements of Imperial Defence (Boycott).

VIII.—Schemes, etc.

The Institution is in possession of the tactical schemes, complete with solutions and maps, set at the Army Headquarters Staff College Course for the past three years and also a number of precis of lectures. These papers are very useful to officers studying for the Staff College Course examination and are available for issue to members of the Institution at the nominal price of annas eight per copy, plus postage. The cost of maps is extra and is charged for at Rs. 2 per map.

In order to simplify their issue, the schemes have been classified as follows. When ordering members are requested to give the subject of the schemes, etc., required.

STAFF COLLEGE SERIES, 1932.

Tactical Schemes.

Continuous Exercises.

- No. 1. "Message Writing."
- " 2. "Order Writing."
- " 3. "Advance Guards."
- " 4. "Appreciation."
- " 5. "Attack Orders."
- " 6. "Defence."
- " 7. "Defence."

Strategy and Tactics

Strategy and Tactics, Paper No. 1.

" " " " No. 2.

" " " " No. 3.

Tactical Exercise—Night Withdrawals.

Cavalry Exercise.

Mountain Warfare Scheme.

Precis of Lectures, etc.*Military History.*

The East Prussian Campaign, 1914 (1931).
The History and Organization of the Empire.

Tactical.

Military Evolution and the influence of modern Inventions on Warfare.

Tactical lessons of the Great War.

Cavalry I.

Cavalry II.

Artillery I.

Artillery II.

Engineers I and II.

Tactical Employment of Tanks.

Chemical Warfare.

Night Operations.

Frontier Warfare.

Air Co-operation.

Military Law.

Military Law I.

Military Law II.

Military Law III.

Military Law IV.

Specimen Military Law Paper.

Organization, Administration and Transportation.

Mobilization.

Reinforcements in War.

Organization, Administration and Transportation (Peace)—
Specimen Examination Paper.

Organization, Administration and Transportation (War)—
Specimen Examination Paper.

" Q " Services in Peace.

Movements.

Movements—Specimen Examination Paper.

Supply of a Division in War.

Supply Problem—Specimen Examination Paper.

General.

Notes on Military Writing.

Essay—Specimen Paper.

STAFF COLLEGE SERIES, 1933

Tactical Schemes.*Continuous Exercises.*

No. 1. " March Orders."

No. 2. " Operation Instructions."

Continuous Exercises.

- No. 3. "Military Appreciation."
- No. 4. "Attack Orders."
- No. 5. "Defence Orders."

Strategy and Tactics.

Withdrawal Scheme.
Counter-Attack Scheme.
Attack Scheme.
Mountain Warfare Scheme.
Cavalry Exercise.

STAFF COLLEGE SERIES, 1934.

Tactical Schemes.

Continuous Exercises.

- No. 1. "March Orders."
- No. 2. "Military Appreciation."
- No. 3. "Attack Orders."
- No. 4. "Defence Orders."

Strategy and Tactics.

S. & T. Paper No. 1.
S. & T. Paper No. 2.
S. & T. Paper No. 3. "Night Attacks."
S. & T. Paper No. 4. "Mountain Warfare Scheme."
Withdrawal Exercise.
Cavalry Exercise.

IX.—Historical Research.

The U. S. I. is prepared to supply members and units with typewritten copies of old Indian Army List pages, at the rate of Rs. 2 per typewritten page.

The staff of the Institution is always willing to assist units, authors of regimental histories and members by searching the many old military records in the Library on their behalf.

X.—The MacGregor Memorial Medal.

1. The MacGregor Memorial Medal was founded in 1888 as a memorial to the late Major-General Sir Charles MacGregor. The medals are awarded for the best military reconnaissances or journeys of exploration of the year.

2. The following awards are made annually in the month of June:—

- (a) For officers—British or Indian—silver medal.
- (b) For soldiers—British or Indian—silver medal with Rs. 100 gratuity.

3. For especially valuable work, a gold medal may be awarded in place of one of the silver medals, or in addition to the silver medals, whenever the administrators of the Fund deem it desirable. Also the Council may award a special additional silver medal, without gratuity, to a soldier, for especially good work.

4. The award of medals is made by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, as Vice-Patron, and the Council of the United Service Institution, who were appointed administrators of the Fund by the MacGregor Memorial Committee.

5. Only officers and soldiers belonging to the Army in India (including those in civil employ) are eligible for the award of the medal.*

6. The medal may be worn in uniform by Indian soldiers on ceremonial parades, suspended round the neck by the ribbon issued with the medal.†

7. Personal risk to life during the reconnaissance or exploration is not a necessary qualification for the award of the medal; but, in the event of two journeys being of equal value, the man who has run the greater risk will be considered to have the greater claim to the reward.

8. When the work of the year has either not been of sufficient value or has been received too late for consideration before the Council Meeting, the medal may be awarded for any reconnaissance during previous years considered by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to deserve it.

MACGREGOR MEMORIAL MEDALLISTS

(With rank of officers and soldiers at the date of the Award.)

1889 .. BELL, Col. M. S., v.c., R.E. (specially awarded a gold medal).

1890 .. YOUNGHUSBAND, Capt. F. E., King's Dragoon Guards.

1891 .. SAWYER, Maj. H. A., 45th Sikhs.

RAMZAN KHAN, Havildar, 3rd Sikhs.

* *N.B.*—The terms "officer" and "soldier" include those serving in the British and Indian armies and their reserves, also those serving in Auxiliary Forces, such as the Indian Auxiliary and Territorial Forces and Corps under Local Governments, Frontier Militia, Levies and Military Police, also all ranks serving in the Royal Air Force, Indian Air Force, Royal Indian Marine and the Indian States Forces.

† Replacements of the ribbon may be obtained on payment from the Secretary, U. S. I., Simla.

MACGREGOR MEMORIAL MEDALLISTS—(contd.).

- 1892 .. VAUGHAN, Capt. H. B., 7th Bengal Infantry.
JAGGAT SINGH, Havildar, 19th Punjab Infantry.
- 1893 .. BOWER, Capt. H., 17th Bengal Cavalry (specially awarded
a gold medal).
FAZAL DAD KHAN, Dafadar, 17th Bengal Cavalry.
- 1894 .. O'SULLIVAN, Maj. G. H. W., R.E.
MULL SINGH, Sowar, 6th Bengal Cavalry.
- 1895 .. DAVIES, Capt. H. R., Oxfordshire Light Infantry.
GANGA DYAL SINGH, Havildar, 2nd Rajputs.
- 1896 .. COCKERILL, Lieut. G. K., 28th Punjab Infantry.
GHULAM NABI, Sepoy, Q. V. O. Corps of Guides.
- 1897 .. SWAYNE, Capt. E. J. F., 10th Rajput Infantry.
SHAHZAD MIR, Dafadar, 11th Bengal Lancers.
- 1898 .. WALKER, Capt. H. B., Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry.
ADAM KHAN, Havildar, Q. V. O. Corps of Guides.
- 1899 .. DOUGLAS, Capt. J. A., 2nd Bengal Lancers.
MIHR DIN, Naik, Bengal Sappers and Miners.
- 1900 .. WINGATE, Capt. A. W. S., 14th Bengal Lancers.
GURDIT SINGH, Havildar, 45th Sikhs.
- 1901 .. BURTON, Maj. E. B., 17th Bengal Lancers.
SUNDAR SINGH, Colour Havildar, 31st Burmah Infantry.
- 1902 .. RAY, Capt. M. R. E., 7th Rajput Infantry.
TILBIR BHANDARI, Havildar, 9th Gurkha Rifles.
- 1903 .. MANIFOLD, Lt.-Col. C. C., I.M.S.
GHULAM HUSSAIN, Lance-Dafadar, Q.V.O. Corps of Guides.
- 1904 .. FRASER, Capt. L. D., R.G.A.
MOGHAL BAZ, Dafadar, Q. V. O. Corps of Guides.
- 1905 .. RENNICK, Maj. F., 40th Pathans (specially awarded a
gold medal).
MADHO RAM, Havildar, 8th Gurkha Rifles.
- 1906 .. SHAHZADA AHMAD MIR, Risaldar, 36th Jacob's Horse.
GHAFUR SHAH, Lance-Naik, Q. V. O. Corps of Guides.
- 1907 .. NANGLE, Capt. M. C., 92nd Punjabis.
SHEIKH USMAN, Havildar, 103rd Mahratta Light Infantry.
- 1908 .. GIBBON, Capt. C. M., Royal Irish Fusiliers.
MALANG, Havildar, 56th Punjab Rifles.
- 1909 .. MUHAMMAD RAZA, Havildar, 106th Pioneers.
- 1910 .. SYKES, Maj. P. M., C.M.G., late 2nd Dragoon Guards
(specially awarded a gold medal).
TURNER, Capt. F. G., R.E.
KHAN BAHADUR SHER JUNG, Survey of India.
- 1911 .. LEACHMAN, Capt. G. E., The Royal Sussex Regiment.
GURMUKH SINGH, Jemadar, 93rd Burmah Infantry.

MACGREGOR MEMORIAL MEDALLISTS—(contd.).

- 1912 .. PRITCHARD, Capt. B. E. A., 83rd Wallajahabad Light Infantry (specially awarded a gold medal).
WILSON, Lieut. A. T., C.M.G., 32nd Sikh Pioneers.
MOHIBULLA, Lance-Dafadar, Q. V. O. Corps of Guides.
- 1913 .. ABBAY, Capt. B. N., 27th Light Cavalry.
SIRDAR KHAN, Sowar, 39th (K. G. O.) Central India Horse.
WARATONG, Havildar, Burmah Military Police (specially awarded a silver medal).
- 1914 .. BAILEY, Capt. F. M., I.A. (Political Department).
MORSHEAD, Capt. H. T., R.E.
HAIDAR ALI, Naik, 106th Hazara Pioneers.
- 1915 .. WATERFIELD, Capt. F. C., 45th Rattray's Sikhs.
ALI JUMA, Havildar, 106th Hazara Pioneers.
- 1916 .. ABDUR RAHMAN, Naik, 21st Punjabis.
ZARGHUN SHAH, Havildar, 58th Rifles (F.F.), (specially awarded a silver medal).
- 1917 .. MIAN AFRAZ GUL, Sepoy, Khyber Rifles.
- 1918 .. NOEL, Capt. E. W. C. (Political Department).
- 1919 .. KEELING, Lieut.-Colonel E. H., M.C., R.E.
ALLA SA, Jemadar, N.-W. Frontier Corps.
- 1920 .. BLACKER, Capt. L. V. S., Q. V. O. Corps of Guides.
AWAL NUR, C. Q. M. Havildar, 2nd Bn., Q. V. O. Corps of Guides. (Special gratuity of Rs. 200.)
- 1921 .. HOLT, Maj. A. L., Royal Engineers.
SHER ALI, Sepoy, No. 4952, 106th Hazara Pioneers.
- 1922 .. ABDUL SAMAD SHAH, Capt., O.B.E., 31st D. C. O. Lancers.
NUR MUHAMMAD, Lance-Naik, 1st Guides Infantry, F. F.
- 1923 .. BRUCE, Capt. J. G., 2/6th Gurkha Rifles.
SOHBAT, Head Constable, N.-W. F. Police.
HARI SINGH THAPA, Survey Department (specially awarded a silver medal).
- 1924 .. RAHMAT SHAH, Havildar, I.D.S.M., N.-W. F. Corps.
GHULAM HUSSAIN, Naik, N.-W. F. Corps.
- 1925 .. SPEAR, Capt. C. R., 5/13th Frontier Force Rifles.
JABBAR KHAN, Naik, 5/13th Frontier Force Rifles.
- 1926 .. HARVEY-KELLY, Maj. C. H. G. H., D.S.O., 4/10th Baluch Regiment.
- 1927 .. LAKE, Maj. M. C., 4/4th Bombay Grenadiers.
- 1928 .. BOWERMAN, Capt. J. F., 4/10th D. C. O. Baluch Regiment.
MUHAMMAD KHAN, Havildar, Zhob Levy Corps.
- 1929 .. ABDUL HANAN, Naik, N.-W. F. Corps.
GHULAM ALI, Dafadar, Guides Cavalry (specially awarded a silver medal).
- 1930 .. GREEN, Capt. J. H., 3/20th Burmah Rifles.

MACGREGOR MEMORIAL MEDALLISTS—(*concl'd.*).

- 1931 .. O'CONNOR, Capt. R. L., 1/9th Jat Regiment.
KHIAL BADSHAH, Naik, 1/13th Frontier Force Rifles.
- 1932 .. BIRNIE, Capt. E. St. J., Sam Browne's Cavalry.
SHIB SINGH NEGI, No. 4013, Rifleman, 10/18th Royal
Garhwal Rifles.
- 1933 .. ABDUL GHAFUR, Havildar, K. G. O. Bengal Sappers
and Miners.

UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION OF INDIA.

PRIZE ESSAY GOLD MEDALLISTS.

(*With Rank of Officers at the date of the Essay.*)

- 1872 .. ROBERTS, Lt.-Col. F. S., V.C., C.B., R.A.
- 1873 .. COLQUHOUN, Capt. J. S., R.A.
- 1874 .. COLQUHOUN, Capt. J. S., R.A.
- 1879 .. ST. JOHN, Maj. O. B. C., R.E.
- 1880 .. BARROW, Lieut. E. G., 7th Bengal Infantry.
- 1882 .. MASON, Lieut. A. H., R.E.
- 1883 .. COLLEN, Maj. E. H. H., S.C.
- 1884 .. BARROW, Capt. E. G., 7th Bengal Infantry.
- 1887 .. YATE, Lieut. A. C., 27th Baluch Infantry.
- 1888 .. MAUDE, Capt. F. N., R.E.
YOUNG, Maj. G. F., 24th Punjab Infantry (specially
awarded a silver medal).
- 1889 .. DUFF, Capt. B., 9th Bengal Infantry.
- 1890 .. MAGUIRE, Capt. C. M., 2nd Cavy., Hyderabad Contingent.
- 1891 .. CARDEW, Lieut. F. G., 10th Bengal Lancers.
- 1893 .. BULLOCK, Maj. G. M., Devonshire Regiment.
- 1894 .. CARTER, Capt. F. C., Northumberland Fusiliers.
- 1895 .. NEVILLE, Lt.-Col. J. P. C., 14th Bengal Lancers.
- 1896 .. BINGLEY, Capt. A. H., 7th Bengal Infantry.
- 1897 .. NAPIER, Capt. G. S. F., Oxfordshire Light Infantry.
- 1898 .. MULLALY, Maj. H., R.E.
CLAY, Capt. C. H., 43rd Gurkha Rifles (specially
awarded a silver medal).
- 1899 .. NEVILLE, Col. J. P. C., S.E.
- 1900 .. THUILLIER, Capt. H. F., R.E.
LUBBOCK, Capt. G., R.E. (specially awarded a silver
medal).
- 1901 .. RANKEN, Lt.-Col. G. P. P., 46th Punjab Infantry.
- 1902 .. TURNER, Capt. H. H. F., 2nd Bengal Lancers.
- 1903 .. HAMILTON, Maj. W. G., D.S.O., Norfolk Regiment.
BOND, Capt. R. F. G., R.E. (specially awarded a silver
medal).
- 1904 .. MACMUNN, Maj. G. F., D.S.O., R.F.A.

PRIZE ESSAY GOLD MEDALLISTS—(concl'd.).

1905	..	COCKERILL, Maj. G. K., Royal Warwickshire Regiment.
1907	..	WOOD, Maj. E. J. M., 99th Deccan Infantry.
1908	..	JEUDWINE, Maj. H. S., R.A.
1909	..	MOLYNEUX, Maj. E. M. J., D.S.O., 12th Cavalry. ELSMIE, Maj. A. M. S., 56th Rifles, F. F. (specially awarded a silver medal).
1911	..	Mr. D. PETRIE, M.A., Punjab Police.
1912	..	CARTER, Maj. B. C., The King's Regiment.
1913	..	THOMSON, Maj. A. G., 58th Vaughan's Rifles (F. F.).
1914	..	BAINBRIDGE, Col. W. F., D.S.O., 51st Sikhs (F. F.). NORMAN, Maj. C. L., M.V.O., Q. V. O. Corps of Guides (specially awarded a silver medal).
1916	..	CRUM, Maj. W. E., V.D., Calcutta Light Horse.
1917	..	BLAKER, Maj. W. F., R.F.A.
1918	..	GOMPERTZ, Capt. A. V., M.C., R.E.
1919	..	GOMPERTZ, Capt. M. L. A., 108th Infantry.
1920	..	KEEN, Lt.-Col. F. S., D.S.O., 2/15th Sikhs.
1922	..	MARTIN, Maj. H. G., D.S.O., O.B.E., R.F.A.
1923	..	KEEN, Col. F. S., D.S.O., I.A.
1926	..	DENNYS, Maj. L. E., M.C., 4/12th Frontier Force Regiment.
1927	..	HOGG, Maj. D. MCA., M.C., R.E.
1928	..	FRANKS, Maj. K. F., D.S.O., 5th Royal Mahrattas.
1929	..	DENNYS, Maj. L. E., M.C., 4/12th Frontier Force Regiment.
1930	..	DURNFORD, Maj. C. M. P., 4/6th Rajputana Rifles.
1931	..	FORD, Lt.-Col. G. N., 2/5th Mahratta Light Infantry.
1932	..	THURBURN, Lt. R. G., The Cameronians (Scottish Rifles).
1933	..	Medal not awarded.
1934	..	DURNFORD, MAJ. C. M. P., 4/6th Rajputana Rifles.

NOTICE.

(i) With effect from the 1st January 1934, members of ten years' standing who retire from the Service, may continue their membership on payment of the reduced subscription of ₹10/6 per annum.

(ii) Cadets of the Indian Military Academy are now eligible for membership of the Institution.

(iii) Officers of the Indian States Forces are eligible to compete in the Gold Medal Prize Essay Competition.

(iv) The revised Library Catalogue (1934) is now available and can be supplied to members and subscribers at Rs. 2/8/- per copy, plus postage.

GOLD MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY COMPETITION, 1935.


The Council has chosen the following subject for the Gold Medal Prize Essay Competition for 1935:—

“ It has been widely asserted that a decision in modern western warfare will be gained in the air.” Discuss this assertion illustrating your arguments with any modification you think necessary in the organisation of H. M.'s Forces for the defence of the British Empire.

The following are the conditions of the competition:—

- (1) The competition is open to all gazetted officers of the Civil Administration, the Royal Navy, Army, Royal Air Force, Auxiliary Forces and Indian States Forces.
- (2) Essays must be typewritten and submitted in triplicate.
- (3) When reference is made to any work, the title of such work is to be quoted.
- (4) Essays are to be strictly anonymous. Each must have a motto and, enclosed with the essay, there should be sent a sealed envelope with the motto written on the outside and the name and motto of the competitor inside.
- (5) Essays will not be accepted unless received by the Secretary on or before the 30th June 1935.
- (6) Essays will be submitted for adjudication to three judges, chosen by the Council. The judges may recommend a money award, not exceeding Rs. 150, either in addition to or in substitution for the medal. The decision of the three judges will be submitted to the Council, who will decide whether the medal is to be awarded and whether the essay is to be published.
- (7) The name of the successful candidate will be announced at a Council Meeting to be held in September or October 1935.
- (8) All essays submitted are to become the property of the United Service Institution of India absolutely, and authors will not be at liberty to make any use whatsoever of their essays without the sanction of the Council.
- (9) Essays should not exceed 15 pages of the size and style of the Journal, exclusive of any appendices, tables or maps.

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Elysia	..	May 22	California	..	" 31
Castalia	..	June 15	Tuscania	..	Nov. 14
Britannia	..	June 29	Elysia	..	Dec. 2
Elysia	..	Sept. 4			

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
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CONTENTS.


	PAGE.
Secretary's Notes	ii
Frontispiece : General Sir C. Norman Macmullen.	
Editorial	259
1. Lyautey, Morocco, and the N.-W. F. P. ..	267
2. Promotion in the War Block	282
3. Forest Wars	287
4. Wadhgaon	309
5. The Wrong Spirit in Army Sport	313
6. The Foreign Legion	319
7. India—The Constitutional and Political Horizon ..	328
8. The Battle of Sedgemoor : Another Version ..	345
9. Education for All	351
10. The First Battle of Jabal Hamrin, March 25th, 1917, Mesopotamian Campaign	356
Letters to the Editor	368
Reviews	371

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
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
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I.—New Members.

The following new members joined the Institution from 1st March to 31st May 1935 :—

ORDINARY MEMBERS.

H. Dow, Esq., C.I.E., I.C.S.	Lt.-Colonel A. W. Malet, m.v.o.
D. C. A. Kincaid, Esq., I.C.S.	Major R. L. Goode.
F. H. Puckle, Esq., C.I.E., I.C.S.	Major R. H. Stevens.
H. S. Stephenson, Esq., I.C.S.	Captain D. H. Browne.
H. Trevelyan, Esq., I.C.S.	Captain C. B. Callander, m.c.
Major-General G. F. H. Brooke, D.S.O., M.C.	Captain G. M. T. Chamarette.
Major-General J. M. R. Harrison, D.S.O.	Captain C. A. L. Davis.
Major-General H. F. Salt, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.	Captain R. B. James.
Colonel L. C. Larmour.	Captain K. S. Mehtab.
Colonel E. L. Morris, O.B.E., M.C.	Lieut. Afif Khan.
Lt.-Col. C. A. L. Howard, D.S.O., M.V.O., M.C.	Lieut. R. P. H. Burbury.
	Lieut. Sarda Nand Singh.
	Lieut. J. W. Terry.
	Lieut. F. R. I. Williams.
	2/Lieut. M. Usman.
Air Marshal Sir Edgar R. Ludlow-Hewitt, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., M.C.	
Flight Lieut. C. W. Rugg.	

II.—The Journal.

The Institution publishes a Quarterly Journal in the months of January, April, July and October, which is issued postage-free to members in any part of the world. Non-members may obtain the Journal at Rs. 2, annas 8 per copy, or Rs. 10 per annum. Advertisement rates may be obtained on application to the Secretary or to Messrs. L. A. Stronach & Co., Advertising Consultants, Stronach House, Ballard Estate, Bombay.

III.—Contributions to the Journal.

Articles may vary in length from two thousand to ten thousand words. They should be submitted in duplicate and typewritten on one side of the paper. Manuscript articles cannot be considered. Payment is made on publication at from Rs. 40 to Rs. 100 in accordance with the value and length of the contribution.

With reference to Regulations for the Army in India, paragraph 204, and King's Regulations, paragraph 522, action to obtain the sanction of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to the publication of any article in the Journal of the United Service Institution of India will be taken by the Executive Committee of the Institution.

The Committee reserve to themselves the right to omit any matter which they consider objectionable.

Articles are only accepted on these conditions.

IV.—Reading Room and Library.

The United Service Institution of India is situated in the Mall, Simla, and is open all the year round—including Sundays—from 9 a.m. until sunset. The Reading Room of the Institution is provided with most of the leading illustrated papers, newspapers, magazines and journals of military, naval and service interest.

There is a well-stocked library in the Institution from which members can obtain books on loan free in accordance with the following rules :—

(1) The Library is only open to members and honorary members, who are requested to look upon books as not transferable to their friends.

(2) No book shall be taken from the Library without making the necessary entry in the register. Members residing permanently or temporarily in Simla are requested to enter their addresses.

(3) A member shall not be allowed, at one time, more than three books or sets of books.

(4) No particular limit is set as to the number of days for which a member may keep a book, the Council being desirous of making the Library as useful as possible to members ; but if after the expiration of a fortnight from date of issue it is required by any other member, it will be re-called.

(5) Applications for books from members at out-stations are dealt with as early as possible and books are despatched post free per Registered Parcel Post. They must be returned carefully packed per Registered Parcel Post within one month of the date of issue.

(6) If a book is not returned at the end of one month, it must be paid for if so required by the Executive Committee. Lost and defaced books shall be replaced at the cost of the member to whom they were issued. In the case of lost books which are out of print, the value shall be fixed by the Executive Committee and the amount, when received, spent in the purchase of a new book.

(7) The issue of a book under these rules to any member implies the latter's compliance with the rules and the willingness to have them enforced, if necessary, against him.

(8) The catalogue of the Library has been revised and is now available for sale at Rs. 2/8/- per copy plus postage. The Library has been completely overhauled and all books re-classified, hence the new catalogue meets the general demand for an up-to-date production containing all military classics and other works likely to be of use to members of the Institution. Members who have not yet ordered their copies are advised to send a post card to the Librarian of the Institution, Simla.

V.—Library Books.

A list of the books received during the preceding quarter is enclosed in loose leaf form suitable for cutting into strips for pasting in the library catalogue.

The Institution is in possession of a collection of old and rare books presented by members from time to time and, while such books are not available for circulation, they can be seen by members visiting Simla.

The Secretary will be glad to acknowledge the gift of old books, trophies, medals, etc., presented to the Institution.

VI.—Promotion Examinations.

(a) *Military History*—(reference I. A. O. 257 of 1935).

The following table shows the campaigns on which military history papers will be set for Lieutenants for promotion to Captain in sub-head *b* (iii), and for Captains for promotion to Major in sub-head *d* (iii), with a list of books recommended for the study of each :—

1 Serial No.	2 Date of Examina- tion.	3 Campaign set for first time.	4 Campaign set for second time.	5 Campaign set for last time.
1	October 1935.	Gallipoli—inception of the campaign to May 1915.	..	Mesopotamia, up to and including the capture of Kut-al- Amara, October 1915.
2	March 1936.	Mesopotamia, from October 1915 to the occupation of Bagdad 11th March 1917.	Gallipoli—inception of the campaign to May 1915.	..
3	October 1936.	..	Mesopotamia, from October 1915 to the occupation of Bagdad, 11th March 1917.	Gallipoli—inception of the campaign to May 1915.
4	March 1937.	The Russo-Japanese War, previous to the Battle of Liao- Yang until the 24th August 1904 (ex- cluding the actual siege operations at Port Arthur).	..	Mesopotamia, from October 1915 to the occupation of Bagdad, 11th March 1917.
5	October 1937.	Mesopotamia, from 12th March 1917, to the Armistice.	The Russo-Japanese War, previous to the Battle of Liao- Yang until the 24th August 1904 (ex- cluding the actual siege operations at Port Arthur).	..
6	March 1938.	..	Mesopotamia, from 12th March 1917 to the Armistice.	The Russo-Japanese War, previous to the Battle of Liao- Yang until the 24th August 1904 (ex- cluding the actual siege operations at Port Arthur).
7	October 1938.	Mesopotamia, from 12th March 1917 to the Armistice.

The following books are recommended for the study of the campaigns:—

Campaign.	Book.
Gallipoli	History of the Great War—Military Operations—Gallipoli, Vol. I.
Mesopotamia— October 1935 ..	History of the Great War—Military Operations—Mesopotamia, Vol. I.
March 1936 to March 1937. ..	History of the Great War—Military Operations—Mesopotamia, Vols. II and III (less Chapters XXXIV <i>et seq.</i>).
October 1937 to October 1938. ..	History of the Great War—Military Operations—Mesopotamia, Vols. III (Chapters XXXIV <i>et seq.</i>) and IV.
All ..	A brief Outline of the Campaign in Mesopotamia, 1914—1918—Major R. Evans, M. C. (<i>Sifton Praed</i>).
The Russo-Japanese War.	Official History of the Russo-Japanese War, Parts I (second edition), and II (<i>British—Military</i>).

The campaigns set for Majors, R.A.M.C. and R.A.V.C., up to and including 1935 are published in I.A.O's. 651 of 1933 and 25 of 1934.

(b) *Other Subjects.*

In addition to the manuals and regulations mentioned in K. R. and R.A.I., the following books are recommended:—

- "Modern Military Administration, Organization and Transportation" (Harding-Newman).
- "Military Organization and Administration," 1932 (Lindsell).
- "A. & Q. or Military Administration in War" (Lindsell).
- "A Study of Unit Administration" (Gale and Polden).
- "Military Law," 1932 (Banning).
- "The Defence of Duffers' Drift," 1929 (Swinton).
- "Tactical Schemes with Solutions, Series I and II" (Kirby and Kennedy).
- "Elementary Tactics or the Art of War, British School," Vol I (Pakenham-Walsh).
- "Imperial Military Geography" (Cole).
- "Elements of Imperial Defence" (Boycott).
- "Changing Conditions of Imperial Defence" (Cole).
- "A Practical Digest of Military Law" (Townshend-Stephens. Pub. Sifton Praed).

VII.—Staff College Examination.—(See Staff College (Camberley Regulations, 1930, obtainable from the Manager of Publications, Delhi or Calcutta).

(a) *Campaigns.*

The following campaigns have been set for the Staff College Entrance Examination:—

Strategy of—

Napoleon's Campaign of 1796 in Italy.

Waterloo Campaign.

Peninsula Campaign, up to and including the Battle of Salamanca.

The Strategy and Broad Tactical Lessons of—

The American Civil War.

Russo-Japanese War, up to and including the Battle of Liao-Yang.

The Great War in France, Belgium, Mesopotamia, the Dardanelles and Palestine, including a knowledge of the influence on the strategy in these areas of the events in other theatres of the War.

The East Prussian Campaign, 1914.

The Strategy and tactics of—

The Palestine Campaign from 9th November 1917 to the end of the War.

The Action of the British Expeditionary Force in France and Belgium up to and including the first battle of Ypres.

The 3rd Afghan War, 1919.

(b) The following books are recommended for the above campaigns :—

(i) *The Strategy of Napoleon's Campaign in Italy, 1796.*

Rise of General Bonaparte (Spencer Williamson).

Principles of War (Foch).

Vol. XI of 11th Edition of the Encyclopædia Britannica.

(ii) *The Strategy of the Waterloo Campaign, 1815.*

Six British Battles (Belloc).

Napoleon and Waterloo (Becke).

11th Edition of the Encyclopædia Britannica.

(iii) *The Strategy of the Peninsula Campaign, up to and including the Battle of Salamanca.*

Short History of the British Army (Sheppard).

Life of Wellington (Fortescue).

(iv) *The Strategy and Broad Tactical Lessons of the American Civil War.*

True History of the Civil War (G. C. Lee).

History of the Civil War in the United States, 1861—65 (W. B. Woods and J. E. Edmunds).

Stonewall Jackson (G. F. R. Henderson).

Robert E. Lee, the Soldier (Maurice).

The Generalship of Ulysses S. Grant (Fuller).

Sherman (Liddell Hart).

(v) *The Strategy and Broad Tactical Lessons of the Russo-Japanese War, 1904, up to and including the Battle of Liao-Yang.*

Lectures on the Strategy of the Russo-Japanese War (Bird).

Campaign of Liao-Yang (Rowan-Robinson).

The Japanese in Manchuria (Cordonnier).
 Critical Comments only in the "Official Account: The Russo-Japanese War (Naval and Military)."
 Staff Officer's Scrap Book (Ian Hamilton).

- (vi) *The Strategy and Broad Tactical Lessons of the Great War in France, Belgium, Mesopotamia, the Dardanelles and Palestine, including a knowledge of the influence on the strategy in these areas of the events in other theatres of War.*

Official Histories—Military Operations, France and Belgium, Vols. I—V. Egypt and Palestine, Vols. I and II, Parts I and II. Gallipoli, Vols. I and II. Mesopotamia, Vols. I and II.
N.B.—Vol. I of the Official History of Military Operations, France and Belgium, has recently been revised.

A History of the Great War 1914-18 (Cruttwell).
 The Great War of 1914—18 (Aston).
 The Real War (Liddell Hart).
 A History of the World War, 1914—18 (Liddell Hart).
 Foch (Liddell Hart).
 The World Crisis (Winston Churchill).
 The Great War (Winston Churchill).
 Brief History of the Mesopotamian Campaign (Evans).
 The Palestine Campaign (Wavell).
 Notes and Comments on the Dardanelles Campaign (A. Kearsey).

- (vii) *The Strategy and Broad Tactical Lessons of the East Prussian Campaign, 1914.*

Tannenburg—First 30 days in East Prussia (Ironside).
 The World Crisis, Eastern Front, 1931 (Winston Churchill).
 The Real War (Liddell Hart).

- (viii) *The Strategy and Tactics of the Palestine Campaign from 9th November 1917 to the end of the War.*

The Official History, Military Operations, Egypt and Palestine from June 17th to the end of the War, Vol. II, Parts I and II.
 The Palestine Campaign (Wavell).

- (ix) *The Strategy and Tactics of the action of the British Expeditionary Force in France and Belgium, up to and including the first battle of Ypres.*

The Official History, Military Operations, France and Belgium, Vol. I—(Revised Edition).
 A History of the World War, 1914—18 (Liddell Hart).
 40 Days in 1914 (Maurice).
 Liaison, 1914 (E. L. Spears).

- (x) *The Strategy and Tactics of the 3rd Afghan War, 1919.*
 The Official Account (General Staff, India, 1926).

(c) In addition to the above, the following books are recommended for the various subjects :—

- (i) *Strategy and Tactics.*
 Soldiers and Statesmen (F. M. Sir W. Robertson).
 Governments and War (Maurice).
 British Strategy (Maurice).
 War Memoirs of David Lloyd-George (Lloyd-George).
 Lectures on F. S. R. II (Fuller).
 Lectures on F. S. R. III (Fuller).
 War and Western Civilization, 1832—1932 (Fuller).
 The British Way in Warfare (Liddell Hart).
 Military History for the Staff College Entrance Examination (Sheppard).
 In the Wake of the Tank (Martel).
 Tactical Schemes with Solutions, Series I and II (Kirby and Kennedy).
 Elementary Tactics—An Introduction to the Art of War, British School, Vol. II (Pakenham-Walsh and Dorman-Smith).
 Passing it on (Genl. Sir A. Skeen).
 Report of the Dardanelles Commission.
- (ii) *Organization, Administration and Transportation.*
 Staff College Examination Lecture Series, 1933 (Denning) also for (i) and (iv).
 Military Organization and Administration, 1932 (Lindsell).
 A. & Q. or Military Administration in War (Lindsell).
 Modern Military Administration, Organization and Transportation (Harding-Newman).
 Administrative Scheme with Solutions (Kirby and Murison).
 Outline of the Development of the British Army (Hastings-Anderson).
 Short History of the British Army to 1914 (Sheppard).
 The Annual Army Estimates of Effective and Non-Effective Services (H. M. S. O.).
 Notes on the Land Forces of the British Dominions, Colonies, Protectorates and Mandated Territories.
 The Statesman's Year Book.
 Army List.
 League of Nations : Armaments Year Book, 1933.
 War Office Official Handbooks of Foreign Armies.
 Declaration of British Disarmament Policy, 1932.
 Commonsense about Disarmament (Lefebure).
- (iii) *Military Law.*
 Military Law, 1932 (Banning).
 A Practical Digest of Military Law (Townshend-Stephens, Pub. Sifton Praed).
 A Digest of the Law of Evidence in Courts-Martial (Stephen and Townshend-Stephens).
- (iv) *The History and Organization of the Empire.*
 Short History of the British Commonwealth (Ramsay).
 Short History of British Expansion (Williamson).
 British Empire (Basil Williams).
 General Survey of the History of India (Sir Verney Lovett).
 India in 1929-30, 1930-31, 1931-32, 1932-33.

Problem of the N.-W. F., 1890—1908, with a survey of policy since 1849 (Davies).

Modern Egypt (Cromer, 1908).

Egypt since Cromer, Vols. I and II (Lord Lloyd).

The History of Canada (W. L. Grant).

The Union of South Africa (R. H. Brand).

History of the Australasian Colonies (Jenks).

Imperial Military Geography (Cole).

Imperial Communications (Wakely).

Changing Conditions of Imperial Defence (Cole).

Elements of Imperial Defence (Boycott).

VIII.—Schemes, etc.

The Institution is in possession of the tactical schemes, complete with solutions and maps, set at the Army Headquarters Staff College Course for the past three years and also a number of precis of lectures. These papers are very useful to officers studying for the Staff College Course examination and are available for issue to members of the Institution at the nominal price of annas eight per copy, plus postage. The cost of maps is extra and is charged for at Rs. 2 per map.

In order to simplify their issue, the schemes have been classified as follows. When ordering, members are requested to give the subject of the schemes, etc., required.

STAFF COLLEGE SERIES, 1932.

Tactical Schemes.

Continuous Exercises.

- No. 1. "Message Writing."
- „ 2. "Order Writing."
- „ 3. "Advance Guards."
- „ 4. "Appreciation."
- „ 5. "Attack Orders."
- „ 6. "Defence."
- „ 7. "Defence."

Strategy and Tactics.

- Strategy and Tactics, Paper No. 1.
- „ „ „ „ No. 2.
- „ „ „ „ No. 3.
- Tactical Exercise—Night Withdrawals.
- Cavalry Exercise.
- Mountain Warfare Scheme.

Precis of Lectures, etc.

Military History.

- The East Prussian Campaign, 1914 (1931).
- The History and Organization of the Empire.

Tactical.

Military Evolution and the influence of modern Inventions on Warfare.

Tactical lessons of the Great War.

Cavalry I.

Cavalry II.

Artillery I.

Artillery II.

Engineers I and II.

Tactical Employment of Tanks.

Chemical Warfare.

Night Operations.

Frontier Warfare.

Air Co-operation.

Military Law.

Military Law I.

Military Law II.

Military Law III.

Military Law IV.

Specimen Military Law Paper.

Organization, Administration and Transportation.

Mobilization.

Reinforcements in War.

Organization, Administration and Transportation (Peace)—

Specimen Examination Paper.

Organization, Administration and Transportation (War)—Specimen

Examination Paper.

"Q" Services in Peace.

Movements.

Movements—Specimen Examination Paper.

Supply of a Division in War.

Supply Problem—Specimen Examination Paper.

General.

Notes on Military Writing.

Essay—Specimen Paper.

STAFF COLLEGE SERIES, 1933.

Tactical Schemes.

Continuous Exercises.

No. 1. "March Orders."

No. 2. "Operation Instructions."

No. 3. "Military Appreciation."

No. 4. "Attack Orders."

No. 5. "Defence Orders."

Strategy and Tactics.

Withdrawal Scheme.

Counter-Attack Scheme.

Attack Scheme.

Mountain Warfare Scheme.

Cavalry Exercise.

STAFF COLLEGE SERIES, 1934.

Tactical Schemes.*Continuous Exercises.*

- No. 1. "March Orders."
- No. 2. "Military Appreciation."
- No. 3. "Attack Orders."
- No. 4. "Defence Orders."

Strategy and Tactics.

- S. & T. Paper No. 1.
- S. & T. Paper No. 2.
- S. & T. Paper No. 3. "Night Attacks."
- S. & T. Paper No. 4. "Mountain Warfare Scheme."
- Withdrawal Exercise.
- Cavalry Exercise.

IX.—Historical Research.

The U. S. I. is prepared to supply members and units with typewritten copies of old Indian Army List pages, at the rate of Rs. 2 per typewritten page.

The staff of the Institution is always willing to assist units, authors of regimental histories and members by searching the many old military records in the Library on their behalf.

X.—The MacGregor Memorial Medal.

1. The MacGregor Memorial Medal was founded in 1888 as a memorial to the late Major-General Sir Charles MacGregor. The medals are awarded for the best military reconnaissances or journeys of exploration of the year.

2. The following awards are made annually in the month of June :—

(a) For officers—British or Indian—silver medal.

(b) For soldiers—British or Indian—silver medal with Rs. 100 gratuity.

3. For especially valuable work, a gold medal may be awarded in place of one of the silver medals, or in addition to the silver medals, whenever the administrators of the Fund deem it desirable. Also the Council may award a special additional silver medal, without gratuity, to a soldier, for especially good work.

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NOTICE.

(i) With effect from the 1st January 1934, members of ten years' standing who retire from the Service, may continue their membership on payment of the reduced subscription of s10/6 per annum.


(ii) Cadets of the Indian Military Academy are now eligible for membership of the Institution.

(iii) Officers of the Indian States Forces are eligible to compete in the Gold Medal Prize Essay Competition.

*N.B.—The terms "officer" and "soldier" include those serving in the British and Indian armies and their reserves, also those serving in Auxiliary Forces, such as the Indian Auxiliary and Territorial Forces and Corps under Local Governments. Frontier Militia, Levies and Military Police, also all ranks serving in the Royal Air Force, Indian Air Force, Royal Indian Marine and the Indian States Forces.

†Replacements of the ribbon may be obtained on payment from the Secretary, U.S.I., Simla.

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
OCTOBER, 1935.

CONTENTS.


	PAGE.
Secretary's Notes	ii
Frontispiece.	
Editorial	374
1. Adowa	379
2. The Box	401
3. Cambrai, 1917	404
4. Debt	410
5. The Dardanelles Campaign	418
6. Experiences in Lapland and Karelia	423
7. Duck Shooting in India	435
8. Lyautey, Morocco, and the N.-W. F. P. (A Reply). ..	455
9. A Suggested Method of Handling Remounts, Based on the Lichtwark Procedure	459
10. A Persian Interlude	471
11. Foreign Tunes as Regimental Marches	484
Letters to the Editor	493
Reviews	499

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
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
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I.—New Members.

The following new members joined the Institution from 1st June to 31st August 1935 :—

ORDINARY MEMBERS.

J. G. Acheson, Esq., C.I.E., I.C.S.	Captain V. W. S. Leatherdale.
H. S. Crosthwaite, Esq., C.I.E., I.C.S.	Captain R. W. S. Lethbridge.
W. W. Dalziel, Esq., I.C.S.	Captain P. D. S. Palmer.
Colonel G. B. Howell, M.V.O., M.C.	Captain J. B. P. Seccombe.
Lt.-Colonel S. Collingwood, M.C.	Captain S. M. Shrinagesh.
Lt.-Colonel C. Greenslade, O.B.E.	Captain A. J. Tyacke.
Major J. P. Acworth.	Captain P. J. S. Watson.
Major G. Barnett, M.C.	Lieut. H. N. Bellamy.
Major G. E. Wheeler.	Lieut. I. H. K. Chauvel.
Captain P. R. Antrobus, M.C.	Lieut. E. G. Farquharson.
Captain A. J. Donkin, M.C.	Lieut. H. Goring.
Captain S. K. Ghose.	Lieut. R. W. Niven.
Captain R. H. Hannay.	2/Lieut. T. J. Phillips.
Captain P. J. Kennedy.	2/Lieut. P. C. Gupta.

II.—The Journal.

The Institution publishes a Quarterly Journal in the months of January, April, July and October, which is issued postage-free to members in any part of the world. Non-members may obtain the Journal at Rs. 2, annas 8 per copy, or Rs. 10 per annum. Advertisement rates may be obtained on application to the Secretary or to Messrs. L. A. Stronach & Co., Advertising Consultants, Stronach House, Ballard Estate, Bombay.

III.—Contributions to the Journal.

Articles may vary in length from two thousand to ten thousand words. They should be submitted in duplicate and typewritten on one side of the paper. Manuscript articles cannot be considered. Payment is made on publication at from Rs. 40 to Rs. 100 in accordance with the value and length of the contribution.

With reference to Regulations for the Army in India, paragraph 204, and King's Regulations, paragraph 522, action to obtain the sanction of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to the publication of any article in the Journal of the United Service Institution of India will be taken by the Executive Committee of the Institution.

The Committee reserve to themselves the right to omit any matter which they consider objectionable.

Articles are only accepted on these conditions.

IV.—Reading Room and Library.

The United Service Institution of India is situated in the Mall, Simla, and is open all the year round—including Sundays—from 9 a.m. until sunset. The Reading Room of the Institution is provided with most of the leading illustrated papers, newspapers, magazines and journals of military, naval and service interest.

There is a well-stocked library in the Institution from which members can obtain books on loan free in accordance with the following rules :—

(1) The Library is only open to members and honorary members, who are requested to look upon books as not transferable to their friends.

(2) No book shall be taken from the Library without making the necessary entry in the register. Members residing permanently or temporarily in Simla are requested to enter their addresses.

(3) A member shall not be allowed, at one time, more than three books or sets of books.

(4) No particular limit is set as to the number of days for which a member may keep a book, the Council being desirous of making the Library as useful as possible to members ; but if after the expiration of a fortnight from date of issue it is required by any other member, it will be re-called.

(5) Applications for books from members at out-stations are dealt with as early as possible and books are despatched post free per Registered Parcel Post. They must be returned carefully packed per Registered Parcel Post within one month of the date of issue.

(6) If a book is not returned at the end of one month, it must be paid for if so required by the Executive Committee. Lost and defaced books shall be replaced at the cost of the member to whom they were issued. In the case of lost books which are out of print, the value shall be fixed by the Executive Committee and the amount, when received, spent in the purchase of a new book.

(7) The issue of a book under these rules to any member implies the latter's compliance with the rules and the willingness to have them enforced, if necessary, against him.

(8) The catalogue of the Library has been revised and is now available for sale at Rs. 2/8/- per copy plus postage. The Library has been completely overhauled and all books re-classified, hence the new catalogue meets the general demand for an up-to-date production containing all military classics and other works likely to be of use to members of the Institution. Members who have not yet ordered their copies are advised to send a post card to the Librarian of the Institution, Simla.

V.—Library Books.

A list of the books received during the preceding quarter is enclosed in loose leaf form suitable for cutting into strips for pasting in the library catalogue.

The Institution is in possession of a collection of old and rare books presented by members from time to time and, while such books are not available for circulation, they can be seen by members visiting Simla.

The Secretary will be glad to acknowledge the gift of old books, trophies, medals, etc., presented to the Institution.

VI.—Promotion Examinations.

(a) *Military History*—(reference I. A. O. 257 of 1935).

The following table shows the campaigns on which military history papers will be set for Lieutenants for promotion to Captain in sub-head *b* (iii), and for Captains for promotion to Major in sub-head *d* (iii), with a list of books recommended for the study of each :—

1 Serial No.	2 Date of Examina- tion.	3 Campaign set for first time.	4 Campaign set for second time.	5 Campaign set for last time.
1	October 1935.	Gallipoli—inception of the campaign to May 1915.	..	Mesopotamia, up to and including the capture of Kut-al- Amara, October 1915.
2	March 1936.	Mesopotamia, from October 1915 to the occupation of Bagdad, 11th March 1917.	Gallipoli—inception of the campaign to May 1915.	..
3	October 1936.	..	Mesopotamia, from October 1915 to the occupation of Bagdad, 11th March 1917.	Gallipoli—inception of the campaign to May 1915.
4	March 1937.	The Russo-Japanese War, previous to the Battle of Liao- Yang until the 24th August 1904 (ex- cluding the actual siege operations at Port Arthur).	..	Mesopotamia, from October 1915 to the occupation of Bagdad, 11th March 1917.
5	October 1937.	Mesopotamia, from 12th March 1917 to the Armistice.	The Russo-Japanese War, previous to the Battle of Liao- Yang until the 24th August 1904 (ex- cluding the actual siege operations at Port Arthur).	..
6	March 1938.	..	Mesopotamia, from 12th March 1917 to the Armistice.	The Russo-Japanese War, previous to the Battle of Liao- Yang until the 24th August 1904 (ex- cluding the actual siege operations at Port Arthur).
7	October 1938.	Mesopotamia, from 12th March 1917 to the Armistice.

The following books are recommended for the study of the campaigns:—

Campaign.	Book.
Gallipoli	History of the Great War—Military Operations—Gallipoli, Vol. I.
Mesopotamia— October 1935	History of the Great War—Military Operations—Mesopotamia, Vol. I.
March 1935 to March 1937.	History of the Great War—Military Operations—Mesopotamia, Vols. II and III (less Chapters XXXIV <i>et seq.</i>).
October 1937 to October 1938.	History of the Great War—Military Operations—Mesopotamia, Vols. III (Chapters XXXIV <i>et seq.</i>) and IV.
All	A brief Outline of the Campaign in Mesopotamia, 1914—1918—Major R. Evans, M. C. (<i>Sifton Praed</i>).
The Russo-Japanese War	Official History of the Russo-Japanese War, Parts I (second edition), and II (<i>British—Military</i>).

The campaigns set for Majors, R.A.M.C. and R.A.V.C., up to and including 1935 are published in I.A.O's. 651 of 1933 and 25 of 1934.

(b) Other Subjects.

In addition to the manuals and regulations mentioned in K. R. and R.A.I., the following books are recommended:—

- "Modern Military Administration, Organization and Transportation" (Harding-Newman).
- "Military Organization and Administration," 1932 (Lindsell).
- "A. & Q. or Military Administration in War" (Lindsell).
- "A Study of Unit Administration" (Gale and Polden).
- "Military Law," 1932 (Banning).
- "The Defence of Duffers' Drift," 1929 (Swinton).
- "Tactical Schemes with Solutions, Series I and II" (Kirby and Kennedy).
- "Elementary Tactics or the Art of War, British School," Vol. I (Pakenham-Walsh).
- "Imperial Military Geography" (Cole).
- "Elements of Imperial Defence" (Boycott).
- "Changing Conditions of Imperial Defence" (Cole).
- "A Practical Digest of Military Law" (Townshend-Stephens. Pub. Sifton Praed).

VII.—Staff College Examination.—(See Staff College (Quetta) Regulations, 1930, obtainable from the Manager of Publications, Delhi or Calcutta).

(a) Campaigns.

The following campaigns have been set for the Staff College Entrance Examination :—

Strategy of—

Napoleon's Campaign of 1796 in Italy.

Waterloo Campaign.

Peninsula Campaign, up to and including the Battle of Salamanca.

The Strategy and Broad Tactical Lessons of—

The American Civil War.

Russo-Japanese War, up to and including the Battle of Liao-Yang.

The Great War in France, Belgium, Mesopotamia, the Dardanelles and Palestine, including a knowledge of the influence on the strategy in these areas of the events in other theatres of the War.

The East Prussian Campaign, 1914.

The Strategy and tactics of—

The Palestine Campaign from 9th November 1917 to the end of the War.

The Action of the British Expeditionary Force in France and Belgium up to and including the first battle of Ypres.

The 3rd Afghan War, 1919.

(b) In addition to his official books every student is recommended to provide himself with a copy of :—

(i) Military Organization and Administration (Lindsell).

Military Law (Banning).

British Strategy (Maurice).

Notes on the Land and Air Forces of British Overseas Dominions, Colonies and Protectorates (Official).

Outline of the development of the British Army up to 1914 (Hastings-Anderson).

Imperial Military Geography (Cole).

An Atlas.

(ii) The following pamphlets, etc., can be borrowed from the Orderly Room, and should be studied :—

Examination papers for admission to the Staff College.

Training memoranda—War Office.

Training memoranda—A. H. Q. India.

Notes on certain Lessons of the Great War.

Passing it on (Skeen).

(iii) Periodicals, etc., to which students should subscribe.—

“ The Times.”

“ U. S. I. (India) Journal.”

(iv) Books which can be obtained from libraries.—

(Note.—Those marked with an asterisk should be used only as books of reference.)

R. U. S. I. Journal.

Army Quarterly.

Round Table.

Journal of the Institute of International Affairs.

Science of War (Henderson).

Transformation of War (Colin).

The War of Lost Opportunities (Hoffman).

*The Principles of War (Foch).

*The Direction of War (Bird).

Soldiers and Statesman (Robertson).

*Historical illustrations to F. S. R. II (Eady).

*In the Wake of the Tank (Martel).

*The re-making of modern armies (Liddell Hart).

*The British Way in Warfare (Liddell Hart).

*Napoleon's Campaign in 1796 in Italy (Burton).

*Waterloo Campaign (Robinson).

*Outline History of Russo-Japanese War 1904, up to Batt'le of Liao-Yang (Pakenham Walsh).

The Battle of Liao-Yang (Robinson).

*The World Crisis (Churchill).

*A History of the Great War (Cruttwell).

The Palestine Campaign (Wavell).

A Brief Outline of the Campaign in Mesopotamia (Evans).

*The Dardanelles Campaign (Callwell).

*German Strategy in the Great War (Neame).

*Official Histories of the War—France, Egypt, Palestine, Mesopotamia, Gallipoli.

*Waziristan 1919-20 (Watteville).

*The Third Afghan War (Official).

A. & Q. (Lindsell).

Changing conditions of Imperial Defence (Cole).

The British Empire (Lucas).

*The Government of the British Empire (Jenks).

*The Foundation and Growth of the British Empire (Williamson).

*A Short History of British Expansion (Williamson).

*Expansion of the British Empire (Woodward).

(v) Books and articles on Transportation.—

Railways in War. Lieutenant-Colonel E. St. G. Kirke, D.S.O., R.E., Army Quarterly, January 1930.

Strategic moves by Rail 1914. Journal R. U. S. I., February and May 1935.

The lines of communication in the Dardanelles. Lieutenant-General Sir G. Macmunn. Army Quarterly, April 1930.

The lines of communication in Mesopotamia. Lieutenant-General Sir G. Macmunn. Army Quarterly, October 1927.

History of the R.A. S. C., Vol. II (all campaigns).

The supply and transportation problem of future armies.

Major B. C. Denning, M.C., R.E., Journal U. S. I. India, April 1932.

The supply of mechanized forces in the field. Journal R. U. S. I., 1929.

The Board of Trade and the Fighting Services. Journal R. U. S. I., 1929.

Railway organization of an Army in War. Lieutenant-Colonel Anderson, D.S.O., R.E., Journal R. U. S. I., 1927.

What is required of a Railway in a theatre of operations. Major-General Taylor, R.E. Journal, September 1932.

F. S. P. B. War Office, 1932. Read Sections 36 to 38. Do not memorize detail. Know where to find it.

F. S. P. B. India.

VIII.—Schemes, etc.

The following tactical schemes, complete with solutions and maps, and precis of lectures set for the A. H. Q. Staff College Course, 1935, are available for issue to members of the Institution at the nominal price of annas eight per copy, plus postage. The cost of maps is extra and is charged for at Rs. 2/- per map.

STAFF COLLEGE SERIES, 1935.

Tactical Schemes.*Continuous Exercises.*

- No. 1. Message Writing.
- „ 2. Divisional Cavalry.
- „ 3. March Orders.
- „ 4. Military Appreciation.
- „ 5. Attack Orders.
- „ 6. Defence Orders.
- „ 7. Withdrawal.
- „ 8. Employment of (A. C.) Squadron R. A. F.

(Note.—The map required for all the above Exercises is Sheet No. 112, 1" to 1 mile.)

Strategy, Tactics and other papers.

- (a) Strategy and Tactics, Paper No. 1 (Ref. Map 1" Sheet 123).
 " " " " No. 2 (Ref. Map 1" Sheet 93).
 " " " " No. 3 (Ref. Map Sheet 44/16 S.E.).
 " " " " No. 4 (The maps required for
 this paper on Frontier
 Warfare Scheme are not
 available; they may be
 obtained on application
 to O. I/C Map Record
 and Issue Office, Calcutta).
 " " " " No. 5.

- (b) D. M. T.'s Paper No. 1.
 " " " " 2.
 " " " " 3.
 " " " " 4. (Without solution).
 " " " " 5.
 " " " " 6.
 " " " " 7.
 " " " " 8.
 " " " " 9.
 " " " " 10.

- (c) Map Reading Paper. (Ref. Map 1" Sheet 112).

Military Law Paper No. I.

II.

Transportation, Peace and War (Without solution).

Organization and Administration excluding Transportation
(Peace).

Organization and Administration excluding Transportation
(War).

Precis of lectures.

- (i) Staff College Examination.
 (ii) Operation Orders and Instructions.
 (iii) Military Writing.
 (iv) Cavalry.
 (v) Artillery No. 1.
 (va) " " 2.
 (vb) " " 3.
 (vi) Engineers.

- (vii) Signals No. 1.
- (viii) „ „ 2.
- (viii) A. F. Vs.—Characteristics and Organization.
- (viii) A. F. Vs.—Tactical Employment.
 - (ix) Army and R. A. F. Co-operation.
 - (x) River Crossing.
 - (xi) Night Operations.
 - (xii) Frontier Warfare.
 - (xiii) Strategy and Tactics. Surprise.
 - (xiii) Strategy and Tactics. Morale.
 - (xiii) Strategy and Tactics. Political Objects in War.
 - (xiii) Strategy and Tactics. Interior Lines and Communications.
 - (xiii) Strategy and Tactics. Fog in War.
 - (xiii) Strategy and Tactics. Gallipoli.
 - (xiv) Military Law. Charges and Charge Sheets.
 - (xiv) Military Law. Evidence.
 - (xiv) Military Law. Court Martial Proceedings.
 - (xv) Transportation. Nos. 1 and 2.
 - (xvi) " Q " and " O " Services in Peace including Mobilization.
 - (xvi) Organization and Administration other than " Q " and " O " Services
 - (xviii) Maintenance of Material and Animals.
 - (xix) Medical Organization and Evacuation of Casualties.

IX.—Historical Research.

The U. S. I. is prepared to supply members and units with typewritten copies of old Indian Army List pages, at the rate of Rs. 2 per typewritten page.

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MACGREGOR MEMORIAL MEDALLISTS.

(With rank of officers and soldiers at the date of the Award.)

1889	..	BELL, Col. M. S., V.C., R.E. (specially awarded a gold medal).
1890	..	YOUNGHUSBAND, Capt. F. E., King's Dragoon Guards.
1891	..	SAWYER, Maj. H. A., 45th Sikhs. RAMZAN KHAN, Havildar, 3rd Sikhs.
1892	..	VAUGHAN, Capt. H. B., 7th Bengal Infantry. JAGGAT SINGH, Havildar, 19th Punjab Infantry.
1893	..	BOWER, Capt. H., 17th Bengal Cavalry (specially awarded a gold medal). FAZAL DAD KHAN, Dafadar, 17th Bengal Cavalry.
1894	..	O'SULLIVAN, Maj. G. H. W., R.E. MULL SINGH, Sowar, 6th Bengal Cavalry.
1895	..	DAVIES, Capt. H. R., Oxfordshire Light Infantry. GANGA DYAL SINGH, Havildar, 2nd Rajputs.
1896	..	COCKERILL, Lieut. G. K., 28th Punjab Infantry. GHULAM NABI, Sepoy, Q. V. O. Corps of Guides.
1897	..	SWAYNE, Capt. E. J. F., 10th Rajput Infantry. SHAHZAD MIR, Dafadar, 11th Bengal Lancers.

*N.B.—The terms "officer" and "soldier" include those serving in the British and Indian armies and their reserves, also those serving in Auxiliary Forces, such as the Indian Auxiliary and Territorial Forces and Corps under Local Governments. Frontier Militia, Levies and Military Police, also all ranks serving in the Royal Air Force, Indian Air Force, Royal Indian Marine and the Indian States Forces.

†Replacements of the ribbon may be obtained on payment from the Secretary, U.S.I., Simla.

MACGREGOR MEMORIAL MEDALLISTS—(contd.).

- 1898 .. WALKER, Capt. H. B., Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry.
ADAM KHAN, Havildar, Q. V. O. Corps of Guides.
- 1899 .. DOUGLAS, Capt. J. A., 2nd Bengal Lancers.
MIHR DIN, Naik, Bengal Sappers and Miners.
- 1900 .. WINGATE, Capt. A. W. S., 14th Bengal Lancers.
GURDIT SINGH, Havildar, 45th Sikhs.
- 1901 .. BURTON, Maj. E. B., 17th Bengal Lancers.
SUNDAR SINGH, Colour Havildar, 31st Burmah Infantry.
- 1902 .. RAY, Capt. M. R. E., 7th Rajput Infantry.
TILBIR BHANDARI, Havildar, 9th Gurkha Rifles.
- 1903 .. MANIFORD, Lt.-Col. C. C., I.M.S.
GHULAM HUSSAIN, Lance-Dafadar, Q.V.O. Corps of Guides.
- 1904 .. FRASER, Capt. L. D., R.G.A.
MOGHAL BAZ, Dafadar, Q. V. O. Corps of Guides.
- 1905 .. RENNICK, Maj. F., 40th Pathans (specially awarded a
gold medal).
MADHO RAM, Havildar, 8th Gurkha Rifles.
- 1906 .. SHAHZADA AHMAD MIR, Risaldar, 36th Jacob's Horse.
GHAFUR SHAH, Lance-Naik, Q. V. O. Corps of Guides.
- 1907 .. NANGLE, Capt. M. C., 92nd Punjabis.
SHEIKH USMAN, Havildar, 103rd Mahratta Light Infantry.
- 1908 .. GIBBON, Capt. C. M., Royal Irish Fusiliers.
MALANG, Havildar, 56th Punjab Rifles.
- 1909 .. MUHAMMAD RAZA, Havildar, 106th Pioneers.
- 1910 .. SYKES, Maj. P. M., c.m.g., late 2nd Dragoon Guards
(specially awarded a gold medal).
TURNER, Capt. F. G., R.E.
KHAN BAHADUR SHER JUNG, Survey of India.
- 1911 .. LEACHMAN, Capt. G. E., The Royal Sussex Regiment.
GURMUKH SINGH, Jemadar, 93rd Burmah Infantry.
- 1912 .. PRITCHARD, Capt. B. E. A., 83rd Wallajahabad Light
Infantry (specially awarded a gold medal).
WILSON, Lieut. A. T., c.m.g., 32nd Sikh Pioneers.
MOHIBULLA, Lance-Dafadar, Q. V. O. Corps of Guides.
- 1913 .. ABBAY, Capt. B. N., 27th Light Cavalry.
SIRDAR KHAN, Sowar, 39th (K. G. O.) Central India Horse.
WARATONG, Havildar, Burmah Military Police (specially
awarded a silver medal).
- 1914 .. BAILEY, Capt. F. M., I.A. (Political Department).
MORSHEAD, Capt. H. T., R.E.
HAIDAR ALI, Naik, 106th Hazara Pioneers.
- 1915 .. WATERFIELD, Capt. F. C., 45th Rattray's Sikhs.
ALI JUMA, Havildar, 106th Hazara Pioneers.
- 1916 .. ABDUR RAHMAN, Naik, 21st Punjabis.
ZARGHUN SHAH, Havildar, 58th Rifles (F. F.), (specially
awarded a silver medal).
- 1917 .. MIAN AFRAZ GUL, Sepoy, Khyber Rifles.

MACGREGOR MEMORIAL MEDALLISTS—(concl'd.).

- 1918 .. NOEL, Capt. E. W. C. (Political Department).
- 1919 .. KEELING, Lieut.-Colonel E. H., M.C., R.E.
ALLA SA, Jemadar, N.-W. Frontier Corps.
- 1920 .. BLACKER, Capt. L. V. S., Q. V. O. Corps of Guides.
AWAL NUR, C. Q. M. Havildar, 2nd Bn., Q. V. O. Corps
of Guides. (Special gratuity of Rs. 200.)
- 1921 .. HOLT, Maj. A. L., Royal Engineers.
SHER ALI, Sepoy, No. 4952, 106th Hazara Pioneers.
- 1922 .. ABDUL SAMAD SHAH, Capt., O.B.E., 31st D. C. O. Lancers.
NUR MUHAMMAD, Lance-Naik, 1st Guides Infantry, F. F.
- 1923 .. BRUCE, Capt. J. G., 2/6th Gurkha Rifles.
SOHBAT, Head Constable, N.-W. F. Police.
HARI SINGH THAPA, Survey Department (specially award-
ed a silver medal).
- 1924 .. RAHMAT SHAH, Havildar, I.D.S.M., N.-W. F. Corps.
GHULAM HUSSAIN, Naik, N.-W. F. Corps.
- 1925 .. SPEAR, Capt. C. R., 5/13th Frontier Force Rifles.
JABBAR KHAN, Naik, 5/13th Frontier Force Rifles.
- 1926 .. HARVEY-KELLY, Maj. C. H. G. H., D.S.O., 4/10th Baluch
Regiment.
- 1927 .. LAKE, Maj. M. C., 4/4th Bombay Grenadiers.
- 1928 .. BOWERMAN, Capt. J. F., 4/10th D. C. O. Baluch Regiment.
MUHAMMAD KHAN, Havildar, Zhob Levy Corps.
- 1929 .. ABDUL HANAN, Naik, N.-W. F. Corps.
GHULAM ALI, Dafadar, Guides Cavalry (specially awarded
a silver medal).
- 1930 .. GREEN, Capt. J. H., 3/20th Burmah Rifles.
- 1931 .. O'CONNOR, Capt. R. L., 1/9th Jat Regiment.
KHIAL BADSHAH, Naik, 1/13th Frontier Force Rifles.
- 1932 .. BIRNIE, Capt. E. St. J., Sam Browne's Cavalry.
SHIB SINGH NEGI, No. 4013, Rifleman, 10/18th Royal
Garhwal Rifles.
- 1933 .. ABDUL GHAFUR, Havildar, K. G. O. Bengal Sappers
and Miners.
- 1934 .. No award.
- 1935 .. FERGUSSON, Lt. K.A.P., R.A.
BOSTOCK, Lt. T.M.T., R.E.

UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION OF INDIA.

PRIZE ESSAY GOLD MEDALLISTS.

(With Rank of Officers at the date of the Essay.)

1872	..	ROBERTS, Lt.-Col. F. S., V.C., C.B., R.A.
1873	..	COLQUHOUN, Capt. J. S., R.A.
1874	..	COLQUHOUN, Capt. J. S., R.A.
1879	..	ST. JOHN, Maj. O. B. C., R.E.
1880	..	BARROW, Lieut. E. G., 7th Bengal Infantry.
1882	..	MASON, Lieut. A. H., R.E.
1883	..	COLLEN, Maj. E. H. H., S.C.
1884	..	BARROW, Capt. E. G., 7th Bengal Infantry.
1887	..	YATE, Lieut. A. C., 27th Baluch Infantry.
1888	..	MAUDE, Capt. F. N., R.E.
		YOUNG, Maj. G. F., 24th Punjab Infantry (specially awarded a silver medal).
1889	..	DUFF, Capt. B., 9th Bengal Infantry.
1890	..	MAGUIRE, Capt. C. M., 2nd Cavy. Hyderabad Contingent.
1891	..	CARDEW, Lieut. F. G., 10th Bengal Lancers.
1893	..	BULLOCK, Maj. G. M., Devonshire Regiment.
1894	..	CARTER, Capt. F. C., Northumberland Fusiliers.
1895	..	NEVILLE, Lt.-Col. J. P. C., 14th Bengal Lancers.
1896	..	BINGLEY, Capt. A. H., 7th Bengal Infantry.
1897	..	NAPIER, Capt. G. S. F., Oxfordshire Light Infantry.
1898	..	MULLALLY, Maj. H., R.E.
		CLAY, Capt. C. H., 43rd Gurkha Rifles (specially awarded a silver medal).
1899	..	NEVILLE, Col. J. P. C., S.E.
1900	..	THUILLIER, Capt. H. F., R.E.
		LUBBOCK, Capt. G., R.E. (specially awarded a silver medal).
1901	..	RANKEN, Lt.-Col. G. P. P., 46th Punjab Infantry.
1902	..	TURNER, Capt. H. H. F., 2nd Bengal Lancers.
1903	..	HAMILTON, Maj. W. G., D.S.O., Norfolk Regiment.
		BOND, Capt., R. F. G., R.E. (specially awarded a silver medal).
1904	..	MACMUNN, Maj. G. F., D.S.O., R.F.A.
1905	..	COCKERILL, Maj. G. K., Royal Warwickshire Regiment.
1907	..	WOOD, Maj. E. J. M., 99th Deccan Infantry.
1908	..	JEUDWINE, Maj. H. S., R.A.
1909	..	MOLYNEUX, Maj. E. M. J., D.S.O., 12th Cavalry.
		ELSMIE, Maj. A. M. S., 56th Rifles, F. F. (specially awarded a silver medal).
1911	..	Mr. D. PETRIE, M.A., Punjab Police.
1912	..	CARTER, Maj. B. C., The King's Regiment.
1913	..	THOMSON, Maj. A. G., 58th Vaughan's Rifles (F. F.).
1914	..	BAINBRIDGE, Col. W. F., D.S.O., 51st Sikhs (F. F.).
		NORMAN, Maj. C. L., M.V.O., Q. V. O. Corps of Guides (specially awarded a silver medal).
1916	..	CRUM, Maj. W. E., V.D., Calcutta Light Horse.
1917	..	BLAKER, Maj. W. F., R.F.A.
1918	..	GOMPERTZ, Capt. A. B., M.C., R.E.
1919	..	GOMPERTZ, Capt. M. L. A., 108th Infantry.

PRIZE ESSAY GOLD MEDALLISTS—(concl'd.).

1920	..	KEEN, Lt.-Col. F. S., D.S.O., 2/15th Sikhs.
1922	..	MARTIN, Maj. H. G., D.S.O., O.B.E., R.F.A.
1923	..	KEEN, Col. F. S., D.S.O., I.A.
1926	..	DENNYS, Maj. L. E., M.C., 4/12th Frontier Force Regiment.
1927	..	HOGG, Maj. D. McA., M.C., R.E.
1928	..	FRANKS, Maj. K. F., D.S.O., 5th Royal Mahrattas.
1929	..	DENNYS, Maj. L. E., M.C., 4/12th Frontier Force Regiment.
1930	..	DURNFORD, Maj. C. M. P., 4/6th Rajputana Rifles.
1931	..	FORD, Lt.-Col. G. N., 2/5th Mahratta Light Infantry.
1932	..	THURBURN, Lt. R. G., The Cameronians (Scottish Rifles).
1933	..	Medal not awarded.
1934	..	DURNFORD, MAJ. C. M. P., 4/6th Rajputana Rifles.

GOLD MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY COMPETITION, 1935.

Eleven essays, bearing the following mottoes, were received in the Gold Medal Prize Essay Competition for 1935 :—

1. Silent leges inter arma.
2. Lumen siccum optima anima.
3. Lance-Naik.
4. Tria Juncta in uno.
5. Nemo me impune lacessit.
6. Video, Volo, Vincio.
7. Air Actions and Re-actions.
8. Seer.
9. Moniti Meliora Sequamur.
10. The air menace and its antidote.
11. Each for all and all for one.

The Council of the Institution do not consider that any of the essays submitted are of a standard sufficiently high to justify the award of a gold medal and money prize for 1935.

NOTICE.

(i) With effect from the 1st January 1934, members of ten years' standing who retire from the Service, may continue their membership on payment of the reduced subscription of \$10/6 per annum.

(ii) Cadets of the Indian Military Academy are eligible for membership of the Institution.

(iii) Officers of the Indian States Forces are eligible for membership of the Institution and also to compete in the Gold Medal Prize Essay Competition.

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GOLD MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY COMPETITION, 1936.

The Council has chosen the following subject for the Gold Medal Prize Essay Competition for 1936 :—

“Certain conflicting requirements may be observed between the organization of the Army at Home and in India, owing to differences in the tasks of these forces. Keeping in mind the importance of the principle of standardization of training and organization in the Imperial forces, discuss the problems involved.”

The following are the conditions of the competition :—

- (1) The competition is open to all gazetted officers of the Civil Administration, the Royal Navy, Army, Royal Air Force, Auxiliary Forces and Indian State Forces.
- (2) Essays must be typewritten and submitted in triplicate.
- (3) When reference is made to any work, the title of such work is to be quoted.
- (4) Essays are to be strictly anonymous. Each must have a motto, and, enclosed with the essay, there should be sent a sealed envelope with the motto written on the outside and the name of the competitor inside.
- (5) Essays will not be accepted unless received by the Secretary on or before the 30th June 1936.
- (6) Essays will be submitted for adjudication to three judges, chosen by the Council. The judges may recommend a money award, not exceeding Rs. 150, either in addition to, or in substitution for the medal. The decision of the three judges will be submitted to the Council, who will decide whether the medal is to be awarded and whether the essay is to be published.
- (7) The name of the successful candidate will be announced at a Council Meeting to be held in September or October 1936.
- (8) All essays submitted are to become the property of the United Service Institution of India absolutely, and authors will not be at liberty to make any use whatsoever of their essays without the sanction of the Council.
- (9) Essays should not exceed 15 pages of the size and style of the Journal, exclusive of any appendices, tables or maps.

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
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California	..	October	31
Tuscania	..	November	14
Elysia	..	December	2
Britannia	..	January	9
Castalia	..	January	30

1936 (season)

Elysia	..	March	7
Britannia	..	March	12
Tuscania	..	March	26
California	..	April	9
Castalia	..	May	7
Britannia	..	May	21

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